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Preface
Management of the Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries depends
ultimately on effective cooperation and strong conservation and management
frameworks. In response, Pacific island States have developed a cooperative
approach to fisheries management that has set global precedents and
significantly boosted their capacity to manage the region’s tuna fisheries and
progress their national interests. The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA) and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) provide high quality
technical advice and support while the Harmonised Minimum Terms and
Conditions of Access for Foreign Fishing Vessels (HMTCs), the Vessel Day
Scheme (VDS), the FFA Vessel Monitoring Scheme (VMS) and the Niue
Treaty support collective management, enforcement and exploitation of much
of the region’s migratory fisheries. Furthermore, the collective will of the
Pacific island States was critical to the establishment of the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) within which the Pacific
island States are a critical membership bloc and play an important role.
Recent increases in fishing effort and overfishing of some tuna stocks present
immediate challenges to the region and its distant water fishing partners to
build on this strong history of cooperation and negotiate and implement strong
conservation and management measures. These challenges raise a number of
complex legal and policy questions.
In April 2008, the FFA hosted a regional conference that explored the legal and
policy trends in the implementation of international fisheries instruments in the
Western and Central Pacific region. Legal and policy officers from FFA
member countries participated in the conference alongside a number of experts
who prepared papers on their various relevant areas of expertise. The
Conference was an FFA activity of the Global Environment Facility funded
Pacific Islands Oceanic Fisheries Management Project.
Subsequently, the FFA commissioned this book to further explore these legal
and policy trends. It is with pleasure that I invite readers to consider the
complex legal and policy matters critically assessed within this book and their
application to the daily tasks of managing and developing our region’s valuable
tuna fisheries.

Su’a N.F. Tanielu – Director General
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)
September 2009
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Introduction
Quentin Hanich and Martin Tsamenyi

This book analyses the legal and policy context for the conservation,
management and exploitation of tuna fisheries in the Western and Central
Pacific region. This is inherently a highly complicated and convoluted matter
due to the trans-boundary nature of the migratory tuna stocks and the diverse
number of flag, port and market States involved in the fishery. The book is split
into two parts: Part One focuses on the impacts of global legal and policy
trends on the conservation and management of the Western and Central Pacific
tuna fisheries; Part Two focuses on the impacts of regional legal and policy
trends on the conservation and management of the Western and Central Pacific
tuna fisheries. Each chapter analyses and explores a key legal or policy issue
within the context of the tuna fisheries.
The legal and policy context for these tuna fisheries varies significantly
depending upon the location of the catch and the circumstances of the States
involved. Some fishing effort occurs within territorial seas and archipelagic
waters, some within exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and some on the high
seas. Some participating States are party to the United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement (UNFSA) and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission (WCPFC), while others are not. These matters have significant
ramifications for the conservation and management of the Western and Central
Pacific tuna fisheries and are analysed and discussed in Chapters One and Ten.
Chapter One by Quentin Hanich, Clive Schofield and Peter Cozens analyses
maritime claims in the context of Pacific island interests and discusses the
benefits of cooperation. Chapter Ten by Quentin Hanich builds on this
overview, analyses historical activities to determine States that have
participated in the Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries, and discusses the
participatory rights and responsibilities of the various flag States involved in
these fisheries.
Unlike Atlantic, Indian and Eastern Pacific tuna fisheries, the majority of
fishing effort in the Western and Central Pacific region occurs within the EEZs
of the Pacific Island States, Indonesia and the Philippines. Most of this catch is
taken by foreign owned vessels from outside the Pacific islands region. These
foreign owned vessels may either be based within a Pacific Island State (due to
licensing requirements) or operate from a distant home port. These vessels are
mostly from distant water fishing nations (DWFN), notably China, Japan,
Korea, the United States, Taiwan and increasingly, the European Union, who
fish within Pacific Island EEZs or on the high seas. These vessels operate
through access agreements or are directly licensed by the coastal States to fish
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within their EEZ. The annual value of tuna caught by DWFN vessels is
approximately four times that caught by domestic fishing vessels. 1
Domestic fishing vessels are generally smaller vessels that mostly fish for tuna
within their own flag State’s EEZ. These vessels may be nationally owned and
operated, or may be foreign owned and operated through domestic charters
and/or joint ventures with local interests. Charter and/or joint venture
arrangements generally specify local participation requirements in the venture
and require that the vessel be located within the country. Most domestic vessels
are longliners, but recently there has been an increase in Pacific Island flagged
or domestic-based purse seiners.
Given the lack of resource alternatives, Pacific island States are heavily
dependent upon the region’s oceanic and coastal fisheries. While coastal
fisheries provide important sources of traditional food and income to artisanal
communities, the oceanic tuna fisheries are the cornerstone upon which many
Pacific island States depend for revenue and economic activity. Access fees
from foreign fishing vessels deliver much-needed financial contributions to
governments, while domestically-based fishing fleets and support industries
pump hard currency into national economies. Fisheries resources have also, to a
degree, motivated some distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) to build and
maintain relationships throughout the region that include significant aid
budgets.
Pacific island States hold strong aspirations to develop their fisheries and
increase their benefits from the fisheries. In this light, Chapter Two by Vina
Ram-Bidesi analyses ongoing fisheries subsidy negotiations under the World
Trade Organisation and likely policy implications for Pacific island States. This
includes some discussion on possible approaches that Pacific island States may
consider when, or if, discussions on fisheries subsidies resume.
In order for the Pacific region to develop and maximise their benefits from the
fisheries, they must be able to effectively control fishing activities. The
following three chapters discuss global developments in monitoring and
controlling fishing vessels. Chapter Three by Mary Ann Palma explores
international developments in combating illegal, unreported and unregulated
(IUU) fishing. Chapter Four by Gail Lugten analyses developments towards a
FAO Global Record of Fishing Vessels and discusses its potential ramifications
for FFA members. Chapter Five by Alexa Cole explores the use of vessel
monitoring data in enforcement proceedings.
Until resolved, overfishing and overcapacity will continue to place significant
pressure on the region’s fisheries and its cooperative frameworks. Addressing
1
ForSEC. Fisheries. Pacific Plan Regional Analysis Papers. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. 2005.
Accessed 18 December 2007. http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-list_file_gallery.php?galleryId=11
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these challenges will require strong cooperation between all relevant coastal,
port and flag States – from within the FFA memberships and beyond. Given the
diverse range of competing national and stakeholder interests, this will create
significant negotiation challenges and fertile ground for dispute. In this context,
Chapter Six by Martin Tsamenyi, Ben Milligan and Kwame Mfodwo analyses
the fisheries dispute settlement provisions of the Convention on the Law of the
Sea and explores current practice within the Western and Central Pacific
region. Chapter Seven by Pio Manoa discusses the role of non-government
organisations in the development and implementation of international fisheries
instruments.
The second part of the book focuses specifically on regional issues and begins
with a discussion of the status of the key tuna stocks. Shelton Harley and John
Hampton establish the regional fisheries context in Chapter Eight and identify
some of the key scientific challenges, particularly in regard to: data; research
funding; establishment of reference points; and evaluation of conservation and
management measures.
Subsequent chapters explore issues relating to regional cooperation and
management of the Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries. In 1979, the
independent members of the Pacific Islands Forum (then named the South
Pacific Forum) combined their resources and established the Pacific Islands
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) to promote intra-regional cooperation and
harmonisation of fisheries management policies. The mission of the FFA is to
support and enable Pacific island States to achieve sustainable fisheries and
maximise their social and economic benefits in harmony with the broader
environment. 2 The FFA supports the interests of the Pacific island States
through facilitating regional cooperation in their favour and providing technical
and policy advice. However, the limited coastal State membership of the FFA
inevitably limited its effectiveness. Until recently, fishing effort targeting the
same migratory stocks on the high seas and inside the neighbouring waters of
Indonesia and the Philippines was essentially unregulated. In the early 1990s,
FFA members recognised that a regional fora was required that engaged their
DWFN partners and Indonesia and Philippines and enable management of
migratory fisheries beyond their EEZs.
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention (WCPF Convention)
entered into force in July 2004 with the objective of ensuring the long term
conservation and sustainable use of WCPO straddling and highly migratory
fish stocks in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (LOSC) and UNFSA. The WCPF Convention established the
decision making WCPFC, which meets annually, and a secretariat which is
headquartered in the Federated States of Micronesia. Chapter Nine by Sandra
2
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency Strategic Plan 2005-2020. Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries
Agency (FFA). Honiara. 2005.
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Tarte discusses the WCPF Convention and explores some of its key
implementation challenges from a historical perspective.
Pacific island States are a critical membership bloc of the WCPFC and were a
key driver behind its development. Other WCPFC members include (amongst
others) Indonesia, Philippines and the DWFNs: Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan,
USA and the European Community. The WCPFC closely follows the
framework established by UNFSA and emphasises a precautionary and
ecosystem based approach to fisheries management. Chapter Twelve by Les
Clark and Chapter Thirteen by Samasoni Sauni explore these management
approaches in the context of the WCPFC and implementation by Pacific island
States.
A key challenge for the WCPFC relates to how the Commission allocates the
benefits of the fishery, and who carries the costs involved in reducing catches
to sustainable levels. Chapter Eleven by Hannah Parris and Alex Lee analyses
potential allocation models for the WCPO tuna fisheries and their implications
for Pacific island States.
Finally, while regional arrangements and institutions are inherently necessary
due to the migratory nature of tuna stocks, effective implementation of
conservation and management decisions ultimately falls to national
governments. The book concludes with a chapter by William Edison on future
directions for the development of fisheries legislation in the Pacific islands.
The editors gratefully appreciate the vision of the FFA in supporting this book,
and the efforts and expertise of the authors contained within. We welcome
readers and hope that this book will contribute to the sustainable management
of the WCPO tuna fisheries through its insights into the legal and policy
context within which the fishery is managed.
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Part One
Impacts of Global Trends in the Western and Central Pacific
Region
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1. Oceans of Opportunity? The Limits of Maritime Claims in
the Western and Central Pacific Region
Quentin Hanich, Clive Schofield and Peter Cozens

Introduction
The South Pacific region hosts twelve independent States (Federated States of
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), two freely associated
with New Zealand (Cook Islands and Niue) and another dependent on New
Zealand (Tokelau). Together these countries, and Australia and New Zealand,
comprise the Pacific Islands Forum. Additionally, there are a number of
territories dependent on or in free association with extra-regional metropolitan
powers such as France (French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna)
the United Kingdom (Pitcairn Islands) and the United States (American Samoa,
Guam and Northern Mariana Islands). 1 The Pacific island States are
predominantly remote both from one another and their metropolitan Pacific
Rim neighbours. 2
Taken altogether, the Pacific island States total just over 550,000km2 of land
(84 per cent of which is provided by Papua New Guinea) scattered over the
vast 165 million km2 Pacific Ocean which encompasses around one third of the
surface of the earth. 3 An alternative way of conceptualising this vast space is to
imagine a region larger in area than China and Central Asia combined, but
inhabited by only approximately 10 million people (see Figure 1). 4

1

See Tsamenyi, B.M. and Manarangi-Trott, L. “The Role of Regional Organizations in Meeting LOS
Convention Challenges: The Western and Central Pacific Experience” in Elferink, A.G.O. and
Rothwell, D.R. (eds) Oceans Management in the 21st Century: Institutional Frameworks and
Responses, The Hague, Kluwer, 2004, pp. 187-208; and Van Dyke, J.M. “Regionalism, Fisheries and
Environmental Challenges in the Pacific” in San Diego International Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2004,
143-178, at 146-158.
2
The term “Pacific island States” is used in this chapter to refer to the independent, freely-associated
and dependent States and territories of the South Pacific region.
3
Anthony, J.M. “Conflict Over Natural Resources in the Pacific” in Ghee, L.T. and Valencia, M.J.
(eds) Conflict Over Natural Resources in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Oxford University Press,
Oxford,/United Nations University Press, 1990; and Tsamenyi and Manarangi-Trott, 2004, pp. 187189.
4
Cozens, P. “Pacific Islands Security: Emerging Issues and Concerns” Paper presented at the AsiaPacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 7 June 2007.
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Figure 1: Maritime Claims in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean5
This very isolation and remoteness has afforded the Pacific island States
enormous maritime opportunities with claims to jurisdiction over an estimated
area of 30,569,000km2, equivalent to around 28 per cent of exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) claims worldwide. 6 These extensive maritime claims have been
facilitated by the introduction of the EEZ out to 200 nautical miles (nm). 7
Additionally, a number of Pacific island States are in a position to assert rights
over substantial areas of continental shelf extending beyond their 200nm limits.
These maritime jurisdictional zones are of tremendous actual and potential
benefit in terms of access to offshore resources, especially tuna, the
exploitation of which remains crucial to the economies of many Pacific island
States.
Despite this extensive maritime wealth, Pacific island States have not, thus far,
fully realised the anticipated economic benefits from their maritime claims. In
practice, Pacific island States have experienced great difficulties in securing
recognition for, and deriving significant benefits from, their claimed maritime
sovereign rights.
5

While every effort has been made to accurately represent the maritime jurisdictional claims and
boundaries of the States located in the Western and Central Pacific region, the map shows theoretical
equidistance lines and should be regarded as no more than an illustrative sketch map. With thanks to
Andi Arsana
6
Gillet, R. “Pacific Island Countries Region’ in Review of the State of World Marine Resources, FAO
Fisheries Technical Paper 457, FAO, Rome, 2005, pp. 144-157.
7
It is acknowledged that technically the correct abbreviation for a nautical mile is “M” and that “nm”
should only be used for nanometres. However, “nm” is widely used by many authorities (for example
the UN Office of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea) and appears to cause less confusion than “M”,
which is often assumed to be an abbreviation for metres. Regarding the breadth of the EEZ, Article 57
of LOSC provides that: “The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” As most coastal States claim a
12nm territorial sea the actual breadth of the EEZ is usually 188nm seaward of territorial sea limits.
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Additionally, the predominantly small island States that comprise the region
face a range of serious economic, developmental, environmental and security
challenges. These problems are partly a consequence of their limited national
administrative, institutional and governance capacity, compounded by external
power competition in the region coupled with their geographically remote
location. Taken together these factors threaten their stability. 8
This chapter examines the legal and policy issues associated with maritime
opportunities and challenges arising from maritime claims and competing
maritime interests in the South Pacific region. The chapter concludes by
pointing to some of the ways in which these opportunities are being realised
and challenges addressed.
Oceans of Opportunity?
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) of 1982 9
provides the fundamental ‘constitution for the oceans,’ 10 and articulates the
rights and responsibilities that coastal States have over the their adjacent
waters. The LOSC enables coastal States to claim sovereignty and sovereign
rights over various maritime resources within territorial seas out to 12nm
offshore measured from a coastal State’s baselines, archipelagic waters within
duly designated archipelagic baselines, and EEZs out to 200nm. 11 The LOSC
also amended the rules relating to the fixing of the outer limits of the preexisting continental shelf regime, which may extend beyond the 200nm limit,
where the continental margin extends that far offshore (see below).

8

See, for example, the contributions to Cozens, P. and Mossop, J. (eds) Engaging Oceania with Pacific
Asia, Wellington, Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand, 2004.
9
United Nations, United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea, Publication No. E97.V10. United
Nations, New York, 1983. Available at:
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm>
(hereafter “LOSC”). It is recognised that this treaty goes by a number of different acronyms, “LOSC”
(as above), “UNCLOS” (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) or, by its opponents,
“LOST” (Law of the Sea Treaty). LOSC is preferred to UNCLOS in order to forestall confusion with
the three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea of 1958 (which itself resulted in four
Conventions), 1960 and 1974-1982 (resulting in LOSC).
10
Statement from Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore, a President of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, at the final session of the Conference at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on
11 December 1982. Further elaborated in Koh, T. T. B. 'A Constitution for the Oceans' in Nordquist,
M. H. (ed) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Nordrecht,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1, 1985.
11
A coastal State’s “normal” baselines will consist of “the low-water line along the coast as marked on
large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.” (LOSC – Article 5). Under certain
circumstances a variety of straight line types of baselines may be defined along the coast, notably
straight baselines, river and bay closing lines, as well as closing lines for ports and roadsteads (see
LOSC – Articles 7-12). The rules relating to the drawing of archipelagic baselines are contained in
LOSC– Article 47.
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Sovereignty over Territorial Seas and Archipelagic Waters
The LOSC recognises coastal State sovereignty over their internal waters
(waters landward of straight baselines), territorial sea and archipelagic waters.
This sovereignty grants coastal States exclusive rights and control over
fisheries resources within these maritime zones. 12 While the maximum seaward
extent of the territorial sea was a matter of ongoing contention prior to the
conclusion of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, the exclusive
control of the fisheries resources within the territorial sea has long been
recognised. 13 As such, the LOSC grants coastal States ‘absolute and unfettered’
control over the exploitation, conservation and management of the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) fisheries within these waters. 14 Coastal States
also hold similar rights and control over fisheries resources within their
archipelagic waters, only limited by an obligation (without prejudice to their
sovereignty) that they respect the traditional fishing rights and other legitimate
activities of the immediately adjacent neighbouring State (and any relevant
existing agreements). 15 Highly migratory fisheries such as tuna are therefore
subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State or, more likely, States, as they
migrate through the territorial seas and archipelagic waters.
Sovereign Rights and the Exclusive Economic Zone
Beyond the territorial sea, the LOSC granted coastal States sovereign rights
over the exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources
within their EEZ. 16 Consequently, coastal States now held rights and
responsibilities over the economic activities that occur within these waters,
including fisheries.
The EEZ regime represented a compromise between competing interests,
especially between developing coastal States and the major maritime powers.
Long-standing high seas freedoms relating to, for example, navigation and
12

LOSC – Article 2.
McDougal, M. S. and Burke, W. T. The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary International
Law of the Sea, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985.
14
Kaye, S. M. International Fisheries Management, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001. It
should also be noted that Article 64 of the LOSC (highly migratory species) only applies to highly
migratory fisheries within the EEZ and high seas. It does not refer to the territorial or archipelagic seas.
15
LOSC – Article 51. It is understood that this Article was drafted in order to accommodate previously
negotiated bilateral agreements such as that between Indonesia and Malaysia, the so-called ‘Jakarta
Treaty’ of 1982, which provides Malaysian fishermen to operate in areas located to the east of
Indonesia’s Anambas islands, using traditional methods. The treaty also designates navigational and
overflight corridors through Indonesian archipelagic waters in order to facilitate communications
between peninsula Malaysia and the Malaysian parts of Borneo, Sabah and Sarawak as well as
specifically safeguarding submarine pipelines and cables linking these geographically distinct parts of
Malaysia. See, Treaty Between Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia Relating to the Legal Regime
of Archipelagic State and the Rights of Malaysia in the Territorial Sea and Archipelagic Waters as well
as in the Airspace above the Territorial Sea, Archipelagic Waters and the Territory of the Republic of
Indonesia Lying Between East and West Malaysia, signed 25 February 1982, entered into force 25 May
1984. Full text available at United Nations Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The Law
of the Sea: Practice of Archipelagic States, United Nations, New York, 1992, pp. 144-155.
16
LOSC – Article 56.
13
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overflight for vessels and aircraft belonging to other States are preserved within
EEZs. Simultaneously, coastal States are accorded sovereign rights over the
resources off their coasts. In 1984 the United Nations (UN) Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimated that 90 per cent of marine fish and
shellfish were caught within 200nm of the coast. 17 Similarly, it was estimated
that 87 per cent of the world’s known submarine oil deposits would fall within
200nm-breadth zones of jurisdiction. 18 The conclusion of the LOSC and the
introduction of EEZs can therefore be characterised as the most significant
reallocation of fisheries property rights of the 20th Century, shifting these
valuable resource rights from international to national regimes.
The introduction of the EEZ concept in particular led to a tremendous increase
in the scope of maritime space coming under national jurisdiction as coastal
States quickly moved to take up this opportunity. 19 EEZs encompass 147
million km2 or around 41 per cent of the world ocean – an area roughly
equivalent to the total area of land territory on the surface of the Earth.
All of the South Pacific’s independent States have ratified LOSC, as have most
of the extra-regional states with territory in the region. 20 The notable exception
to this is the US. 21 The Pacific island States have likewise been enthusiastic in
advancing claims to extended maritime zones. 22
Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries
These EEZ claims represent a tremendous actual and potential benefit to the
Pacific island States, especially in regard to the abundant and valuable tuna
fisheries. For example, in 2007 the tuna catch in the WCPO was estimated at
2,396,915 tonnes and worth approximately US$3,895 million. 23 These tuna
17
Quoted in Schurman, R. “Tuna Dreams: Resource Nationalism and the Pacific Island’s Tuna
Industry” in Development and Change, Vol. 29, 1998, pp. 107-136, at p. 107.
18
Churchill, R. and Lowe, A. The Law of the Sea, 3rd Edition, Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1999, p. 162.
19
Prescott, J.R.V. and Schofield, C.H. The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005, p. 9.
20
Although Fiji was the first state to sign LOSC, the Pacific small island developing States were not
especially swift to adopt the LOSC due to a number of political, practical and policy considerations.
See, Wolfers, E.P. “The Law of the Sea in the South Pacific” in Crawford, J. and Rothwell, D. (eds)
The Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region, Kluwer, The Hague, 1995, pp. 41-49, at pp. 41-46.
21
United Nations, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement
Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the
Implementation of the Convention Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, United Nations, New York, updated to 4 June 2008,
available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2008.pdf>
22
See, Anthony, 1990; and, United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office
of Legal Affairs, ‘Table of Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction’ 2008, at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_claims
.pdf>
23
Williams, P. and Terawasi, P. Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
including Economic Conditions – 2007. Paper presented to the Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 11-22 August 2008, Port
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fisheries represent the primary economic opportunity for many of the region’s
small island developing States. 24 Pacific island States depend upon these
stocks: as a traditional and important source of food; as a critical form of
revenue (US$60-70 million in access fees or as high as 45% of total
government revenue in the case of Kiribati) 25 ; employment (21,000 to 31,000
regional jobs or approximately five to eight per cent of all wage employment);
and income (expenditure by locally-based vessels is worth US$130 million). 26
Overall, the value of the annual tuna catch in the region has been calculated to
equate to 11 per cent of the combined gross domestic product of all the
countries in the region and almost half of their exports while access fees are a
significant component of national economies for seven Pacific island States. 27
Consequently, the tuna industry has come to play a critical role in the
economies of many Pacific island States.
Moving Beyond the 200 Nautical Mile Limit
As well as codifying the EEZ concept, the LOSC also refined the rules relating
to the continental shelf. 28 Previously, the definition of the continental shelf
under the relevant 1958 Convention was based on exploitability and was thus
open-ended. 29 In contrast, Article 76(1) of LOSC establishes that the
continental shelf of a coastal State consists of “the seabed and subsoil of
submarine areas”, extending to a distance of 200nm from relevant baselines or
“throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin.” 30
Thus, in accordance with the EEZ concept, codified through LOSC, every
coastal State has the right to claim sovereign rights over both the seabed and
Moresby, Papua New Guinea, WCPFC-SC4-2008/GN WP-1. For further information see, Reid, C.
Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries, Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 2007.
24
Tsamenyi and Manarangi-Trott, 2004, p. 189.
25
Tarte, 2002, p. 262.
26
Gillett, R., McCoy, M., Rodwell, L. and Tamate, J. Tuna. A Key Economic Resource in the Pacific
Island Countries. A Report Prepared for the Asian Development Bank and the Forum Fisheries
Agency. Honiara. 2001.
27
Gillett, R. et al., 2001, at p. 11.
28
The rights and duties of coastal States in relation to the continental shelf are detailed in Part VI of
LOSC. See generally, Cook, P.J. and Carleton, C.M. (eds) Continental Shelf Limits, the Scientific and
Legal Interface, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000.
29
The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), which took place in
Geneva in 1958, yielded four Conventions: Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,
opened for signature 29 April 1958, 516 UNTS 205 (entered into force 10 September 1964);
Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 499 UNTS 311 (entered into
force 10 June 1964); Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 450 UNTS 11
(entered into force 30 September 1962); and Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Sea, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 559 UNTS 285 (entered into force 20
March 1966).
Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 defined the continental shelf as “the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the Territorial
Sea to a depth of 200 metres”, “or to a depth beyond that limit where exploitation of resources was
possible”.
30
LOSC, Article 76(1)
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the water column out to 200nm, regardless of whether the continental margin
actually extends that distance offshore, and provided there are no overlapping
claims with neighbouring states. 31 Alternatively, where coastal States are
positioned on broad continental margins, they are able to assert rights over
those parts of the continental shelf beyond the 200nm EEZ limit forming part
of their natural prolongation. 32 These areas of continental shelf beyond the
200nm limit are frequently referred to as the ‘outer’ or ‘extended’ continental
shelf. 33
Article 76 of LOSC goes on to lay down a complex series of formulae through
which the coastal State can establish its rights to, and the outer edge of its
continental shelf areas seaward of the 200nm limit. 34 In order to make these
calculations and thus establish entitlement to outer continental shelf areas in
accordance with Article 76, a coastal State is required to gather information
related to the morphology of its continental margin and its geological
characteristics, as well as bathymetric information relating to water depth. A
submission then needs to be made to a specialised United Nations body, the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). 35
Although complex, the point here is that Article 76 of LOSC provides for a
definable outer limit to the continental shelf claims of coastal States and this
represents a major step forward, compared to the indeterminate scenario under
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. 36 This is not, however, to
31

These rights are, however, governed in accordance with Part VI (dealing with the continental shelf)
of the Convention rather than Part V (dealing with the EEZ).
32
While no sure figure can be determined until all outer continental shelf submissions have been
considered by the CLCS, it has been estimated that outer continental shelf areas may encompass around
five per cent of the ocean floor. See, Cook, P.J. and Carleton, C.M. (eds) Continental Shelf Limits,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 3.
33
The term ‘extended’ continental shelf gives a somewhat misleading impression that coastal States are
somehow extending or advancing claims to “additional” areas of continental shelf. This is not the case
as the sovereign rights enjoyed by the coastal State over the continental shelf are, as discussed above,
inherent. Coastal States making submissions in respect of outer continental shelf areas are therefore
merely seeking to confirm their existing sovereign rights over parts of “their” continental shelf beyond
the 200 nm limit.
34
Essentially, Article 76 provides two formulae according to which coastal States can establish
existence of a continental margin beyond the 200 nm limit – the “Gardiner Line”, based on reference to
depth or thickness of sedimentary rocks overlying the continental crust, or the “Hedberg Line”
consisting of 60nm from the foot of the continental slope. Two maximum constraints, or ‘cut-off’ lines
are then applied - either a distance of 350nm from relevant baselines or 100 nautical miles from the
2,500 metre isobath. See, LOSC, Article 76(4-5).
35
The CLCS is a body consisting of 21 scientists. Importantly, the CLCS is not a legal body and it does
not therefore adjudicate on submissions. Instead, the CLCS plays, or was intended to play, a technical
role, evaluating whether coastal States, through their submissions, have fulfilled the requirements of
Article 76. On the basis of this assessment the CLCS makes recommendations to the coastal State on
the basis of which the coastal State can establish limits that are “final and binding” (LOSC, Article
76(8)).
36
McDorman has stated that the fact that “the real achievement” of Article 76 of LOSC lies not in the
complexity of its provisions or in the establishment of the CLCS but in the fact that it provides for “a
definable limit” to continental shelf claims “however difficult the defining of that limit may be”. See,
McDorman, T. “The Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body
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suggest that the process of preparing a submission to the CLCS, the CLCS’s
consideration of it and the subsequent fixing of final and binding outer
continental shelf limits is anything but complex, expensive and fraught with a
number of daunting uncertainties and ambiguities. 37
Outer Continental Shelf Opportunities in the South Pacific
It has been suggested that eight of the Pacific island States – the Cook Islands,
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands and Tonga – have a “credible” case to make submissions to
the CLCS in respect of a combined area estimated at approximately 1.5 million
km2 of outer continental shelf beyond their 200nm EEZ limits. 38 These
countries have been actively engaged in gathering the required scientific
information and preparing their submissions for the CLCS. These activities
were given considerable impetus by the existence of a deadline for submissions
which for many coastal States around the world, including most of the Pacific
island States listed above, was 13 May 2009. 39 In this context the role of the
Oceans and Islands Programme of the South Pacific Applied Geoscience
Commission (SOPAC) has been (and continues to be) crucial.
As a result of these efforts a series of submissions from Pacific island States
were lodged with the CLCS in early 2009. On 16 April 2009 the Cook Islands
lodged its submission with the CLCS in respect of parts of the Manihiki Plateau
located to the north of the Cook Islands, to the east of Tokelau and the central
grouping of islands belonging to Kiribati (the Phoenix Islands) and west of the
easternmost part of Kiribati (the Line Islands) as well as Jarvis Island which is
an unincorporated territory of the United States. 40 This development was
followed, on 20 April 2009, by a partial submission on the part of Fiji in
in a Political World” in International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2002, pp.
301-324, at p. 307.
37
Indeed, considerable debates have arisen over the interpretation of certain aspects of Article 76 of
LOSC. For example, the provisions of Article 76 relating to submarine ridges and analogous features
have been termed “a masterpiece of ambiguity” (Prescott and Schofield, 2005). Similarly, debate has
arisen regarding the work and practice of the CLCS. See, for example, McDorman, Ibid., and Macnab,
R. “Submarine Elevations and Ridges: Wild Cards in the Poker Game of Article 76” in Ocean
Development and International Law, Vol. 39, 2008, pp. 223-234.
38
See, “Race Against Time as the Deadline to claim Extra Seabed Resources draws closer”, Oceans
and Islands Programme, Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), available at,
<http://www.sopac.org/tiki-index.php?page=Extended+Continental+Shelf+Activities>
39
The original deadline was set as 10 years after LOSC coming into force on 16 November 1994,
However, as this 2004 deadline approached it became clear that many interested States would struggle
to complete their submissions in time. Consequently the States Parties to LOSC opted to extend the
deadline, taking the date of the adoption of the Commission’s Scientific and Technical Guidelines on
13 May 1999, as the start of the 10 year ‘clock’, resulting in the 13 May 2009 deadline. However, this
deadline only applied to States that were party to LOSC prior to 13 May 1999. States becoming Parties
to the Convention after that date have 10 years to make a submission from the date of their accession or
ratification to LOSC.
40
See, Submission by the Cook Islands to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
Concerning the Manihiki Plateau. Executive Summary, April 2009, available at,
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/cok23_09/cok_2009_executive_summary.p
df>
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respect of the Lau Ridge – northern South Fiji Basin. 41 This area of continental
shelf located beyond the 200nm limit is located to the south of Fiji and includes
areas concerning which New Zealand has already had a submission considered
and recommendations received in 2008.42 Fiji’s eastern neighbour, the
Kingdom of Tonga, also subsequently made a submission on 11 May 2009
concerning the eastern Kermadec Ridge. 43 The outer continental shelf
entitlements of Fiji and Tonga may well overlap and Executive Summary of the
Fijian submission notes that Fiji and Tonga have held diplomatic consultations
on outer continental shelf issues and that Tonga has agreed not to object to the
CLCS considering Fiji’s submission, without prejudice to the delimitation of a
maritime boundary between the two States. 44
Additionally, a joint submission by Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New
Guinea and Solomon Islands was lodged with the CLCS on 5 May 2009 in
respect to Ontong Java Plateau. 45 The submarine plateau area has islands of the
Federated States of Micronesia to the northwest, Papua New Guinea to the
southwest and south, and the Solomon Islands to the south and southeast. The
Republic of Palau also made a submission to the CLCS on 8 May 2009
concerning three areas of outer continental shelf, located to the east, west and
north of Palau. 46 The largest of these three areas is that to the north, overlaps
with Japan’s submission for the Southern Kyusyu-Palau Ridge and potentially
also overlaps with the entitlements of the Federated States of Micronesia (to the
east). Palau has stated that its submission is without prejudice to the
delimitation of maritime boundaries. Furthermore, the submissions of both
41

See, A Partial Submission by The Republic of the Fiji Islands for the Establishment of the Outer
Limits of the Continental Shelf of Fiji Puruant to Article 76, Paragraph 8 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Executive Summary, April 2009, available at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fji24_09/fji_2009exsummary.pdf>
42
Ibid. 5. The area concerned was submitted as part of New Zealand’s ‘Northern Region’ in its
submission of 19 April 2006 and includes outer continental shelf areas relating to the Kermadec and
Colville Ridges to the north of New Zealand and up to the 200nm limits of Fiji and Tonga. See, New
Zealand Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to article 76(8)
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Executive Summary. 19 April 2006, available
at, <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/nzl_exec_sum.pdf>. With regard
to New Zealand’s submission for its Northern Region, the CLCS stated that New Zealand’s submission
fulfilled the relevant criteria and recommended the establishment of an outer edge of the continental
margin in this area on the basis of New Zealand’s submission. See also a Summary of the
Recommendations of the Commission of 22 August 2008, p. 42. Available at,
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/nzl_summary_of_recommendations.p
df>
43
See, A Partial Submission of Data and Information on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf of
the Kingdom of Tonga Pursuant to Part VI of and Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Executive Summary. 11 May 2009, available at,
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_ton_46_2009.htm>.
44
Ibid.
45
See, Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf concerning the
Ontong Java Plateau by the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon
Islands, Executive Summary. 5 May 2009, available at,
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_fmpgsb_32_2009.htm>.
46
See, Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Pursuant to Article 76 of
the Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Executive Summary. 8 May 2009, available at
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_plw_41_2009.htm>.
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Palau and Japan indicate that these States have no objection to the Commission
considering and making recommendations on the other’s submission for this
area, without prejudice to maritime boundary delimitation.47
Furthermore, as a consequence of a June 2008 amendment to the relevant rules,
submissions of preliminary information, rather than full submissions, are
allowable and several Pacific island States have taken advantage of this
option. 48 Thus, on 20 April 2009: Fiji made such a submission of preliminary
information (over and above its submission mentioned); Fiji and the Solomon
Islands lodged a joint submission of preliminary information concerning the
Charlotte Bank Region on 21 April 2009; Fiji, the Solomon Islands and
Vanuatu also made a joint submission on 21 April 2009 concerning parts of the
North Fiji Basin); and the Solomon Islands did so in respect of the ‘donut hole’
located between the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Australia. Both
Papua New Guinea and the Federated States of Micronesia made separate but
coordinated submissions of preliminary information on 5 May 2009 concerning
the Mussau Ridge and Eauripik Rise. It is likely that the submissions of both
Papua New Guinea and the Federated States of Micronesia will overlap not
only with one another but with a submission from Indonesia for areas of outer
continental shelf located seaward of its 200nm limit off Irian Jaya. 49 Finally, on
11 May 2009, New Zealand made a submission of preliminary information on
behalf of Tokelau for parts of the Robbie Ridge and Manihiki Plateau. 50
In due course submissions are also likely to be forthcoming from both Tuvalu
and Kiribati. However, as these two States became parties to LOSC in 2002
and 2003 respectively, consequently the deadlines for their submissions are set
at 2012 and 2013, 10 years from the date that they became parties to LOSC. 51

47
Ibid., p. 8. See also, Japan’s Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Executive Summary. 12 November 2008. available at,
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_jpn.htm>, pp. 7-8.
48
In June 2008 the meeting of the State Parties to the LOSC decided that instead of a full submission,
coastal States may instead submit “preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and a description of the status of preparation and intended
date of making a submission”. See, Decision of the eighteenth Meeting of State Parties, SPLOS/183 at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/meeting_states_parties/SPLOS_documents.htm>. This relaxing in the
requirements to meet the deadline and essentially ‘stop the clock’ was taken because many coastal
States were struggling to complete their submissions in time to meet the 13 May 2009 deadline
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In keeping with the process outlined above, the CLCS will, in due course,
consider these submissions, make recommendations and the coastal States will
declare their “final and binding” outer continental shelf limits. However, it is
abundantly clear that many of these submissions relate to the same areas of
outer continental shelf and overlap. Under this scenario it should be
emphasised that the Commission is a scientific rather than technical body. As
such it does not have the mandate to consider areas subject to a sovereignty
dispute or subject to overlapping maritime claims. Furthermore, the
Commission’s recommendations are specifically without prejudice to the
delimitation of maritime boundaries. Ultimately, it will up to the coastal States
themselves to resolve any overlapping maritime claims and disputes.
Article 77(1) of LOSC provides that coastal States exercise sovereign rights
over continental shelf areas “for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
natural resources”. While resource opportunities related to the outer continental
shelf tend to be largely framed in terms of access to seabed energy and mineral
resources, coastal States also have sovereign rights over “living organisms
belonging to sedentary species,” These are defined as “organisms which, at the
harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to
move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.” 52
Examples of this type of organism include molluscs (abalone, oysters, scallops,
trochus shell), crustaceans (lobsters, crabs) and echinoderms (sea urchins,
beche-de-mer). These sedentary living resources of the outer continental shelf,
including marine genetic resources, may also prove to have considerable value.
Advancement in technologies to explore the seabed has led to the discovery of
features such as seamounts, hydrothermal vents, methane seeps and deep sea
sediments. The marine species and micro-organisms that have evolved to exist
in these extreme environments may provide developmental potential for a
range of valuable applications in a number of sectors including medicine and
pharmaceutical industries. This has led to the emergence of “bioprospecting”
and the deep seabed, including outer continental shelf areas, is likely to be a
focus for these activities. 53 This represents a potentially rich resource and
opportunity for coastal States. Indeed, marine biotechnology related products
were estimated to be worth US$100 billion in 2000 alone. 54 Simultaneously,
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however, such developments pose significant surveillance and enforcement
challenges. 55
The Limits of Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction
One of the key objectives of the EEZ concept was to facilitate enhanced
management and conservation of living resources, thereby addressing rising
fears over unsustainable fishing mentioned above. It was also widely
anticipated that EEZs would (and should) deliver substantial economic gains to
developing states, though whether this has actually taken place is far from
clear. It was generally assumed that the granting of sovereign rights to coastal
States over their EEZs would significantly benefit coastal States, at some cost
to distant-water fishing nations (DWFNs) who previously had fished these
waters and the stocks therein (either through displaced effort or requirement to
pay access fees). However in practice, DWFNs still largely control key aspects
of the global fisheries trade, including access to the most lucrative markets.
This has also largely been the case in the Pacific. While it is clear that the
declaration of EEZs has delivered some economic gains to the Pacific island
States, they have, thus far, not proved to be as significant as hoped.56 Why is
this the case and what can be done to overcome the constraints identified?
Transboundary Resources
The fundamental challenge facing the Pacific island States relates to the highly
migratory and transboundary nature of the key living resources at stake. These
tuna migrate between the national maritime jurisdictions of the Pacific island
States, and between these collective EEZs and the high seas. Furthermore, the
migratory patterns of tuna in the Pacific are intimately linked to the El Nino
Southern Oscillation (ENSO) Index. This phenomenon involves east-west
shifts in the Pacific equatorial “warm pool”, which in turn impacts spatially and
temporally on the presence of tuna stocks.57 Essentially, as the warm pool
moves, so do the tuna with significant consequences for seasonal catches in
individual Pacific island’s EEZs.
Thus, the maritime claims of the Pacific island States, whilst broad, are not
broad enough to cover the whole fishery. In this context, not only are maritime
boundaries between national claims important but also the ‘boundary’ between
the Pacific island States’ collective EEZ limits and the high seas becomes
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critical, providing the legal and spatial framework against which the maritime
geopolitical interactions between coastal States and DWFNs are played out.
Recognition of Sovereign Rights
The Pacific island States have faced a considerable, and ongoing, struggle to
win recognition of their sovereign rights over resources in their EEZs from key
DWFNs. The EEZ regime provides claimant States with considerable
sovereign rights (rather than full sovereignty) in relation to the conservation and
utilisation of living resources. However, these rights are not exclusive in nature
and are also coupled with significant responsibilities. These obligations are
articulated, in particular, in LOSC Articles 61 and 62, dealing with the
conservation of living resources, and the utilisation of living resources
respectively.
Article 61(1) provides that the coastal State “shall determine the allowable
catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone.” The Article goes
on to specify that the coastal State shall “ensure through proper conservation
and management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the
exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation”, and that such
measures shall be designed to “maintain or restore populations of harvested
species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield.” 58
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 61, LOSC Article 62 provides
that the coastal State shall “promote the objective of optimum utilization of the
living resources in the exclusive economic zone” and shall determine its own
capacity to harvest such resources. Where the coastal State lacks the capacity to
harvest the entire allowable catch, Article 62 of the LOSC requires that the
coastal State shall give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch.
In doing so the coastal State is required to have “particular regard” to the
provisions of LOSC Articles 69 and 70 which deal with land-locked states and
geographically disadvantaged States respectively. These provisions can also be
interpreted address the concerns of DWFNs that they would be denied access to
fishing grounds within newly-declared EEZs. However, the fact that it remains
the prerogative of the coastal State to determine the total allowable catch
(TAC), determine its domestic harvesting capacity and thus determine the
surplus that may be made available to other States means that coastal States
have retained control over this process.
Furthermore, LOSC Article 63 provides for cooperation between coastal States
where stocks occur in both their EEZs and for cooperation between coastal
States and fishing States where stocks occur both in the EEZ of the coastal
State and in the adjacent areas of high seas. Article 64 also obliges coastal
States and fishing States to cooperate to ensure “conservation” and the
promotion of “the objective of optimum utilization” of highly migratory
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species. Such cooperation is to be achieved either directly between such states
or through the medium of “appropriate subregional or regional organizations.”
Given the highly migratory nature of tuna, comprehensive management of the
resource both within and between national EEZs and on the high seas is crucial.
Unrestrained exploitation in a particular EEZ or on the high seas clearly has the
potential to impact on catches elsewhere, and thus the revenues to be derived
from the resource, and the sustainability of the fishery as a whole. However,
despite widespread agreement on the need for compatible, indeed
comprehensive, management of migratory stocks across the high seas and
EEZs, there are significant disputes between coastal States and DWFNs over
the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of LOSC.
Coastal States have steadfastly sought to protect and preserve their sovereign
rights as provided for in LOSC and attempted to focus discussions on the need
to address unregulated fishing on the high seas. DWFNs have argued that
management of highly migratory stocks such as tuna should be applied
throughout their range, and therefore they should have a substantive role in
management measures on the high seas and in the EEZs of coastal States.
These tensions were explicit in the course of the negotiations leading to the
conclusion of LOSC and were not effectively resolved. This is evident in the
US refusal until the late 1980s to acknowledge claims by Pacific island States
to jurisdiction over tuna stocks within their EEZs in the absence of US
participation in their management both on the high seas and within their
EEZs. 59 In the context of the LOSC, a resolution of sorts was reached through
the use of ambiguous legal language and provisions capable of supporting
distinctly differing interpretations.
These fundamental differences of perspective became a recurring theme in
subsequent bilateral and multilateral engagements between coastal States and
DWFNs – notably in negotiations towards the conclusion of the United Nations
Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) 60 and in the Multilateral High Level
Conferences leading up to the conclusion of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Convention (WCPF Convention)61 and the consequent creation of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). 62
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The WCPF Convention closely follows the framework established by the
UNFSA and emphasises a precautionary and ecosystem based approach to
fisheries management. The WCPF Convention applies to all waters of the
WCPO, including both high seas and EEZs. However, the WCPF Convention
clearly states in Article 4 that nothing in the Convention shall prejudice the
rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the LOSC and UNFSA, and that
the WCPFC shall be interpreted and applied in the context of, and in a manner
consistent with the LOSC and UNFSA.
There are key disagreements between DWFN and Pacific island States over
how the WCPF Convention should be interpreted regarding implementation of
management measures in EEZs and on the issue of allocation. Both
interpretations cite relevant articles of the WCPF Convention and UNFSA.
Pacific island States argue that the main purpose for the WCPFC is to regulate
the high seas and ensure that stocks are not over-fished on the high seas. 63
They note that management measures already exist within their EEZs. This
argument is supported by provisions within both the WCPFC and the UNFSA
which require measures be compatible across the high seas/EEZ nexus, taking
into account existing measures already in practice.
DWFNs argue that the WCPFC, as the primary management authority for tuna
across the WCPO, should establish management and conservation measures
across the entire range of the stocks, both inside EEZs and on the high seas. 64
These States refer to Article 10 of the WCPF Convention which provides that
the WCPFC can determine the quantity of catches, levels of effort, limitations
on fishing capacity and other necessary management measures throughout the
Convention area.
Pacific island States respond that the WCPFC can establish ‘global’ catch,
effort and/or capacity limits across the entire Convention area, but that it is the
sovereign right of coastal States to determine catches within their EEZs. This
view is supported by the ‘without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal
States’ clause in Article 10 of the WCPF Convention regarding the WCPFC’s
functions.
Similar arguments between coastal States and DWFNs have recently emerged
in regard to the application of the WCPFC to the archipelagic waters of coastal
States. Due to some controversy over the issue, in 2008 the Chair of the
WCPFC requested an opinion from the legal counsel on, amongst other things,
the application or otherwise of the WCPFC to archipelagic waters. The legal
counsel referred to the WCPF Convention, LOSC and UNFSA and suggested
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that the WCPF Convention only has application to the high seas and EEZs, and
not the internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas, due to
qualifications in UNFSA and the WCPF Convention between “sovereign
rights” and “sovereignty”. Nevertheless, the legal counsel noted that in addition
to the WCPF Convention, the LOSC and UNFSA, other principles of
international law need to be considered, particularly the principle of “good
neighbourliness” which requires that States must act in good faith and ensure
that activities in their territories do not cause harm or affect the interests of
other States.
Despite this, the US continued to oppose such an interpretation and argued that
the WCPFC applies to archipelagic waters, as well as EEZs and high seas.
Confusingly, the US distinguished between territorial seas and archipelagic
waters in this regard and contended that territorial seas remained excluded from
the application of the WCPF Convention. 65 Pacific island States, Philippines
and Indonesia refuted the US position and argued that as archipelagic waters
are deemed to be under the sovereignty of the coastal State, they are outside the
jurisdiction of the WCPFC (as is the case with territorial seas).
A critical focus for the WCPFC will be how it develops co-operative
management across the high seas/EEZ nexus, and by operation or intent,
allocates rights to the tuna resource. Resolving conflicts over interpretations of
compatible management will be critical to the effective functioning of the
WCPFC and its ability to agree upon, and implement effective conservation
and management measures across the range of the stocks.
Enforcement Challenges
A key problem associated with the broad maritime claims to jurisdiction made
by the Pacific island States is that of scale. These maritime claims are
enormous in scope and present significant monitoring, control and surveillance
challenges to ensure sound management and counter the threat of illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Additionally, maritime boundaries
remain largely unsettled so there is some uncertainty as to the precise scope of
individual coastal State EEZs. Large EEZs such as these also represent a
significant responsibility in ocean management and require sophisticated
infrastructure and investment, placing serious demands on the limited human
and financial resources of the claimant States involved.
Thus, while the expansive maritime claims of the Pacific small island States are
undoubtedly a vital resource and opportunity, they also represent a major
oceans governance and management burden to the claimant States. The scale
and nature of the problem is thrown into stark relief by the example of Kiribati
which has a total landmass of 811km2 but a claimed EEZ of approximately
3.3 million km2.
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The Geopolitics of Fish
Despite the vast maritime claims of the Pacific small island States, and their
substantial sovereign rights, it has predominantly bee the developed DWFNs
who have reaped the most benefit from the tuna resources. Historically,
DWFNs have caught 90 per cent 66 of the WCPO tuna, despite approximately
41 per cent 67 of the catch originating from within the EEZs of Pacific island
States. Furthermore, it has been argued that the level of access fees delivered to
the Pacific island States from DWFNs, and thus the “resource rent” of the
fishery, is in the order of three to six per cent - this is considered low in global
terms. 68
As noted, many Pacific island States are heavily reliant on the region’s tuna
fisheries. Development aid also forms a significant component of national
budgets. This represents a key area of vulnerability and a lever that can be
applied, particularly by DWFNs to secure preferential terms of access. DWFNs
have proved adept at playing Pacific island States off against one another and
using aid as a political lever to undermine regional moves to enhance
cooperative management and enforcement measures. It has been argued that
this tied aid provides a false benefit. FFA members could be substantially better
off if they were to act collectively to raise access fees to, arguably, a more
equitable level, even if development aid were entirely withdrawn. 69 It is also
the case that the lack of transparency that occurs in some bilateral access
negotiations exacerbates opportunities for corruption which seriously
undermines both revenue collection efforts and fisheries management
controls. 70
For example, for many years Japan steadfastly refused to entertain multilateral
negotiations with the Pacific island States as a group, instead preferring to
negotiate on a bilateral basis. 71 This strategy puts DWFNs in a strong
negotiating position and provides an opportunity for development aid to be
applied as a tool to secure advantageous fisheries access terms, thereby eroding
the effectiveness of collective regional approaches. 72 As a key distant-water
fishing power in the region, accounting for up to three-quarters of the foreign
fishing fleet at its peak, Japan was able to wield great power in bilateral
negotiations. 73 This translated into a lack of transparency over access fees and
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resistance to, for example, the establishment of minimum conditions for entry
into EEZs on the part of DWFN vessels and the creation of a vessel monitoring
scheme.
Pacific island States are also disadvantaged by the impacts of globalisation on
the tuna industry. In essence their key economic advantage is access to fish
stocks. However, small island developing States are ill-equipped to be at the
high-risk, technically challenging and capital-intensive end of the fishing
industry. This has led to the failure of numerous attempts to establish domestic
tuna fishing operations. The Pacific island States are effectively excluded from
the more profitable “downstream” end of the tuna business as these activities,
especially the distribution and retail components of the commodity chain,
remain dominated by multinational corporations.74
A profound asymmetry exists between Pacific island States and the DWFNs in
negotiations on these issues. Combating overfishing, reducing overall fishing
effort and securing improved returns pits small island developing States against
some of the richest, most powerful and most capable states in the world,
especially in terms of negotiating experience.
Challenges on the Outer Continental Shelf
As noted above, a number of Pacific island States have made submissions
relating to areas of continental shelf beyond the limits of their 200nm EEZs to
the CLCS, which may well result in substantial increases in the extent of their
maritime jurisdictions. These areas are likely to include potentially highly
valuable living resources and marine biodiversity. These resources and the
marine habitats that they exist in, such as seamounts and hydrothermal vents
are potentially vulnerable. This means that the coastal States which confirm
their rights over outer continental shelf areas face oceans governance
responsibilities and challenges as well as resource exploitation opportunities. 75
Serious management issues may well arise on the outer continental shelf as a
consequence of the fact that coastal State sovereign rights over these
continental shelf areas will be overlain by areas of high seas. This layering of
jurisdictions is potentially problematic and it is possible that competing and
potentially conflicting uses will arise. For example bioprospecting may conflict
with fishing interests on sea mounts. 76 A significant challenge also exists in
these areas in distinguishing between marine scientific research on the one
hand and commercial bioprospecting on the other.77 The fact that outer
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continental shelf areas are, by their very nature, remote and peripheral, will
tend to exacerbate these regulatory and enforcement challenges.
Realising Opportunities
The key means for the Pacific island States to address the significant challenges
facing them in the maritime arena is through regional or sub-regional
cooperation. This is especially the case in tackling resource conflicts in the
context of the tremendous asymmetries in political and economic power
inherent between these small developing states and developed DWFNs. The
Pacific island States have already proved relatively successful in adopting
cooperative multilateral approaches to the maritime challenges facing them,
especially through the development of regional and sub-regional organisations
and arrangements such as the Pacific islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA),
which was established in 1979 and is based in Honiara in the Solomon Islands.
The FFA was set up with the express purpose of facilitating the management,
conservation and use of the tuna resources within member State’s EEZs and
beyond.78 The past 30 years has demonstrated a remarkable level of
cooperation within the Pacific islands region that has substantially increased
the capacity of the region to manage their fisheries and successfully negotiate
with far more powerful DWFNs – most particularly the US and Japan.
A good example of the benefits of cooperation is provided by how the sensitive
issue of maritime boundaries has been handled. A consequence of the
enormous extension of maritime claims seawards, notably through the
introduction of the EEZ regime, has been the creation of a multitude of ‘new’
maritime political boundaries as States 400nm distant from one another
abruptly find themselves to be maritime neighbours with potentially
overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction. Furthermore, in the context of
outer continental shelf entitlements, maritime neighbours in need of the
delimitation of a seabed boundary may hypothetically be in excess of 700nm
distant from one another. 79 Given the relatively recent nature of the maritime
claims in question, many of which have only been advanced since the 1970s
onwards, it is unsurprising that the maritime political map of the world is far
short of completion. Indeed, less than 50 per cent of potential maritime
boundaries worldwide have been even partially delimited. 80
In this context, the Pacific islands region has been successful in the
establishment of a mechanism of dealing with undelimited maritime
boundaries. In the South Pacific less than 30 per cent of potential maritime
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boundaries have been even partially delimited.81 Accordingly, it might have
been anticipated that maritime boundaries would prove highly problematic.
This has not, however, proved to be the case. Territorial and maritime
jurisdictional disputes are not completely absent from the region – for example,
France and Vanuatu dispute sovereignty over Matthew [Umaenupne] and
Hunter [Umaeneag] Islands and delimitation between Fiji and Tonga is
complicated by Tonga’s claims in respect of the so-called “Tongan Box”
arising from that country’s Royal Proclamation of 1887 and Tonga’s claims to
North and South Minerva Reefs [Teleki Tokelau and Teleki Tonga]. 82
Nonetheless, such disputes have not proliferated as they have elsewhere, for
example in Southeast and East Asia.
Furthermore, disputes among the Pacific island States over transboundary
resources such as tuna have largely been circumvented and the monitoring and
protection of the stocks concerned has been enhanced. This has been achieved
through agreement facilitated by the FFA, on interim maritime boundaries
based on equidistance lines. These theoretical maritime boundaries are used to
determine the distribution of a substantial portion of the access fees derived
from the US treaty discussed above, on the basis of the distribution of catches
in the maritime zones these theoretical boundaries define. 83
Another major breakthrough illustrating the benefits of cooperation can be seen
in the areas of surveillance and enforcement. The Niue Treaty on Cooperation
in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region of
1992 broke new ground, particularly in respect of cooperative maritime
surveillance and enforcement. 84 This agreement provides flexible arrangements
for cooperation in fisheries surveillance among Pacific island States. Of
particular note are the Niue Treaty’s provisions enabling vessels and personnel
of one State the authority to enforce the laws of another State so scarce
surveillance assets can be deployed most efficiently.
Similarly, some limited efforts at increased cooperation have been made in the
area of regional ocean governance where steps have been taken towards the
drafting of a Pacific Islands Regional Oceans Policy (PIROP). The goal of
PIROP is stated to be “to ensure the future sustainable use of our Ocean and its
resources by Pacific islands communities and external partners.” In order to
achieve this, PIROP is guided by five principles: improving understanding of
the ocean, sustainably developing and managing the use of ocean resources,
81
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maintaining the health of the ocean, promoting the peaceful use of the ocean,
and creating partnerships and promoting cooperation. Implementation is,
however, still at a relatively early stage. 85
Perhaps the best example of strong regional cooperation can be seen in the
recent developments of the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) by the Parties to the
Nauru Agreement (PNA). 86 The previous PNA fishing vessel cap had become
increasingly seen as a blunt and not particularly effective tool at promoting
conservation and development interests. Problems emerged as the fishing
vessel cap made it difficult for new fleets to enter the fishery that were more
advantageous to PNA interests. In 2007, the Pacific island members of the
PNA reviewed the vessel cap and agreed to introduce a limit on the number of
purse seine days. Vessel days could be sold in such a way as to maximise
economic returns, enable greater fleet flexibility and better conservation
outcomes.
In response, the VDS was introduced in December 2007 and aimed to constrain
catches to sustainable levels and increase benefits from fishing activities
through access fees paid by DWFNs. The VDS replaced the broad purse seine
vessel number cap with a set number of days that can be fished in the combined
EEZs of the PNA. Vessel days are then allocated to each PNA country. This
enabled PNA to account for effort creep by differentiating fishing days based
on vessel length and allowing for vessel formulas to be modified over time to
account for changes in technology and efficiency.
The VDS increases the opportunities for a Pacific island State to take a more
proactive approach to developing their own fisheries and progressing their own
aspirations. For example, a key objective of the VDS is to create competition
between DWFN vessels to purchase fishing days at the maximum price. As the
VDS has been introduced, allowances have been made for vessels that fish
under an internal arrangement within the PNA membership that supports
regional development aspirations; the FSM Arrangement. 87
Simultaneously, the Pacific island members of the PNA updated their
requirements for licensed foreign fishing vessels and introduced new licensing
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terms and conditions that set important precedents in coastal State management
of tuna fisheries. Firstly, the PNA agreed that they would collectively apply
additional licensing terms and conditions that introduced new conservation and
management requirements within their EEZs. However, more significantly, the
PNA agreed that they would also prohibit licensed fishing vessels from fishing
in two high seas pockets surrounded by PNA EEZs north and northeast of
Papua New Guinea (see Figure 1).
Vessels may continue fishing on the high seas if they wish, but in so doing they
may not fish in PNA EEZs. As such it does not breach the freedom of the seas
that is enshrined in Article 87 of the LOSC. However, given that the PNA
EEZs contain the most productive fishing grounds, it is a powerful tool and
quickly raised concerns amongst DWFNs. Despite significant opposition from
DWFN interests, the PNA signed the Third Implementing Arrangement (3IA,
2008) in Palau in May 2008.
This cooperation between PNA members subsequently supported FFA member
interests within the WCPFC. In 2006 and 2008, key arguments between coastal
States and DWFN were partly resolved in practice (though not clearly in
principle) through the incorporation of the PNA VDS and the PNA 3IA into
WCPFC conservation and management measures. These decisions indirectly
recognised the primacy of coastal States over management of fisheries within
their EEZs and framed conservation and management for high seas fisheries in
the context of existing management practised in EEZs. A key example of this
was the endorsement of the PNA 3IA’s closure of the high seas pockets and its
inclusion within the WCPFC bigeye and yellowfin conservation and
management measure (CCM 2008-01). It is highly unlikely that the WCPFC
would have agreed to close any high seas areas without their hand being
previously forced by the PNA.
However, while there was significant progress on the issue of EEZ/high seas
compatibility, disagreements have increased over the application of regional
measures to archipelagic waters and there continues to be significant challenges
in terms of the application and implementation of the WCPFC in practice.
The Way Forward
Recent achievements within the WCPFC, particularly the bigeye and yellowfin
conservation measure, illustrate the strength of the FFA and PNA sub-group
when they negotiate collectively. Similarly, the achievements of the FFA and
PNA management, control and development mechanisms demonstrate their
potential to manage fishing efforts throughout their area in the direct interests
of their members, and to extend their influence beyond their immediate
boundaries. While neither the current VDS nor WCPFC conservation and
management measures yet meet conservation requirements as recommended by
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the WCPFC Scientific Committee, they provide the initial framework – due
almost entirely to the drive of the FFA and PNA.
With regard to living resources, especially the key economic resource tuna, it is
vital to Pacific Island interests that they are able to sustain this high level of
cooperation and build upon the progress achieved to date. While some success
has been realised in improving the returns to Pacific island States from the tuna
fisheries, there is still a widespread perception that more can be achieved.
Distant water fishing fleets depend upon access to EEZs for their financial
viability. No surface fishing fleet, distant water or locally based, can profitably
operate pole and line or purse seine vessels without some access to waters
under national jurisdiction. 88
Achieving higher returns calls for enhanced cooperation and sophisticated
collective development strategies. The history of bilateral negotiations between
DWFNs and Pacific island States demonstrates that bilaterals play to DWFN
strengths and enable DWFN to “divide and conquer” island States. 89 In
contrast, when Pacific island States act multi-laterally, they do so from a
position of strength, because together they control access to the fishing grounds
which are crucial to the economic viability of distant water fishing operations.
An example of this is the US multi-lateral treaty which has historically
generated higher access fees and cooperation for Pacific island States than
equivalent bilateral agreements. 90
The collective achievements of the Pacific island States, and further
developments within the PNA, place the region in a good position to improve
the benefits from the tuna fisheries. However, the success or failure of the
cooperative arrangements and strategies depend upon the effective participation
of members and their ability to implement decisions within the national
context. The inability of some members to effectively participate and buy in to
regional decisions undermines the ability of the entire region to sustainably
manage and benefit from its maritime resources.
Collective regional strategies require the informed will of all parties involved.
This requires that all Pacific island States have the national capacity and
confidence to determine and pursue their own national interest, within their
shared vision of a collective strategy. The compromises and balancing required
in any collective strategy require members to make choices in the full
88
Van Santen, G. and Muller, P. Working Apart or Together: The Case for a Common Approach to
Management of Tuna Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Pacific Island Countries, Pacific
Island States Discussion Paper Series (10), World Bank, Washington, 2000.
89
Good discussions of some of the issues in bilateral negotiations between DWFN and Pacific island
States can be found in: Schurman, 1998; Tarte, 1999; Barclay and Cartwright, 2006.
90
The Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific island States and the
Government of the United States was negotiated multi-laterally and signed in 1988. The Treaty governs
access for USA purse seiners to all FFA member’s EEZs and includes catch reporting and other
requirements. Access fees from the USA multi-lateral are far higher (exceeding 20% of landed value)
than bilateral access fees with other DWFNs (3.5% to 6%).
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knowledge of their strategic context. Otherwise, nice words and silences simply
provide a paper-thin veneer with little real substance underneath.
This chapter suggests that the region consider further developing national
capacity building and engagement strategies in order to sustain and build the
regional cooperation that is necessary to meet development and conservation
objectives. 91 Such a strategy would work in-country within particularly
vulnerable Pacific island States and build the capacity of governments to
analyse, strategise, prepare for, participate and implement regional agreements
and development strategies.
Similarly, ongoing implementation challenges in monitoring, control and
surveillance undermine the sustainability of key tuna stocks and require
increased regional cooperation and coordination responses, supported by
national capacity-building programs if they are to be overcome. The current
development by the FFA of a Regional MCS Strategy will have positive
impacts on both the sustainability of key fisheries and on the economic returns
for the Pacific island States.
Successful implementation of the various new economic and management
strategies all depend upon Pacific island States protecting their offshore
sovereign rights over their various and extensive maritime areas. While this is
likely to require some sharing of benefits and costs to make it attractive to all
parties, the increased value in the fishery should ensure increased benefit to all
stakeholders beyond any short term small gain from a go-it-alone strategy.
Achieving success in this context will require pragmatic regionalism and the
development of collective environmental and economic goals.

91
The authors note the strong progress achieved by the GEF funded Pacific Islands Oceanic Fisheries
Management Project and its regional programmes. The authors suggest that similar focus and energy
could also be directed at in-country national capacity building strategies that focus more heavily on
national interests, within the umbrella of shared regional visions.
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2. Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations under the WTO and Likely
Policy Implications for the Pacific Island Countries
Vina Ram-Bidesi

Introduction
It is well known that Pacific Islands Countries (PICs) are heavily reliant on fish
and fisheries products as a source of livelihood, food and foreign exchange. Fish
and fishery products are one of the major traded food commodities and this trade
is likely to increase in the future to meet the ever increasing demand for fish and
seafood.1 The relationship between international fish trade, fisheries management
and sustainable development is intrinsically intertwined.2 While the main aspects
of this interdependence can be conceptualised, it however poses a major challenge
for legal practitioners and policy makers when dealing with cross-disciplinary
issues relating to fisheries management, subsidies and trade. Thus there is the need
for an integrated and interdisciplinary approach when formulating fisheries
policies whether it is at an international, regional, national or local level.
Expanding fish exports is seen to generate significant benefits and economic
growth to the exporting country. However, this can simultaneously give rise to
problems such as economic pressure to harvest fish unsustainably, or excessive
investment in fishing capacity which in turn can lead to overfishing and depletion
of stock on which the communities depend upon for their nutrition and livelihood.
On the other hand, there is a growing interest in the potential synergistic
relationship between trade rules, conservation and sustainable development
objectives such as in relation to eco-labelling, reduction in subsidies and use of
trade measures to promote more sustainable fisheries. Trade measures are seen as
a more powerful enforcement mechanism for fisheries management because of the
World Trade Organisation’s (WTO’s) rules-based system.
Defining the scope and breath of harmful fisheries subsidies has been a central
aspect of the WTO negotiations. 3 A subsidy is a government expenditure that
makes a resource cheaper to produce than its full economic cost or makes a
product cheaper to consumers. Subsidy payments and transfers are important
policy tools used by governments to support an economic sector (institution,
business or industry), with the aim of promoting an activity within it, which the
1

Food and Agriculture Organisation, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (2006). 2007, p.136.
Deere (2000) further explores this link in Net Gains: Linking Fisheries Management, International Trade
and Sustainable Development.
3
International Centre for Sustainable Trade and Development (ICSTD) 2006, p. 62.
2
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government considers beneficial to the economy and society. In the context of
fishing, subsidies are provided to lower the cost of fishing or to increase revenues,
or both; such as budgetary assistance, tax exemptions, lower interest rates, grants
and price support schemes. 4 Some subsidies are applied directly to boost
production and help secure profits and encourage export growth, while others are
targeted at improving efficiency and the scale of production.
Over the years, subsidies have helped in the development of fishing industries to
achieve their social and economic objectives. However, the high estimate of global
subsidies 5 in the fisheries sector has raised concerns on their role in exacerbating
the decline in marine resources driven by the increase in demand for fish together
with advances in technology. These have contributed to overcapacity and
overfishing that not only depletes fish resources but also distorts the price of fish,
hence its market and trade. Critics argue that subsidies contradict efforts to
liberalise trade and undermine development potential that can be unleashed by
properly-managed fisheries. 6 Despite such concerns, some subsidies continue to
remain important in achieving public policy objectives. 7
This chapter outlines some key aspects of fisheries subsidy negotiations at the
WTO so far and analyses their possible implications for Pacific Island fisheries.
First, a brief background to the subsidies debate is outlined followed by a
discussion on the first draft text proposed by the Chair of the Negotiating Group
on Rules and how the provisions may influence the Pacific Islands fisheries sector
policies. The chapter then makes some possible suggestions on the approaches that
Pacific Island countries could use when discussions on fisheries subsidies resume.
While formal discussions on new subsidies rules are suspended and therefore the
final outcome is not clear, the chapter nevertheless makes some preliminary
assessment on the challenges it is likely to pose for legal and policy personnel
dealing with the fisheries sector issues.
Subsidies Rules at the WTO
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM)
Agreement) disciplines the use of subsidies by regulating the actions countries can
take to counter the effects of subsidies. Under the WTO Agreement, a country can
use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure to seek withdrawal of the subsidy or
the removal of its adverse effects. A country can also carry out its own
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Milazzo, 1998; Westlund, 2004; Sumaila and Pauley, 2006.
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investigation and ultimately charge extra duty “countervailing duty” on subsidized
imports if they are found to hurt domestic producers. 8
There have been a number of arguments by certain member countries,
international agencies, non-government organisations (NGOs) and researchers that
the current WTO subsidy rules cannot effectively regulate the impacts of fisheries
subsidies on trade and have therefore put pressure within the WTO to expand,
clarify and develop new rules on fisheries subsidies. 9 Under the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), fisheries subsidies are difficult
to target as actionable because they are largely granted at the production level
which causes production distortion while ASCM targets subsidies that cause trade
distortion. It is therefore difficult to prove “adverse effects” to allow the subsidy to
be punished under the WTO rules. 10
The mandate in paragraphs 28 and 31 of the Doha Declaration states that members
are to “clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into
account the importance of the sector to developing countries … with a view to
enhance the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment.” 11 In addition to
this, members reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen the rules on fisheries
subsidies at the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005. Members
agreed to prohibit subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity,
improve transparency in reporting and strengthen the enforceability of rules.
Members also agreed to address the importance of the sector to development
priorities including reduction in poverty, food security and improved livelihood. 12
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
The ASCM defines subsidies as any financial contribution provided by
government that confers a benefit to a “specific” domestic industry.13 A financial
contribution can be provided directly by the government or a public or private
entity on behalf of the government such as direct payment, goods and services,
price support, income support or foregone revenues. 14 Under ASCM, subsidies are
divided into three categories: prohibited, actionable and non-actionable. Prohibited
subsidies are those that directly affect trade such as those that promote exports
8

On 31 July 2008, the Subsidies Committee elected Members of a Permanent Group of Experts to assist in
Dispute Panel and provide expert advisory services on issues relating to Subsidies.
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For example, see: Schorr 1998; WWF 1997; OECD 2003; Schorr 2004.
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Campling, L., Havice, E. and Ram-Bidesi, V. 2007 – outline some of the difficulties associated with
implementing ASCM to discipline fisheries subsidies.
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(export subsidy) or those that restrict imports (use of domestic goods). Actionable
subsidies must show proof of having an adverse effect. The subsidizing
government is required to pay for the loss incurred by the member that lodges the
complaint but can continue with the subsidy. This means that harmful actionable
subsidies may continue to persist even if action is taken against at the WTO.15 The
third category of subsidies are non-actionable or permitted and include such things
as research activities, assistance to disadvantaged regions and assistance to adapt
to new environmental requirements. 16
Progress on the Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations
The initial discussion on fisheries subsidies began at the WTO’s Committee on
Trade and Environment (CTE) in 1994 and gradually progressed into the Rules
Negotiating Group. A number of proposals on new fisheries subsidies disciplines
focusing on a diverse range of issues have been presented since then. Among the
key issues include the structure and definitions, treatment of access agreements,
exemptions to artisanal and small-scale fisheries, nature and extent of special and
differential treatment for developing countries and environment management and
conservation.
A coalition group called the “Friends of Fish” 17 lobbied within the CTE to include
discussions on fisheries subsidies, overcapacity and overfishing. Their
submissions were essentially labelled as the “broad ban approach.” 18 On the other
hand, another group of Asian countries 19 argued that WTO was not the right forum
to deal with fisheries resource sustainability issues. Their main concern was that
fisheries management issues and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing
was outside the competence of WTO. This group’s submissions have been labelled
as the “positive list” approach. 20 Since 2004, as discussions progressed on
subsidies, this latter group has raised some key issues that target harmful
subsidies. 21
The European Union (EU) initially took a middle-ground on subsidies issues. By
the end of 2006, EU’s approach to subsidies issues were more in line with that of
15

Campling, L., Havice, E. and Ram-Bidesi, V. 2007, p. 107.
Under the ASCM, the provisions for permitted subsidies expired in 1999.
Australia, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines and USA.
18
For example see: TN/RL.GEN/141 2006; TN/RLGEN/127 2006; TN/RL/GEN/100 2006; TN/RL/W/164
2004; TN/RL/W/154 2004; TN/WT/CTE/W/204 2002.
19
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Chinese Taipei).
20
‘Broad ban’ – prohibit all subsidies except for those under the green box (applied for conservation) as
opposed to ‘positive list’ – allows all subsidies and prohibit those that increase fishing capacity. [For a
more detailed discussion – refer to Campling, L., Havice, E. and Ram-Bidesi, V. 2007, Part II].
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Japan, Korea and Chinese Taipei. The proposals to the WTO from small
vulnerable economies (SVEs) 22 including the Pacific Island members argued that
the fisheries sector is important for their economies as stated in the Doha
Development Agenda and that access agreements and small-scale fisheries should
be exempt from the subsidies rules.
From 2004 onwards, Brazil also took an active part in the negotiations. 23 Brazil
submitted a number of proposals that accelerated the progress in negotiations,
particularly focusing on special and differential treatment (S&DT) provisions. The
various submissions by the members have thus helped to shape the draft text
released by the Chair of Negotiating Group on Rules.
Proposed Chair’s Draft Legal Text on New Rules
In releasing the draft text in November 2007, the chair of the Negotiating Group
on Rules requested members to identify their interests while accommodating the
interests and concerns of other members to seek a balance in moving forward the
negotiations. The draft text on fisheries subsidies is to be appended as Annex VIII
of the ASCM. 24 In the chair’s draft text, government to government payments of
access to marine fisheries are not considered as subsidies and therefore nonactionable. Article 1 provides a detailed list of prohibited subsidies while Article II
outlines the general exceptions. These are briefly summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1: Proposed Prohibited and Permitted Subsidies in the Draft Chair’s
Text
Prohibited
Subsidies

Permitted
Subsidies

Goods and Services benefits relating to:
Acquisition, construction, repair, renewal, renovation, modernization and boat
building
Transfer of fishing or service vessels to third countries
Operating costs of fishing - license fees, fuel, ice, bait, personnel, insurance and gear
support, at-sea support, handling in- or near-port processing, covering operating
losses
Port infrastructure – landing facilities, fish storage facilities, in-or near-port
processing facilities
Income support, price support
Transfer of access rights by government in another member’s jurisdiction
Vessels engaged in illegal, unreported or unregulated fishing
Vessels and fishing activity affecting fish stocks in “unequivocally overfished”
condition
Improving crew safety without increase vessel capacity
Adoption of selective fishing techniques
Adoption of techniques to reduce environmental impact of fishing
Compliance with fisheries management regime for sustainable use and conservation
– eg VMS
Re-education, retraining or redeployment of fishworkers into non-fishing occupations
Early retirement or permanent cessation of employment of fishworkers to reduce
capacity or effort
Vessel decommissioning or capacity reduction provided vessels are scrapped or
permanently prevented from being used for fishing elsewhere; fish harvesting rights
are permanently revoked; relinquish any claim associated with vessel or harvesting
rights.

Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) Provisions
Under Article II of the proposed rules, the least-developed countries (LDCs) are
exempt from the use of prohibited subsidies. Non-LDC countries are allowed to
provide prohibited subsidies to fisheries in inshore areas (i.e. territorial waters)
that are characterised by non-mechanised fishing methods, and carried out by
individuals, family members or group organised in associations. The catch is to be
consumed by fishworkers and their family members and that fishing activities do
not go beyond a small profit. In addition, fisheries management measures should
be in place to ensure sustainability.
Developing country members are also allowed to provide construction-related
subsidies that are otherwise prohibited for developed countries. These include port
infrastructure, fish landing facilities, fish storage facilities, and in-or near-port
processing facilities. They are also allowed to provide income support and price
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support but these provisions are subject to having an effective fisheries
management system based on internationally-recognised best practices described
in the various international agreements under the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO).
Under the proposed rules, prohibited subsidies such as those for boat building,
repairs, and to meet operating costs like fuel, ice, bait, insurance and gear, are also
allowed for developing country members for undecked vessels and decked vessels
that are less than 10 metres or 43 feet in length.
Developing member countries are also allowed prohibited subsidies for vessels
construction, repair and modernisation of vessels greater than 10 metres provided
that such vessels are able to satisfy a list of management-related criteria to reduce
the risk of overcapacity in fishing. These criteria include fishing exclusively for
identified target stocks within the member’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), that
the fish stocks have been subject to prior scientific assessment to ensure their
capacity does not exceed beyond sustainable level and that assessment has to be
subjected to peer review by a competent international organisation such as the
FAO.
Likewise, under the S&DT provisions for developing countries, payments made
from one government to another and then transferred to an external third party
(such as an industry) are permitted subsidies if the fishery is conducted within the
developing country member’s EEZ and the access agreement is made public and
has provisions designed to prevent overfishing based on internationally recognized
best practices for management and conservation.
Other Provisions
Article V of the draft text details the requirements for an effective fisheries
management regime that reflects internationally recognised best practices among
which include the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (1995), the Code of
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995) and the Compliance Agreement (1995),
technical guidelines and plans of action. 25 The incorporation of such fisheries
instruments into national legislation and policy is aimed to ensure the use of
science-based stock assessment, capacity and effort management based on
allocation of fishing rights or quotas, a vessel monitoring system including
observers on board and a system of timely reporting to national and international
authorities. These are likely to have direct influence on the fisheries law and
policy because they may require changes to domestic legislation, including
changes to administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms. Developing
25
FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995); Agreement to Promote Compliance with
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (1995).
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country members can implement and operate the fisheries management measures
at a regional level provided they fulfil their individual obligations for the
regionally agreed management requirements.
In addition, each member country has to maintain an enquiry point to answer
queries in relation to the fisheries management system including measures in place
to address fishing capacity, effort and biological status of fisheries in question.
Article VI outlines the notification requirements among which includes such
things as notifying the ASCM committee the terms of fisheries access agreement
and reporting on any applicable domestic fisheries legislation. Article VIII implies
that any subsidies that are not notified would be deemed prohibited and thus
vulnerable to litigation. The subsidising member has to demonstrate that the
subsidy in question is not prohibited. On compliance and implementation of the
rules, Article III (4) recognises the need for technical assistance for developing
countries either bilaterally and/or through appropriate international organisations.
Reaction to the Chair’s Draft Rules
WTO members discussed the chair’s draft text during the Negotiating Group on
Rules meetings that started in December 2007 and officially suspended in July
2008 when trade talks on the Doha Round came to a halt. The text bans several
types of subsidy payments that enhance fishing capacity or create incentives to
increase fishing. The text attempts to bridge the two broad views in the
negotiations between the proponents of “top-down” blanket ban on fisheries
subsidies (with negotiated exceptions), and those that support a “bottom-up” ban
on specific kinds of subsidies. Developing countries are allowed to maintain a
number of subsidies that are otherwise banned so as to assist in the development of
their fishing industries to meet their economic and social objectives. However, all
such subsidy payments are subject to having an effective fisheries management
system in place. India questioned the conditionality imposed to qualify for S&DT
while China and Brazil described the text as being both too rigid and overly
burdensome. 26 Japan, Korea and Chinese Taipei argued that prohibition of
subsidies for port infrastructure, operating costs and near-port fish processing had
little effect on overcapacity. 27 Australia and New Zealand together with
environmental groups like WWF and Oceania see the draft text as constructive
because of the incorporation of environmental provisions. The Pacific Island
members together with the African, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) welcomed
the exemptions relating to access agreements. A particular concern to many
developed and developing countries alike is the prohibition on fuel subsidies
which they argue would deprive their fishers of their livelihood by making it
26
27
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impossible for them to continue fishing, while there are some member countries
who argue that if prohibition did not cover fuel subsidies, then any discipline on
subsidies would be ineffective. 28
So far, discussions have focused on the treatment of small-scale fisheries, aspects
of fisheries management and on the scope of the peer review mechanism for
fisheries management measures. Norway submitted an amendment to the draft
provision on fisheries management by distinguishing the legal and institutional
aspect to that of practical implementation which calls for stock specific
management plans. A number of countries found this to be rather burdensome and
a costly proposal because of the difficulty in having stock-specific management
plan for each fishery particularly in the small-scale and artisanal sector where
scientific information is scant. WTO members remain divided on the conditions
under which developing countries would be allowed to provide assistance to their
fisheries sector.
On 28 May 2008, the chair issued a working document in the form of a matrix that
summarized the core issues in negotiations, proposed chair’s text in addressing
them and the various positions of the members to the text. 29 Because of the many
divergent views on key issues of the subsidies discussions, the Chair then
circulated a new draft consolidated text in December 2008 which he termed as the
“road map” in an attempt to reconcile the different approaches to disciplining
fisheries subsidies. 30 The focus of the road map is to focus on regulating subsidies
that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity while also formulating appropriate
and effective S&DT to address concerns of developing member countries.
Responses so far on the Chair’s new road map reflect similar divides and
sentiments. Small Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) together with some other
developing country members say that the road map is more complex and prefer the
initial draft text of the Chair as a better platform to move forward the
discussions. 31
Implications of Draft Rules for Pacific Islands Fisheries
Being designated as a LDC, the Solomon Islands will be exempt as a WTO
member from the proposed draft rules on prohibited subsidies. The exemption is
important given the limited capacity not only to subsidise but also to implement
obligations under the new disciplines. 32 The draft text does not clarify how the
overcapacity issues in relation to straddling or migratory fish stocks will be dealt
28
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with for the LDCs since they are exempt from the subsidy provisions of Article 1
of Annex VIII. 33
Fisheries access agreements such as the EU fisheries access agreements and the
further transfer of EU fishing vessels are permitted since the agreement is
government-to-government and is for access to a developing country EEZ.34 This
allows the PICs the legal basis for subsidised access agreements which has been an
important policy concern for a number of smaller island countries.
In the rural coastal areas of the Pacific Islands where income and employment
opportunities are limited, development assistance through infrastructural support,
boat building, marketing and operating costs such as fuel and bait are common
means to encourage the communities to move to cash economy to improve their
livelihoods. The provisions under the Article III.2(a) only allows use of nonmechanised gear and fishing equipment, and where fishing operations are not to go
beyond a small profit trade and there is no major employer-employee relationship
to qualify for subsidies operating cost. This provision and the use of the terms
require further clarification. The terms “small-profit trade” and “no major
employer-employee relationship” need to be clarified in order to ensure that these
do not exclude those fishers who use their savings to purchase additional vessels
and employ other fishers from their communities, or those who do not have boat
and gear and who provide labour to earn wages. This has been a common practice
in many islands where only some coastal households may be owners of vessels
and the means of production. This provision is restrictive since it does not
adequately consider the transitional stage of fishers who progress from subsistence
to artisanal to commercial where resources permit.
For developing countries, subsidies for boat building, acquisition, repair and
operating costs are allowed for undecked vessels and decked vessels that are less
than 10 metres. While most subsistence and artisanal fishing vessels are smallscale, important artisanal commercial fisheries rely on subsidised operating
expenses such as fuel and bait. Two important fisheries that employ vessels that
are larger than 10 metres and are either decked or partially decked are the Samoan
alia, and the Papua New Guinea pump boats. Thus, Article III(b)(2) on S&DT
poses a major constraint to the development and progress of these artisanal
operations. This provision will also be restrictive in light of the need to divert
fishing effort from over-exploited inshore coastal areas to more deep sea and
offshore areas as one of the major initiatives to build local capacity for domestic
development of tuna fisheries in the Pacific Islands.

33
34
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Lobbying for an extension in the allowable length of decked vessels under this
provision, the ACP and countries such as India, China and Indonesia have argued
this should be extended to 24 metres instead of the 10 metre limit. However, this
has been opposed by members such as the EU and the United States (US) who are
pushing for more strict rules. There is also a possibility that expanding such
provisions can also make larger developing countries more competitive, thereby
affecting the export markets for Pacific Island countries which may lack the
economies of scale that the larger developing countries may have. Campling
(2008) suggests that an alternative capacity parameter should be sought if PICs
want to satisfy their legitimate development needs while simultaneously not
allowing the S&DT provisions as a means to avoid the rules. 35 Another option that
could be explored would be to seek some kind of differentiation amongst the
developing countries, such as distinguishing the SVEs from the rest of the
developing countries. Creating the policy space for the progressive development of
artisanal fishery would be an important objective in light of meeting the
developmental needs of the Pacific Islands. 36
In the draft text, government can grant fishing access to individuals and groups as
long as it does not affect straddling or highly migratory fish stocks of other
member countries and affect stocks in which another member has identifiable
fishing interests. Furthermore, in granting permissible subsidies, member’s
management practices and compliance-related information will have to be verified
with relevant international organisations. 37
Limiting subsidies to vessels within a developing country member’s EEZ implies
that the exemptions granted will not be sufficient to achieve the economic viability
of some of the vessel operations that require regional access beyond a member’s
EEZ. Fisheries that can be affected by this provision would be vessels seeking
regional access, such as domestic vessels from Papua New Guinea that fish in
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) waters under the FSM Arrangement. The
longline tuna fishery where vessels from Fiji fish in Vanuatu and Solomon Island
waters and the initiative under-way to create a sub-regional arrangement for South
Pacific Albacore fishery to gain access to each others’ zones will be affected. The
rationale for such arrangements has been to overcome the lack of economies of
scale due to the small EEZs of members, as well as oceanographic and seasonal
fluctuations affecting stock abundance. Therefore, the legal justification for the
limitations within 200 mile EEZ is weak given the existence of bilateral and
multilateral agreements and where fish stocks are straddling and high migratory.
35
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With the exception of subsistence fisheries under Article V.1, subsidies for
developing countries are contingent upon satisfying a number of fisheries
management measures. These include having a management system based on
internationally recognised best practices such as the Code of Conduct, Compliance
Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement. For example, subsidies relating to port
infrastructure and other port facilities are permitted for developing countries, but
are subject to strict environmental conditionality under Article V. The private
sector in the Pacific Island countries is small and heavily reliant on government
assistance for infrastructural support such as port construction and maintenance.
Therefore any such restriction on infrastructure support is likely to affect the
island communities’ fisheries development initiatives.
The smallness of Pacific Island Countries also poses capacity constraints and
underscores the need for technical assistance in meeting the environmental
management requirements. Besides limitations on resources such as skilled
personnel and budgetary constraints, there is also lack of quantitative data on
coastal and inshore fisheries on which to base management decisions and to meet
reporting requirements.
The role of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) is exemplified
in the draft text to ensure that subsidies granted do not undermine resource
sustainability. Members can only grant subsidies provided they satisfy the national
requirements relating to regional fisheries management obligations. A number of
exemptions to developing countries relate to coastal fisheries which do not directly
come under the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) as
the designated RMFO for the Western and Central Pacific. It is not clear how this
issue will be dealt with in the Pacific region and whether this will leave a gap
when dealing with coastal inshore fisheries. Will it require expanding the scope of
the WCPFC as a RFMO to deal with coastal fisheries or will it facilitate a
mechanism for cooperation with the Secretariat for the Pacific Community that
deals with coastal fisheries issues?
In all, the matrix captures the divergent comments of the various members on the
chair’s text. The Pacific delegation’s key submissions summarised by Campling
(2008) are also reflected in this matrix. 38
Possible Approaches by Pacific Island Countries
To ensure the flow of long-term sustainable benefits from their fisheries, the
Pacific Island States would need to clearly define their current and future fisheries
38
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development goals and objectives which in turn can help to identify the subsidies
that are needed to achieve them. The impact of WTO subsidies discipline on PICs
will need to be considered directly through their effect on domestic fisheries and
through the impact of rules on their distant water partners fishing in the Western
and Central Pacific region. Therefore, PICs will also need to consider the role
played by domestic and foreign fisheries in their economies to meet their
development aspirations and the subsidies that both may be able to use which will
be beneficial to both parties. 39 Many of the current management efforts in the
inshore fisheries focus on the strengthening of community based resource
management systems. The importance of such policy tools must also be reflected
in any sustainability criteria for coastal fisheries management.
Many PICs have attempted to define their fisheries development aspirations
through their national tuna management plans and national fisheries sector plans
and policies. Comprehensive and updated national fisheries policies can help
define the policy positions of the countries which in turn can assist in any
subsidies negotiation process and also in forming different regional or
international alliances necessary to support the desired positions.
In particular, PICs can lobby for exemption of desirable subsidies that must be
protected through the S&DT provisions. Although developing countries such as
PICs do not currently have the budget to support all of the subsidies they would
like to provide, S&DT provisions will allow them to protect their rights to use
subsidies to develop their industries in the future. 40 On the other hand, if the
S&DT provisions are wide-ranging and flexible, these may become more
beneficial to large developing countries like China or Thailand by making them
more competitive as opposed to small developing countries like the PICs. This can
also have the potential to increase competitive pressure among the developed
distant water fishing nations in the WCPFC region such as Japan and the US with,
for example, the Chinese or Latin American vessels. PICs may also like to find
other avenues to make the terms of S&DT for SVEs relatively more responsive to
their economic development needs such as working closely with small island
developing States or the ACP group.
In terms of the draft text, the specific areas that PICs may require more detailed
analysis would be on the issue of identifying vessel length for the artisanal fishery
that can accommodate the development aspirations of the domestic industry in
PICs, but at the same time ensure that this does not create competition with larger
developing country members. Secondly, there should also be some flexibility in
granting subsidies to fishing operations beyond a member’s EEZ such as those that
39
40
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have bilateral or multilateral arrangements to fish in another member’s EEZ and
where management and conservation conditions are effectively integrated into
access agreements.
A key area emphasised in the draft text is resource management and conservation,
and the potential role that could be played by RFMOs in ensuring that fishing
activities are carried out in a sustainable manner and that there is no undue
increase in fishing capacity. This is likely to increase the reporting requirements
for the WCPFC on resource management issues in relation to whether a member
can ultimately be granted subsidies. The complex reporting requirements will
require additional capacity and resources which will need to be factored in during
negotiations in the context of technical and development assistance in meeting the
implementation and reporting requirements. One of the concerns that will need to
be addressed is the ability and mandate of the WCPFC in dealing with other fish
species and national inshore fisheries of artisanal commercial importance.
Since a summary of all different submissions exists, PICs could prepare their
defense or support accordingly, as informal trade talks continue.
Fisheries Policy Trends – Issue of Sustainability
While overfishing and overcapacity could be due to many causes, there is a strong
debate that these reflect an ineffective fisheries management regime – where there
are “too many boats chasing too few fish” and that this problem cannot be solved
without paying attention to subsidies which are a contributing factor. In addition,
the WTO rules are also binding and therefore seen by many countries as playing
an important role towards achieving the fisheries management objectives which in
turn can provide long term gains from trade.
Achieving sustainable fisheries has been the centre of discussion for several
country’s submissions to the WTO. While the chair’s consolidated draft text
exempts certain subsidies, it does; however; require countries benefiting from
waivers to operate effective fishery management systems to conserve fish stocks.
The proposed sustainability criteria draws on the principles and concepts
highlighted in the key international fisheries agreements such as the UN Code of
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The
WCPFC therefore is well placed in attempting to implement a number of the key
principles and practices for the conservation and management of highly migratory
fish stocks in the Western and Central Pacific as required under the respective
international fisheries instruments.
International fisheries instruments including the WCPF Convention also allow the
use of trade-based measures for fisheries management and compliance such as
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through the use of port State measures, vessel lists, and catch and trade
documentation schemes. An example is the EU’s intention to combat IUU through
the establishment of a catch documentation scheme for all its imports by 2010.41
In the context of international fisheries policy trends, therefore, what is becoming
apparent is the need for an effective fisheries management regime to solve both
environmental and fisheries trade problems. This; however; puts greater pressure
on developing counties which are at various stages of their fisheries development.
While these countries recognise the need for sustainable fisheries, they also
depend on the fisheries sector to generate economic growth and support
community livelihoods which makes their policy decisions more complex.
One of the areas of focus for PICs should be to continue participation in forums
that help to define the sustainability criteria within the context of WTO rules that
are practical and enforceable in relation to their fisheries and one that can meet
their developmental goals. This could perhaps link the special development needs
of developing countries under the implementation requirements of both the
international fisheries as well as the trade instruments. This will require a
concerted effort by national fisheries managers, policy makers, legal practitioners
and trade personnel to coordinate and cooperate to implement an integrated
approach to deal with such cross-cutting issues such as environment, trade and
economic development. National policies to strengthen institutional frameworks
for fisheries management and trade development through inter-departmental and
inter-sectoral linkages will be a necessary first step.
Concluding Comments
The subsidies negotiations present opportunities to develop and protect domestic
development interests, and encourage sustainable fishing practices, while at the
same time, integrate developing country trade interests into the WTO rules.
However, the diverse nature of Pacific Islands with their different development
goals and expectations makes the PIC WTO members’ task more difficult in
protecting a wide range of subsidies interests even of those Pacific Island States
who are not signatories to the WTO. For example, some PICs rely on access
agreements, while others focus on domestic development and for some the
artisanal fisheries is more important. This will require cooperation and
collaboration amongst PICs national fisheries, legal and trade officials, regional
organisations and PIC’s WTO representatives to identify regional positions. An
integrated institutional policy framework is also necessary at the national level to
incorporate the various issues in a coherent and systematic manner to address
national policy goals and interests.
41
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While the formal discussion on new fisheries subsidies rules is on hold and
dependent on the completion of the Doha Round, there are a number of points of
interest already emerging with regard to fisheries policy implications. First, it is
important to recognise that having an effective fisheries management regime with
an effective enforcement and monitoring system is central to both trade and
sustainable fisheries development. Thus, implementing the resolutions and
decisions of the WCPFC is essential if subsidies are to be granted for domestic
commercial tuna fisheries development. There is also a need for greater
recognition of the complementary roles of fisheries subsidies under the WTO and
the fisheries management instruments and agreements.
Defining and elaborating on an appropriate sustainability criteria and the process
of applying the criteria to the different fisheries in the region (subsistence,
artisanal, commercial) is also an important factor that is likely to influence PICs
fisheries policies. Staying informed and engaged in these issues is important for
PIC members in order to be able to have any influence on the outcome of the
subsidies negotiations so as to achieve their fisheries development needs and
goals.
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3. Combating IUU Fishing: International Legal Developments
Mary Ann Palma

Introduction
When the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) was adopted in 2001, the
term illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing or “IUU fishing” instantly
gained the attention of States, regional organisations, non-government
organisations, and academic institutions. States have adopted national plans of
action and specific regulations to address IUU fishing. At a much larger scale,
regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) have adopted
resolutions and conservation and management measures to address IUU fishing
in their areas of competence. In these organisations, records of fishing vessels,
IUU vessel lists, vessel monitoring systems (VMS), observer programmes,
boarding and inspection schemes, trade documentation systems, and trade
restrictive measures are being implemented. These RFMO measures are
continuously setting the standards for fisheries compliance particularly on the
high seas.
More recently, other international initiatives have been developed to address
IUU fishing, including the initial process towards the adoption of a legally
binding agreement on port State measures to combat IUU fishing, schemes to
label legally-caught fish by individual States and independent entities,
legislative measures to address IUU fishing, and cooperative measures outside
the framework of RFMOs. These international developments in addressing
IUU fishing are examined in this chapter.
The IPOA-IUU
The IPOA-IUU is the first international voluntary instrument formulated to
specifically address IUU fishing. 1 Its objective is “to prevent, deter, and
eliminate IUU fishing by providing States with comprehensive, effective, and
transparent measures by which to act, including through appropriate regional
fisheries management organisations, established in accordance with
international law.” 2 The main components of the IPOA-IUU are the scope and
nature of IUU fishing, the measures that may be adopted by States to address
the problem, and the implementation of the international plan of action through
RFMOs. The IPOA-IUU also recognises the special requirements of
developing States in its implementation. In this regard, it requires the
1

Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU), Adopted on 23 June 2001 at the
120th Session of the FAO Council.
2
IPOA-IUU, para. 8.
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cooperation of States, Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), and
international financial institutions to provide financial, technical and other
assistance to developing States in order for them meet their requirements under
the IPOA-IUU. 3
The IPOA-IUU is considered a comprehensive “toolbox”, which has a full
range of measures that can be used by flag States, port States, coastal States,
and “market States” or States which engage in the international trade in fish to
deal with various manifestations of IUU fishing within the jurisdiction of States
and on the high seas. 4 Such measures include the implementation of a fishing
vessel registration and licensing system, maintenance of a record of fishing
vessels, and implementation of a monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS)
system, the requirement to provide an advanced notice of port entry, inspection
of fishing vessels in port, denial of fish landing and transhipment in port, catch
documentation schemes, and trade restrictions. Measures that cut across the
responsibilities of flag, coastal, port, and market States are categorised under
“All State Responsibilities”. These measures include the implementation of
international instruments, development of national plans of action, cooperation
among States, application of sanctions, and adoption of measures against IUU
fishing by vessels without nationality and vessels flying the flags of noncooperating States to RFMOs.
As a “toolbox,” the IPOA-IUU attempts to embrace all existing measures
which States, acting alone, in cooperation with other States, or through
RFMOs, may adopt to combat IUU fishing.5 A State should be able to find an
appropriate tool or a combination of tools in the IPOA-IUU, to address any
incident of IUU fishing.6 There are some overlaps in the application of these
measures, although no contradictory measures can be found within the IPOAIUU. Most of these measures are also addressed in other fisheries-related
international instruments, on which the IPOA-IUU is based, such as the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), 7 UN Fish Stocks
Agreement, 8 FAO Compliance Agreement, 9 and the FAO Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries. 10
3

IPOA-IUU, para. 85.
FAO, Fisheries Department, Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible
Fisheries No. 9, FAO, Rome, 2002, para 16.
5
FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 9, para 16.
6
FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 9, para 16.
7
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, hereinafter referred to as LOSC, Montego Bay,
Jamaica, 04 December 1982.
8
UN, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, 24 July - 04 August 1995.
9
FAO, Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, hereinafter referred to as FAO Compliance Agreement,
Adopted at the 27th Session of the FAO Conference, 24 November 1993.
10
FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, hereinafter referred to as FAO Code of Conduct,
Adopted at the 28th Session of the FAO Conference, Rome, Italy, 31 October 1995.
4
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Paragraph 3 of the IPOA-IUU defines the scope and nature of each of the
components of IUU fishing as:
3.1 Illegal fishing refers to activities:
3.1.1 conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the
jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that State, or in
contravention of its laws and regulations;
3.1.2 conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to
a relevant regional fisheries management organization but
operate in contravention of the conservation and management
measures adopted by that organization and by which the States
are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international
law; or
3.1.3 in violation of national laws or international obligations,
including those undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant
regional fisheries management organization.
3.2 Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.2.1 which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the
relevant national authority, in contravention of national laws
and regulations; or
3.2.2 undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional
fisheries management organization which have not been
reported or have been misreported, in contravention of the
reporting procedures of that organization.
3.3 Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.3.1 in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries
management organization that are conducted by vessels without
nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party to
that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not
consistent with or contravenes the conservation and
management measures of that organization; or
3.3.2 in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no
applicable conservation or management measures and where
such fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent
with State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine
resources under international law.
A closer look at the text of the IPOA-IUU reveals the lack of apparent
connection between Part II on the nature and scope of IUU fishing and Part IV
on the implementation of measures to combat IUU fishing. While Part II of the
IPOA-IUU discusses the scope of each component of IUU fishing, reference is
only made to the general term “IUU fishing” in Part IV. The IPOA-IUU does
not specify which measures address illegal fishing, unreported fishing, or
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unregulated fishing. By failing to provide a clear link between Parts II and IV,
the IPOA-IUU may encourage States to adopt flag, coastal, port, market, and
all State measures as part of their compliance with the international plan of
action, without examining how the international definition of IUU fishing
applies within a national context. This shortcoming is reflected in most national
plans of action (NPOAs) adopted by States. A number of States have
incorporated specific measures against IUU fishing in their NPOAs, but simply
adopted the IUU fishing definition under paragraph 3 of the IPOA-IUU without
indicating how the definition relates to the specific nature of fishing activities
occurring within their jurisdiction or to vessels flying their flags and
conducting fishing operations on the high seas and RFMO areas. 11 As a result,
these NPOAs may have the tendency to become generic documents only with a
list of measures, rather than a concrete plan of action targeting specific IUU
fishing activities. It is reasonable to adopt a NPOA which is broad enough to
cover a wide range of IUU fishing issues and measures; however, it is also
necessary to identify priority IUU concerns which will be addressed by the
NPOA, especially given the limited capacity of most States to simultaneously
address all IUU fishing problems.
Despite some limitations of the IPOA-IUU, it can be considered as one of the
most widely accepted non-binding instruments next to the FAO Code of
Conduct as can be seen by the increasing adoption of IUU-related measures by
States and regional organisations. By creating a non-binding instrument which
embodies measures adopted in binding instruments, States are able to promote
fisheries compliance, which has been largely hindered by the lack of
ratification of some of the key international fisheries agreements. This also
enables States to deal with IUU fishing activities in a more practical manner.
Developments in Addressing IUU Fishing
The IPOA-IUU not only reiterates fisheries management obligations found in
binding agreements but further includes other obligations or fisheries
management measures which may be difficult to incorporate in binding
instruments. As the term IUU fishing has been more widely used, States and
RFMOs have developed and adopted more stringent measures than those
required under the IPOA-IUU. This section provides a discussion of the most
recent developments in combating IUU fishing.
11
See Kingdom of Tonga, Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, September 2004; Ghana, National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, June 2004; US, National Plan of Action of the
United States of America to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing, coordinated by the U.S. Department of State in conjunction with the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, the National Marine Fisheries Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the U.S. Customs Service, 20 February 2003; Republic of Korea,
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Republic of Korea National Plan of Action to Prevent,
Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing, no date; New Zealand, Ministry of
Fisheries, New Zealand Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unregulated and
Unreported Fishing, May 2004.
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Listing of IUU Vessels
In addition to establishing a record of fishing vessels, 12 the IPOA-IUU
encourages RFMOs to maintain a record of vessels engaged in IUU fishing.13
RFMOs such as the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas (ICCAT), Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC),
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission (IATTC), Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), and
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR) have created IUU Vessel Lists for vessels flying the flags of NonContracting Parties which are published on their websites. 14 Among these
organisations, ICCAT, NEAFC, IOTC, and CCAMLR provide that fishing
vessels flying the flag of a Non-Contracting Party sighted in their respective
management areas are presumed to have carried out IUU fishing and are placed
on a provisional IUU list. 15 The flag States are required to demonstrate that
their vessels sighted in the management areas of the RFMOs have not taken
part of any IUU fishing activities or that effective action has already been taken
in response to the IUU fishing activities in question.16 In order to be removed
from the provisional IUU list, flag States have to prove that the vessel has
changed ownership and that the previous owner no longer has any legal,
financial or real interests in the vessel. 17 Flag States also have to demonstrate
that the vessel did not take part in IUU fishing activities, or that the vessel was
only fishing for unregulated resources and has fulfilled all relevant
obligations. 18
While it is more common to include vessels flying the flags of Non-Contracting
Parties (NCP) members in the RFMO IUU Vessels list, some RFMOs also
12
Vessels found in the record of fishing vessels are deemed to be vessels entitled to fly the flag of a
State and authorised to fish on the high seas.
13
IPOA-IUU, para. 81.4.
14
See for example: www.iccat.int/en/IUU.asp; www.nafo.int/fisheries/frames/fishery-iuu.html;
www.iattc.org/VesselRegister/IUU.aspx?Lang=en;
www.iotc.org/English/iuu/search.php;
www.neafc.org/illegal; www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/sc/fish-monit/iuu-vess-list.htm.
15
ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried out
IUU Fishing Activities in the ICCAT Convention area, 06-12, para. 1; NEAFC, Non-Contracting Party
Scheme, no date, Art. 3(1); IOTC, Resolution 06/01 on Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to Have
Carried Out IUU Fishing in the IOTC Area, para. 1; CCAMLR, Conservation Measure 10-07 (2006),
Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation
Measures, para. 3.
16
ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried out
IUU Fishing Activities, para. 1; NEAFC, Non-Contracting Party Scheme, Art. 3(1); IOTC, Resolution
06/01 on Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried Out IUU Fishing, para. 1;
CCAMLR, Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR
Conservation Measures, para. 3.
17
ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish an IUU List, para. 6; NEAFC Non-Contracting
Party Scheme, Art. 9(3); IOTC Resolution on Establishing IUU Vessel List, para. 9; CCAMLR Scheme
to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels, para. 10.
18
ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish an IUU List, para. 6; NEAFC Non-Contracting
Party Scheme, Art. 9(3); IOTC Resolution on Establishing IUU Vessel List, para. 9; CCAMLR Scheme
to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels, para. 10.
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provide for a list of IUU vessels flagged by their Members. 19 As an example,
CCAMLR provides for an IUU list for vessels flying the flags of Contracting
Parties or a CP-IUU Vessel List. A provisional CP-IUU Vessel List is created
based on information provided by other Contracting Parties, trade statistics, and
information gathered by port States. 20 This procedure is similar to that
established for creating a NCP-IUU Vessel List under CCAMLR Conservation
Measure 10-07 (2006).
Similar to other RFMOs, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission (WCPFC) has adopted Conservation and Management Measure
(CMM) 2007-03 on the establishment of a list of vessels presumed to have
carried out IUU fishing in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (revision of
CMM 2006-09). 21 Paragraph 3 of the CMM 2007-03 provides that vessels
fishing for species covered by the WCPFC Convention are presumed to have
carried out IUU fishing activities if there is evidence that such vessels:
a) harvest species covered by the WCPFC Convention in the
Convention Area and are not either on the WCPFC Record of
authorised vessels or a fishing vessel fishing exclusively in waters
under their jurisdiction;
b) conduct fishing activities in waters under the jurisdiction of a state,
without permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and
regulations;
c) do not record or report their catches made in the Convention Area as
required by WCPFC measures in force, or make false reports;
d) take and land undersized fish in contravention of WCPFC
Conservation Measures;
e) fish during closures in contravention of WCPFC Conservation
Measures;
f) use prohibited fishing gear in contravention of WCPFC Conservation
Measures;
g) transship with, participate in joint fishing operations with, support or
re-supply vessels included in the IUU Vessel List;
h) are without nationality and harvest species covered by the WCPFC
Convention in the Convention Area;
i) engage in fishing activities contrary to any other WCPFC
Conservation Measures; or
j) are under the control of the owner of any vessel on the WCPFC IUU
Vessel List.

19
Most vessels included in current RFMO IUU Vessel Lists are flagged by non-contracting parties. As
at January 2009, only IATTC, NEAFC and CCAMLR have included vessels of contracting parties in
their IUU vessel lists.
20
CCAMLR, Conservation Measure 10-06 (2006), Scheme to Promote Compliance by Contracting
Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation Measures, paras. 2 and 3.
21
WCPFC, Conservation and Management Measure to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to have
carried out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the WCPO, Conservation and
Management Measure 2007-03, 07 December 2007.
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The same provision made reference to the IPOA-IUU as the basis of the
definition or characterisation of IUU fishing in the CMM 2007-03. However, a
closer look at the IPOA-IUU would suggest that paragraph 3(j) of CMM 200703 is not included within the scope of the international definition of IUU
fishing.
The WCPFC CMM 2007-03 on IUU fishing was initially agreed unanimously
by Members and Cooperating Non-Members of the Commission in 2006
without any substantive debate nor discussion of the policy rationale for
paragraph 3(j). 22 It can be argued that the implementation of paragraph 3(j) can
be an effective tool in preventing and deterring IUU fishing by identifying
beneficial owners of IUU vessels, encouraging corporate responsibility, and
enabling States to take effective actions against their nationals as required
under the IPOA-IUU. 23
However, the adoption of paragraph 3(j) of CMM 2007-03 has a number of
implications. One, the listing of an entire fleet for the wrongdoing of one vessel
under the same owner or controller seems to be too onerous, as well as
inconsistent with other provisions of the same conservation and management
measure, such as the application of equitable, transparent, and nondiscriminatory measures. Two, extending the IUU list to vessels which have
not committed IUU fishing but are associated with IUU vessels through
ownership or control may not only prove to be a financial burden to a fishing
company but will also affect the general economic situation of the flag State,
particularly small island developing States with small fleets. Three, such
criteria for IUU listing may encourage a quick transfer of ownership to avoid
being on the IUU list. This will make it more difficult for the Commission to
ascertain the beneficial ownership of vessels. Four, CMM 2007-03 is not clear
on the process involved in reporting vessels which fall under the category of
paragraph 3(j). Among the various RFMOs, only IATTC has a similar
provision in its resolution on IUU listing. However, there has been no evidence
to suggest that such provision has been implemented by the IATTC.
The Secretariat of the WCPFC has also highlighted a number of issues with
respect to the implementation of paragraph 3(j) of CMM 2007-03. It maintains
that placing an entire fleet in the WCPFC IUU Vessel List for the violation of
one vessel in the fleet may be excessive and may over-burden the Commission
in their implementation of CMM 2007-03. The concepts of control and
ownership under the provision do not take into account the complexities of
legal ownership and control of vessels, including beneficial ownership
structures that may not be easily traceable. Paragraph 3(j) also has the potential
22
WCPFC, Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC), Fourth Regular Session, 2-7 October 2008,
Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia; WCPFC, Conservation and Management Measure 2007-03:
Outstanding Issues from WCOFC4, WCPFC-TCC4-2008/12, 29 August 2008, para. 7.
23
WCPFC TCC, Conservation and Management Measure 2007-03: Outstanding Issues from
WCPFC4, para. 8.
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to permit the inclusion on the WCPFC IUU Vessel List of vessels that may not
necessarily be fishing in the WCPFC Convention area. 24
The issue with respect to the implementation of paragraph 3(j) of CMM 200703 was raised by South Korea at the Fourth Regular Session of the Commission
in 2007. Since then, there has been a lack of consensus among WCPFC
Members on the matter. South Korea, with the support of other Members of the
Commission, proposed the deletion of this provision 25 while other WCPFC
Members support the implementation of paragraph 3(j), subject to further
elaboration of practical guidelines, as a strong deterrent to IUU fishing.26 It was
agreed by the majority of the WCPFC Members and Cooperating Nonmembers at the Fourth Regular Session of the Technical Compliance
Committee in October 2008 that the Commission will not apply paragraph 3(j)
of CMM 2007-03 as a criterion for IUU listing in developing the Draft IUU
Vessel List in 2009 and that additional procedures that will give effect to the
provision would need to be developed for discussion at the next meeting of the
WCPFC Technical and Compliance Committee. 27
Another issue associated with the WCPFC CMM 2007-03 is its implementation
with respect to CMM 2004-01 on Record of Fishing Vessels and
Authorisations to Fish. Under Article 24(4) of the WCPF Convention and
paragraph 4 of CMM 2004-01, each Member of the Commission is required to
maintain a record of fishing vessels entitled to fly its flag and authorised to fish
in the Convention Area beyond areas of national jurisdiction. The vessels in the
national record are then submitted to the WCPFC for inclusion in the WCPFC
Record of Fishing Vessels. Any vessel not included in the WCPFC Record of
Fishing Vessels are deemed not authorised to fish for, retain on board, tranship
or land highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area beyond the
national jurisdiction of the flag State. 28 This prohibition implies that vessels not
included in the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels are considered IUU fishing
vessels, as substantiated by paragraph 3(a) of CMM 2007-03. The
implementation of CMM 2004-01 and CMM 2007-03 could mean the
establishment of two lists, a Record of Fishing Vessels or a White List, and an
IUU List or a Black List, which may not necessarily complement each other.
This also raises the question as to whether or not the implementation of CMM
2004-01 alone makes the CMM 2007-03 redundant.

24
WCPFC TCC, Conservation and Management Measure 2007-03: Outstanding Issues from
WCPFC4, para. 8.
25
WCPFC, Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session, Tumon, Guam, 3-7 December 2007, paras.
310 and 311.
26
WCPFC TCC, Fourth Regular Session, Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, 2-7 October 2008,
Summary Report, para. 113.
27
WCPFC TCC, Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session, para. 115.
28
WCPFC, Record of Fishing Vessels and Authorisation to Fish, Conservation and Management
Measure 2004-01, 10 December 2004, para 12.
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Other Forms of IUU Listing
There are other less formal initiatives aimed at “naming and shaming” IUU
fishers by compiling and making available to the general public information
about activities of IUU fishers. 29 These initiatives include the Watch List of the
Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO), 30 the International Southern
Oceans Longline Fisheries Information Clearing House (ISOFISH),31 and
Greenpeace International. 32 Although these measures are not provided under
the IPOA-IUU nor conducted directly by States, they nevertheless encourage
States to take measures against IUU vessels included in the lists. Through the
campaigns of these organisations, governments have taken actions to curb IUU
fishing and IUU fishers have been discouraged to engage in such activities. 33
Adoption of a Legally-Binding Agreement on Port State Measures
Under the IPOA-IUU, port States are encouraged to cooperate bilaterally,
multilaterally, or within RFMOs in developing harmonised measures for port
State control of fishing vessels, 34 similar to port State agreements which were
adopted to trace substandard vessels. 35 A Model Scheme on Port State
Measures to Combat IUU Fishing was adopted by the FAO in 2005 which
outlines principles and guidelines to be used by States as a reference for the
negotiation and adoption of measures at the national level, regional memoranda
of understanding (MOUs), and resolutions within RFMOs. 36 The FAO Model
Scheme provides guidelines for carrying out inspections of foreign vessels in
ports, a list of information that should be provided by vessels in advance to port
States, expected results from port inspections, training of port inspectors, and a
proposed information system among port States. 37 The scheme conforms to the
measures adopted under the IPOA-IUU and all relevant rules of international
law.

29
High Seas Task Force, “How to Get Better Information About High Seas Fishing Vessels,”
Presented at the Meeting of the High Seas Task Force, Paris, France, 09 March 2005, Annex page 3.
30
Coalition for Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) Website, Toothfish Vessels, www.colto.org.
Accessed on 28 December 2008.
31
See High Seas Task Force, How to Get Better Information About High Seas Fishing Vessels, Annex
page 3.
32
See Greenpeace International Website, Blacklist, http://blacklist.greenpeace.org/
Accessed on 28 December 2008.
33
See Fallon, L. D. and Kriwoken, L. K. “International Influence of an Australian Nongovernment
Organisation in the Protection of Patagonian Toothfish,” in Ocean Development and International Law
35, 2004, pp. 221-266.
34
IPOA-IUU, par. 62.
35
For example Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Port State Control (PSC), Indian
Ocean MOU on Port State Control, Black Sea MOU on Port State Control, Tokyo MOU on Port State
Control, Caribbean MOU on PSC, Latin American Agreements on Port State Control of Vessels.
36
FAO, Report of the Technical Consultation to Review Port State Measures to Combat Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Rome, Italy, 31 August-02 September 2004; FAO Fisheries
Report No. 759, FAO, Rome, para. 16.
37
FAO Fisheries Report No. 759, Appendix E.
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At the Twenty-seventh Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI), it
was agreed that an expert consultation be convened in 2007 to prepare a draft
agreement on port State measures to combat IUU fishing and present it to the
Twenty-eighth COFI Session in 2009. 38 Three technical consultations have also
been held since then to deliberate on the draft agreement. 39
The draft port State agreement applies to all foreign fishing vessels that are
seeking entry into a port State or are in one of its ports, with the exception of
artisanal vessels of a neighbouring State engaged in fishing for subsistence. 40 A
port State may also choose not to apply the agreement to licensed chartered
vessels which are fishing exclusively in areas under its national jurisdiction. 41
However, in both circumstances, the draft port State agreement provides that a
port State must ensure that those vessels are subject to effective measures that
prevent IUU fishing. The draft port State agreement also recognises the
sovereignty of States over ports located in their territories, including the right to
adopt more stringent measures than what is provided under the agreement in
accordance with international law. 42
The provisions of this draft port State agreement are based on the FAO Model
Scheme; however, the legal nature of this agreement would strengthen the
application of port enforcement actions against vessels believed to have
conducted IUU fishing. For example, Article 9 of the draft port State agreement
provides for the right of a port State to deny a vessel the use of its ports for
landing, transhipping, or processing of fish if:
•
the vessel was engaged in fishing in an area and for fish under the
competence of an RFMO and was not flying the flag of a State that is
a member or a cooperating non-member of that organisation;
•
has been reported as engaged in, or supporting IUU fishing in an
RFMO area or in areas under the national jurisdiction of a coastal
State; or
•
has been identified as participating or supporting unregulated fishing
activities in areas or in relation to species where there are no
applicable conservation or management measures and where the said
38

FAO, Committee on Fisheries, Report of the Twenty-seventh Session of the FAO Committee on
Fisheries, 5-9 March 2007, Rome, Italy, para 68. See also, FAO, Report of the Expert Consultation to
Draft a Legally-binding Instrument on Port State Measures, Washington, D.C., USA, 4-8 September
200; FAO Fisheries Report No. 846, Rome, FAO, 2007.
39
Technical Consultation to Draft a Legally-binding Instrument on Port State Measures to Prevent,
Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Rome, Italy, 23-27 June 2008;
Informal Open-ended Technical Meeting to Review the Annexes of the Draft Legally-binding
Instrument on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing, Rome, Italy, 25-27
November 2008; and a resumed session on Technical Consultation to Draft a Legally-binding
Instrument on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, Rome, Italy, 26-29 January 2009.
40
Draft Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, in FAO, Report of Expert Consultation to Draft a Legally-biding Instrument on
Port State Measures, FAO Fisheries Report No. 846, Art. 3(1).
41
Draft Port State Agreement, Art. 3(1bis).
42
Draft Port State Agreement, Preamble and Art. 4(1)(b).
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fishing activities are not carried out in accordance with
responsibilities relevant to the conservation of living marine
resources that fall on the State in accordance with international law.
In such cases, the burden of proof lies with the fishing vessel. The draft
agreement also provides for mechanisms for appeal in cases where the owner,
operator, or representative of the fishing vessel does not agree with the actions
of the port State. 43 It also provides for the obligation of the Party to the
agreement to ensure that the owner or operator of the fishing vessel is entitled
to compensation for any loss or damage suffered as a consequence of undue
delay. 44 These provisions are not found in the FAO Model Scheme and offer
protection to fishing vessels in case of undue delay, which is crucial if an
international agreement on port State measures is to be adopted.
One criticism that may be raised of the text of the draft agreement on port State
measures is the characterisation of actions that may be grounds for believing
that a vessel has engaged in, or supported IUU fishing. Article 17 of the draft
port State agreement lists a number of actions constituting IUU fishing which
contain qualifiers that may be subject to different interpretations, such as
“serious failure to maintain accurate records of catch and catch-related data”,
“serious misreporting of catch”, “significant fishing in a closed area during a
closed season or contrary to applicable effort or quota requirements,” “using
fishing gear that is significantly inconsistent with authorised gear,” and
“serious failure to comply with requirements for VMS.” These references to
IUU fishing activities are not as strong compared to the list of activities
considered as IUU fishing under RFMO conservation and management
measures. This provision would therefore need further review if States are
aiming for a harmonised set of port measures to combat IUU fishing.
One of the identified advantages of the current process of drafting the port State
agreement is that it is considered more inclusive than the development of the
FAO Model Scheme. 45 The adoption of the draft port State agreement also
addresses the constraints and gaps found in the implementation of the FAO
Model Scheme and may strengthen the prospects for coordinated efforts to
combat IUU fishing.46 However, just like in any international agreement, only
a wide ratification and effective implementation of the agreement can achieve
the objective of deterring IUU fishing in ports.

43

Draft Port State Agreement, Art. 18.
Draft Agreement on Port State Measures, Art. 19.
45
Swan, J. “Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing: International and Regional Developments,”
in Sustainable Development Law and Policy VII:1, 2006, p. 43.
46
Swan, Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing, p. 43.
44
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Measures to Prevent IUU Fishing in National Legislation
States have incorporated provisions in national legislation to strengthen
measures to combat IUU fishing. For example, a number of States have
adopted measures to exercise effective control over their nationals. Some States
have made it a violation in their law for their nationals to engage in fishing
activities that violate fisheries conservation and management laws of any other
State or that undermine the effectiveness of conservation and management
measures adopted by a relevant RFMO. 47 For example, New Zealand, in its
fisheries legislation, prohibits its nationals from taking or transporting fish,
aquatic life, or seaweed in the national fisheries jurisdiction of a foreign State
contrary to the laws of that State. 48 Australia also makes it an offence for its
citizens fishing in foreign vessels beyond the Australian fisheries zone to
conduct operations in contravention of international conservation and
management measures in the high seas, such as those established by the
WCPFC. 49
Some States have also exercised jurisdiction based on the active nationality
principle, by enacting laws which would punish their own nationals for taking
part in IUU fishing operations, even if on board the vessels of other States. 50
An example of a State which has exercised this kind of jurisdiction is the
United States, through the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981. According to this
Act, “It is unlawful for any person to import, export, transport, sell, receive,
acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce any fish or wildlife
taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of any law or regulation of
any State or in violation of a foreign law.” 51 This approach of “long arm
enforcement” has been considered effective in controlling the IUU fishing
activities of US nationals outside national jurisdiction.52 Pacific Island States
have also implemented Lacey Act-type laws that authorise them to regulate
fisheries imports such as Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands,
Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tonga. 53
In addition to the Lacey Act, the US has specifically adopted a definition of and
measures to address IUU fishing that appear to be more rigorous than what is
47
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required under the IPOA-IUU. The definition of IUU fishing has been
incorporated in Section 403 of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Reauthorisation Act. Section 403 amends the High Seas
Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act by adding, among other things, a
new Section 609 on IUU fishing. Section 609(e)(3) provides the definition of
IUU fishing, at the minimum as:
a) fishing activities that violate conservation and management measures
required under an international fishery management agreement to
which the United States is a party, including catch limits or quotas,
capacity restrictions, and bycatch reduction requirements;
b) overfishing of fish stocks shared by the United States, for which
there are no applicable international conservation or management
measures or in areas with no applicable international fishery
management organisation or agreement, that has adverse impacts on
such stocks; and
c) fishing activity that has an adverse impact on seamounts,
hydrothermal vents, and cold water corals located beyond national
jurisdiction, for which there are no applicable international
conservation or management measures or in areas with no applicable
international fishery management organisation or agreement. 54
By adopting this definition of IUU fishing, the US has extended the application
of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorisation Act of 2006 to areas beyond national jurisdiction and to
fisheries with no current international regulations.
In implementing this provision, the US lists a nation if:
(1) fishing vessels of that nation are engaged, or have been engaged during
the preceding calendar year in fishing activities or practices;
a) in waters beyond any national jurisdiction that result in bycatch of a
protected living marine resource; or
b) beyond the exclusive economic zone of the United States that result
in bycatch of a protected living marine resource shared by the United
States;
(2) the relevant international organisation for the conservation and
protection of such resources or the relevant international or regional
fishery organisation has failed to implement effective measures to end
or reduce such bycatch, or the nation is not a party to, or does not
maintain cooperating status with, such organisation; and
(3) the nation has adopted a regulatory program governing such fishing
practices designed to end or reduce such bycatch that is comparable to
that of the United States, taking into account different conditions.” 55
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The US also aims to establish a procedure for determining if a nation listed
under section 609 of the amended High Seas Driftnet Moratorium Protection
Act has taken corrective actions with respect to the offending activities of its
fishing vessels. 56 Such certification procedure shall provide for giving notice
and an opportunity for comment by such nation.57 Any nation which has not
been certified or for which a negative certification has been issued will be
subject to 16 USC 1826(a), (b)(3), and (b)(4) which provide for the denial of
port privileges for the IUU vessels, prohibition on the imports of fish and fish
products, and application of other economic sanctions.
In January 2009, a rule to implement the identification and certification
procedures to address IUU fishing activities has been proposed. This proposed
rule is accompanied by a draft environmental assessment, regulatory impact
review, and regulatory flexibility act analysis. 58 An environmental assessment
explores the impacts of IUU fishing and bycatch of protected marine living
resources which provides the public with a context for reviewing proposed
certification action. Two separate procedures are being developed for the
purpose of implementing the amended legislation. One procedure is for the
certification of nations that have been identified as having fishing vessels
engaged in IUU fishing and the other is for nations that have been identified as
having fishing vessels engaged in activities resulting in the bycatch of protected
living marine resources. 59 At the time of writing, the US is soliciting comments
on the IUU certification procedure and the draft environmental assessment,
which are yet to be finalised.
These legislative measures are significantly different from the measures
adopted under the United States NPOA-IUU. The latter has less restrictive
policies than what has been provided under the amended Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorisation Act. By embracing a
similar concept of an RFMO IUU Vessel List and adopting specific measures
to address IUU fishing in areas outside its jurisdiction, the US may be
considered to be applying a much “longer arm of enforcement,” in terms of
broadening the application of its national laws to fisheries outside its
jurisdiction and by implying a requirement for other States to adopt
conservation and management regulations similar to those of the US. The
56
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implementation of these provisions has a potential impact on the trade
relationships of the US with other States. If a trading partner of the US cannot
ensure that its fish products have been derived through legal means, the fish
exports of that partner country run the risk of being rejected at the border and
will not reach the US market. These IUU measures have detrimental impacts
particularly on developing States, as in the case of the application of the new
regulation adopted by the European Community against IUU fishing which is
discussed in succeeding sections.
Promoting Responsible Fishing Through Trade Documentation and
Labelling
Trade Documentation for Fish under RFMOs
Trade documentation refers to “schemes established by RFMOs that require
documentation to accompany particular fish and fish products through
international trade identifying the origin of fish for the purpose of ascertaining
levels of unreported fishing.” 60 Two of the most commonly used schemes for
documenting fish and fish product are catch certification and trade documents.
Catch certification is issued by relevant national authorities at the point of
harvesting and covers all fish to be landed or transhipped, while a trade
document is issued only with respect to products that enter international
trade. 61 RFMOs such as ICCAT, IATTC, IOTC, and the Commission for the
Conservation of Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) have adopted trade documentation
programmes, while CCAMLR has adopted a Catch Documentation Scheme for
toothfish (Dissostichus) which is an amalgam of catch certification and trade
documentation schemes.
The Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Programme of ICCAT applies to all
bluefin tuna imported into the territory of a Contracting Party. The Bluefin
Tuna Statistical Document must contain information on imported, exported, or
re-exported fish and fish products such as the name of the country issuing the
document; description of vessel; name of the exporter and the importer;
description of fish for re-export; area of harvest of the fish in the shipment;
gear utilised to catch the fish; type of product and total weight; and point of
export. 62 The document is validated by a government official of the flag State
60
FAO, Report of the Expert Consultation of Regional Fisheries Management Bodies on
Harmonisation of Catch Certification, FAO Fisheries Report No. 697, hereinafter referred to as FAO
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of the vessel that harvested the tuna. 63 ICCAT also implements equivalent
Statistical Document Programmes for swordfish, bigeye tuna, and other
species. 64 Other RFMOs such as the CCSBT, IATTC, and IOTC have very
comparable statistical document programmes and utilise very similar trade
document forms. 65
Unlike the statistical document programmes, the Catch Documentation Scheme
for Dissostichus spp. (CDS) adopted by CCAMLR aims not only to identify the
origin of toothfish imported into or exported from its territories, but also to
determine whether the toothfish was harvested in a manner consistent with
CCAMLR conservation measures. 66 Each landing of toothfish at the port of a
Contracting Party needs to be accompanied by a Dissostichus catch document
(DCD) which contains information of the issuing authority; description of the
vessel; reference number of the fishing license; weight of, area where, and date
when the catch was taken; date and port at which the catch was landed; and
information on the recipients of the catch and amount of each species and
product type received. 67 In addition to this information, the DCD also requires
information on landing and transhipment. 68 Provision for the collection of the
information in the DCD is not found in the trade documents of ICCAT,
CCSBT, IATTC, and IOTC. However, similar to the practice of these RFMOs,
validation of the DCD also needs to be undertaken by proper authorities of
CCAMLR Members. 69 The Export or Re-export Government Authority
Validation is not certified when the shipment of toothfish is declared to have
been caught by any vessel included in the IUU list. 70 If, as a result of the
examination of a DCD, a question arises as to the information contained in the
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document, the flag State is called upon to cooperate with the importing State to
resolve the question. 71
There are two major gaps in the implementation of trade documentation and
catch certification schemes. First, there is no complete coverage of fisheries
trade utilising these schemes. In the case of CCAMLR’s CDS for example,
among the 56 States trading for toothfish, only 35 States are believed to be
complying with CDS requirements. 72 This gap may create an opportunity for
the trade of IUU caught toothfish. Second, statistical document programmes do
not require statements that the catch had been made in compliance with
regional fisheries conservation and management measures and do not directly
prohibit the importation of illegally harvested tuna. Hence, such types of catch
documentation schemes do not necessarily identify IUU-caught fish. There is
therefore a need to fill these gaps in the implementation of trade documentation
and catch certification schemes in order for this measure to effectively address
IUU fishing.
AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certification
The Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP)
provides for the certification of AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna and Tuna
Products. 73 An AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certificate is a document issued by
the department of a national government which is responsible for implementing
the procedures for the certification of AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna. 74 An AIDCP
Dolphin Safe Tuna Label may be used on the packaging of the tuna certified
under the program. 75 It is a graphic representation which distinguishes dolphin
safe tuna and tuna products. This certification is implemented together with the
System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna. 76 The purpose of the system for
tracking and verifying tuna is to enable dolphin safe tuna to be distinguished
from non-dolphin safe tuna from the time of capture, during unloading, storage,
transfer, and processing, or to the time it is ready for retail sale. 77 Tuna which
is positively identified by the IATTC as having been caught in contravention of
IATTC tuna conservation and management measures is not eligible for AIDCP
Dolphin Safe Tuna Certificate. 78 Such measure not only addresses illegal
fishing for tuna in the IATTC area, but also bycatch issues associated with IUU
fishing. Among the Pacific Island countries, only Vanuatu has ratified the
AIDCP. There are also other dolphin-safe tuna labelling initiatives which are
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supported by non-government organisations, either with or without a third party
certification process. 79
Marine Stewardship Council Eco-labelling Standard
Another scheme that promotes sustainable fishing, although it does not directly
target IUU fishing, is eco-labelling. One of the most popular initiatives in ecolabelling is the formulation of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 80
Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fisheries. These principles consider the
status of the target fish stocks, impact of the fishery on the ecosystem, and
performance of the fishery management system. 81 Certain operational criteria
under these principles ensure that fishing activities are in compliance with all
legal and administrative requirements of a State and that fish has not been
caught through IUU fishing activities, such as the use of destructive fishing
methods. 82 Fisheries which conform to these principles and criteria are
certified. However, the MSC eco-labelling programme is voluntary and has a
very limited scope. As at October 2008, there are 858 MSC-labelled seafood
products sold in 34 countries worldwide. 83 This involves 35 fisheries
accredited to the MSC standards and 74 others are currently undergoing
assessment. 84 Over 7 per cent of the world’s wild-capture fisheries are now
engaged in the program, either as certified fisheries or in full assessment
against the MSC standard for a sustainable fishery. 85 There is currently no
company owned by Pacific Island countries which is certified to carry a MSC
logo.
To address the inability of some fisheries to conform to existing standards for
sustainable fishery, a new process has been established to develop new
technical guidelines to help fisheries with insufficient data to be certified under
the MSC. The new guidelines introduce a risk assessment that will be initiated
on small-scale and data-deficient fisheries to assess their performance and
provide an alternative route to certification against MSC standards. 86 There are
currently four fisheries in Africa and South America which are participating in
the trials to test the new guidelines for the assessment of small-scale and datadeficient fisheries. 87
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There are various advantages for implementing eco-labelling schemes for fish
and fisheries products. Eco-labelling programmes can provide information
about the environmental impact of products, provide consumers with the
opportunity to express their environmental or ecological concerns through their
purchasing behaviour, enhance incentives for producers to supply products that
meet eco-labelling requirements, and encourage retailers and consumers to buy
only fisheries products that come from sustainably managed resources. 88 For
the purpose of combating IUU fishing, eco-labelling schemes may be used to
distinguish between fish which have been caught contrary to fisheries
conservation and management measures of a State or RFMO and those which
have been caught in a sustainable manner.
However, there are challenges in the implementation of the MSC eco-labelling
scheme. There have been criticisms that eco-labelling processes of certain
fisheries, such as the western rock lobster, New Zealand hoki and South
Georgia toothfish, have been inaccurate and misleading, have failed to address
the problem of IUU fishing, and have not complied with the MSC Principles
and Criteria for Sustainable Fisheries. 89 Another challenge is the accountability
in and transparency of the MSC certification process, as well as the refinement
and consistent interpretation and implementation of the MSC Principles and
Criteria. 90 It has been submitted that the implementation of the MSC ecolabelling process could be improved through the identification of critical
indicators for failing a certification process such as the failure to follow
scientific advice in management and the levels of IUU fishing in the fishery
and by-catch levels. 91
Unilever’s Fish Sustainability Initiative (FSI)
Related to the campaign on sustainable fisheries is Unilever’s Fish
Sustainability Initiative (FSI). Unilever has committed to buy its fish from
sustainable sources and supports the Marine Stewardship Council standard for
fish certification. In 1996, Unilever wrote to all of its suppliers asking them to
confirm that their fish were legally caught in specified FAO statistical areas
and has stopped doing business with suppliers who could not offer that
confirmation. 92 Unilever has established its own assessment tool known as the
‘traffic light system’, where each fishery is assessed according to five
indicators: fisheries research, quota system, regulatory tools, control systems,
and long-term management plan. 93 The effect of fishing on marine ecosystems
is also taken into account. 94 The assessment results are graded based on three
88
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colours—red, green, and yellow. A fishery that gets all green colours is deemed
sustainable and Unilever recommends that they seek certification under MSC
standards. Those that show a mix of green and yellow are deemed managed and
progressing, and those that get one or more red are considered poorly managed.
The fishery is deemed unmanaged if its assessment scores red in all five
indicators. Unilever does not obtain fish from unmanaged fisheries and
supports those which are making progress towards sustainability. 95
More companies are now supporting more sustainable fisheries. Retailers like
Wal-Mart and Asquith and Dairies (ASDA) have pledged to switch to 100 per
cent MSC-certified fish within 3 to 5 years. 96 The widening campaign against
IUU fishing is progressively establishing a trend towards buying legally-caught
fish, which could result in loss of market for fishing companies which cannot
comply with international and regional certification processes.
Regional Cooperation to Address IUU Fishing
Cooperation among States to combat IUU fishing also exists outside the
framework of RFMOs. Some of the recent examples of this form of
cooperation are: the adoption of the Regional Plan of Action to Promote
Responsible Fishing involving States in Southeast Asia; the proposed strategies
to eradicate IUU fishing in the European Community; High Seas Task Force
work on Best RFMO Practices; and the Africa Caribbean and Pacific Group of
States-European Union (ACP-EU) Joint Parliamentary Assembly meeting on
IUU fishing. 97 These initiatives highlight the need for strengthened cooperation
among States in order to effectively address IUU fishing.
Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing, including Combating
IUU Fishing in the Region
The Regional Plan of Action (RPOA) to Promote Responsible Fishing
Practices including Combating IUU Fishing in the Region was approved by the
Ministers of Republic of Indonesia, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, TimorLeste and Vietnam on 5 May 2007 at Bali, Indonesia. The RPOA is a voluntary
instrument that draws on core principles from binding and non-binding
international fisheries instruments for promoting responsible fishing practices.
The objective of the RPOA is to enhance and strengthen the overall level of
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fisheries management in the region, in order to sustain fisheries resources and
the marine environment, and to optimise the benefit of adopting responsible
fishing practices. 98
There are 12 actions adopted under the RPOA which cover conservation of
fisheries resources and their environment, managing fishing capacity, and
combating IUU fishing in three areas: the South China Sea, the Arafura-Timor
Seas, and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas (Celebes Sea). Some of the specific actions
include collaboration to compile an overview of artisanal and industrial fishing;
the current status of fish stocks trade flows and markets; implementation of
international and regional instruments; improvement of data collection systems;
assessment and management of fishing capacity; adoption of port State
measures; implementation of regional market measures; strengthening of MCS
systems; monitoring of transhipment activities; and capacity-building.
In order to ensure the implementation of the RPOA, a Coordination Committee
composed of officials from participating States has been established. The
Coordination Committee is a high level decision-making body which provides
strategic advice and direction to RPOA members. Regular meetings are held to
discuss and monitor the implementation of the RPOA. At the initial meeting of
the RPOA, five strategic priority areas were identified for strengthening and
implementing further measures. These areas are strengthening MCS systems,
coastal State responsibilities, regional capacity building, current resource and
management situation in the region, and port State measures. Workshops have
been held on MCS in order to identify relevant issues, needs, and potential
actions for the region. 99
EC Regulation on IUU Fishing
Apart from its active participation in RFMOs in combating IUU fishing, the
European Commission (EC) has adopted specific measures to address the
problem. The EC is one of the first regional organisations to adopt a
Community Action Plan for the Eradication of IUU Fishing in 2002. 100 The
Community Action Plan focused on strengthening the control of fishing
activities, particularly of European Union (EU) vessels and nationals to deter
98
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and sanction illegal fishing activities. Four years after the adoption of the
European Community Plan of Action, a new strategy was proposed to address
IUU fishing. The strategy aims to improve port State control of third country
fishing vessels and control of third country fishery products to close the market
to IUU fish products.
There have been a number of criticisms on the proposed EC strategy to combat
IUU fishing. It was perceived that proposed measures on traceability of fish
and fishery products from third country vessels may lead to the exclusion of
products of developing countries from EU markets if they are unable to
comply. 101 The requirement on third country flag States to demonstrate that
produce on board vessels has been caught legally through certification is a
capability that may not exist in developing countries. 102 Similarly, a ban on all
products from States which fail to ensure that their vessels comply with
conservation and management measures, rather than a restriction solely applied
to specific vessels or companies involved in illegal fishing, is also of concern to
some stakeholders. 103 In these proposed measures, the onus to demonstrate
compliance with the EU strategy lies with the developing flag State.
Despite concerns raised by developing trade partners of the EC, this strategy
became the basis for drafting the EC IUU Regulation. On 29 September 2008,
the Council of the European Union adopted EC No 1005/2008 establishing a
Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing. 104 This regulation is scheduled to enter into force on 1
January 2010. 105
The EC IUU Regulation applies to “any vessel of any size used for or intended
for use for the purposes of commercial exploitation of fishery resources,
including support ships, fish processing vessels, and vessels engaged in
transhipment and carrier vessels equipped for the transportation of fishery
products, except container vessels”. 106 The EC IUU Regulation also applies to
“any products which fall under Chapter 03 (fish and crustaceans, molluscs and
other aquatic invertebrates), and Tariff headings 1604 (prepared or preserved
fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs) and 1605
(crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved)
of the Combined Nomenclature established by Council Regulation (EEC) No
2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the
101
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Common Customs tariff, with the exception of products listed in Annex 1 of
this Regulation.” 107
The EC IUU Regulation comprises four key elements: port control over third
country fishing vessels; catch certification requirements; establishment of the
Community IUU vessel list; and establishment of a list of non-cooperating third
countries. Among these components, the implementation of catch certification
requirements and listing of non-cooperating third countries would have the
most impact on Pacific Island States.
The EC IUU Regulation requires that the importation, exportation and indirect
importation of fishery products be allowed only when accompanied by catch
certificates validated by the flag State of the vessel. 108 As a rule, importers
must submit validated catch certificates to the competent authorities of the EC
member State in which the product is intended to be imported at least three
working days before the estimated time of arrival into the territory of that
State. 109 If an importer has been granted the status of an approved economic
operator, it has the option to merely advise the EC member State of the arrival
of the product and keep the validated catch certificates for verification of the
competent authority at a later stage when the fishery product has entered the
territory of the EC member State. 110 The status of an approved economic
operator may be granted on the basis of certain criteria, including an
appropriate record of compliance with relevant conservation and management
measures. 111 If a third country fishing vessel has not complied with catch
certification requirements under the EU IUU Regulation, a range of actions
may be taken by an EC member State, such as the refusal to import the fishery
product associated with the catch certification. 112
The implementation of catch certification requirements under the EC IUU
Regulation has a number of implications for Pacific Island States. In order to
ensure that fisheries products are not denied entry into the territories of the EC
Members, Pacific Island States will need to establish a national catch
certification and validation scheme that complies with the requirements of the
EC IUU Regulation. Such a scheme would also need to take into account the
nature and management of domestic-based foreign-owned fishing vessels
operating in a number of Pacific Island States and ensure that they exercise
control over the activities of vessels under such arrangement. In order to
facilitate export of fishery products into the EC, Pacific Island States would
further need to establish a system for granting fishing companies and
establishments the status of approved economic operators, similar to the
107
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regulations on determining authorised establishments which comply with EC
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations. The implementation of national catch
certification systems to meet the requirements of the EC IUU Regulation
entails cost to developing trade partners of EC member States, including
Pacific Island States.
Another measure adopted under the EC IUU Regulation which has a potential
negative impact on Pacific Island States is the establishment of a list of noncooperating States. According to the EC IUU Regulation, a State may be
identified as a non-cooperating third country if it fails to discharge the duties
incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market States
and to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing activities. 113 The
listing of such States is based on a number of factors, including the
implementation of relevant international obligations by the third country in
question, the IUU fishing record of its vessels, operators and nationals, and its
record in taking effective enforcement actions in respect of the IUU fishing
activities by its nationals. 114
Furthermore, the EC IUU Regulation prohibits the importation into the EC of
fishery products caught by fishing vessels flying the flag of non-cooperating
third countries and non-acceptance of catch certificates accompanying such
products. 115 The EC IUU Regulation also contains a provision on the
denunciation by the EC of any standing bilateral fisheries agreement or
fisheries partnership agreements with non-cooperating third countries, refusal
to enter into negotiations to conclude a bilateral fisheries agreement or fisheries
partnership agreements with such States, and prohibition of private trade
arrangements between nationals of an EC Member State and the noncooperating third country. 116 These particular provisions may affect the
Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, and Kiribati which currently
have bilateral access agreements with the EC. Enforcement of this nature
functions as economic sanctions and goes beyond what is provided under the
IPOA-IUU and RFMO schemes against IUU fishing. Since procedures on how
these provisions will be implemented have not been established, it not clear as
to how the EC will make the assessment of how and why a State can be listed
as a non-cooperating State. There is potential for discriminatory application of
these provisions should the EC fail to implement the same level of stringent
measures against its Members. 117
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ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly Meeting on IUU Fishing
As a response to the impending implementation of the EC IUU Regulation, the
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 118 held a meeting in Port Moresby,
Papua New Guinea on 25 November 2008 to discuss the threats posed by IUU
fishing and the necessary interventions within the context of EC IUU
Regulation. A number of issues have been raised by ACP States such as the
lack of capacity and resources to implement the new regulation, increased
pressure on the market of fisheries product entering EU territories, and the lack
of proper consultation by the EC when the regulation was being prepared.119
The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly resolved that further meetings be
conducted in 2009 and 2010 to discuss the scale of IUU fishing issues and the
support that the EC may offer the ACP States to adapt and comply with the
new regulation.
RFMO Best Practices
In March 2006, the Ministerially-led Task Force on IUU Fishing on the High
Seas 120 launched a report which included a proposal to develop a “model” for
improved governance by RFMOs. In January 2007, an initiative began to
develop a common methodology and set of criteria for the core functions of the
five tuna RFMOs to guide the organisations through individual performance
reviews. 121 The report has nine subject areas: general practice; conservation
and management; allocation; compliance and enforcement; decision-making;
dispute settlement; transparency; special requirements of developing countries;
and institutional practices.
The report reiterates some of the key measures implemented by RFMOs and
recommends the adoption of a comprehensive system of control to ensure
compliance with their conservation and management measures. This system of
control should include a register of all fishing vessels, transhipment and
support vessels, and a centralised VMS that reports high seas fishing operations
118
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to RFMOs in real time. It is recommended that the system should also have
port State measures that would only allow landing and transhipment in ports
from fishing vessels confirmed to have conformed to conservation and
management measures. The system of control should further have trade and
market-related measures such as catch certification and trade documentation
scheme, particularly for high-value fisheries. Other proposed measures to be
included in the system are observer programmes and inspection schemes. 122
There are other RFMO practices recommended by the High Seas Task Force on
compliance and enforcement. The report recommends a system for punishing
flag States and/or their vessels and nationals for violations of RFMO
conservation and management measures, as well as the requirement to follow
up any violations by its flagged vessels and report on the domestic actions
taken to the relevant RFMO. Another recommended practice is the adoption of
schemes to target non-parties fishing in contravention of RFMO conservation
and management measures, such as blacklisting non-party vessels and listing
irresponsible flag States followed by agreed actions against those vessels and
States. 123 This report indicates the general view of most RFMOs that IUU
vessel listing should be directed against vessels of third parties fishing in
RFMO areas. In the case of nationals of members of RFMOs, the report
recommends that schemes to promote compliance by national vessels must be
adopted. In this report, there was no reference to the creation of IUU listing for
vessels flying the flags of RFMO members.
Conclusion
After the adoption of the IPOA-IUU, various measures have been adopted to
address IUU fishing at a much broader and more effective manner. Most of
these measures are being implemented rigorously by individual States and
regional organisations, and it will not be surprising to see the adoption of more
stringent measures to combat IUU fishing in years to come. Such development
not only signifies the increasing awareness on the negative impacts of IUU
fishing, but also demonstrates a better understanding of the gaps in the existing
international regulatory framework and the need to strengthen measures to deal
with the problem. However, there are still a number of issues that need to be
addressed in the implementation of measures such as IUU vessel listing, trade
documentation, labelling of fish, and listing of non-cooperating States. Such
measures need to take into account the nature of IUU fishing issues and the
legal implications of adopting some of these restrictive measures. States will
also need to strengthen measures at the domestic level to control their nationals
and explore other avenues of cooperation in order to address IUU fishing.
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4. The FAO Global Record of Fishing Vessels: Issues for Pacific
Island States and the Forum Fisheries Agency
Gail Lugten*

Introduction
In 1993, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
concluded the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas
(hereafter referred to as the Compliance Agreement). 1 The primary aim of the
Compliance Agreement was to address the increasing global problem of
reflagged fishing vessels or vessels which were attempting to escape the
jurisdiction (and control) of their flag State. 2 The Compliance Agreement
proposed numerous significant measures, but for the purposes of this chapter,
the provisions relating to the need for, and establishment of, a global record of
fishing vessels, are of particular significance. 3
History suggests that the Compliance Agreement may have been drafted too
soon. Although it was a prompt response to the reflagging problem in 1993, the
problem was to significantly magnify over the following years until 1997 when
the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR) became the first forum to expressly identify and label illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing). 4 It was soon apparent that
* The author wishes to acknowledge the intellectual contribution of Dr. Denzil Miller, Executive
Secretary of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, (CCAMLR,
Hobart).
1
FAO, Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, FAO, Rome, 1993, 41 ISBN 92-5-103834-1. In accordance with
Article XI (1) of the Compliance Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 April 2003 when
the Republic of Korea became the twenty-fifth State to accept the Agreement. There are currently 38
instruments of acceptance: Albania, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Brazil,
Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Egypt, European Community, Georgia, Ghana,
Japan, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, New Zealand,
Norway, Oman, Peru, Republic of Korea, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, Seychelles, Sweden, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tanzania, United States of America and Uruguay. (Note most recent acceptance by
Brazil on 2 March 2009.)
2
The existing legal regime on fishing for living resources of the high seas is covered in Articles 116119 of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) but as a mechanism to deal with
reflagging of fishing vessels, the existing regime was inadequate. The Compliance Agreement aimed to
interpret, in practical terms, the LOSC provisions.
3
Compliance Agreement Article IV, Records of Fishing Vessels; Article V, International Cooperation;
and Article VI Exchange of Information.
4
The first appearance of the term “IUU” was in relation to Patagonian Toothfish fishing in the
Southern Ocean, and it occurred in the 1997 annual meeting of the Convention for the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). Refer CCAMLR-XVI (1997) paragraphs 8.7-8.13.
The preferred definition/explanation of IUU fishing is that offered in the FAO IPOA –IUU fishing (see
Chapter 3 for detail). The FAO IPOA-IUU was adopted by consensus at FAO Committee on Fisheries
(COFI) on 2 March 2001. Available online through Legal Materials at http://www.fao.org
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combating IUU fishing would require broader domestic, regional and
international action than simply becoming a party to the Compliance
Agreement. Many States appear to have weighed up the effectiveness of the
Compliance Agreement, and their cost/benefit analysis led them to reject the
instrument as a remedy for IUU fishing. Consequently, the number of
instruments of acceptance for the Compliance Agreement is sparse, its entry
into force was slow, and its global record of fishing vessels has never been
effectively realised.
Six years after the Compliance Agreement, the call for a Global Record of
fishing vessels was restated with some urgency in the International Plan of
Action (IPOA) for the Management of Fishing Capacity. 5 Here, paragraph 18
provides, “while awaiting the entry into force of the [Compliance Agreement],
States should support the establishment by FAO by the end of 2000 of an
international record of fishing vessels operating in the high seas, following the
model indicated in the Compliance Agreement.” 6
The wheels of progress have turned slowly and the next call for the Global
Record occurred on 9 March 2005 when the Ministerially-led Task Force on
IUU Fishing on the High Seas agreed on the need to “establish a global
information system on high seas fishing vessels in the form of a publicly
available international database of information relating to the global high seas
fishing fleet.” 7
Also in 2005, the Rome Declaration on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing identified and called for “new actions” to address IUU fishing
including the development of:
A comprehensive global record of fishing vessels within FAO, including
refrigerated transport vessels and supply vessels, that incorporates
available information on beneficial ownership, subject to confidentiality
requirements in accordance with national law. 8
Finally in 2008, real movement occurred to support the calls for a FAO Global
Record. From 25-28 February, FAO conducted an Expert Consultation on the
Development of a Comprehensive Global Record of Fishing Vessels,
Refrigerated Vessels and Fishing Support Vessels (hereafter referred to as the
Expert Consultation). The purpose of the consultation was to determine
5

Refer FAO website: www.fao.org/docrep/006/x3170e/x3170e04.htm (accessed 18 August 2008). The
IPOA-Capacity was adopted by the COFI in February 1999.
The High Seas Fishing Vessel Authorisation Record (HSVAR) is not specifically mentioned in the
Compliance Agreement. Instead, the HSVAR is a construct based on provisions for compiling and
exchanging vessel-related data under Articles IV, V and VI of the Agreement. The HSVAR title for the
database was invented by FAO.
7
High Seas Task Force, “How to Get Better Information about High Seas Fishing Vessels” (Paris, 9
March 2005) at www.high-seas.org/docs/HSTF_05_February_2005_Final.pdf (accessed 18 August
2008).
8
The 2005 Rome Declaration on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/DOCUMENT/ministerial/2005/iuu/declaration.pdf (accessed 18 August 2008).
6
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whether a Global Record could be developed and implemented successfully,
and, if so, how could this success be maximised and maintained?9
The aim of this chapter is to examine the progress of the FAO Global Record
and its likely impact on both individual Pacific Island States and on the Pacific
Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA).
Record versus Register
As an important preliminary point it is necessary to distinguish between the
words “Record” and “Register.” The term “Record of fishing vessels” was
defined in Article 1(d) of the Compliance Agreement as “a record of fishing
vessels in which are recorded pertinent details of the fishing vessel.” This must
be distinguished from a “Registry of fishing vessels.” “Registry” has different
meanings at the national and regional levels.
At the national level, a Registry of fishing vessels involves the issuance of a
certificate of registry, the right to fly the flag of a country, and is a record of
ownership and associated mortgages and liens. Article 94(2)(a) of the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) provides that every State shall maintain a
register of ships containing the names and particulars of ships flying its flag,
except those which are excluded from generally accepted international
regulations on account of their small size. 10 However, despite this legal
obligation in an international treaty which enjoys widespread support, 11 the
reality is that a significant number of States do not do this. Furthermore, for
those States which do operate a register of ships, there is no internationally
agreed system with respect to the content, purposes, goals or even language, of
vessel registries.
A Registry of fishing vessels can also exist at the regional level. Many regional
fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) maintain a list (or record) of the
vessels which are authorised to fish in their area, and they call this record “a
vessel register.” 12 The FFA has a system which is unlike other RFMOs. The
FFA, (which was established for the purpose of helping member States manage
their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) fishery resources), has an obligation on
9
Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a Comprehensive Global Record of Fishing
Vessels, FAO Fisheries Report No. 865, p.1 paragraph 5.
10
UN Doc.A/CONF. 62/122.
11
Currently the LOS Convention has 157 ratifications. The most recent State (at the time of writing) to
ratify the Convention was Liberia on 25 September 2008.
12
For example: Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR
since 1997); Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT since 2003);
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC since 2005); Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization (NAFO since 2004); South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO, using national
records established from March 2004); International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas (ICCAT since 2003); North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC with a system of
notification for authorisation to fish since 2007); Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC since 2003);
and Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC since 2000) .
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foreign fishing vessels to be listed on the FFA Vessel Register in order to apply
for a national fishing license from an FFA member State. 13 Any application
which is incomplete, inaccurate or misleading is rejected. Registration is
required on an annual basis upon payment of a substantial fee. 14
In lay terms, the FAO Global Record is likely to be more akin to a database,
than a State vessel registry which accords legal personality to a vessel, or an
RFMO vessel record which authorises fishing.
The FAO Global Record will not follow the trend apparent in many RFMOs of
distinguishing between “black listed vessels” and “white listed vessels.” In
simple terms, a black listed vessel is a vessel which has been accused of some
form of IUU fishing, and most black listed vessels will have reflagged more
than once. A white listed vessel has a “clean” fishing record and can be granted
RFMO or State authorisation to fish. These labels require a judgment or
assessment, and FAO is unwilling to engage in such classifications. FAO is not
a management body, it is a neutral body in the service of its members, and in
accordance with its mandate, it would be illegal for FAO to make value
judgements on the status of any fishing vessel. Therefore the FAO database is a
simple record, and States, RFMOs, and non-government organisations (NGOs)
can interpret the data on the record as they see fit. 15
The Existing Regime under the Compliance Agreement (HSVAR)
The Compliance Agreement entered into force on 24 April 2003, and at the
time of writing there are 38 instruments of acceptance. 16 Australia, New
Zealand and the Cook Islands are the only FFA member States which are also
States Parties to the Compliance Agreement. The low level of instruments of
acceptance given to the Compliance Agreement is not surprising. As mentioned
above, the Compliance Agreement was barely drafted before it was out-of-date.
The result is that comparatively few States have had the inclination or political
will to accept the Compliance Agreement. Even less support is given to the
vessel record system established by the Compliance Agreement: the High Seas
Fishing Vessel Authorization Record (HSVAR).
The establishment and operation of HSVAR can be briefly outlined. Article IV
of the Compliance Agreement requires each State Party to maintain a record of
fishing vessels and ensure that all fishing vessels are entered on that record.
13
Baird, R. The Development of a Comprehensive Global Record for Fishing Vessels, Refrigerated
Transport Vessels and Supply Vessels: An Analysis of the Practice of Regional Fisheries Bodies,
Consultant Paper produced for FAO Expert Consultation, Rome, February 2008; See Appendix G of
Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a Comprehensive Global Record of Fishing
Vessels, Note 9, p. 25.
14
Ibid.
15
Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a Comprehensive Global Record, Note 9,
paragraph 7.
16
FAO, Compliance Agreement, Note 1.
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Article V deals with international cooperation, and parties are required to
exchange information, including evidentiary material. Article VI elaborates the
exchange of information whereby each party shall make available to FAO
certain mandatory and discretionary data on each fishing vessel domestically
recorded under Article IV of the Agreement. This mandatory data (paragraph
1) and discretionary data (paragraph 2) which are made available to FAO is
stored on a FAO database referred to as the HSVAR. The data to be exchanged
with FAO is listed in Article VI(1) and (2) of the Compliance Agreement:
1. Each Party shall make readily available to FAO the following
information with respect to each fishing vessel entered in the record
required to be maintained under Article IV:
a) name of fishing vessel, registration number, previous names (if
known), and port of registry;
b) previous flag (if any);
c) International Radio Call Sign (if any);
d) name and address of owner or owners;
e) where and when built;
f) type of vessel;
g) length.
2. Each Party shall, to the extent practicable, make available to FAO the
following additional information with respect to each fishing vessel
entered in the record required to be maintained under Article IV:
a) name and address of operator (manager) or operators (managers) (if
any);
b) type of fishing method or methods;
c) moulded depth;
d) beam;
e) gross register tonnage;
f) power of main engine or engines.
The 2008 Global Record Expert Consultation spent some time considering
whether the HSVAR could be developed (and the Compliance Agreement
amended) so that HSVAR could become the new FAO Global Record.
However, it was made very clear that the HSVAR in its current form is a
second-rate database, and inadequate to address the real purpose of a FAO
Global Record which is to be a remedial tool in the fight against IUU fishing.
Some specific weaknesses can be mentioned.
HSVAR has Poor Data
The HSVAR is limited by both the quantity and quality of data that it contains.
Some States do not provide any data, and those that do, will often provide
incomplete data. Neither the Article VI(1) compulsory data nor the Article
VI(2) discretionary data are well provided to the HSVAR. New Zealand was
singled out for its exceptional provision of comprehensive, clear data in excel
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spreadsheet format, but clearly the New Zealand practice is the exception and
not the norm. 17
Restrictions Regarding the Size of Fishing Vessels and their Maritime Zones of
Operation
Fishing vessels which are less than 24 metres in length are exempted from the
Compliance Agreement. Furthermore, the Compliance Agreement is
specifically restricted to the high seas. This means that the HSVAR does not
apply to vessels engaged in IUU fishing within coastal zones or inland waters
where a large amount of IUU fishing occurs. It also does not apply to the
increasing number of fishing vessels operating in all maritime zones, which are
“invisible” (not recorded) as they are less than 24 metres.
No Attempt to Deal with Beneficial Ownership
The HSVAR provides for data on “the owner.” Although it is a compulsory
data requirement, the information is frequently not provided to FAO.
Furthermore, where the owner’s name is provided to FAO, this will only be the
name of the “legal owner” of the vessel. There is an increasing trend for vessels
to have their real ownership vested in a beneficial owner. This is the party who
controls the real activities and profits of the vessel whilst hiding behind the
registered legal activity. The Expert Consultation had a mandate to consider the
problem of “beneficial ownership” of vessels. Ultimately, it was decided to be
too difficult. The Expert Consultation decided that data describing the identity
of the vessel operator and manager would be more valuable as a remedial tool
(since these people control the “operation” of the vessel, including any
engagement in IUU operations), than the identity of the beneficial owner. 18
This author disagrees with the findings of the Expert Consultation on the matter
of beneficial ownership. It is submitted that although identification of operator
managers is also important, these people are merely working on the instructions
of the beneficial owner. Put simply and literally, “the buck stops with the
beneficial owner.” This point was recognised by the 2005 Ministerially-led
Task Force on IUU fishing on the High Seas which noted that the identification
of beneficial owners was a vital part of combating IUU fishing and that it was
surprising that such information was not contained in a “single and complete
database or register of high seas fishing vessels.” 19 It was also noted at the
Second Joint FAO/IMO ad hoc Working Group where it was argued that whilst
difficult to determine beneficial ownership, it was an important matter that
17
Fitzpatrick J. “Comprehensive record of fishing vessels, refrigerated vessels, supply vessels and
beneficial ownership” 20 October 2007- FAO Discussion Paper.
18
FAO, Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a Comprehensive Global Record of
Fishing Vessels, Note 9, paragraph 21, “On the issue of beneficial ownership, it was considered that it
could be difficult to obtain reliable information on beneficial owners, and that identifying sources of
operational control of a vessel should be regarded as the more significant issue.”
19
High Seas Task Force, How to Get Better Information About High Seas Fishing Vessels, a Meeting
of the High Seas Task Force, Paris, 9 March 2005.
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needed to be addressed. 20 Working with colleagues in corporate law, banking
law and taxation law, this author has examined possible processes for the
identification and accountability of beneficial owners. 21 It can be done.
However, it would require a commitment to activity at the State level (domestic
laws, banking, insurance etc.), rather than by public international law.
It is submitted that the immediate role for international law should be to flag
the matter as important, and call on all States to address the subject of
beneficial ownership. An example can be given from the FAO International
Plans of Action. These instruments call for “National Plans of Action” whereby
States are encouraged to develop and implement national laws that would give
effect to international instruments. 22 If the subject of “beneficial ownership” is
ignored by international law because it is difficult, it will never be resolved.
However, if the subject is raised now and flagged as important, then there is a
reason for the United Nations (UN) or FAO to return to the subject in five or
ten years and ask States why better progress is not being made with national
laws to address beneficial ownership. The subject is of vital importance to
many areas of international crime, not just IUU fishing.
Inadequate Recognition of the Needs of Developing States
The Compliance Agreement contains only a brief statement in Article VII on
providing assistance to developing countries:
The Parties shall cooperate, at a global, regional, subregional or bilateral
level, and, as appropriate, with the support of FAO and other
international or regional organizations, to provide assistance, including
technical assistance, to Parties that are developing countries in order to
assist them in fulfilling their obligations under this Agreement.
This may have been a significant provision at the time of writing in 1993, but
in 2008 it reads more like “lip-service” recognition on the plight of developing
States. The reality is that if developing States are to effectively contribute to,
and benefit from, the FAO Global Record, they will need extensive assistance.
It has already been noted that IUU fishing is not a mere high seas problem. It is
highly damaging in coastal zones under national jurisdiction and in inland
20
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation Flag State Implementation Report of the Second
Joint FAO/IMO ad hoc Working Group on IUU Fishing and Related Matters, 31 July 2007, paragraph
33.
21
Griggs, L. and Lugten, G. “Veil Over the Nets: Unravelling Corporate Liability for IUU Fishing
Offences” in Marine Policy (2007) 31 pp. 159-168; and Bender, P. and Lugten, G. “Taxing Illegal
Fishing: A Proposal for Using Taxation Law to Reduce Profiteering from IUU Fishing Offences” in
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law Vol. 22, No. 4, 2007, p. 513. For example, Griggs
and Lugten recommend a suggested legal framework that includes: 1) disclosure of the corporate entity
which must become transparent; 2) for an entity to gain the benefits of limited liability a minimum
level of operating capital must be started with, and maintained throughout the life of the corporation; 3)
harmonization across national boundaries; and 4) a swift regulatory response to any attempt to transfer
assets or liabilities between jurisdictions.
22
For example, Articles 25-27 of the FAO IPOA- IUU.
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waters. In developing States, IUU fishing occurs not only at the industrial
fishing level, but also with small-scale commercial or artisanal fishers. If a
vessel record is to work effectively at the national level, as well as the regional
and global level, then all artisanal fishing vessels would need to be
domestically registered. For many developing States, (Indonesia springs
immediately to mind), this will be an onerous task. It will require extensive
cooperation between developed and developing States. Developed States can
provide assistance through the UN Development Programme, FAO and other
specialized agencies, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Commission
on Sustainable Development and other appropriate international and regional
organisations and bodies. Forms of cooperation include financial assistance,
human resource development, technical assistance, and transfer of
technology. 23
Review Mechanisms
A final problem with the Compliance Agreement and the HSVAR is that there
is no provision relating to review. Therefore, the Compliance Agreement has
not remained current, relevant or practical. To amend the Compliance
Agreement, it would be necessary to call the thirty-eight States parties
(including the EU which represents 22 States) together and obtain support for
the amendment of the Compliance Agreement and/or the HSVAR.
The Expert Consultation gave considerable discussion to whether the HSVAR
could be developed into the new FAO Global Record. Ultimately, it was
unanimously agreed that the weaknesses and limitations associated with the
HSVAR suggested that “HSVAR could not be used for the global record
without considerable investment, which would be better directed towards a new
and more comprehensive system.” 24
How a FAO Global Record is Likely to be Different from HSVAR
The Expert Consultation agreed that the main goal of the FAO Global Record
should be simple: to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing and related
activities, making it more difficult and expensive for vessels and companies
acting illegally to do business. 25
However, the Expert Consultation added that additional goals for future uses of
the Global Record could be identified:
23
For an examination of the role of the World Bank and GEF in the implementation of the LOSC
regime, refer Freestone, D. “The Role of the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility in the
Implementation of the Regime of the Convention on the Law of the Sea” in Freestone, D., Barnes R.
and Ong D. (eds) The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, Oxford University Press, New York,
2006, p. 320.
24
Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a Comprehensive Global Record of Fishing
Vessels, Note 9, paragraph 38.
25
Ibid, paragraph 29.
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•
•
•
•

improving the traceability of vessels and products regarding IUU detection;
transparency of vessel information and operation;
strengthening risk assessment for both governments and industry at all
levels;
supporting decision-making on a broad range of topics including fleet
capacity, management, safety, pollution, security, statistics and related
issues. 26

The Expert Consultation envisaged that the Global Record would become a
“publicly available one-stop shop with many linkages to data sources such as
international, regional, national and other databases.” 27 The Global Record
should also be an essential tool in ensuring the practical effectiveness of port
State measures and of binding and non-binding instruments that aim to address
IUU fishing. 28
The Expert Consultation on the Global Record was not required to delve into
technical details of the structure and content of the Global Record, but several
basic or preliminary subjects were considered. The fundamental legal starting
point was whether the FAO Global Record should be incorporated into a soft
law instrument, or a hard law treaty, or whether, (like most databases,) the
Global Record should exist without any foundation legal instrument.
The Expert Consultation considered 4 options: 29
1. HSVAR is renamed the FAO Global Record, and the Compliance
Agreement in its current form becomes the legal instrument which
underpins the Global Record. [However, to the extent that the Global
Record is intended to improve oceans governance, and address IUU
fishing, and the HSVAR does not address either of these subjects, this
option was not considered appropriate to pursue.]
2. Developing or extending HSVAR in order to produce a new, extensive
vessel database. This could be done by combining existing HSVAR data
with data from Lloyds Register Fairplay, RFMOs registries and State
registries, to quickly produce a comprehensive Global Record of vessels
without a foundation legal instrument. That is, the database would no
longer reflect the structure created by the Compliance Agreement. [This
option may work, but the question remaining is whether States and
RFMOs will continue to actively contribute data if there is no legal
instrument compelling or encouraging them to do so.]
3. Amend both the Compliance Agreement and HSVAR in order to
produce a Global Record, based on a binding legal instrument (the
Compliance Agreement). The new regime should also correct any
shortcomings in the existing regime. [Only the States parties of the
26

Ibid, paragraph 30.
Ibid, paragraph 31.
28
Ibid, paragraph 32.
29
Ibid, paragraphs 14 and 15.
27
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Compliance Agreement can change the Compliance Agreement. This
option would require the 38 States Parties (including the 22 member
States of the European Union) to agree to numerous amendments. It is
likely to be a time consuming process and the Global Record is an
urgent issue.]
4. Attach the Global Record to a new legally binding instrument, such as
the Legally-Binding Instrument on Port States Measures to Prevent,
Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (the
PSM). 30 The Agreement on Port State Measures addresses most of the
weaknesses that have been identified and listed in the Compliance
Agreement: it applies to small fishing vessels; it applies to vessels
operating in EEZs; it provides for an exchange of data between States,
RFMOs and FAO; it makes extensive provision for the special needs of
developing States; and it has review mechanisms. 31
The FAO Legal Office offered a fifth alternative:
5. Linking the Global Record to an existing soft law instrument such as the
FAO IPOA-IUU or the FAO IPOA-Capacity. The Record would clearly
fit within both IPOAs where provisions recommend that States and
RFMOs report to FAO, and that FAO collects all data for the purpose of
establishing a global database. In support of this option, it was noted by
the FAO legal office that follow-up on levels of compliance with
voluntary versus binding instruments, suggested that voluntary
instruments were more successful. It is submitted that more citable data
and empirical analysis needs to be produced on this important
submission. To suggest that voluntary soft laws are more effective than
hard treaty laws impacts far beyond the international law of marine
capture fisheries and would be a significant development in the making
and implementing of all public international law.
The Expert Consultation supported the Global Record using some of the broad
definitions employed in the Draft Legally Binding Instrument on Port State
Measures:
“fishing” means:
(i) the actual or attempted searching for, catching, taking or
harvesting of fish; and
(ii) engaging in any activity which can reasonably be expected to
result in the locating, catching, taking or harvesting of fish.
“fishing related activities” means any operation in support of, or in
preparation for, fishing, including the processing, transhipment, or
30
Draft Legally-Binding Instrument on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. Draft as of 18 August 2008 available on line at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/tc-psm/2008/2e.pdf
31
Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a Comprehensive Global Record of Fishing
Vessels, Note 9, paragraph 14.
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transport of fish that have not been previously landed and offloaded at a
port, as well as the provision of personnel, fuel and other supplies at sea.
“vessel” means any vessel, ship of another type, boat and other craft
used for, equipped to be used for, or intended to be used for, fishing or
fishing related activities. 32
The Expert Consultation proposed a phased-in approach to develop a global
record commencing with vessels of 100GT and above, followed by vessels of
55GT and above but less than 100GT, and then finally by vessels of 10GT and
above but less than 55GT. It was further agreed that the Global Record would
need to use a system of unique vessel identifiers which would not change, even
if a vessel changed flag, owner or name. This might be accomplished through a
combination of Lloyds Register Fairplay vessel numbers (for vessels more than
100GT) and a FAO numbering system for vessels smaller than 100GT. It was
agreed that more work needed to be done on unique vessel identification. 33
Perhaps the most startling advancement of the proposed FAO Global Record
over the HSVAR is the perception (and plan) that data on the Global Record
will be used, and driven, by market forces. The Expert Consultation was
addressed by an Industry Expert who noted that 65% of all fish consumed in
the European Union (EU) is imported from third countries, and IUU fishing is
becoming an increasingly important issue in the commercial fish processing
and marketing industries, the media, powerful NGOs such as Greenpeace, and
consumers. Fish buyers and processors need public access to up-to-date data
(such as the Global Record) so that they can adequately risk assess and manage
their supply basis. Ideally, the Global Record will create a situation whereby if
a vessel is not on the Global Record, it could be presumed to be an IUU vessel,
and consumers (such as the EU) would not buy the fish. 34
Ultimately, the Expert Consultation believed that the Global Record would
succeed where HSVAR has failed because it would be driven by both flag
States and the harvesting industry in order to demonstrate transparency in the
fishing operations of their fleets. Furthermore, and importantly, the Global
Record will be driven by the retail market in order to meet the demands of
consumers for non-IUU products. 35

32

Draft Legally Binding Instrument on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Note 30, Article 1 (Use of Terms) and Note 9, Paragraph 33.
Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a Comprehensive Global Record of Fishing
Vessels, Note 9, paragraphs 49-52.
34
Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a Comprehensive Global Record of Fishing
Vessels, Note 9, paragraph 50.
35
Ibid, paragraph 52.
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The Role of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency and Pacific Island
States in the FAO Global Record
The urgency surrounding the need for the Global Record, and the operational
strategies of how to get the database established quickly and extensively, tends
to veil the fact that the Global Record will need to have long-term
sustainability. From this perspective, the issue of ongoing data input is
particularly important, and organisations such as the FFA, plus individual
Pacific Island member States, will need to play a key role.
The following discussion looks at the obligation of RFMOs and States to
exchange data (such as vessel registry/record details) with FAO for the
purposes of creating and maintaining the Global Record.
From the LOSC, there is no systematic obligation on either States or RFMOs to
exchange vessel data. Only Article 119(2) dealing with the conservation of the
living resources of the high seas, comes close to addressing this issue when it
provides:
Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and
other data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed
and exchanged on a regular basis through competent international
organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, where
appropriate and with participation by all States concerned.36
This would not compel either the FFA or Pacific Island States to participate in
Global Record data exchange with FAO.
Similarly, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is limited to straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks. It prefers a State and regional, (as opposed to
global) approach to the resolution of fishery management problems. Only
Article 2 of Annex 1 comes close to supporting an exchange of data between
States, RFMOs and FAO:
States should compile fishery-related and other supporting scientific
data and provide them in an agreed format and in a timely manner to the
relevant subregional or regional fisheries management organization or
arrangement where one exists. Otherwise, States should cooperate to
exchange data either directly or through such other cooperative
mechanisms as may be agreed among them. 37
The FAO IPOA-IUU urges States and RFMOs to report to FAO on their plans
to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, 38 and the FAO is charged with
collecting all relevant information and data39 and establishing and maintaining
36

United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, Note 10, Article 119(2) Emphasis by this author.
Emphasis by this author.
38
FAO IPOA-IUU, Note 4, Article 87.
39
Ibid, Article 88.
37

115

a regional and global database. 40 However, the IPOA-IUU is a soft law
instrument, and despite some argument that it has force as a customary
international law, 41 it carries no legally binding obligation for either the FFA or
the Pacific Island States to exchange or contribute data to FAO.
The FAO Compliance Agreement is the only international instrument which
requires parties to enter into cooperative agreements on a global, regional,
subregional or bilateral basis. 42 Article VI specifically deals with the exchange
of mandatory and discretionary data on every fishing vessel to FAO for the
purposes of the HSVAR database. Despite the clear application and relevance
of the Compliance Agreement, two important points must be recalled. First,
only three States from the FFA are member States of the Compliance
Agreement: Australia, Cook Islands and New Zealand. Secondly, the Global
Record Expert Consultation concluded that both the Compliance Agreement
and the HSVAR were failed initiatives for the purposes of creating a FAO
Global Record and the expense of resurrecting them would be better directed at
launching a new project that would address the many weaknesses in the
Compliance Agreement.
However, apart from the provisions of treaty law, there is a recognizable trend
in the law of marine capture fisheries for States to cooperate with one another
and with competent sub-regional, regional and global organisations.
Kwiatkowska has described a “duty to cooperate.” 43 It can be argued that the
duty to cooperate exists in international customary law, particularly in matters
of marine resource conservation and management, such as the remedying of
IUU fishing.
In fact, the customary law duty to cooperate is supported by numerous treaty
references obliging States to cooperate on a variety of subjects including the
conservation and management of EEZ 44 and high seas 45 fisheries, and, (in the
case of the Compliance Agreement), on exchange of vessel data with FAO. 46
The international customary law duty to cooperate can be linked to the
common law doctrine of obstruction. That is, it is an offence to obstruct or
hinder without reasonable excuse, a person or body acting under statutory
authority. Applied to international law, it may be an offence to obstruct or
hinder a party acting under treaty law as there is an express obligation that
40

Ibid, Article 92.
Lugten, G. “Soft Law with Hidden Teeth: The Case for a FAO International Plan of Action on Sea
Turtles” in Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2006, pp. 155-173.
42
FAO Compliance Agreement, Note 1.
43
Kwiatkowska B. “The Role of Regional Organizations in Development Cooperation in Marine
Affairs” in Soons, A.H. (ed.) Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention Through International
Institutions, Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu, 1990.
44
Note for example the 1982 Convention, Articles 61(2), 64(1), 65, and 66(3)(b).
45
Ibid, Articles 117 and 118.
46
The duty to cooperate in international law is also clear in the UN Charter, and the ILO, FAO and
GATT Constitutions.
41

116

States parties to a treaty will cooperate with one another, and (in the case of the
Compliance Agreement) with the FAO. 47 The duty to cooperate can be
effectuated in several ways, and the exchange (with FAO) of vessel data,
(where release of that data does not breach confidentiality laws) can be seen as
a basic first step. 48
Of some importance as a FFA contribution to the FAO Global Record is the
fact that vessel and gear data has been compiled on the FFA Register since its
inception in 1979. Each year, a physical description of vessels which are
entered on the FFA Vessel Register, is presented to the Director General of the
FFA. Vessel Register Forms include the physical characteristics of the vessel,
its home port, the identity of the fishing master, the identity of the vessel
master and owner, as well as a photograph of the vessel which includes its
identifying characteristics. 49 At the present time, the FFA Vessel Register only
covers foreign fishing vessels, and for a comprehensive picture of vessels
operating in the region, it would be necessary for either the FFA to expand its
database, or, more ideally, to jointly contribute data to FAO with other regional
bodies such as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community – Oceanic Fisheries
Programme (SPC-OFP) and the Commission for the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean (WCPFC). The WCPFC data is more limited because it does not
actually indicate where its vessels are operating. The FFA are currently
working with the SPC to get all combined vessel data on to the Tuna Fishery
Data Management System (TUFMAN).
In a leading display of regional cooperation, the FFA and the SPC have
concluded a 1997 Memorandum of Understanding between the Pacific Islands
Forum Fisheries Agency and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community
Concerning Collaboration in the Development, Conservation and Management
of the Tuna and Related Resources of the Western and Central Pacific. The
Memorandum has been revised three times with the most recent revision being
2007. 50 The Memorandum of Understanding provides for free exchange of
information and documentation between the parties. Ideally such data exchange
could also be extended to FAO for the purposes of establishing and maintaining
the Global Record.

47
Kirk, F.O. Duty to Cooperate and Not Hinder, Masters Thesis, US Defense Technical Information
Centre. Accessed on line 23 April 2009 Refer:
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA196478
48
Baird, note 13 lists the “vessel data” held by the FFA as: name of vessel, register number,
international radio call sign and name / address of owner / operator, pp. 12-13.
49
Aqorau, T. “Illegal Fishing and Fisheries Law Enforcement in Small Island Developing States: The
Pacific Islands Experience” in International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2000,
pp. 37-63 at 47.
50
Available on line at http://www.spc.int/mrd/asides/Other_orgs/FFA/SPC-FFA-MOU3.pdf accessed
18 August 2008.
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A 2002 report which reviewed the quality of FFA Vessel Register data noted
problems of duplicated vessels, missing data and possible errors in data entry. 51
Since that time, the FFA has endeavoured to update both their data bases and
the quality of their data as part of the Regional Monitoring, Control and
Surveillance (MCS) Strategy.
Specifically, in 2002 there was both a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)
Register and a Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels. Not all vessels on the VMS
Register were on the latter register and so the Lawson report discovered
inaccuracies or inconsistencies. Today, the two vessel registers have been
integrated and the current FFA data is adequate for FFA purposes.
Nevertheless, as the FAO Global Record would rely on the provision of
continuous, top-quality data, the FFA (and other RFMOs with predominant
developing State membership) is likely to require special assistance.
Should the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency and the Pacific Island
States “Cooperate” with FAO over the Global Record?
Ultimately, both the individual Pacific Island States and the FFA will need to
decide whether the FAO Global Record is an initiative that is worth supporting.
An appraisal will be offered by this author.
Against supporting the FAO Global Record, this author sees 3 arguments:
• that the concept has been tried (in the form of HSVAR) and has failed;
• that the personnel, technical and financial costs of assimilating and
sustaining the Global Record data at a State and regional level, will be
prohibitive for the developing economies of Pacific Island States and the
FFA; and finally
• that many States are suffering from “instrument implementation fatigue” 52
and the extensive and ongoing requirements of the Global Record will only
exacerbate this problem.
First, regarding the argument that the concept has been tried and has failed, it
must be remembered that although various forms of IUU fishing have existed
for many years, the HSVAR was established before IUU fishing in its
contemporary sense, was identified, labelled and addressed. That is, the
HSVAR database was never intended to deal with the current problem of IUU
fishing. The HSVAR deals with large vessels reflagging on the high seas. It
does not deal with, and does not address, for example, dynamite or cyanide
artisanal fishing within coastal waters, or unreported tuna longliners operating
51

Lawson, T. Data Requirements of the SPC Oceanic Fisheries Programme and Status of Data,
Oceanic Programme Internal Report 47, Noumea, SPC-OFP, 2002, p.30.
52
Cochrane, K. and Doulman, D. “The Rising Tide of Fisheries Instruments and the Struggle to Keep
Afloat” in Fisheries: A future, (Theme Issue of Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences), Vol. 80, 2005.
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in EEZs. The modern problems of IUU fishing are vastly different to the issues
that were a priority for the drafters of the Compliance Agreement. To
effectively address IUU fishing, the Global Record would need to be a
significantly different database to that of the HSVAR. The Expert Consultation
recognised this fact, and noted the need for the Global Record to address the
jurisdictional and technical shortcomings of the HSVAR. 53
A second reason why Pacific Island States and the FFA might elect to reject or
not participate in the FAO Global Record, is a financial inability to do so. In a
collaborative research project conducted with the World Fish Center in Penang,
this author has examined aspects of fisheries law compliance by five
developing archipelagic States. In brief, it was found that:
The full and effective implementation of [international fishery laws]
poses a major challenge for any country. Developing countries (which
often lack technical, financial and institutional capacity) are particularly
vulnerable to excessive global programmes of development and
change. 54
It has already been noted that the 1993 Compliance Agreement gives only the
briefest recognition to developing States. In contrast, the 1995 UN Fish Stocks
Agreement (UNFSA) set a new standard in legal provisions dealing with
developing States. Here, Articles 24-26 elaborate an extensive regime for
cooperation between States, and by using the expertise of specialised agencies
within the United Nations. 55 The provisions acknowledge the vulnerability of
developing States, the need to avoid adverse impacts on subsistence and
artisanal fishers and how to improve monitoring, control, surveillance,
compliance and enforcement. The provisions culminate in a proposal to
establish a trust fund that would assist developing States to meet the costs of
implementing the UNFSA.
This sophisticated legal regime to assist developing States has been
reconstructed in the Agreement on Port State Measures where Article 22
recognises the special requirements of developing States. 56
The Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a
Comprehensive Global Record of Fishing Vessels noted:
Consideration should be given to establishing mechanisms which can
provide financial assistance and expertise to developing countries for
53

Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a Comprehensive Global Record of Fishing
Vessels, Note 9, Paragraph 13.
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Lugten, G. and Andrew, N. “Maximum Sustainable Yield of Marine Capture Fisheries in Developing
Archipelagic States – Balancing Law, Science, Politics and Practice” in International Journal of
Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1-37.
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United Nations Development Programme, the Global Environment Facility, the Commission on
Sustainable Development and other appropriate international and regional organisations.
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Draft Legally-Binding Instrument on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Note 30.
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capacity building. These could be similar to the Trust Fund established
by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement or Article 22 of the draft binding
legal instrument on port State measures. A UN system-wide approach
for funding and support among other specialized UN agencies such as
the World Bank and United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP)
should be considered.
The willingness of developing countries to perform the necessary
functions such as registration and data gathering should not be
underestimated but provision of appropriate training, assistance with
technology, financial resources and cooperative relationships would be
needed. 57
If the FAO Global Record progresses, and some form of foundation instrument
accompanies it, the instrument is likely to include firm statements that will
enable assistance to be given to both individual Pacific Island States and the
FFA.
In the six months following the Global Record Expert Consultation, this author
has consulted with numerous delegates from Pacific Island States and the FFA,
and the third reason why such entities might reject, or not actively participate in
the FAO Global Record has been found to be the strongest of reasons. This is
the issue of instrument implementation fatigue.
The subject of instrument implementation fatigue has been persuasively argued
by Cochrane and Doulman who have examined the multitude of international
fishery instruments since the LOSC, and the challenges for States and RFMOs
to comply with every recommendation in this multitude of instruments. 58 The
challenges of instrument implementation are compounded in developing State
economies.
This discussion overlaps a subject raised above which is a fundamental starting
point in the progression of the FAO Global Record – should the record have a
soft or hard law at its base? It is submitted that any analysis on State and
RFMO levels of instrument implementation fatigue must distinguish between
the obligation to implement hard law treaties, and the recommendation to
implement soft law instruments. Put simply, it is absurd for States to get too
“fatigued” implementing instruments that do not have to be implemented.
57
Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a Comprehensive Global Record of Fishing
Vessels, Note 9, paragraphs 43 and 44.
58
Note for example the following environmental / sea / marine resource instruments: 1992 Convention
on Biological Diversity; 1992 Agenda 21; 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement; 1995 UN Fish Stocks
Agreement; 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 2001 FAO Reykjavik Declaration on
Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem, 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development’s
Plan of Implementation. To this list, could be added the 4 FAO IPOAs: seabirds, sharks, IUU fishing
and fishing capacity, the FAO Technical Guidelines on Sea Turtles and the 2005 Rome Declaration on
IUU fishing.

120

In February 2003, the twenty-fifth FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI)
meeting convened in Rome and considered, inter alia, a Report on Progress of
the Implementation of the soft law Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
and its related International Plans of Action. 59 The Report revealed an
appalling level of State interest in, and compliance with, the soft law FAO
IPOAs. Only 57% of FAO members even bothered to respond to the FAO
questionnaire. 60 Bearing this in mind, it is interesting to note that the FAO
Legal Office now suggests that the previous five years (2003-2008) may have
seen a complete turn-around by the international community of States so that
voluntary soft law instruments are now more widely adhered to than hard law
instruments. 61
At this stage it is unclear whether the FAO Global Record will be linked to a
hard law treaty (with an obligation for States to exchange vessel data), or a soft
law instrument (with a recommendation that States exchange vessel data) or
whether it will be a mere database with no legal instrument underpinning its
existence, and reliant only on the good-will of States and RFMOs to support
the FAO materials. This author strongly supports a hard law instrument at the
base of the Global Record. Admittedly, some instrument implementation
fatigue may be experienced by States which are struggling to keep up with the
many international instruments of fisheries governance, but there have been no
new hard global fishery laws since the 1995 UNFSA – thirteen years ago, and
as such, the Global Record should take State and RFMO compliance priority
over the many soft law instruments.
A number of points will now be made for Pacific Island States and the FFA to
support the FAO Global Record.
First, and most obviously, the FAO Global Record will be an important tool in
improving oceans governance. The global fight against IUU fishing is
hampered by one overwhelming problem – lack of information. The problem
applies to where IUU fishing is happening, who is engaging in it, what is its
true financial damage and its true environmental damage. The FAO Global
Record has the potential to become the biggest source of fishing vessel
information in the world and it would be a publicly available database.62
However, the Global Record can only work if it is supported by States and
RFMOs contributing their registry data in an ongoing exchange of information.
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Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Committee on Fisheries COFI/2003/3.
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Report of the Expert Consultation on the Development of a Comprehensive Global Record of Fishing
Vessels, Note 9, paragraphs 27 and 31.
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Secondly, as an international lawyer participating in the negotiations at the
FAO Global Record, it was surprising to observe the role of private enterprise
(such as Lloyds Register Fairplay) and seafood industry representatives in the
negotiation and progression of public international law. It has been noted above
that the Global Record is expected to be driven by market forces: if your boat is
not on the list, it could be presumed to be an IUU vessel, and you will be
unable to sell your fish. 63 If powerful trading blocks such as the EU take a
commercial stand in favour of the Global Record, the global fishing fleet will
need to pay attention. It was further pointed out by an industry expert present at
the Expert Consultation that if a NGO such as Greenpeace, directs its members
to only purchase fish from Global Record vessels, the European seafood
industry will be forced to pay attention. Green groups have enormous market
clout within the EU. The Pacific Island States and the FFA should aim to be at
the forefront of accessing this preferred market choice by supporting the global
record.
Thirdly, it has been mentioned that the Global Record has both urgent and
aspirational goals. As part of its aspirational goals, data on the record will be
used to: improve the traceability of vessels and their fish products; strengthen
risk assessment for both governments and industry; and to support decisionmaking on topics such as fleet capacity, safety at sea, pollution, and vessel
security. It will be a vital tool in the armoury of flag and port State jurisdiction,
and in the fighting of transnational fishing crimes. 64 Put simply, the Global
Record aims to expose illegal and improper fishing activity.
Finally, it has been mentioned that it is thirteen years since the international
community’s last global hard law fisheries management treaty. In the
intervening period, the leadership of much fisheries governance has moved
away from global organisations and into the hands of proactive RFMOs.
However, the Global Record is a clear example of a “big picture” project that
can only be done at the global level. Ecosystems are inter-connected, fish
markets are trans-national, and the philosophical discipline is public
international law. These factors necessitate a global approach to dealing with
the subject. The scope of the Global Record will be world-wide. It will aim to
include all UN specialised agencies, all coastal States, all RFMOs and private
enterprise corporations. Ultimately, it is not unfeasible that the Global Record
could totally change the way we manage, catch and purchase our fish and fish
products.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined a potential new international instrument to improve
oceans governance – the FAO Global Record of Fishing Vessels. It has
considered the historical origins of, and formal calls for, a global vessel
63
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Ibid, paragraphs 49 and 50.
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database, the FAO Compliance Agreement and HSVAR as a prototype of the
Global Record; how the Global Record would differ from the prototype; the
potential role of the FFA and individual Pacific Island States in establishing
and maintaining the Global Record; and finally an evaluation of whether the
Global Record is good for the region.
This text is to commemorate and celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. In 1979 the FFA led the way with
regional fisheries management based on a vessel register system that was
unlike any other. It would be encouraging to see (thirty years later) the FFA
take another leading stand by using its regional and State registry data to
promote the FAO Global Record.
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5. Lessons from the Toolbox ~ Using Vessel Monitoring System
Data in Enforcement Proceedings
Alexa A. Cole

Introduction
In the monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) world, we talk a lot about tools.
It is about taking what is often intangible and applying discrete, tangible and
useful tools in order to make enforcement more approachable. They are not
gadgets but mechanisms whereby enforcement capacity is enhanced. Satellitebased vessel monitoring systems (VMS) are tools. In the fisheries MCS world,
VMS, while perhaps not revolutionary, has indeed forever changed our ability to
combat illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing. Confronted with vast
swaths of ocean, domestic and international laws to enforce, unruly fish with no
regard for boundaries, and perpetually insufficient MCS assets and resources,
domestic and regional fishery management organisations (RFMOs) have embraced
the potential of VMS.
The challenge for prosecutors is to use the evidence from new and untested tools
to successfully prosecute violations. There is little more frustrating for a
prosecutor than the inability to use good evidence to prosecute violations. A
prosecutor never wants to let the enforcement team down by not adequately
educating and persuading the court 1 of the utility and reliability of what may be
perceived as a technically complicated enforcement tool. In the United States
(US), we are fortunate that there is a small group of about seven judges that hear
the vast majority of our fisheries enforcement cases. As a result, we were able to
quickly introduce VMS to these judges and educate them as to its capabilities; as
such, we are now typically able to strip down our presentations to the court about
VMS and rely on the court’s prior understanding of its basic elements and
functions. However, in other jurisdictions, prosecutors may not be so fortunate and
must constantly educate and inform new judges on the utility and reliability of
VMS data for fishery enforcement purposes.
This chapter is intended to convey some of the “lessons learned” in the use of
VMS data in enforcement proceedings. Initially, it touches briefly on what VMS
1

For the purposes of this chapter, the term “court” will apply generically to civil and criminal,
administrative and judicial, proceedings. Every legal system has its own standards of proof, rules of
procedures, rules of evidence, and evidentiary burdens, which among other things may significantly alter
the ability or method to present VMS evidence in court. The information provided herein is intended to be
used generally and adapted as necessary to individual legal systems.
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is, how it is used and its introduction into US fisheries management. From there, it
focuses with some detail on the first US court case to rely solely on VMS data.
The following section outlines the use of VMS data in practical terms of how we
present the evidence to the court. Finally, it concludes with some thoughts on the
limits of VMS and the need for more, not less, enforcement resources as a result of
its use.
Background
There are few people in the fisheries management or enforcement world currently
who are unfamiliar with satellite-based VMS. 2 Despite this, many references to
VMS still describe it as new or emerging technology. In the US, the genesis of our
VMS program occurred almost twenty years ago. 3 It began with a pilot program in
the Hawaii-based pelagic longline fishery to support enforcement of newly-created
management areas closed to longline fishing. 4 Before the government began to
require the use of such technology, it first needed to test how and whether it
worked and to evaluate it as a technique that would withstand judicial review.
After some initial encouraging trials, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service funded a three year
pilot project beginning in January 1995. 5
The pilot project proved to be “an effective surveillance and enforcement tool,
providing a level of monitoring that would not be possible with traditional
methods.” 6 VMS immediately opened a window into the ocean for management
and enforcement by allowing authorities to conveniently track the location and
monitor the activity of vessels in management areas of particular interest. At
around the same time, there were successful trials conducted in other fisheries
around the globe and the system was quickly adopted by many enforcement
authorities. 7 Satellite-based VMS systems are described by the Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) as:
comprised of several components. Each participating vessel must carry a
VMS unit. This shipboard electronic equipment is installed permanently on
board a fishing vessel and assigned a unique identifier. Most shipboard
VMS equipment types use satellite communication systems that have an
2

For the purposes of this chapter all references to VMS will be to satellite-based vessel monitoring
systems.
3
Harman, R.F., and Yamashita, S.Y. Hawaii Fishing Vessel Monitoring System: Report of the Pilot
Project. National Marine Fisheries Service, Office of Enforcement, Southwest Region, Honolulu, Hawaii,
1997. Appendix A – Chronology of VMS Activities.
4
Ibid at 1-2.
5
Ibid at 3.
6
Ibid at 6.
7
Cacaud, P. Legal Issues Relating to Vessel Monitoring Systems, FAO / Norway Government Cooperative
Programme, GCP/INT/648/NOR, Field Report C-1, Supp. 2, FAO, Rome, 1999, at 4.
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integrated Global Positioning System (GPS). The system calculates the
unit’s position and sends a data report to shoreside users. The standard data
report includes the VMS unit’s unique identifier, date, time and position in
latitude and longitude. 8
The VMS data are used by MCS personnel by plotting it on a chart to depict the
location, or in the case of multiple coordinates, track of a vessel in relation to
management areas, zones or boundaries. 9
Figure 1: Component Diagram of Hawaii Vessel Monitoring System 10

With the success of our first VMS pilot program, the use of VMS in fisheries
management in the US expanded to other US fisheries around the country. 11
Similar expansions were taking place in the world’s oceans as interest in the use of
VMS in fisheries management spread quickly. 12 Sovereign nations and
8

Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Fishing Vessel Monitoring Systems,
Introduction to VMS fact sheet, http://www.fao.org/fishery/vms/2/en
Ibid.
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Harman and Yamashita, at 3.
11
Eg 50 C.F.R. § 622.9 (South Atlantic rock shrimp and Gulf reef fish); 50 C.F.R. § 635.69 (Atlantic
Highly Migratory Species); 50 C.F.R. §§ 648.9 and 648.10 (Northeastern fisheries); 50 C.F.R. § 660.312
(West Coast groundfish); 50 C.F.R. § 665.25 (Western Pacific Pelagic fisheries).
12
Cacaud, P., 1999, at 4.
9
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international fishery management organisations, or bodies, quickly came to the
same conclusions. It was based on a general recognition of “the limitations of
conventional MCS measures …, essentially the prohibitive costs of carrying out
such measures, especially observer programmes and naval and aerial surveillance
operations throughout extensive exclusive economic zones (EEZs), marine areas
which in certain cases exceed several fold the national land area.” 13
As a result, VMS has become a mainstay in NOAA’s enforcement case packages.
It is regularly used both in conjunction with traditional documents such as
logbooks, catch and effort data, observer reports, and boarding reports, and on its
own. VMS data was incorporated into the suite of enforcement tools available to
investigative agencies to monitor the activities of fishing vessels carrying VMS
units. VMS data has been instrumental in increasing NOAA’s ability to protect
and manage closed areas, and often plays a decisive role in a prosecutor’s decision
to charge a case.
Case Study – Lobsters, Inc.
Although NOAA was regularly using VMS as evidence in its enforcement cases
from the mid-90’s onward, it was not until December 2001, that NOAA received
its first reported decision involving VMS evidence.14 Lobsters, Inc. involves the
F/V Independence which was charged with unlawfully entering a closed area off
the coast of New England. This was the first fisheries prosecution in the United
States that relied on VMS evidence as sole proof of entry into a closed area.
In June 2000, the Respondents, Lobsters Inc. and Lawrence Yacubian, were
charged with entering a closed area on two occasions in December 1998, as well
as making false statements to an authorized officer. 15 NOAA assessed, jointly and
severally, a civil penalty of US$250,000, and sought to revoke the vessel’s Federal
fishing vessel permit. 16 The Respondents contested the charges against them and a
civil administrative hearing was held in June 2001 before an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ).
For the first count of entering a closed area, NOAA relied solely on VMS
evidence. 17 In order to prevail on this count, the attorneys 18 had to convince the
court of the reliability both of the VMS itself and of NOAA’s use of the VMS
13

Ibid at 3.
In the Matter of Lobsters, Inc. and Lawrence Yacubian, 2001 WL 1632538 (N.O.A.A.).
Ibid at 1-2.
16
Ibid.
17
For the purpose of this chapter, the analysis of the Lobsters, Inc. case will focus solely on the first count
which involved VMS only as support for the violation. Discussion of the other counts can be found in the
court decisions cited throughout.
18
Juliand, C. R. and MacDonald M. J., NOAA Office of General Counsel, Northeast Region.
14
15
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data. The first step, taken by the NOAA prosecutors prior to charging, was to
review the full scope of potential violations shown by the VMS data, and choose
the strongest case. The VMS data indicated the vessel had entered the closed area,
at various incursion depths, more than 25 times over the course of three days. 19
Instead of charging each individual incursion, NOAA chose to focus this first
VMS-only case on the deepest incursion.
Prior to the commencement of the civil administrative hearing on the merits, the
Court conducted a preliminary session on the reliability of the VMS technology.20
In the US, such a hearing is known as a Daubert 21 hearing based on standards set
forth by the US Supreme Court. At the hearing, NOAA presented several expert
witnesses to the Court to testify as to the reliability of the VMS used in that case –
Boatracs. 22 NOAA’s procedural rules governing administrative hearings do not
provide guidance to the Court on determining the reliability of evidence presented
by expert witnesses. 23 Therefore, the Court relied on the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) to guide it during the Daubert hearing. 24
Based on his reading of the FREs, the Judge qualified three outside experts 25 on
the subject of reliability of the Boatracs technology. 26 The Judge qualified the
Chief Operating Officer of Boatracs, Charles J. Drobny, as “an expert on the
operation or workings of the Boatracs system,” but did not qualify him to offer an
opinion on the reliability of the system. 27 In addition, NOAA offered and the
Court admitted reports from each of the three experts on the reliability of the
system, as well as a report from the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard),
entitled Eighth District BOATRACS Test and Evaluation Final Report,28 which
provides a detailed description of the Boatracs system. 29

19
In the Matter of Lobsters Inc. and Lawrence Yacubian, National Oceanic and Administration, Agency’s
Initial Brief at 3.
20
Lobsters Inc., 2001 WL 1632538 at 3.
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert held that the Federal Rules
of Evidence governed the admissibility of scientific evidence and imposed a “gatekeeping” responsibility
on trial courts to ensure that scientific evidence, in order to be admissible, must be not relevant but reliable.
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael later extended this standard to all expert evidence. See Kumho Tire v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
22
Lobsters Inc., 2001 WL 1632538 at 4.
23
15 C.F.R. Part 904 (2008).
24
Lobsters Inc., 2001 WL 1632538 at 3 – 4 (citing Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703 and 704
particularly).
25
Benjamin Peterson, PhD; Peter Dana, PhD; and LCDR Gregory W. Johnson
26
Ibid at 4.
27
Ibid.
28
Advanced Communications Technology: Eighth District BOATRACS Test and Evaluation Final Report,
United States Coast Guard, Office of Research and Development, July 1998.
29
See Lobsters Inc., 2001 WL 1632538 at 4.
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After hearing testimony from all of the expert witnesses, the Court found the Coast
Guard report most persuasive, basing its decision on the reliability of the VMS
solely on the report. 30 The Coast Guard commissioned the study in order “to
corroborate or confirm the claims of BOATRACS that the system was reliable
enough to report accurately geographic positions 95% of the time within 300
meters of the actual position.” 31 In its review of the study, the Court found it:
to be an off the shelf study and was not prepared for the purposes of
litigation. It was prepared prior to the time that might be in question in this
case. Thus, I have concluded that the Coast Guard study … presented …
statistically sound and reasonable conclusions regarding the reliability and
the accuracy of the system’s ability to identify the position of fishing
vessels employing that system on board that vessel. 32
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the BOATRACS system is a reliable system
reporting positioning data accurately 95% of the time within 300 metres of the
actual position … [and] that the system would reliably report positions 98 to 99
percent of the time within 400 to 450 metres of the actual position.”33
Although the Court’s conclusion on the reliability of the Boatracs system was
positive, the Court’s sole reliance on the Coast Guard study begs the question of
what would have happened without it. In a case without an independent outside
study, would the expert witnesses have persuaded the Court? It is impossible to
know, but it underscores the importance of good evidence, certainly, and of
presenting the evidence you have in a compelling and effective manner. The
Court’s finding that the Boatracs technology was reliable for determining a fishing
vessel’s geographic position enabled NOAA to proceed with prosecution of its
case. 34
NOAA had to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence; once it had done
so, the burden shifted to the Respondents. 35 In presenting its evidence to establish
its prima facie case that the F/V Independence was unlawfully inside a closed
30
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area, NOAA relied on testimony and evidence from NOAA and the Coast Guard
detailing the track of the vessel by VMS, and the interception and subsequent
boarding of the vessel. After reviewing the testimony provided by the government
and the Respondents, the Court held that “[t]he record demonstrates respondents
were within Closed Area II at the time and place shown in the Boatracs data.
Moreover, the Boatracs data further demonstrate that this was not an incidental
intrusion into the closed area, but between December 6 and December 8 there
were numerous such intrusions.” 36
Although NOAA chose to charge only the most egregious incursion into the
closed area, the testimony and evidence of the other less egregious incursions were
key elements in the Court’s holding. NOAA successfully used its prosecutorial
discretion to focus the Court’s attention on one significant incursion for liability
purposes and used the other incursions to bolster its civil penalty assessment and
permit sanction recommendation. In its determination of the civil penalty, the
Court stated that “[t]he Respondents’ entry into Closed Area II was not incidental,
accidental or in the course of transit through the area. It was numerous and to fish
for scallops.” 37 The Court further characterised it as “the most serious intrusion
into a closed area” 38 and found “Respondents’ claim that they did not intentionally
intrude … incredible.” 39 As a result, the Court upheld NOAA’s civil penalty
assessment of US$250,000 and permanently revoked the Respondents’ Federal
fishing permits.
Respondents appealed for discretionary review by the NOAA Administrator in
January 2002. The NOAA Administrator declined discretionary review and
therefore the Court’s decision became the final agency decision in July 2003. 40 In
August 2003, Respondents appealed the decision to the US District Court for the
District of Massachusetts. 41
The District Court first addressed the limited scope of its review of administrative
proceedings, recognising that its review is “limited to the administrative record
that was before the agency at the time the decisions were made.” 42 The Agency’s
decision can only be set aside “if not supported by substantial evidence,” 43
otherwise it is “the prerogative of the ALJ to draw inferences and make credibility
assessments, and [courts] may not disturb his judgment and the [agency’s]
36
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37

132

endorsement of it so long as the findings are adequately anchored in the record.” 44
With this in mind, the District Court, as did the administrative Court, began its
analysis with Daubert.
The District Court found that although “strictly speaking … Daubert does not
apply, … ‘the spirit of Daubert’ does apply to administrative proceedings because
‘[j]unk science’ has no more place in administrative proceedings than in judicial
ones.” 45 In analyzing the administrative court’s Daubert analysis of the Boatracs
evidence, the District Court found that there was substantial evidence to support
the ALJ’s conclusion that Boatracs was reliable. 46 As a result, the District Court
held that “[t]he record as a whole, including the Boatracs evidence, … contains
substantial evidence from which the ALJ and Agency could have determined, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Independence did enter Closed Area II on
December 8 and 11, 1998.” 47 Although the District Court upheld the ALJ’s
finding of liability regarding the closed area incursions, it vacated the civil penalty
assessed and permit sanction imposed, and remanded the case back “to NOAA for
de novo reconsideration of civil penalties and permit sanctions.” 48,49 Issues
relating to the civil penalty and permit sanction were ultimately resolved through a
settlement agreement between the parties.
Practicalities of Using VMS Evidence in Court
There are, without doubt, legal hurdles associated with the use of VMS data in
enforcement proceedings. As discussed above, in the US, we must contend with
the standards established under Daubert and its progeny to effectively introduce
new scientific or technological evidence to a court. Prosecutors in other countries
must contend with their own evidentiary burdens. It is commonly recognized that
“[t]he question of whether or not VMS data can be used as evidence in legal
proceedings relating to fisheries offences and, if it can, the weight to be accorded
to it, will ultimately depend on the applicable rules of evidence in the jurisdiction
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concerned.” 50 However, the practicalities and mechanics of using VMS in court
have commonalities that transcend jurisdictional requirements.
Discussed below are some of the fundamentals of presenting VMS evidence to a
court. This discussion assumes the successful establishment of the reliability of the
VMS data, or, better yet, that the reliability of the data went unchallenged. The
reality is, however, “until such time as there is either a ruling from a higher court
on its admissibility or its use becomes so routine that it is not questioned
prosecutors will generally need to be aware of the need for expert testimony.” 51
Establishing the Credibility of the VMS Program
It is not the VMS data alone which must be credible. In order for a case to succeed
on the basis of, in part or in whole, VMS data, you must also establish the
credibility and veracity of the entire program created to monitor, review, safeguard
and track the VMS. A VMS program:
must be implemented and operated by people with an understanding of
surveillance, computers and communications. In addition to the technical
skills, however, the VMS staff must also have a comprehensive knowledge
of the regulated fishing industry, including operations and activities. This
knowledge is required to reliably interpret the information provided by the
VMS, and also to plan and implement changes to the VMS and responses to
provided information. 52
In presenting VMS evidence to the court, the program is as much on trial as the
VMS data. In other words, you must be prepared to answer the who, what, where,
when and how of the response to the violation detected using VMS.
VMS is not a problem-free enforcement tool. This alone does not defeat its
efficacy as evidence, but it means that potential problems must be addressed and
disposed of directly and up front. What possible scenarios could have occurred
that might compromise or affect the VMS data? Did your VMS program check or
conduct any recent reviews or audits to ensure that they did not occur? If they
occurred, what corrective steps were taken to ascertain whether they affected the
data in this case? Frequently, the best preparation for such questions in court is to
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Evidential Value of VMS Position Reports, (FISH/2002/11), Final Report, Marine Resources Assessment
Group Ltd, April 1 2004, (MRAG Report). The MRAG Report documents a study intended “to assess the
extent to which VMS data has successfully been used as evidence in legal proceedings relating to fisheries
offences.” The report was submitted in April of 2004 to the European Commission.
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Ibid at 51.
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Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Fishing Vessel Monitoring Systems, VMS
Components fact sheet, http://www.fao.org/fishery/vms/6/en
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have created a standard checklist or procedure that is used in every case. 53 By
regularising the process, you signal to the court your awareness that there can be
problems, but minimise their likely significance to the specific case by showing
such ground-truthing is a routine activity.
If you can demonstrate in a robust fashion that the actions taken in this case were
the same as are taken in every case, the courts will place greater weight on the
overall credibility of the program. Witnesses from the VMS program should be
prepared to detail their role in the process from initial suspicion of illegal activity
through to the recommendation for prosecution. In particularly complex cases,
VMS program personnel should prepare a memorandum for the case file outlining
all of their actions on the case. More routinely, at least in the US, VMS personnel
will prepare a memorandum that will accompany the VMS raw data, along with
any graphical depictions, that outlines the known reliability of the VMS system,
any anomalies in the given case, and, depending on the person’s expertise, an
analysis of the VMS track vis-à-vis a violation. These memoranda can be
comprised essentially of boilerplate language that is adapted to the facts of a
specific case.
Another potential area of questioning by both courts and defendants relates to the
VMS program’s data security and integrity. “To a certain extent the evidential
value of VMS position reports could depend on the verifiability (authentication
and integrity) of the data and the level of confidence in the accuracy of the system,
data and its traceability.” 54 According to a 2004 Marine Resources Assessment
Group (MRAG) Report, this aspect of VMS had not yet been subject to a legal
challenge, 55 it is, however, an area ripe for contention. Approaching such issues
internally in a proactive manner will likely reap benefits in the long term.
VMS data security is often touted as an issue of paramount importance to the
commercial fishing industry; however, data integrity is an equally compelling
interest for fisheries management and enforcement personnel.
The positions of fishing vessels can be valuable and sensitive commercial
information. Thus, monitoring agencies must make efforts to ensure the
physical and operational security of shipboard equipment, communications,
and fishery monitoring centres. Security is essential to the fishery managers
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to ensure that the VMS information is authentic and non-repudiated, of high
integrity, and private. 56
On the international front, with an ever-increasing focus on combating IUU
fishing, the potential repercussions of charges of illegal fishing have also
increased. 57 Challenges to the security and integrity of VMS data seem inevitable,
yet they should not be fatal to a case or a program. If necessary in the face of a
challenge, third party verification or audits can be used to bolster in-house
assurances.
The reality is that despite the enforcement community’s growing comfort with
VMS, it remains relatively untested in the courtroom. 58 By 2004, worldwide
“VMS data [had] only been considered by the courts on less than three dozen
occasions to date.” 59 While that number has undoubtedly grown in the past five
years, we are still in the early years. However, “[p]robably the most significant
point that emerges is that, to date, VMS data has been accepted as evidence in all
the cases … whether civil or criminal.” 60 Thus far, VMS continues to prove to be
an asset to fisheries enforcement efforts and has enhanced, not hampered,
prosecution efforts.
Graphically Depicting VMS data
VMS data are only as useful as the ability to effectively convey the information
for what may be a non-technically oriented audience. And this is not just to the
court. Prosecutors are the first audience for the evidence and must be convinced of
the merits of the case before charges will be filed. At NOAA, this has led to an
ongoing evolution in how VMS evidence is presented to the prosecutors and thus
to the court. What began as simple VMS tracks crossing over a line signifying a
closed area boundary has now morphed into ever more sophisticated renderings of
VMS data. VMS information can be displayed in many different ways in order to
highlight different facts. Depicted in Figures 2 through 4, below, are three
examples of VMS plots that convey markedly different information.
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Figure 2: Plot from the Lobsters, Inc. case

Figure 2 is from the Lobsters, Inc. case discussed earlier. This plot provides
several key pieces of information that should be included on all plots going to the
court – the fishing vessel name, the date, a scale, a compass rose, and a legend.
What may be obvious to the person creating the plot is often not obvious to an
uninformed reviewer. The plot also clearly differentiates the closed area from the
EEZ and annotates them as such. For this plot, each number represents a ping on
the VMS, meaning VMS data position information was generated for each of those
locations.
Importantly, the Figure 2 plot shows two things unmistakably. First, it shows the
volume of pings inside the closed area. Second, and more strikingly, it shows that
the vessel fished right alongside the closed area boundary for an extended period
of time indicating knowledge of the regulatory boundaries. This demonstrates not
only knowledge of the boundary, but it tells the story of exactly what happened in
terms of the vessel’s operational activity. The vessel fished the boundary line and
then darted in and out of the closed area.
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Figure 3: Plot from the Lobsters, Inc. case

Figure 3 is a blown up section of the upper portion of Figure 2 and highlights the
VMS signals or pings from inside the closed area. Once again, in terms of
presentation, the plot retains the vessel name, date scale, compass rose and legend
that are vital to orienting the reviewer. In addition, it adds a text box to focus the
reviewer on the key information. This plot depicts not only the extent of the
incursion (e.g. point 17), but also presents the substantial number of incursions
inside the closed area. Labeling each ping in sequence allows the viewer to see
that it was not just one incursion, but a series of repeated incursions into the closed
area. Here, the exact location of the plots in the ocean is less important than the
volume of plots and evidence of multiple incursions.
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Figure 4: Hypothetical Plot from a Fishing Vessel

Figure 4 is a more recent plot made to demonstrate how the addition of logbook
data to the standard VMS plots can enhance the reviewer’s understanding of the
case. By plotting logbook (or catch and effort) data alongside VMS data the results
can be extremely effective in a couple of ways. For instance, if there is close
correlation between the two, then the logbooks, which are typically signed on a
daily basis by the vessel master, become the vessel’s own corroboration of the
VMS data. And if the logbooks do not correlate with the VMS data, then the VMS
data may be used to demonstrate that portions of the logbooks were falsified.
When using logbook data, however, it is important to highlight certain information
for the court. As is true with the VMS track lines or plots, the only positions where
there is certainty as to the vessels location are those actual points (e.g. Figure 4).
The lines connecting the VMS-generated vessel positions are just that – lines
connecting two points. They do not necessarily represent the actual path of the
vessel. However, VMS tracks with short intervals of time between pings create
approximate paths of the vessel that are closer to the true course of the vessel.
Sometimes, rather than using a straight line to connect the logbook set and
haulback positions, the chart will include a shaded area that covers the entire
possible area of the vessel’s course, based on the known variables. This could, for
instance, effectively show the court that no matter the path the vessel took between
point A and point B, it remained inside a closed area the entire time.
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It can also be noticeable that the end points of the set and haulback are not exactly
on top of VMS points. Logbook positions may not occur at the exact same time as
a VMS poll and therefore will not always correspond exactly to VMS tracks. The
longer the polling period of the VMS, for instance four hours versus thirty
minutes, the more likely it is that the logbook position may seem like an outlier.
This apparent anomaly should be easily explained to the court by comparing the
logbook position time with the VMS polling time.
There are a wide variety of ways to effectively display VMS information. The
secret is to always remain mindful of your viewer and ensure that the exhibit, to
the greatest extent possible, can be understood and recalled in the absence of a
verbal explanation. Often, there is a long lag time between the hearing and the
time when the judge actually sits down to review the evidence and write a
decision. The goal is that your VMS exhibits can withstand that test of time and
will still serve to educate and inform the court.
Using Demonstrative Exhibits
One of the challenges of introducing “new” technology to a court or a jury is
taking a concept that may be technically complex and winnowing it down to the
critical elements of the process. When presenting VMS data to a court that has
little or no experience with VMS, one should plan to present the evidence orally,
in writing and graphically through demonstrative exhibits. MRAG recommends
that “in cases where a court is being asked to consider the use of VMS data for the
first time, more imaginative approaches be considered.” 61 By varying the methods
of presentation of the information, you increase the likelihood of conveying the
information in a manner that will be helpful to the listener and subtly reinforce
your message through repetition without seeming duplicative.
The use of graphically appealing and demonstrative exhibits to present VMS
information to the court can be extremely helpful for several reasons. Some judges
or juries may need a visual display to fully grasp the functioning of VMS
generally. When presenting information on actual VMS tracks, visual aids become
increasingly necessary. Displaying a vessel’s VMS tracks on a chart can
demonstrate many key facts to the court. It can show the extent of an incursion
into a closed area or an EEZ. It can show the close correlation between the VMS
track and the positions documented in a vessel’s logbook. It can corroborate the
eyewitness evidence from a marine or aviation patrol.
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As shown in Figure 2 above, sometimes, showing a VMS track outside a closed
area can be persuasive in proving your case. A vessel, accused of unlawfully
entering a closed area, may claim not to have known of the closed area boundary.
By reviewing and presenting VMS tracks, by that same vessel, that demonstrates
movement in a repeated or continuing parallel fashion along the outside of a
closed area, one can compellingly demonstrate knowledge of the boundary. Often
historical VMS data from the vessel’s previous activity (i.e. previous fishing trips)
can be particularly useful for conveying this point.
Visual aids can also combat the dry nature of technical testimony. Technical
testimony, although not always dull, lends itself to detailed, complex explanations
that may not always be easily understood. There is a potential risk that an expert
technical witness will begin lecturing in an academic manner rather than
testifying. Using demonstrative exhibits can help defuse that risk by focusing your
witness on explaining an exhibit. In addition, such exhibits will often require that
the witness get out of the witness box and onto their feet. This will serve to deformalise the proceedings somewhat and allow for a more comfortable, less
formulaic exchange of technical information. 62
Well-presented visual exhibits have the added benefit of sometimes lingering in
the courtroom after the completion of the witness’s testimony, remaining on an
easel as the trial moves on or even being co-opted by the Judge or opposing party.
It is not unusual for a chart or large exhibit to remain in place after its use in the
trial, passively displaying its information throughout the trial. Out of convenience,
such exhibits are frequently used by the Judge or opposing party during the trial.
Use of your exhibits by the court or an opposing party can give additional
reinforcement of their authenticity and reliability – in essence, they become
reference material for the case as a whole rather than the presentation of one side
of the argument.
Courts and judges differ greatly in their rules, procedures and styles. The use of
demonstrative evidence and some of the techniques described above may not
always be appropriate or possible. Effective presentation of technical information
can often be the most challenging piece of a trial. It is, in many ways, a balancing
act between competing needs and goals. There is the basic goal to provide the
court with clear, comprehensive and cogent information that supports your case.
62
One caveat to the use of demonstrative exhibits is that the enthusiasm of creating a visually pleasing
exhibit should never overwhelm critical attention to detail. You should ensure that you have confidence in
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being used for demonstrative purposes. If using a map as an underlay to VMS data, be certain that the map
accurately represents the area in question. Demonstrative exhibits have a way of ending up as material
exhibits before the court, even if not originally intended for that purpose. Treat them with the same level of
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However, it is imperative that you do not allow the case to become bogged down
in technical minutiae salient to neither the case nor the reliability of the evidence.
The expression “explain it to me as if I am six year old” 63 is often used to convey
to technical experts the appropriate level for their testimony. However, simplifying
does not have to lead inexorably to over-simplification. Both the prosecutor and
the technical witness must demonstrate command of and comfort with the
technical information. One technique for conveying this, and educating the court,
is essentially to swap roles. The prosecutor uses the technical terminology,
conveying his or her knowledge and understanding of the evidence, in questioning
the technical witness. The technical witness translates those technical questions
into readily understandable answers. This establishes the technical witness as one
who recognises the complexity of the technical issue and can explain it in
everyday terms. This allows the witness to become an ally of the Court.
Every trial is different and no one formula will work every time. VMS data will
continue to play an increasing role in fisheries enforcement, and thus, fisheries
prosecutions. The techniques and strategies discussed above are the lessons we
have learned from each other thus far. As we all continue to establish standard
practices, both in and out of the courtroom, for the handling and use of VMS data,
VMS will quickly become assimilated into our trial routines. With each case, we
have the opportunity to add to the growing acceptance of VMS data as evidence in
fisheries enforcement proceedings.
Conclusion
VMS is often either heralded as the magic elixir of fisheries enforcement or
condemned as completely unreliable. VMS is neither fool-proof nor fool-hardy.
VMS has effectively increased our ability to combat IUU fishing worldwide. VMS
alone, however, is not enough for such a large task. As stated in the FAO
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated, IUU fishing “is of serious and increasing concern. … IUU
fishing can lead to the collapse of a fishery or seriously impair food security and
environmental protection.” 64 Such a result is unacceptable.
VMS cannot, and should not, “replace or eliminate conventional MCS measures
such as aerial surveillance, boarding at sea via patrol boat, landing inspections and
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Rome, FAO, 2001, 24p.
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documentary investigations.”65 The challenges of fisheries enforcement in the 21st
Century are too great to rely passively on VMS to protect our oceans. As discussed
above, VMS allows us to see that which was heretofore hidden, but it is what we
do with this increased information that makes all the difference.
I am wary, however, of VMS becoming the facile solution to increasing
enforcement capacity. Those of us in fisheries enforcement and management must
be vigilant in ensuring that VMS complements, but does not replace, other critical
elements of an effective enforcement strategy. VMS is but one sturdy, good tool,
in a toolbox that must teem with enforcement tools.

65
FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries – Fishing Operations, Vessel Monitoring Systems,
No.1, Suppl. 1, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Rome, 1998, 58 p, at 5.
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6. Fisheries Dispute Settlement under the Law of the Sea
Convention: Current Practice in the Western and Central
Pacific Region
Martin Tsamenyi, Ben Milligan and Kwame Mfodwo

Introduction
The international regulation of fisheries is one of the central features of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (the
LOSC). 1 Provisions regarding fisheries, which are largely incorporated into
Part IV of the LOSC under the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) provisions,
permit coastal States to extend their fisheries jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles
from their baselines. This development has had far-reaching effects on the
relations between coastal States and distant water fishing nations whose
nationals had previously harvested the fisheries resources in the extended zones
of jurisdiction under the freedom of the high seas.
Part XV of the LOSC establishes a comprehensive framework for the
settlement of disputes arising from the interpretation and application of the
Convention, including the settlement of fisheries-related disputes. This chapter
provides an overview and analysis of the dispute settlement mechanism
established by the LOSC and examines how the Part XV framework has been
implemented by member countries of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries
Agency (FFA). 2
Fisheries Dispute Settlement Under the LOSC
The Development Of LOSC Part XV
As discussed in detail below, the LOSC contains a number of specific
provisions regarding the settlement of fisheries-related disputes and a
significant number of disputes arising from the Convention have contained
fisheries-related elements. The dispute settlement mechanism for fisheries is
only one aspect of Part XV of the LOSC, the part of the Convention devoted to
dispute settlement in general.
The context in which the entire dispute settlement mechanism was drafted is
particularly important for understanding its key characteristics of flexibility,
comprehensiveness, and complexity. During the Third United Nations
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, opened for signature 10
December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994).
2 The members are: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall
Islands, Nauru, New Zealand (including Tokelau), Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
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Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 3 it became obvious to
negotiators from most States that a comprehensive and to some extent,
compulsory, system was necessary to help resolve the variety of ambiguities
and problems of interpretation fated to arise when the LOSC came into force. 4
However, States were not prepared to establish a mechanism which could
easily compel their submission to its jurisdiction, even as they were also not
ready to submit all categories of disputes to the comprehensive system they
desired. 5
The resolution of these conflicting perspectives, after much negotiation and
creative 6 legal work, was Part XV of the LOSC, which for the first time,
incorporated within the main text of a major multilateral treaty, comprehensive,
and in some cases, compulsory judicial settlement mechanisms, rather than
relegating compulsory dispute settlement to an optional protocol.
There are many reasons why States were prepared to accept a general
obligation on dispute settlement equally binding on all State ratifying the
LOSC. 7 The reasons included: the flexibility of the system based on the
proposition that the will of the parties must prevail and that the parties may by
agreement select any dispute settlement system they wish; the ingenuity of the
system in incorporating the non-compulsory procedures of general international
law; the presence within the system of the variety of dispute settlement
approaches advocated by different States (functionalist arbitration; ad-hoc
general arbitration; judicial proceedings); and the fact that the LOSC restricted
itself to dispute settlement relating only to the written rules of the Convention,
leaving out the unwritten rules of general international law about which there is
much uncertainty. Finally, the major maritime and distant water fishing States
accepted the dispute settlement system as the only means of keeping in check
the broad powers granted to coastal States. 8
3

This conference was convened in New York in 1973 and concluded in 1982 with the adoption of the
LOSC. For an overview of the LOSC negotiation processes see United Nations Division for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A
historical perspective)’, available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_historical_perspective.htm>
4
See, generally, Nordquist, M., Rosenne, S. and Sohn, L. (eds) UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
1982: A Commentary Vol V, 1989; Sohn, L. ‘Settlement of Disputes Arising out of the Law of the Sea
Convention’ in San Diego Law Review, Vol. 12, 1975, p. 495; Adede, A. ‘ Settlement of Disputes
Arising under the Law of the Sea’ in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 69, 1975, p.
798; Adede, A. The System for Settlement of Disputes under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea,
1987; Klein, N. Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 2005.
5
Jaenicke, G. ‘Dispute Settlement under the Law of the Sea Convention’ in ZaöRV 813, Vol. 43, 1983,
p. 817; Adede, A. ‘Prolegomena to the Dispute Settlement Part of the Law of the Sea Convention’ in
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics Vol. 10, 1977, p. 253.
6
See Adede, 1987, above n 4, p. 53-54, which discusses in particular the flexible system of access to
the procedures devised by Professor Riphagen, known thereafter as the Montreux Formula. See also
Nordquist, Rosenne and Sohn, above n 4, p. 8-9; Rosenne, S. ‘UNCLOS III – The Montreux
(Riphagen) Compromise’ in Bos, A. and Siblesz, H. (eds) Realism in Law Making: Essays in
International Law in Honour of Wilhelm Riphagen, 1986, p. 169.
7
See Jaenicke, above n 5, p. 815-816; Nordquist, Rosenne and Sohn, above n 4, pp. 3-19.
8
See Jaenicke, above n 5, p. 815-816; Adede (1987), above n 4, p. 243.
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The Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Part XV of the LOSC 9
There are three ways in which fisheries disputes are addressed in Part XV and
its related annexes. First, some disputes, including those concerning high seas
fisheries are subject to compulsory settlement procedures. Second, fisheries
disputes within the EEZ are exempted from any requirement of compulsory
settlement where what is in dispute is the assertion of alleged or undisputed
sovereign rights by a coastal State. Third, in three specified instances where
sovereign rights are flagrantly exercised to the detriment of other States,
conciliation procedures are compulsory at a disputant State’s request. The
outcome is; however; not binding on the disputants, a clear recognition of the
primacy of the sovereign rights granted the coastal State under the LOSC.
The ways in which fisheries disputes are addressed in Part XV result from the
interaction of compulsory and non-compulsory dispute settlement procedures
in addition to general obligations applicable to dispute settlement. These
elements of Part XV of the LOSC may be described as follows.
General Obligations and Non-compulsory Dispute Settlement Procedures
Part XV Section 1 of the LOSC sets out a number of obligations regarding
conciliation, exchange of views and the seeking of settlement through treaty
mechanisms outside the LOSC framework.
Article 279 of the LOSC asserts that the fundamental and preliminary
obligation of all State parties is to settle disputes, whether in the fisheries sector
or otherwise, by the peaceful means indicated in Article 33(1) of the Charter of
the United Nations (UN Charter), and in accordance with Article 2(3) of the
Charter. Article 2(3) of the UN Charter requires members States to ‘settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.’ The peaceful means of
dispute settlement indicated in Article 33(1) of the UN Charter include:
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
and resort to regional agencies or arrangements. 10

9

See generally, Churchill, R. and Lowe, V. The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed, 1999, pp. 447-462; Nordquist,
Rosenne and Sohn, above n 4; Klein, above n 4.
10
Article 33(1) of the UN Charter provides in full: ‘The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.’ The reference to this
provision in LOSC Article 279 is really only to the ‘means referred to in Article 33, paragraph 1 of the
Charter, not to paragraph 1, as a whole. This drafting choice was made in order to avoid the restriction
in that provision that only disputes ‘the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security’ are subject to the settlement under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
Under Article 279 all disputes, not only those endangering international peace and security, are subject
to settlement: See Nordquist, Rosenne and Sohn, above n 4, p. 18.
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Article 284 of the LOSC permits State parties involved in disputes concerning
the Convention to invite the other disputant(s) to submit to conciliation. The
presiding body is a five person Conciliation Commission, with the limited
though useful brief of hearing the parties, examining their claims and
objections, and making proposals with a view to reach an amicable
settlement. 11 Each party is entitled to choose two conciliators, including one of
its nationals. 12 The fifth conciliator is chosen by the other four or by the UN
Secretary General at the request of a party to the dispute if an appointment is
not made within a specified period.13 Conciliators are chosen from a list to
which each State party to the LOSC is entitled to nominate four people. The
Conciliation Commission is required to report to the UN Secretary General
within twelve months. Where successful the report is to include any agreements
reached, and where unsuccessful, the report is to state its conclusions on all
questions of fact and law relevant to the matter in dispute, as well as all
recommendations that the Commission deems appropriate for an amicable
settlement. The report is not binding, though its hortatory value would
presumably be quite high as the UN Secretary General may distribute it widely.
The entire procedure can be aborted if one party rejects the Commission’s
recommendations.
State parties are free to settle their disputes by peaceful means set out in
general, regional or bilateral agreements in force between them outside the
LOSC’s system. 14 However, in cases where no settlement has been reached
under these alternative procedures, and where reference to the LOSC procedure
is not precluded, State parties may have recourse to the system set out in the
LOSC. 15
The submission to the dispute-settlement procedures of the LOSC is predicated
on the exhaustion of local remedies. 16 This requirement has been described as
ambiguous, 17 since it could mean that in disputes which arise as State-to-State
disputes inter-se local remedies should first be sought in one State’s fora. A
more widely accepted interpretation is that the exhaustion of local remedies
requirement applies only in situations where nationals of one State are engaged
in a dispute against the authorities of another State, the core sense in which the
concept is used in international law. 18
Mindful of the possible confusion and delay in proceeding through the
multiplicity of mechanisms, expeditious inter-party communications are
11

LOSC Annex V Article 6.
LOSC Annex V Article 3.
13
LOSC Annex V Article 3.
14
LOSC Article 282.
15
LOSC Article 286.
16
LOSC Article 295.
17
See Birnie, P. 'Dispute Settlement Procedures in the 1982 UNCLOS' in Butler, W.E. (ed) The Law of
the Sea and International Shipping: Anglo-Soviet Post-UNCLOS Perspectives, 1985, p. 46.
18
See Adede, 1987, above n 4, p. 162; Shaw, M. International Law, 5th ed, 2003, p. 730-732.
12
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mandated by Article 283.19 To accommodate a strongly expressed concern held
by coastal States, 20 Article 294 attempts to prevent costly and vexatious
proceedings by empowering settlement bodies to determine the existence or not
of a prima facie case. 21
Compulsory Dispute Settlement Procedures
Part XV Section 2 of the LOSC sets out ‘compulsory procedures entailing
binding decisions’ which become operative in accordance with LOSC Articles
286 and 287 where no settlement has been reached by recourse to the noncompulsory procedures specified in Part XV Section 1. Article 287 refers to
four alternative fora for compulsory dispute settlement procedures, namely (i)
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); (ii) the International
Court of Justice (ICJ); (iii) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VII of the LOSC; and (iv) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VIII of the LOSC. States are entitled to choose, by
means of a written declaration, one or more of these dispute settlement fora at
any time, on or after becoming party to the Convention. State parties that have
not made a declaration indicating their choice of fora are deemed to have
accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII of the LOSC. If the parties
to a dispute have chosen the same forum for dispute settlement under Article
287, the dispute may be submitted only to that forum unless the parties
otherwise agree. If the parties to a dispute have not chosen the same forum for
dispute settlement under Article 287, the dispute may be submitted only to
‘Annex VII’ arbitration unless the parties otherwise agree.
If a dispute has been duly submitted to a court or tribunal which considers that
prima facie it has jurisdiction under Part XV or Part XI, Section 5, the court or
tribunal may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate
under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the
dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final
decision. 22 ITLOS is empowered to prescribe, modify or revoke provisional

19

See Adede, 1977, above n 5, p. 262.
For example, during UNCLOS III Kenya stated: ‘All matters relating to that zone were exclusively
within the competence of the coastal State, and to accept the possibility of compulsory third-party
settlement would mean that the coastal State might be subjected to constant harassment by having to
appear before international tribunals at considerable loss of time and money. Similarly, where the
coastal State had been given clearly defined jurisdiction by the Convention, particularly with respect to
the preservation of the marine environment, its power would be negated if it could be subjected, each
time it exercised such power, to compulsory dispute settlement systems on matters which could be
dealt with through local courts.’: Statement by Mr Njenga (Kenya) III UNCLOS Official Records 3,
UN Doc. A (Conf. 621/WP.9/Add 1, 1976).
21
LOSC Article 294(1) provides: ‘A court or tribunal provided for in Article 287 to which an
application is made in respect of a dispute referred to in Article 297 shall determine at the request of a
party, or may determine proprio motu, whether the claim constitutes an abuse of legal process or
whether prima facie it is well founded. If the court or tribunal determines that the claim constitutes an
abuse of legal process or is prima facie unfounded, it shall take no further action in the case.’
22
LOSC Article 290.
20
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measures pending the constitution of the court or tribunal to which the dispute
has been submitted. 23
Article 292 of the LOSC establishes a specific compulsory procedure for
disputes concerning LOSC Article 73, which requires the prompt release of
vessels and crews detained in the exercise of a coastal State’s right to enforce
its laws and regulations regarding the conservation and management of living
resources in its EEZ. Where the authorities of a coastal State have detained a
vessel flying the flag of another State, disputes regarding compliance with
LOSC Article 73 may be heard by ITLOS or a tribunal accepted by the
detaining State under Article 287.24 The tribunal hearing the dispute is
empowered to determine a reasonable bond or security and order the release of
the detained vessel or its crew. 25
Fora Available for Compulsory Dispute Settlement 26
As noted above, the variety of dispute settlement approaches available in Part
XV of the LOSC was a key reason why States were prepared to accept the
inclusion of a binding system of dispute settlement in the Convention. The four
fora for compulsory dispute settlement set out in LOSC Article 287 and their
varied characteristics are described briefly below.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established after the Second World
War as the ‘principal judicial organ’ of the United Nations. 27 The ICJ is
comprised of 15 judges, no two of whom may be nationals of the same State, 28
who are: 29
elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral
character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective
countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are
jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.
Judges are elected from a list of qualified persons for nine year terms according
to a procedure involving separate votes in the UN General Assembly and
Security Council. 30 Judges are also subject to several requirements designed to
ensure their impartiality 31 and enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities
when engaged in the business of the court. 32 The ICJ is empowered to manage
23

LOSC Article 290(5).
LOSC Article 292(1).
LOSC Article 292(4).
26
See, generally, Shaw above n 18, pp. 959-1012 (regarding the ICJ and ITLOS), Churchill and Lowe,
above n 9, pp. 451-458.
27
See UN Charter Article 92.
28
ICJ Statute Article 3(1).
29
ICJ Statute Article (2).
30
See Shaw, above n 18, pp. 961-962.
31
ICJ Statute Articles 16-18.
32
ICJ Statute Article 19.
24
25
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its own procedure and operations and has adopted detailed rules of court in
addition to several practice directions. 33 Each party to a dispute before the ICJ
is entitled to appoint an ad hoc judge for the duration of the case, unless there is
already a judge of its nationality on the bench.34 State parties to a dispute may
also agree to have their dispute heard by a Chamber of the Court, although such
arrangements are rare. 35 The ICJ is required to form annually a Chamber of
Summary Procedure, consisting of five judges allocated by the Court, ‘with a
view to the speedy dispatch of business of the Court. 36 Chambers may also be
formed to handle particular subject matter (for example environmental matters)
or specific disputes. 37 In the latter case, parties to a dispute may, in practice,
determine the composition of the Chamber by consensus. 38
The ICJ is considered to be the most prestigious judicial body with competence
to adjudicate disputes in accordance with international law. 39 The court has
delivered many judgements in relation to disputes concerning the law of the
sea 40 and has been chosen as a dispute settlement forum by 24 of the 46 States
that have, as of February 2009, submitted declarations under LOSC Article
287. 41 Commentators have identified the time period required by the court to
deliver judgements (a minimum of several years) and the formality of the
court’s procedures as potential disadvantages of using the ICJ as a dispute
settlement mechanism. 42
ITLOS was established in accordance with Annex VI of the LOSC. Unlike the
ICJ, which is only capable of adjudicating disputes between States, 43 ITLOS is
also open to non-State entities (for example international organisations). 44 The
tribunal is comprised of 21 independent judges, who are ‘elected from among
persons enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and integrity and of
recognised competence in the field of the law of the sea.’ 45 The Statue of the
tribunal incorporates several requirements designed to ensure that the tribunal,
as a whole, is representative of the principal legal systems of the world and
reflects and an equitable geographical distribution of judges. 46 Judges are
33
See ICJ Statute Article 30 and the rules of court and practice directions available on the ICJ website
at <http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4>. See also Shaw, above n 18, pp. 965-966.
34
ICJ Statute Article 31.
35
See Shaw, above n 18, pp. 964-966 and the summary of Chambers of the Court published on the ICJ
website at <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=4>
36
See ICJ Statute Article 29.
37
See ICJ Statute Article 26(1) and (2). See also above n 35.
38
See the comments of Judge Oda at ICJ Reports, 1987, 10, 13 extracted in Shaw, above n 18, p. 965.
39
Shaw, above n 18, pp. 959-960.
40
See generally, Shaw, above n 18, pp. 490-571 and the list of cases referred to in Churchill and Lowe,
above n 9, xix-xxii.
41
See DOALOS, ‘Settlement of Disputes Mechanism: Recapitulative Tables’ available at:
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm>
42
See Churchill and Lowe, above n 9, p. 452.
43
ICJ Statute Article 34.
44
See LOSC Annex VI Article 20.
45
LOSC Annex VI Article 2(1).
46
See LOSC Annex VI Articles 2 and 3.
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elected by State parties to the LOSC for nine year terms. 47 The Statute of the
tribunal provides for the appointment of ad hoc judges in a similar manner to
the ICJ procedure described above. 48 Parties to a dispute may agree to have
their dispute heard by a Special Chamber of the tribunal consisting of three or
more judges, selected with approval of the parties. 49 The tribunal is also
required to form annually a chamber composed of five judges to hear and
determine disputes by summary procedure. 50 In accordance with the Statute of
the tribunal and Part XI, Section 5 of the LOSC, a Seabed Disputes Chamber of
the tribunal has been formed with jurisdiction in relation to disputes regarding
activities in the international seabed area. 51
So far, ITLOS has emerged as the preferred judicial mechanism for the
settlement of fisheries-related disputes under the LOSC, with 12 out of the 15
cases submitted, to date, to ITLOS having dealt with such disputes. 52 Ten of
these cases have been submitted to the tribunal under the Article 292 procedure
described above (regarding the prompt release of vessels and crews detained by
a coastal State). A key advantage of using ITLOS as a dispute resolution body
is the tribunal’s ability to process disputes much faster than the ICJ.
An arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the LOSC
may be established in relation to disputes concerning the interpretation and
application of the Convention between State parties to the LOSC and/or other
entities (for example international organisations). 53 Parties to a dispute may
determine the composition of an Annex VII arbitral tribunal by agreement.
Each party is entitled to appoint one of the five members of the tribunal, with
the remaining three members being selected jointly. 54 Members must be
appointed from a list of arbitrators to which each State party to the LOSC may
nominate four people, ‘each of whom shall be a person experienced in maritime
affairs and enjoying the highest reputation for fairness, competence and
integrity.’ 55 Persons nominated to the list of arbitrators are not required to have
legal expertise, and accordingly may be technical experts in fisheries
management.

47
See LOSC Annex VI Articles 4 and 5. Elections are conducted on a staggered basis every three
years. In order to make this staggered process possible, the terms of 14 judges elected at the first
election were shortened by lot – seven terms to three years, and the other seven terms to six years.
48
See LOSC Annex VI Article 17.
49
See LOSC Annex VI Article 15.
50
LOSC Annex VI Article 15(3).
51
See LOSC Annex VI Article 14. See also Shaw, above n 18, p. 1007.
52
A list of cases heard by ITLOS is available at the Tribunals website: <http://www.itlos.org/cgibin/cases/list_of_cases.pl?language=en>. See also Klein, above n 4, pp. 85-118.
53
See LOSC Annex VII Article 13.
54
See LOSC Annex VII Article 3. In the event that parties to a dispute fail to reach agreement
regarding the appointment of the three members chosen jointly, these members are appointed by the
President of the Law of the Sea Tribunal: See LOSC Annex VII, Article 3(d).
55
See LOSC Annex VII Article 2.
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A Special Arbitral Tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII of the
LOSC may be established as a forum for four categories of disputes, namely:
‘(1) fisheries, (2) protection and preservation of the marine environment, (3)
marine scientific research, or (4) navigation, including pollution from vessels
and by dumping.’ 56 The fisheries panel is comprised of technically competent
experts drawn primarily from a list of world-wide State-nominated experts
(who may be technical, as opposed to legal experts). The list is drawn up and
maintained through the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United
Nations (FAO). 57 Parties to a dispute may agree to request the panel ‘to carry
out an inquiry and establish the facts giving rise to the dispute.’58 Unless the
parties otherwise agree, the findings of fact made during this procedure are
considered conclusive between the parties. 59 Parties to a dispute may also agree
to request the panel to formulate recommendations, which ‘shall only constitute
the basis for a review by the parties of the questions giving rise to the dispute’
and do not have the binding effect of a legal decision. 60
Arbitral tribunals, constituted under either Annex VII or Annex VIII of the
LOSC, have several advantages over judicial settlement bodies such as ITLOS
or the ICJ. As Shaw notes: 61
Arbitration is an extremely useful process where some technical
expertise is required, or where greater flexibility than is available before
the International Court is desired. Speed may also be a relevant
consideration … the establishment of arbitral tribunals has often been
undertaken in order to deal relatively quietly and cheaply with a series
of problems within certain categories …
However, a disadvantage of referring disputes to arbitration rather than ITLOS
or the ICJ is the costs associated with such a process. Unless the relevant
arbitral tribunal decides otherwise, because of the particular circumstances of
the case, the costs associated with the establishment and operation of an arbitral
tribunal constituted under either Annex VII or Annex VIII are borne equally by
the parties to the dispute. 62 In contrast, both ITLOS and the ICJ have
established premises and staff that are funded, respectively, by parties to the
LOSC and the United Nations.

56

See LOSC Annex VIII Article 1.
LOSC Annex VIII Articles 1 and 2.
LOSC Annex VIII Article 5(1).
59
LOSC Annex VIII Article 5(2).
60
LOSC Annex VIII Article 5(3). Adede observes that ‘the Special Arbitral Tribunal under this Annex
combines the function of fact-finding and making non-binding recommendations comparable to those
of the conciliation procedure, with the normal function of rendering binding decisions … No other third
party procedures for judicial settlement under Article 287 of the Convention have this double
function.’: Adede, 1987, above n 4, observes at page 235.
61
Shaw, above n 18, pp. 958-959.
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See LOSC Annex VII Article 7 and Annex VIII Article 4.
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Exceptions to Compulsory Procedures and Non-compulsory Dispute Settlement
The basic position set out in Article 297(3) of the LOSC is that disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the LOSC with
regard to fisheries are subject to the compulsory procedures set out in Part XV
Section 2. However, the requirement set out in Part XV Section 2 of the LOSC
to engage in compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions is subject to a
number of exceptions,63 some of which specifically apply to fisheries-related
disputes.
First, Article 297(1) provides that disputes concerning the exercise by a coastal
State of its sovereign rights (including sovereign rights in the EEZ) or
jurisdiction shall not be subject to the compulsory procedures entailing binding
decisions set out in Part XV Section 2 of the LOSC except in the following
cases:
a) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of the

provisions of this Convention in regard to the freedoms and rights of
navigation, overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or
in regard to other internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in
Article 58;
b) when it is alleged that a State in exercising the aforementioned
freedoms, rights or uses has acted in contravention of this Convention or
of laws or regulations adopted by the coastal State in conformity with
this Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible
with this Convention; or
c) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of
specified international rules and standards for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment which are applicable to the
coastal State and which have been established by this Convention or
through a competent international organization or diplomatic conference
in accordance with this Convention.
Furthermore, the basic position of article 297(3) is qualified by the requirement
that States shall not be …
obliged to accept the submission to such settlement [compulsory
procedures under Article 287] of any dispute relating to its sovereign
rights with respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic
zone or their exercise, including its discretionary power for determining
the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of surpluses to
other States and the terms and conditions established in its conservation
and management laws and regulations.

63
These are set out in LOSC Part XV Section 3, entitled ‘Limitations and Exceptions to Applicability
of Section 2’.
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However, in three specified circumstances where sovereign rights are flagrantly
exercised to the detriment of other States, a ‘compulsory conciliation’
procedure under Section 2 of Annex V of the LOSC may be initiated at a
disputant’s request. 64 The three specified circumstances comprise core possible
areas of fisheries disputes, namely allegations that:
i) a coastal State has manifestly failed to comply with its obligations to

ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is
not seriously endangered; or
ii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine, at the request of
another State, the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest living
resources with respect to stocks which that other State is interested in
fishing; or
iii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to allocate to any State, under
Articles 62, 69 and 70 and under the terms and conditions established by
the coastal State consistent with this Convention, the whole or part of
the surplus it has declared to exist.
The compulsory conciliation procedure is the same as the ‘classical’
conciliation set out in Article 284 of the LOSC and described above, except
that States involved in a dispute are required to participate, and the Conciliation
Commission is entitled to proceed despite a failure of a State to participate. 65
Under Article 13 of Annex V, the ‘compulsory’ Conciliation Commission also
has the competence to decide whether the subject matter of the dispute falls
within its mandate. 66 This is intended to prevent frustration of the proceedings
through objections by the party compulsorily impleaded. 67 Article 297(3)(c) of
the LOSC prohibits the Conciliation Commission from substituting its own
discretion for that of the coastal State when deciding disputes. Although this
requirement has been criticised on the basis that it may completely frustrate the
Commission’s work, 68 it is arguable that Article 297(3)(c) does not prevent the

64

LOSC Article 297(3)(b).
See Articles 11 and 12 of LOSC Annex V. Article 11 provides that ‘1. Any party to a dispute which
in accordance with Part XV, Section 3, may be submitted to conciliation under this Section may
institute the proceedings by written notification addressed to the other party or parties to the dispute. 2.
Any party to the dispute, notified under paragraph 1 shall be obliged to submit to such proceedings.’
Article 12 provides: ‘The failure of a party or parties to the dispute to reply to notification of institution
of proceeding or to submit to such proceeding shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings.’ See
Nordquist, Rosenne and Sohn, above n 4, p. 331 for detailed commentary regarding the compulsory
conciliation procedure.
66
Nordquist, Rosenne and Sohn, above n 4, p. 327. See also LOSC, Article 288(4).
67
Nordquist, Rosenne and Sohn, above n 4, p. 327: ‘In the case of compulsory recourse to conciliation
… precisely because recourse to the procedure is compulsory for the other part, it was considered
necessary to provide for the determination of the competence of the Commission as a precaution
against frustration of the proceedings.’
68
Ibid, p. 321; cf Riphagen, W. ‘ Dispute Settlement in the 1982 UNCLOS’ in Rozakis, C. and
Stephanou, C. (eds) The New Law of the Sea, 1983, p. 281; and Rosenne, S. ‘Settlement of Fisheries
Disputes in the EEZ’ in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 73, 1989, 89 p. 99.
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Commission from finding that that actions of a coastal State were made on
‘patently impermissible grounds.’ 69
Optional Exceptions to Compulsory Procedures
Article 298 of the LOSC enables States to exclude the application of
compulsory dispute settlement procedures by opting out of such procedures in
relation to one or more of three categories of dispute, namely: (a) disputes
regarding the delimitation of maritime boundaries and claims to historic waters;
(b) disputes concerning military and law enforcement activities; and (c)
disputes in respect of which the UN Security Council is exercising the
functions assigned to it by the UN Charter. 70 A State may invoke an optional
exception by special declaration, at or after ratification of the LOSC.
The optional exception relating to law enforcement activities undertaken by the
coastal State is of particular relevance to fisheries-related dispute settlement, 71
and raises a number of issues. First, it is unclear whether the exception applies
to fisheries-related disputes. In light of the explicit reference to such disputes in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 297 (as discussed above), it is arguable that
fisheries-related disputes may not be excepted by declaration under Article
298(1)(b). This, at least, is the view of the University of Virginia’s Centre for
Ocean Law and Policy’s Commentary on the LOSC, which argues: 72
The important consequence of these changes was to make law
enforcement activities under article 297, paragraph 1 (namely those
related to navigation, overflight or the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, as well as those related to the protection and preservation of
the marine environment) subject to the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal.
Only disputes concerning the enforcement of provisions relating to
marine scientific research or fisheries, which are not subject to the
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal because of the express exceptions in
article 297, paragraphs 2 and 3, can be excepted by a declaration under
article 298. That means the enforcement of some provisions on marine
scientific research or fisheries may not be excepted under article 298,
paragraph 1(b).
Second, it is unclear whether the optional exception regarding law enforcement
activities by a coastal State may be invoked in relation to disputes where law
69

Churchill and Lowe, above n 9, p. 455.
See LOSC Article 298.
71
LOSC Article 298(1)(b) provides: ‘When signing or ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at
any time thereafter, a State, may without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, declare in
writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided in section 2 with respect to
one or more of the following categories of disputes … disputes concerning military activities including
… disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or
jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under Article 297, paragraph 2 or 3.’
72
See UNCLOS 1982: A Commentary Vol V supra note pp. 134-137. The quoted extract is from p.
137.
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enforcement activities of one coastal State intrude into the territorial sea of an
adjacent or neighbouring coastal State (for example as a result of the
continuation of a hot pursuit into such a zone). Intrusion into the territorial sea
is patently illegal, as under LOSC Article 111(3), Article 23(2) of the High
Seas Convention, and customary law, hot pursuit has to cease in the territorial
sea (unless the relevant coastal State agrees otherwise). For this reason, arising
from the sovereignty of States over their territorial sea, it is arguable that
disputes arising from such an intrusion could not be excluded from compulsory
dispute settlement by the law enforcement activities exception set out in LOSC
Article 298(1)(b).
Applicable Law
LOSC Article 293 provides that at least in relation to compulsory procedures
entailing binding decisions, the law to be applied to any fisheries or other
dispute is to be the LOSC itself and other rules of international law not
incompatible with the LOSC. Article 293 also permits decisions ex aequo et
bono 73 if the parties to the dispute agree to this. 74 The fact that Article 293
applies only to courts or tribunals handing down binding decisions75 provides a
degree of flexibility to the non-binding conciliation procedures in the
Convention – i.e. a conciliation commission may propose creative settlements
without sole reference to the legal rights of the parties. 76
State Practice of FFA Members
As explained in detail above, the system of dispute settlement set out in Part
XV of the LOSC provides considerable flexibility for parties to a dispute. Key
areas of flexibility include the ability to select a preferred means of compulsory
dispute settlement under LOSC Article 287 and exclude specific subject matter
from compulsory dispute settlement procedures set out in LOSC Part XV
Section 2 in accordance with LOSC Article 298. In order to take advantage of
these possible implementations of Part XV of the LOSC, State parties are
required to make official declarations at the time they sign the LOSC, ratify it
or any time thereafter, either choosing a forum for compulsory dispute
resolution under Article 287 or declaring that the State does not accept
compulsory dispute resolution procedure with respect to one or more categories
of dispute set out in Article 298.
73
In the context of international dispute settlement a decision ex aequo et bono is made according to
what is fair and in good conscience, not necessarily in accordance with what the law requires: see
Trakman, L. ‘Ex Aequo Et Bono: De-Mystifying an Ancient Concept’ in Chicago Journal of
International Law, Vol. 8, 2008, p. 621.
74
LOSC Article 293(2).
75
The relevant sections of the LOSC (Annex V, Section 1 – Conciliation; Annex V, Section 2 –
Compulsory Conciliation) have no clauses clearly detailing the applicable law.
76
See Shaw, above n 18, p. 927, who provides several examples of such proposals by conciliation
commissions, including a proposal to settle a maritime boundary dispute between Iceland and Norway
by establishing a joint development zone.
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As of February 2009, only Australia and Palau have, among the FFA members,
made declarations pursuant to Part XV of the LOSC. 77
Australia
Australia has declared acceptance of ITLOS and the ICJ as fora for compulsory
dispute settlement under LOSC Article 287. Australia has also made a
declaration under Article 298 excluding disputes referred to in Article
298(1)(a) (regarding the delimitation of maritime boundaries and claims to
historic waters) from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures set out in
Part XV, Section 2. The relevant Australian declaration provides in full: 78
The Government of Australia declares, under paragraph 1 of article 287
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea done at
Montego Bay on the tenth day of December one thousand nine hundred
and eighty-two that it chooses the following means for the settlement of
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention,
without specifying that one has precedence over the other:
(a)
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in
accordance with Annex VI of the Convention; and
(b)
the International Court of Justice.
The Government of Australia further declares, under paragraph 1 (a) of
article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
done at Montego Bay on the tenth day of December one thousand nine
hundred and eighty-two, that it does not accept any of the procedures
provided for in section 2 of Part XV (including the procedures referred
to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this declaration) with respect to disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83
relating to sea boundary delimitations as well as those involving historic
bays or titles.
These declarations by the Government of Australia are effective
immediately.
8 April 2002
Palau
Palau has also made a declaration under Article 298 excluding disputes referred
to in Article 298(1)(a) from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures set
out in Part XV Section 2. The declaration by Palau provides in full:79
77
This conclusion is based on a review of the United Nations Treaty Collection online database,
available at <http://treaties.un.org>
78
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, Australia:
Declaration under Articles 287 and 298, UN Ref. C.N.326.2002.TREATIES-4, available at
<http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2005/10/20051007%200526%20AM/Related%20Documents/CN.326.2002-Eng.pdf>
79
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, Palau:
Declaration under Article 298, UN Ref. C.N.348.2006.TREATIES-2, available at
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The Government of the Republic of Palau declares under paragraph 1 (a)
of Article 298 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea that it does not accept compulsory procedures entailing binding
decisions relating to the delimitation and/or interpretation of maritime
boundaries.
28 April 2006
Remaining FFA Members
The Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall
Islands, Nauru, New Zealand (and Tokelau), Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu have made no declarations under
either Articles 287 or 298 of the LOSC. However, New Zealand has accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by declaration
under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. The New Zealand declaration
provides: 80
I have the honour, by direction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of New
Zealand, to declare on behalf of the Government of New Zealand:
(I.) The acceptance by the Government of New Zealand of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by
virtue of the Declaration made on 1 April 1940 under Article 36 of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and made
applicable to the International Court of Justice by paragraph 5 of
Article 36 of the Statute of that Court, is hereby terminated.
(II.) The Government of New Zealand accept as compulsory, ipso facto,
and without special agreement, on condition of reciprocity, the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in conformity with
paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Court over all disputes other than:
(1) Disputes in regard to which the parties have agreed or shall agree
to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement;
(2) Disputes in respect of which any other party to the dispute has
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute: or
where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on
behalf of any other party to the dispute was deposited or ratified
less than twelve months prior to the filing of the application
bringing the dispute before the Court;
(3) Disputes arising out of, or concerning the jurisdiction or rights
claimed or exercised by New Zealand in respect of the
<http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2005/10/20051007%200526%20AM/Related%20Documents/CN.348.2006-Eng.pdf>
80
This declaration is published on the ICJ website at
<http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=NZ>
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exploration, exploitation, conservation or management of the
living resources in marine areas beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea of New Zealand but within 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.
This Declaration shall remain in force for a period of five years from 22
September 1977 and thereafter until the expiration of six months after
notice has been given of the termination of this Declaration provided
that the Government of New Zealand reserves the right at any time to
amend this Declaration in the light of the results of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in respect of the settlement of
disputes.
New York, 22 September 1977.
Conclusion
Part XV of the LOSC provides parties to the Convention with considerable
flexibility to determine and utilise their preferred means for resolving disputes,
including fisheries-related disputes, concerning the interpretation and
application of the Convention. Key areas of flexibility include the ability to
select a preferred means of compulsory dispute settlement under LOSC Article
287 and exclude specific subject matter from compulsory dispute settlement
procedures set out in LOSC Part XV Section 2 in accordance with LOSC
Article 298. In order to take advantage of these possible implementations of
Part XV of the LOSC, State parties are required to make official declarations at
the time they sign the LOSC, ratify it or any time thereafter, either choosing a
forum for compulsory dispute resolution under Article 287 or declaring that the
State does not accept compulsory dispute resolution procedure with respect to
one or more categories of dispute set out in Article 298.
FFA member countries that have not made official declarations regarding Part
XV of the LOSC are advised to identify a preferred implementation of Part XV
and incorporate this into fisheries governance policies. Such action would
enable FFA member countries to be well-prepared for international fisheriesrelated disputes in the Western and Central Pacific Region and to avoid any
perceptions of bad faith that may be associated with making declarations
regarding Part XV in haste following the development of an international
fisheries dispute.
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7. Partners or Adversaries? The Role of NGOs in the
Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments
Pio E. Manoa

Introduction
Non-government organisations (NGOs) are regarded as ‘heavyweight’ actors in
international fora. 1 The term NGO refers to any organisation that is not a
government or inter-governmental organisation. In fisheries governance in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean, the increasing involvement of NGOs is a
consequence of post United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) 2 developments and globalisation processes. The 1992
UNCED, also referred to as the Earth Summit, provided the platform for greater
participation of civil society in the pursuit of sustainable development and key
fisheries principles were elaborated. Other international meetings such as the
World Summit on Sustainable Development have reaffirmed principles raised
since the Earth Summit.
In fisheries decision-making at the regional and international levels, the
participation of interested stakeholders including NGOs is now the norm. When
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 3 (LOSC) was
negotiated, the emphasis was on promoting cooperation among States and between
States and inter-governmental organisations. This is reflected in the duty to
cooperate for conservation and management purposes in waters under national
jurisdiction 4 as well as on the high seas. 5 As the fisheries management paradigm
evolved to include more environmental principles and the promotion of
transparency and accountability, texts of international fisheries instruments
extended participation to NGOs. Explicit references to participation are made in
the 1995 Food and Agricultural Organisation Code of Conduct for Responsible

1

Betsill, M. M. & Corell, E. ‘NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework
for Analysis’ in Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2001, pp. 65-85; Clark, A. M. ‘NonGovernmental Organizations and their Influence on International Society’ in Journal of International
Affairs, Winter 1995, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1995, pp. 507-522; Charlton, R. & May, R. ‘NGOs, Politics, Projects
and Probity: A Policy Implementation Perspective’ in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1995, pp.
237-255; Warkentin, C. Reshaping World Politics. NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society, Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Maryland, 2001.
2
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 3-14 June 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
3
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Jamaica, concluded on 10 December
1982, in force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 (1982), hereinafter referred to as LOSC.
4
See Articles 61 and 64 LOSC for instance.
5
For example, Article 118 LOSC.

163

Fisheries (FAO Code of Conduct). 6 In addition, both the 1995 United Nations Fish
Stocks Agreement 7 (UNFSA) and the 2000 Convention on the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean 8 (WCPF Convention) explicitly promote transparency in decision-making
processes and other activities. 9
At the national level, the extent of NGO recognition and participation in national
fisheries consultations varies throughout the region and depends primarily on the
policy of the host government and its international and regional commitments, the
approach and reputation of the NGO, and the nature of that NGO’s activity.
Generally, most NGOs are still considered to be controversial in their approach
with ulterior motives believed to be disguised in the relevance and importance of
their programmes in the region.
This chapter places emphasis on NGOs accredited as observers to the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). 10 The central question is whether
NGOs should be considered partners or adversaries in the implementation of
fisheries instruments. In addressing the question, this chapter first provides an
historical overview of the activities of accredited NGOs. A cursory analysis of
NGO fisheries management objectives is then made and compared with objectives
provided in fisheries instruments. A discussion of existing and future roles played
by NGOs follows the analysis of objectives.
An Overview of Accredited NGOs
The NGOs accredited with the WCPFC may be broadly categorized as
environmental NGOs or industry NGOs. Accredited NGOs have either been
working in the Pacific for years or are relative newcomers to the region. Generally,
6

Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted at the
28th session of the FAO Conference, Rome, Italy, 31 October 1995, hereinafter referred to as FAO Code of
Conduct.
7
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 34 ILM 1542, 1995, hereinafter referred to as UNFSA.
8
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean, adopted 5 September 2000, in force 19 June 2004 hereinafter referred to as WCPF
Convention.
9
UNFSA, Article 12; and WCPF Convention, Article 21.
10
The NGOs that have been accredited as observers to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission include: Greenpeace, Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), Sea Turtle Restoration Project,
Pacific Islands Tuna Industry Association (PITIA), World Wildlife Fund, Traffic, the International Game
Fishing Association, Humane Society, Blue Ocean Institute, Earth Island Institute, Constitution of the
Centre for Environmental Law and Community Rights Inc., Organisation for the Promotion of Responsible
Tuna Fisheries (OPRT), World Tuna Purse Seine Organisation (WTPO), Birdlife International, Oceana,
and Agreement for the Conservation of Albatross and Petrels.
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NGOs that are not based in the region are not as sensitive to the realities and
uniqueness of Pacific Island nations compared to locally based ones.
Each environmental NGO campaigns on their own specific interests and on
interests that overlap with other NGOs. For instance, Oceana aims to protect the
world’s oceans but its most recent objective in the region is the protection of
endangered shark species. 11 Similar concerns on sharks have been raised by others
such as World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Traffic. 12 Overlaps may not be
considered a total waste of resources if there is complementarity. Another example
is by-catch. The majority of accredited NGOs campaign for the reduction of bycatch in the fishery and while some campaign broadly on the issue, others
advocate the protection of specific species. For example, the Sea Turtle
Restoration Project recently campaigned for the protection of Leatherback turtles,
the Earth Island Institute advocates ‘dolphin safe’ tuna and monitors tuna
canneries, while Birdlife International is focused on the mitigation of albatross and
petrels caught in the longline fishery. Amidst overlapping campaign objectives, a
healthy competitive environment is emerging. In some cases, the competition is
for greater external support for their respective cause.
Unlike environmental NGOs, industry NGOs comprised of the Marine
Stewardship Council (MSC), the International Game Fishers Association, the
Pacific Islands Tuna Industry Association (PITIA), the World Tuna Purse Seine
Organisation (WTPO), and the Organisation for the Promotion of Responsible
Tuna Fisheries (OPRT) are diverse. The MSC and OPRT are examples of industry
NGOs concerned about sustainability and consumer choice. The MSC was
established through a partnership between WWF and Unilever in the mid-1990s
and has developed a widely recognised set of environmental principles for the
sustainability assessment of a fishery. 13 Once a fishery satisfies the criteria, it can
be certified by MSC. In contrast, the OPRT aims to “link the oceans with the
consumers and promote sustainable use of tunas.” 14 Established in 2000, the
OPRT comprises tuna longline producers from various countries, 15 and
associations of traders, distributors, consumers and public interest organisations.
On the other hand, PITIA and WTPO advocate interests of their members in the
exploitation of fisheries resources. WTPO was created in 2001 and PITIA was
formed three years later. The former is comprised mainly of purse seine vessel
owners from developed fishing nations while the latter is made up of national
11
WCPFC Fourth Regular Session, Tumon, Guam, Statement by Oceana, WCPFC4-2007/OP16,
7 December 2007.
12
Lack, M. and Sant, G. Confronting Shark Conservation Head On! TRAFFIC International, 2006.
13
For more information see MSC website, accessed 16/12/08. http://www.msc.org/
14
OPRT official website, accessed 16/12/08. http://www.oprt.or.jp/eng/e_home.html
15
Japan, Chinese Taipei, Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, China, Ecuador, Seychelles and
Fiji.
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commercial tuna associations and operators in Forum Island countries. 16 The two
organisations are in direct competition for access to the lucrative high seas fish
stocks. Although PITIA members are expected to have an advantage over WTPO
in terms of access to waters under national jurisdiction, the combined sum of
fishing capacity of its members is small. PITIA advocates increased participation
of its members in the fishery and greater benefits for Pacific communities. WTPO
on the other hand, argues for improving levels of access to the fishery and its
members contribute a significant amount of capacity to the fishery. One can
foresee intense debate between these two NGOs in future. The scenario will be
similar to relations between Pacific Island nations and Distant Water Fishing
Nations (DWFNs) where Pacific nations are calling for greater participation and
benefits and DWFNs are reluctant to relinquish access privileges to the fishery.
The final example of an industry NGO is the International Game Fish Association
(IGFA). 17 Unlike other industry NGOs, the IGFA represents recreational fishers.
IGFA was formed in 1939 and as the governing body for international recreational
fishing, formulates rules for ethical angling practices. The IGFA currently plays a
passive role in WCPFC matters and is likely to challenge the WTPO and the
PITIA when its target species, including swordfish and striped marlin, are overexploited.
Putting these issues aside, this chapter now focuses on the NGOs that are based in
the region: Greenpeace, WWF and PITIA. A discussion of the rationale for their
establishment in the Pacific and their current activities sets the context for the next
discussion of objectives and trends.
Greenpeace is known for its confrontational stand in raising awareness of
environmental concerns. Since witnessing underground nuclear tests in Amchitka
in 1971, the organisation has set up offices in at least forty countries. Its first
activity in the Pacific Islands region was the campaign against nuclear tests in the
middle of the 1970s. 18 Once nuclear tests in the region were stopped, Greenpeace
worked to establish an office in Fiji but faced some difficulty with registration
until 1994 when a company was successfully incorporated. In the early years of its
operation the organisation was funded by its international office. When funds were
no longer available, the organisation had to merge with its Australian office and
now operates under Greenpeace Australia Pacific. The organisation’s activities are
funded by individual donors. The organisation has had to adapt to working within
16

Forum Island member countries are: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji,
Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
17
International Game Fish Association website. http://www.igfa.org/
18
Weyler, R. Greenpeace: The Inside Story How a Group of Ecologists, Journalists and Visionaries
Changed our World, Raincoat Books, 2005.
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the Pacific Islands context but the challenge continues. The focus of its fisheries
campaign is pirate (or illegal, unreported and unregulated - IUU) fishing with
attention on fishers, transhipments, ports and markets. 19
The World Wildlife Fund for Nature was established over five decades ago with
the ultimate goal of building a future where people live in harmony with nature.
Over time its campaigns and priority areas of focus have evolved. In 1990, the
World Wildlife Fund for Nature South Pacific Programme (WWF-SPP) was set up
with the aim of promoting its climate change campaign and initiating a regional
marine programme. 20 WWF-SPP is funded primarily by the WWF network,
government and aid agencies, corporations and foundations. In addition to its
regional office, WWF also operates national offices in the Cook Islands, Solomon
Islands, Papua New Guinea and Fiji. WWF also utilises its partner organisations,
particularly TRAFFIC Oceania to further its campaign objectives. 21 TRAFFIC
Oceania was set up in 1987 and its main focus is to work with governments and
other stakeholders to build capacity to implement the 1973 Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 22
within the region.
PITIA is the other accredited NGO based in the region. Its membership is
restricted to national commercial export tuna associations and operators in the
Forum Island countries. The association is an example of a locally grown NGO
incorporated by regional tuna representatives at a workshop in 2004. 23 Although
the workshop also included participants from government and academia, industry
participants led the formulation of objectives and functions of the association. The
objectives are tailored to allow the association to provide a united voice for the
domestic tuna fishing and associated industries in FFA Island countries, to
promote the sustainable use of tuna and related resources taking into account
economic and biological considerations, and to advocate interests of its members
in negotiations at all levels. 24 PITIA is seen as a key proponent for greater
participation by small island developing States (SIDS) and is expected to play an
important role in raising awareness of special consideration for Pacific SIDS and
in defining development aspirations of FFA Island countries.

19

Greenpeace website, accessed 14/12/2008. http://www.greenpeace.org.au/
See World Wildlife Fund for Nature website, accessed 18/12/2008. http://www.wwfpacific.org.fj/
21
See TRAFFIC Oceania website, accessed 18/12/2008. http://www.traffic.org/oceania/
22
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, concluded on 3
March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 27 UST 1087; TIAS 8249; 993 UNTS 243. Herinafter referred to as
CITES.
23
Summary report of discussion on the formation of a Regional Tuna Industry Association as agreed at the
Workshop on the Implications of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention to the Private
Sector, Forum Secretariat, Suva, Fiji Islands, 14-16 September 2004.
24
Ibid.
20
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The process that each accredited NGO follows to develop its objectives and
priorities may differ. In the example of PITIA, objectives and functions of the
organisation were defined at a regional meeting and implemented by its executive
committee. For Greenpeace and WWF-SPP, planning meetings are conducted at
the regional and international levels in which campaign objectives and strategies
are negotiated and defined. The inclusion of regional perspectives depends largely
on where the meetings are held and the active participation of regional
representatives. It follows generally that the farther the meeting from the region,
the weaker the representation. A short discussion on influences on NGOs is
warranted.
NGOs are influenced by their members, partners, donor agencies, governments,
the political environment in which they operate, and their employees and
representatives. The extent of influence within each NGO shifts between a wide
range. For instance, Greenpeace indicates that it only accepts support from
individual donors and does not accept money from corporations or governments.
This means that individual contributors would have some influence, albeit small,
on the campaigns that the organisation runs but the finer details of the campaign
are the responsibility of the campaign team. The campaign team will undertake the
necessary analyses and develop the objectives and strategy. The approach of
Greenpeace is unique in that the organisation does not work in partnership with
governments. Compared to other NGOs, the organisation has been described on
the one hand as, ‘loud’ and ‘bold’ and on the other hand as ‘eco-terrorists.’
While the campaign planning processes may be similar, the approach of WWF is
considerably different from that taken by Greenpeace. WWF-SPP works with
donor agencies, national and regional partners and governments. Memorandums of
Understanding have been concluded with key partners. The campaign approach
involves working in partnership with governments, regional organisations and
communities. This approach promotes strong working relationships and fosters
long term commitment by all parties. Compared to Greenpeace, WWF is ‘quieter’
and perhaps more strategic in partnering with other organisations and
governments. Through partnerships with government, WWF is able to influence
national policy and play a lead role in national programmes. Governments also
rely on NGOs to implement and legitimise national policies. 25
Influences aside, NGOs have been described as not being ‘technically’ or
‘democratically’ fit to engage in fisheries decision-making.26 Taking technical
fitness first, all of the locally based NGOs have technical capabilities in their
respective areas of interest. In some instances, these capabilities may be of a
25
Mikalsen, K. H., Hernes, H-K., and Jentoft, S. ‘Leaning on User-groups: The Role of Civil Society in
Fisheries Governance’ in Marine Policy Vol. 31, 2007, pp. 201 – 209 at 207.
26
Ibid.
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higher level than that available in national administrations. This is attributed, in
part, to the attraction of higher salaries and benefits provided by NGOs compared
to those offered by governments. NGOs have access to a wider network of
individuals that are either employed or act as advisors. For instance WWF-SPP has
direct access to fisheries trade specialists in TRAFFIC and other individuals
throughout its network. Having said this, the point needs to be made that technical
experts may not necessarily be knowledgeable about the region, behaviour of
fishers, the characteristics of the stocks concerned, or other matters particular to
Pacific Islanders.
On the question of democratic fitness, the answer varies from one NGO to another.
Strictly speaking, the accredited NGOs discussed in this chapter are accountable to
its members and partners. The membership base may be a minute fraction of the
population of the country or region in which the NGO is based. NGOs normally do
not say that they represent the society but the NGO’s interests and activities may
appeal to others beyond its membership. Should there be a precondition for NGO
involvement in fisheries consultations and decision-making? It has been said that
before governments establish partnerships with an NGO, the NGO must show that
it is internally democratic and characterised by genuine popular involvement. 27
When applied to national or regional NGOs in the Pacific region these two criteria
attract some debate.
Firstly, the internal democratic processes of an NGO are defined by that NGO’s
governing body. The democratic processes of an NGO affiliated with a wider
international network would be different from another that is developed locally.
The former may have some control over campaign direction but would be heavily
influenced by decision-making authorities overseas. Meaningful participation in
any decision-making by locally based representatives of international NGOs is
critical to ensuring appropriate national and regional representation. The foregoing
description would apply to Greenpeace and WWF. Both operate offices in the
region; however, decision-making processes allow for wider input from their
respective international offices. It follows that local participation and
representation in campaign decision-making will remain a challenge.
In contrast, a locally grown NGO would be primarily controlled locally or from
within the region and would be more committed to satisfying interests of its
members. PITIA, for instance, has an executive committee made of industry
representatives from the region that are elected and mandated by the membership
to carry out functions of the organisation. Committee members are accountable to
members. In general, there should be greater participation of members in a locally
27
Hadenius, A and Uggla, F. ‘Making Civil Society Work, Promoting Democratic Development: What Can
States and Donors Do?’ in World Development, Vol. 24, No. 10, 1996, pp. 1621 – 39.
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grown NGO rather than an international NGO. Genuine popular involvement
therefore differs between NGOs.
Returning to the question on preconditions for NGO involvement in fisheries
consultations and decision-making, governments ultimately determine the extent
of participation based on their policies. The requirements of internal democratic
processes and genuine involvement are quite useful in the Pacific Islands context.
By satisfying these and other attributes, NGOs are supporting transparency and
better governance. Having discussed accredited NGOs briefly and how they are
influenced and function, this chapter now devotes attention to fisheries objectives
of selected NGOs.
Complementary or Conflicting Objectives?
Since the 1992 Earth Summit wide stakeholder participation in sustainable
development is encouraged at all levels. The FAO Code of Conduct is the first
instrument legitimising NGO involvement in fisheries management and decisionmaking. The FAO Code of Conduct, a voluntary instrument, is directed toward a
wide constituency from members and non-members of the FAO, fishing entities,
to sub-regional, regional and global organisations, “whether governmental or nongovernmental, and all persons concerned with the conservation of fisheries
resources and management and development of fisheries.” 28 In the strict legal
sense, implementation is the responsibility of States that are committed to
satisfying their rights and obligations under various instruments. But NGOs and
other stakeholders mentioned are mandated to collaborate in the fulfillment and
implementation of the objectives and principles contained in the FAO Code of
Conduct, promote its understanding, as well as its voluntary acceptance and
effective application. 29 NGOs and other relevant organisations “should be afforded
the opportunity to take part in meetings of regional and sub-regional fisheries
management organisation and also be given timely access to the records and
reports of such meetings.” 30
As correctly put, the FAO Code of Conduct provides the justification for NGO
participation in fisheries management decision-making.31 If NGO participation in
the meetings of the FAO Committee of Fisheries (COFI) is anything to go by,
NGO participation has increased at least two and half times between 1995 and
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30
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2005. 32 This is in light of the fact that the Fisheries Department of the FAO has
actively encouraged NGO participation in COFI meetings since 1983.
NGOs participated actively in elaborating the FAO Code of Conduct. The FAO
highlights that NGOs “were able to provide information and insights to the
elaboration process concerning a broad range of global fisheries and
environmental problems and, in some cases, to sensitize government
representatives about the extent and severity of these issues.” 33 NGOs clearly
made a positive contribution to the process and consequently influenced
provisions supporting their involvement in the implementation.
The FAO Code of Conduct, however, does not qualify NGOs or set conditions for
NGO engagement. The Code promotes inclusiveness and broad participation to
achieve maximum effectiveness in fisheries governance. National governments are
responsible for determining the extent of NGO participation based on their
policies. Unlike national governments, regional and sub-regional fisheries
management organisations are influenced by international developments and are
required to promote transparency and inclusivity.
Should Complementarity or Conflict in Objectives Matter?
In promoting inclusivity, the intention appears to be that as long as the objective
for an NGO is related to the conservation and management of fisheries resources
and the trade thereof, they have a role to play in the implementation of the FAO
Code of Conduct.
This chapter argues that broad complementarity of objectives held by NGOs and
fisheries management organisations should be an important consideration. In
situations where objectives conflict to a large degree, the objectives of fisheries
instruments will be undermined. The question whether this consideration should
be placed only at the international and regional levels or should extend to the
national level also arises.
Fisheries objectives in post-Earth Summit international fisheries instruments
advocate long term sustainable fisheries and responsible fisheries. 34 A cursory
analysis of the broad objectives of accredited NGOs finds that there is general
complementarity of objectives. The industry NGOs support sustainability and
responsible fishing. The objectives of environmental NGOs easily complement
responsibility in the fishery yet dissenting views exist in what sustainable fisheries
32

FAO NGO/CSOs Fact Sheet, accessed 7/03/2008.
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33
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should mean. Other accredited environmental NGOs are more concerned about
specific species rather than sustainability of the fishery as a whole, arguably
undermining an ecosystem approach to fisheries governance. While there is
congruity between the broad objectives of fisheries at the international and
regional levels and the broad objectives of NGOs, conflicts may arise in the
interpretation and application of principles.
The need for complementarity of objectives is heightened at the national level. In
addition to the fisheries objectives in binding instruments, national governments in
the Pacific Islands region have their own objectives and policies. Typical fisheries
objectives and policies in the region promote, among other things, greater local
participation in the fishery, increased returns, the realisation of development
aspirations, and the objective of maximum sustainable yield. Sovereignty over
resources extends to the limits of the territorial sea, and beyond that, sovereign
rights to conserve, manage, explore and explore continue to the limits of the
exclusive economic zone. 35 Given these powers, the history of foreign exploitation
of resources in national waters, and the absence of capacity by most Pacific Island
States to participate in the fishery, national objectives are in most cases skewed
towards greater local development and participation. This is where conflict can
arise.
The environmental NGOs based in the region acknowledge the situation and
aspirations of Pacific Island States and to a certain extent are sympathetic. WWFSPP for instance, considers the critical role of coastal communities to minimise
adverse economic and social impacts and to support sustainable human
communities and ecosystems. Its principles of ecosystem-based management
include the reality that human use and values of ecosystems are at the core of
establishing objectives for the use and management of natural resources. 36 There is
also recognition that economic, social and cultural factors can affect resource
management. In promoting an ecosystem-based management approach, WWF
considers that it is vital to take into account the needs and aspirations of Pacific
Island communities.
Like WWF, Greenpeace supports small-scale fisheries with less adverse impacts to
the ecosystem rather than large-scale industrial fisheries. The first fisheries
principles developed by Greenpeace advocates the quest for ecologically
responsible low-impact fisheries. 37 The organisation seeks “a substantial
transformation from fisheries production dominated by large-scale, capitalintensive, destructive methods to smaller scale, community-based, labour35

See Parts II, V and VI, LOSC.
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intensive fisheries using ecologically responsible, selective fishing technology and
environmentally sound practices.” 38 Further, recent messaging of the organisation
challenges IUU fishing, capacity migration and overfishing in the region. 39
NGO recognition of local realities aside, the FAO Code of Conduct elaborates
general principles that all stakeholders may wish to adopt in its decision-making.40
These principles were derived from the Earth Summit. The UNFSA is the first
binding international instrument that includes broad principles. General principles
supporting conservation and management must be applied in areas under national
jurisdiction and in areas beyond.41 Accredited NGOs are in a useful position to
contribute to the debate on the implementation of principles at all levels. While
dissenting views on relevant considerations may exist between NGOs and fisheries
management organisations, debate is healthy and is constructive in the
evolutionary process. This chapter exemplifies NGO views on two principles – the
precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach and how these contribute to
implementation.
Is There Conflict in the Application of the Precautionary Approach and
Ecosystem-Based Approach?
The international community defined the precautionary approach in principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration. 42 The UNFSA elaborates on how the precautionary approach
is to be implemented and introduces guidelines in Annex II. 43 Simply put,
precautionary reference points in the form of limit references points and target
reference points are to be used. Limit reference points restrict fishing levels within
safe biological limits that can produce maximum sustainable yield, while target
reference points are designed to meet management objectives. The fishing level
that generates maximum sustainable yield “should be regarded as the minimum
standard for limit reference points.” 44 While States and industry groups are
generally content with the framework for the application of the precautionary
approach, NGOs support the adoption and implementation of higher standards.
For instance, Greenpeace asserts that to cover for the lack of understanding of
marine ecological processes, fisheries management must be based on the
38
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Precautionary Principle with emphasis on prevention of damage rather than efforts
to repair mistakes through mitigation or restoration measures. 45 According to
Greenpeace, exploiters and institutions responsible for management have a
fundamental duty of care.
A duty of care arguably exists today in almost all FFA member jurisdictions. This
duty arises once general fisheries principles are incorporated in national
legislation. Fisheries legislation binds the government and the public. Therefore, in
the event that a fisheries management institution does not exercise its duty through
an act or omission, there would be, at the very least, grounds for a review of the
relevant decision. The approach is reactive yet may still have a role in mitigating
the effects on ecosystems.
Greenpeace refers in passing to reference points but then calls for the performance
of management procedures to be tested before being implemented. Simulations or
otherwise should be made under a “wide range of alternative assumptions and
scenarios about the dynamics of the system.” 46 The prerequisite for the simulation
of management procedures to ensure that a high probability for conservation and
management of the stocks and the environment is attained, is not an explicit
requirement in fisheries instruments. Testing of reference points and management
procedures is, however, important to ensure that stocks and their ecosystems are
sustained. Although not explicit, the analysis of management options under
various fishing conditions already occurs to an extent at the national and regional
levels in the formulation of total allowable catches and the preparation of WCPFC
management measures. The application of target and limit reference points would
also attract an analysis of biomass and economic yields under various conditions.
WWF also supports the application of the precautionary approach and puts the
approach within its ecosystem-based management framework. WWF publications
provide constructive commentary on the application of the approach and
recommend best practices. 47 Management strategies are to be based on
precautionary reference points “reflecting a sufficiently high probability of
sustainability” for all target stocks. 48 The threshold of a high probability of
sustainability advocated by both WWF and Greenpeace goes beyond the
requirement in the UNFSA and related instruments. Annex II of the UNFSA
provides that strategies are to “maintain or restore populations of harvested stocks,
and where necessary associated or dependent species, at levels consistent with
45
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previously agreed precautionary reference points.” 49 As noted earlier the rate of
fishing mortality that generates maximum sustainable yield is regarded as a
minimum standard for limit reference points. Neither WWF nor Greenpeace refer
to maximum sustainable yield as the criteria for setting limit reference points and
this is perhaps due to the fact that, in their view, the maximum sustainable yield
standard may not be ideal for ensuring sustainability of target stocks and
associated species.
Based on the above, it is apparent that there is some incongruity between the way
both WWF and Greenpeace and international fisheries instruments advocate the
precautionary approach. There is agreement on the definition and the application
of reference points. But the threshold of a high probability for sustainability goes
beyond the standard in international fisheries instruments. A high probability
involves more effort than merely maintaining or restoring populations. Both NGOs
argue that fisheries managers need to apply the precautionary approach to the
wider ecosystem rather than on target stocks alone. Extending existing practices to
associated and dependent species as well as their habitats presents a challenge.
Precautionary approach aside, this chapter now asks whether there is conflict
between the way the ecosystem approach is defined and promoted by fisheries
instruments and NGOs. The ecosystem approach is supported in the LOSC in
relation to the management of associated and dependent species. 50 The FAO Code
of Conduct contains additional provisions calling on States to have measures that
minimise waste and discards of non-target species and to determine impacts on
associated or dependent species to improve gear selectivity. The FAO Code of
Conduct also calls on States to assess the impacts of environmental factors on
target stocks and species belonging to the same ecosystem and to also assess the
relationship between populations in the ecosystem. 51 The UNFSA includes
provisions for the assessment of impacts of fishing, human activities and other
environmental factors on target stocks and species in the same ecosystem as well
other points raised in the FAO Code of Conduct. 52 In addition, the FAO has
provided technical guidelines for the application of the approach. 53 Unlike the
precautionary approach, implementation of the ecosystem approach has been slow
and this is attributed to how widely the concept is understood and the constraints
faced by management bodies.
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Of the NGOs based in the region, WWF has devoted considerable attention to
developing a framework for ecosystem-based management. WWF posits that “our
underlying principle [to promote sustainable fishing] is ecosystem-based
management, which aims to achieve the sustainable exploitation of natural
resources by balancing the social and economic needs of human communities with
the maintenance of healthy ecosystems.” 54 On the face of it, ecosystem-based
management appears to be an alternative form of the ecosystem approach found in
international instruments. But on closer analysis, the two are virtually the same.
The FAO guidelines on the application of the ecosystem approach are practical
and describe considerations for the implementation of the approach. The
guidelines state that the ecosystem approach originated from the Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment and the LOSC and as a result the two
main pillars are: (i) the elimination of overcapacity and overfishing, rebuilding of
depleted stocks and protection of associated and dependent species; and (ii) the
maintenance of ecosystem habitats, functional relations between components and
productivity. 55 Further the principles of relevance in Ecosystem Approach to
Fisheries (EAF) are: avoiding overfishing, ensuring reversibility and rebuilding,
reducing by-catch, taking into account species interactions, promoting
compatibility, applying the precautionary approach, improving human well being,
allocating user rights, promoting sectoral integration, extending stakeholder
participation, and maintaining ecosystem integrity. 56
On the other hand, the principles of ecosystem-based management proposed by
WWF are summarised as: maintaining ecosystems, ensuring that human use and
values of ecosystems are central to management, acknowledging the ecosystems
are dynamic, promoting broad stakeholder participation, and that successful
management is adaptive and based on scientific knowledge and monitoring.57
Compared with the FAO principles, there are close similarities. However the FAO
principles appear to be wider in scope because specific principles are enunciated.
That said, the key difference between the approaches lies in the procedures for
implementation. The FAO guidelines describe planning requirements and
ingredients for an EAF management plan as well as the requirements and process
for implementation. WWF introduces planning by ecoregions of species, habitats
and oceanographic features and calls for a determination of ecosystem values in
habitats, species and uses. Ecoregions identified may be found in one jurisdiction
or be spread over a number of jurisdictions. Implementation of the ecosystem54
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based management approach, therefore, is more demanding and requires countries
to cooperate with each other in management. This goes beyond the duty to
cooperate in the LOSC because it potentially involves, among other tasks, joint
mapping of ecoregions, assessment of ecosystem values of habitats, species and
uses, the determination of hazards and risks, and agreement on management goals
and reference points.
The ecosystem approach is promoted by Greenpeace in its principles for low
impact ecologically responsible fisheries. Although there is no specific part
relating to the approach, the principles included in the FAO guideline are
embodied. Fisheries that threaten the biodiversity, productivity or characteristic
structure and function of marine ecosystems should be addressed. The organisation
also states that fisheries management generally concerns the management of
fishers and their activities, not the management of ecosystems. In their view,
attempts to supplement fisheries production must not include the culling of
predator species or the fertilization of marine ecosystems.
In the final analysis both NGOs provide useful insight into the application of the
approach. Although biased toward conservation, their guiding principles urge
more integration and a holistic approach to management. WWF’s ecoregion
approach draws some attention and requires transboundary action. If applied in the
WCPO, there would be a role for institutions including the WCPFC, the proposed
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, and the International
Sea Bed Authority.
NGO Roles and Responsibilities
A basic analysis shows that NGOs directly promote two pillars of sustainable
development. Industry NGOs involved in fishing will advocate interests of their
members and support sustainable catch levels that would not harm the economic
viability of their operations. Although the focus of industry NGOs would be
development and increased economic benefits, there would also be strong interest
in long term sustainability. Environmental NGOs, on the other hand, are more
concerned about the ecosystem and its importance in sustaining human life. Social
and cultural aspects are addressed to a certain extent by industry and
environmental NGOs but this is largely left for governments.
Broad roles aside, the role of NGOs in the implementation of international
fisheries instruments is diverse and arguably goes beyond that envisaged by
drafters of the FAO Code of Conduct. At an NGO and civil society workshop held
in Fiji in 2007, participants comprised of environmental NGOs, outlined current
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and future roles and challenges in improving their effectiveness. 58 Current roles
include: developing materials on fisheries management and the plight of fish
stocks, monitoring the public sector and calling for transparency in decisionmaking, engaging communities, and building capacity through meetings and
workshops.
In addition, NGOs are in a position to contribute significantly because of their
combined ability to work at all levels and on transboundary issues. Their ability to
access funds and technical expertise is another strength that can complement
limited resources of national governments. Working with NGOs in specific
activities would be mutually beneficial for governments and regional
organisations. Current and future NGO roles include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

influencing the contents of new fisheries instruments to address existing
governance gaps;
monitoring and guiding the implementation of international principles and
concepts;
identifying inherent weaknesses and enhance roles of national governments
and regional fisheries management organisations in fisheries governance;
acting as a conduit for information dissemination between local communities
and national governments;
motivating local communities to promote sustainability by implementing
sound practices;
promoting responsible fishing among fishing communities and decisionmaking authorities; and
encouraging the continual improvement of fisheries governance.

These are not minor but substantive roles that demonstrate the future level of
influence of NGOs on fisheries governance. This chapter has elaborated on a
number of these roles above and will only concentrate on the role of NGOs in
influencing the development of new instruments and in local level initiatives.
NGOs have participated actively in international and regional fora on sustainable
development and fisheries management. Their involvement in the development of
the FAO Code of Conduct is noted. One observer comments that NGOs made
“substantial and important written contributions … on all articles in the
Agreement.” 59 In the negotiations for the WCPF Convention, NGOs participated
58
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through national delegations. As far as new instruments are concerned, NGOs are
currently lobbying for an instrument for the protection of high seas biodiversity.
Environmental NGOs in the region have long raised concerns of the impacts of
fishing activities on the biodiversity of the high seas. 60 An international coalition
to conserve high seas biodiversity was established to primarily secure a
moratorium on high seas bottom trawling and protect fragile and unique
ecosystems of the deep seas. 61 Accredited NGOs such as Greenpeace, Oceana,
Birdlife International, and Friends of the Earth are part of the coalition.
Greenpeace has challenged international law principles, particularly, the freedom
of the high seas as an obstacle to the protection of high seas biodiversity.62 It
argues that the freedom should be reversed. In their view the high seas should be
viewed as marine reserves and nations have the burden of proving that they will
not harm the ecosystem before being given access. 63 They posit that the
longstanding freedom of the high seas should be replaced by the freedom for the
seas where the ecosystem approach and the precautionary principle are considered
fundamental to management. This proposal is akin, albeit narrower in scope, to
that originally recommended by Ambassador Arvid Pardo in the common heritage
of mankind concept. 64
It is only a matter of time before there is a new instrument addressing legal
challenges in high seas fisheries governance. By adopting resolution 61/105,
members of the United Nations General Assembly concur that there is a need for
international, regional and national action.65 The resolution is a testament to the
commitment of NGOs in influencing change in existing practices. It also shows
the importance of their role in highlighting governance gaps and weaknesses in
long standing legal concepts.
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On NGO relations with local communities, NGOs are vital in extending national
fisheries awareness and capacity building to these communities. While NGO
motives may be to establish programmes in accordance with their own campaign
initiatives, the programmes are nevertheless useful in raising awareness of the
ecosystem and sustainability. An example is WWF’s work in Macuata, Fiji, to
protect globally significant seascapes. The work has seen the completion of
surveys of the world’s third longest barrier reef, the Great Sea Reef, and
empowerment of local communities to establish marine reserves and to carry out
monitoring and management activities. 66
Taking all the above considerations into account, the level of participation of
NGOs in fisheries governance at all levels is likely to increase over time. In recent
international fisheries instruments such as the FAO Code of Conduct, NGO and
stakeholder participation was considered vital. In time the international
community is expected to provide greater recognition to particular NGOs that are
capable of possessing international rights and duties. By being able to exercise
international rights and duties, NGOs would be conferred international legal
personality. 67
Concluding Remarks
Although NGOs generally have been viewed with scepticism by Pacific Island
governments, this view is gradually changing. Change is influenced primarily by
international trends embracing wide stakeholder participation in fisheries
governance, and current activities of NGOs in the region. The initial sentiment of
distrust toward NGOs diminishes as cooperation and partnerships emerge. But will
there be a symbiotic relationship where all stakeholders mutually benefit? The
answer depends upon NGO approaches and the policies of sovereign nations in the
region.
In assessing whether NGOs should be considered partners or adversaries in the
implementation of fisheries instruments, it is clear that NGOs have a vital role.
NGOs have participated in the development of international instruments and
helped to legitimise such instruments. National policies are also legitimised, to a
certain degree, when used by NGOs in local awareness, capacity building and
management initiatives. While some NGOs have formal partnerships with
66
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governments in the region, others may be considered informal or “loose” partners.
The activities of the latter NGOs may be quietly supported by government(s) as
formal agreements are not consistent with policy.
Current national policies on engagement with NGOs are believed to be based on
the potential for national contribution and the characteristics of an NGO.
Obviously an NGO that challenges or criticises government would not normally be
considered as a partner but an adversary. NGOs are not without flaws. Whilst
NGOs may not represent significant proportions of the population, in most cases
they are supported by individuals outside the region and promote foreign ideas that
may not be suitable in the local context. NGOs have also been challenged for lack
of transparency and for failing to accommodate regional and local realities.
Further, NGOs can only be held accountable by their respective constituents,
supporters and donors.
In spite of this, the role of NGOs in implementation is likely to broaden. The limits
on the role of NGOs was not provided by the drafters of the FAO Code of Conduct
and other instruments and is largely left for States to determine in practice. NGOs
are independent enough to highlight weaknesses in regional fisheries management
organisations and national administrations and to offer suggestions for change.
Their role in monitoring and facilitating compatibility of measures across national
jurisdictions and international areas is essential. However, it is important that the
involvement of traditional interest groups not be undervalued as more NGOs
participate in fisheries governance. In the future, greater recognition will be
accorded to NGOs and a select few capable of possessing and exercising
international rights and duties would be conferred international legal personality.
NGOs working at the national level need to continually reflect on their approach
and the nature of their activities. If their activities are compatible and sensitive to
the Pacific Islands context, than they are likely to be considered by Pacific Island
governments to be real partners rather than mere “partners of convenience.”
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8. Status of Tuna Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean
and Scientific Challenges
Shelton Harley and John Hampton

Introduction
Tuna fishing in the Pacific Islands region has a rich history. For centuries, tuna
have provided an important source of food for Pacific Island peoples and the
traditional fishing techniques and equipment involved are part of their cultural
heritage. Today, tuna are also an important source of income and employment for
many Pacific Island countries and territories. For many, the tuna resources within
their 200 mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) represent their only significant
renewable resource and their best opportunity for economic development.
This chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part we report on the
fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) and the current health
of the stocks on which these fisheries operate. In the second part we will discuss
some of the science-related issues for the WCPO tuna fisheries that require policy
or legal development.
We include several recommendations for the science process in the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). While these recommendations
are principally directed at the WCPFC, it is likely that they are relevant to other
tuna regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) and to the
interpretation and further development of international fishery instruments. A
history of the assessment and management of WCPO tuna stocks is provided
elsewhere 1 and is not repeated in detail here.
Fisheries in the WCPO
The four principal species fished in the WCPO are skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye, and
albacore tuna and the predominant fishing methods are longline and purse seine,
with lesser catches taken by pole and line and other gears. The fisheries for these
species in the WCPO are by far the largest of any in the world’s oceans.
Provisional catch estimates for 2007 indicate that over 80% of the Pacific tuna

1

Langley, A., Wright, A., Hurry, G., Hampton, J., Aqorau, T. and Rodwell, L. ‘Slow Steps Towards
Management of the World’s Largest Tuna Fishery’ in Marine Policy Vol. 33, pp. 271-279, 2008.

187

catch and 55% of the world tuna catch is taken from the waters of the WCPO. 2
The landed value of the catch in 2007 was estimated at USD 3.9 billion 3 and the
catches and landed value of the main species, skipjack, have increased since that
time. 4
Annual total catches of the four main tuna species in the WCPO increased steadily
throughout the history of the fishery (Figure 1). Increases in total tuna catch have
accelerated in the past 6 years, primarily due to increases in purse-seine fishery
catches (Figure 1). The provisional total WCPO tuna catch for 2007 was estimated
at 2,396,815 metric tons (mt), clearly the highest annual catch recorded, and more
than 120,000 mt higher than the previous record in 2006 (2,273,322 mt). During
2007, the purse seine fishery accounted for an estimated 1,739,859 mt (73% of the
total catch, and a record for this fishery), with pole-and-line taking an estimated
214,935 mt (9%), the longline fishery an estimated 232,388 mt (10%), and the
remainder (8%) taken by troll gear and a variety of artisanal gears, mostly in
eastern Indonesia and the Philippines.
Figure 1: Total Catch of Tuna Fisheries in the WCPO a) by Gear Type and b)
by Species
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While tuna are taken throughout much of the WCPO, most of the purse seine catch
occurs between 10°N and 10°S, and most of the longline catch between 10°N and
20°S (Figure 2). Furthermore, around 80% of the catch is taken within the waters
of coastal states in the convention area, and around 50% (1,200,000 mt) is taken
from the waters of Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) member
countries.

2

Williams, P. and Terawasi, P. Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
Including Economic Conditions – 2007. Fourth regular session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee, 11–22
August 2008, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. WCPFC-SC4-2008/GN WP-1.
3
Langley, Wright, Hurry, Hampton, Aqorau and Rodwell, 2008, above n 1.
4
William and Terawasi, 2008, above n 2.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Catch by a) Purse Seine and b) Longline, 2005-2007
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Note: The line at the right hand side of each plot indicates the eastern boundary of
the Convention Area of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
Status of Tuna Stocks in the WCPO
Under the interim scientific arrangements currently operating within the WCPFC,
the Oceanic Fisheries Programme of the Secretariat for the Pacific Community
(SPC-OFP) is contracted to undertake assessments for the four main tuna stocks:
bigeye, yellowfin, and skipjack tuna, and the South Pacific stock of albacore tuna.
Below we report the conclusions of the assessments for bigeye, skipjack, and
South Pacific albacore tuna undertaken in 2008, and for the yellowfin tuna
assessment undertaken in 2007 (stock assessments for all species are not
undertaken each year).
Later we will discuss the need for the WCPFC to provide guidance on reference
points for evaluating stock status against, but in the absence of such guidance, the
WCPFC Scientific Committee (WCPFC SC) has typically summarised the
condition of these stocks in relation to three interim reference points: the level of
fishing mortality that should result in the maximum sustainable yield (FMSY), the
biomass that is capable of supporting the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY), and
the level of biomass predicted to exist today if fishing had not occurred
(BCURR(F=0)). The first two are very common MSY-related reference points based
on equilibrium (e.g. static or ‘on-average’) conditions enshrined in most
international fishery instruments and form the basis of the so-called “Kobe plots” 5
provided below, while the third is based on more modern fishery science views of
fish population dynamics and the rather non-equilibrium patterns that we observe.
5

The name ‘Kobe plot’ came from discussions at the first joint tuna RFMO meeting held in Kobe, Japan in
January 2007that considered, amongst other matters, some generic ways that researchers in all the world’s
oceans could use to display the results of tuna stock assessments.
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Bigeye Tuna
Currently the biomass of adult bigeye tuna in the WCPO is predicted to be at 26%
of the level that would be present if fishing was not occurring has been declining
at a steady rate for the past 30 years (Figure 3a). Based on the point estimates (e.g.
a single number that does not consider any uncertainty) from the assessments,
current levels of fishing mortality are much higher than FMSY, therefore the rate of
fishing is not sustainable, but the actual level of biomass is slightly above BMSY so
theoretically the stock is still capable of supporting the MSY 6 (Figure 4a). Taking
into account uncertainty within the stock assessment in our estimates of current
status and the correctness of our assessment model (versus other models with
equally plausible assumptions), there is a high probability that the stock could be
less than BMSY and we are essentially certain that fishing mortality is too high. If
current levels of fishing mortality continue, the biomass of adult bigeye is
predicted to decline well below the level that can support the MSY. 7
Figure 3: Exploited (light grey) Adult Biomass and Biomass Removed by
Fishing (dark grey)
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Langley, A., Hampton, J., Kleiber, P. and Hoyle S. Stock Assessment of Bigeye Tuna in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean, Including an Analysis of Management Options. Fourth regular session of the
WCPFC Scientific Committee, 11–22 August 2008, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. WCPFC-SC42008/SA-WP-1.
7
Hampton, J. and Harley S. Predicted Impact of Potential Management Options on Stock Status and
Catches of Bigeye, Skipjack and Yellowfin Tunas in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Fourth regular
session of the WCPFC Technical and Compliance Committee, 2–7 October 2008, Pohnpei, Federated
States of Micronesia. WCPFC-TCC4-2008/ 14 Suppl.
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These results led to the following recommendation from the Fourth session of the
WCPFC SC:
The SC recommended a minimum 30% reduction in fishing mortality from
the average levels for 2003–2006 with the goal of returning the fishing
mortality rate to FMSY .... The SC acknowledged that projections indicate
that the bigeye tuna stock may become overfished (biomass<BMSY,
spawning biomass<SBMSY) in the future with regard to both total biomass
and spawning biomass even with a 30% reduction in fishing mortality.
Therefore, it may be necessary to recommend additional reductions in
fishing mortality in the future if assessments indicate that fishing mortality
is greater than FMSY. 8
Yellowfin Tuna
Currently the biomass of yellowfin tuna in the WCPO is predicted to be at 51% of
the level that would be present if fishing was not occurring and has declined
rapidly during the late 1990s (Figure 3b). Based on the point estimates from the
assessments, current levels of fishing mortality are close to FMSY, and the actual
level of biomass is slightly above BMSY 9 (Figure 4b). If you take into account
uncertainty within the stock assessment in our estimates of current status and the
correctness of our assessment model (versus other models with equally plausible
assumptions), there is a significant probability that the stock could be less than
BMSY and that fishing mortality is too high. If current levels of fishing mortality
continue, the biomass of adult yellowfin is predicted to remain near the level that
can support the MSY. 10
These results led to the following recommendation from the Third session of the
WCPFC SC:
The WCPO yellowfin tuna fishery can be considered to be fully exploited.
Both the 2006 and 2007 assessments indicate that there is a high probability
that overfishing is occurring (73% for the base case 2006 assessment and
47% for the base case 2007 assessment). In order to reduce the likelihood
of overfishing, and if the Commission wishes to maintain average biomass
8
WCPFC, The Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Scientific Committee Third Regular Session, 13-24 August 2007,
Honolulu, HI, U.S.A
9
Langley, A., Hampton, J., Kleiber, P. and Hoyle S. Stock Assessment of Yellowfin Tuna in the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean, Including an Analysis of Management Options. Third regular session of the
WCPFC Scientific Committee, 13-24 August 2007, Honolulu, United States of America. WCPFC-SC32007/SA-WP-1.
10
Hampton and Harley, 2008, above n 7.
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at levels greater than 5% above BMSY, reductions in the fishing mortality
rate would be required. 11
Figure 4: Temporal Trends in Annual Stock Status of a) Yellowfin Tuna and
b) Bigeye Tuna in the WCPO relative to BMSY (x-axis) and FMSY (y-axis)
reference points.
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South Pacific Albacore Tuna
Currently the biomass of spawning age albacore tuna in the South Pacific Ocean is
estimated to be at 50% of the level that would be present if fishing was not
occurring and biomass has declined rapidly during the last ten years (Figure 3c).
Though not presented here, current levels of fishing mortality are less than FMSY,
and spawning biomass is above SBMSY. 12 There is a concern about reductions in
B

11

WCPFC, 2007, above n 8.
Hoyle, S., Langley, A. and Hampton, J. Stock Assessment of Albacore Tuna in the South Pacific Ocean.
Fourth regular session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee, 11–22 August 2008, Port Moresby, Papua
New Guinea. WCPFC-SC4-2008/SA-WP-8.
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the biomass of very large and old albacore which are targeted by the longline
fisheries operating within the EEZ’s of South Pacific countries. Current catches
are thought to be sustainable.
These results led to the following recommendation from the Fourth session of the
WCPFC SC:
The current assessment indicates lower levels of stock size and maximum
sustainable yield which appear to be more realistic than previous
assessments. There is uncertainty regarding the sustainability of the south
Pacific albacore stock and the SC recommended that catches of south
Pacific albacore remain at current levels considering the current rates of
fishing mortality on adult albacore. 13
Skipjack Tuna
Currently the biomass of skipjack tuna in the WCPO is predicted to be at 66% of
the level that would be present if fishing was not occurring and is estimated to
have been increasing over the period of the fishery due to above average
recruitment (Figure 3d). Though not presented here, current levels of fishing
mortality are well below FMSY, and biomass is well above BMSY. 14
These results led to the following recommendation from the Fourth session of the
WCPFC SC:
The SC acknowledged that skipjack catches in 2007 increased to a
historical high of ~1.7 million mt. The SC noted the increasing trend in
estimated recruitment throughout the entire time series of the fishery. This
trend may reflect skipjack’s high productivity relative to other tuna species
and its position in the ecosystem. These high recent catches are considered
to be sustainable unless recruitment falls persistently below the long-term
average. However, any increases in purse-seine catches of skipjack may
result in a corresponding increase in fishing mortality for bigeye and
yellowfin tunas. 15

13
WCPFC. The Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Scientific Committee Forth Regular Session, 11-22 August 2008, Port
Moresby, Papua New Guinea.
14
Langley, A. and Hampton, J. Stock Assessment of Skipjack Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean. Fourth regular session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee, 11–22 August 2008, Port Moresby,
Papua New Guinea. WCPFC-SC4-2008/SA-WP-4.
15
WCPFC, 2008, above n 13.
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Policy and Legal Needs for the WPCFC Science Process
There are several areas where policy development and/or legal work could help
improve the scientific processes within the WCPFC. Here we focus our discussion
under two general themes: 1) impediments to undertaking the best possible stock
assessments; and 2) challenges in providing the necessary scientific advice to the
WCPFC. Within these 2 themes we touch on several important issues.
Impediments to Providing the Best Possible Stock Assessments
The most important inputs for successful stock assessments are accurate data on
fish catches and fishing activities and good understanding of the biology of the
fish. Currently there are impediments relating to both of these.
Data Available for Stock Assessments
In 2005 the WCPFC agreed to standards for “Scientific data to be provided to the
Commission.” 16 These standards include the data that are required to undertake
good assessments of the tuna stocks in the WCPO. The fundamental requirement
under these standards is the provision of estimates of total catch and effort. There
are currently two problems relating to this: 1) the late provision of data; and 2) the
difficulties faced by some of the important fishing nations/coastal States in
providing this information.
Analyses prepared for the Fourth Session of the WCPFC SC 17 indicated that there
is a substantial mismatch between the data that are required to be provided to the
WCPFC and what has been actually provided and available for use in scientific
analyses. Of particular concern was the lack of data provided by some of the major
longline fishing fleets. Typically these data are not available until 18 months after
the end of the calendar year, and the delay in receiving them leads to unnecessary
uncertainty in stock assessment estimates of current conditions and future trends.
A similar issue is that there are some developing States that have major fisheries,
but limited infrastructure to provide reliable fisheries statistics. Currently catches
in these fisheries are a major source of uncertainty in the stock assessments for
bigeye and yellowfin tuna. 18 This is of particular concern in Indonesian and the
Philippines, where some efforts have been made to address such problems.
However, further work is required in both these regions and in other countries that
are not currently engaged in the WCPFC process (e.g. Vietnam). There is clearly a
16

WCPFC, available from www.wcpfc.int under Guidelines, Procedures, and Regulations, updated in 2007.
SPC-OFP, Scientific Data Available to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Fourth
regular session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee, 11–22 August 2008, Port Moresby, Papua New
Guinea. WCPFC-SC4-2008/ST-IP-2.
18
Langley, Hampton, Kleiber, and Hoyle, 2008, above n 6; Langley, Hampton, Kleiber and Hoyle, 2007,
above n 9.
17
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need to consider the responsibility of those States operating fisheries or having
fisheries operating in their waters, with the broader interest of all WCPFC
members in having accurate data available for stock assessments.
Another data-related issue is due to our strong reliance on catch and effort data
(particularly from longline fisheries) to infer trends in abundance in tuna
populations. Assessments for non-pelagic species often include data from fishery
independent surveys of the fish stocks (e.g. trawl or acoustic surveys) which are
critical to obtaining reliable estimates of stock status. Unfortunately these types of
monitoring tools are not appropriate for these highly mobile pelagic tuna species.
While the WCPFC standards include the requirement to provide operational level
fishing activities, e.g. detailed data on individual longline sets, there is currently an
out-clause exercised by most of the major longline fishing nations.
Operational level catch and effort data (e.g. individual sets by longliners
and purse seiners, and individual days fished by pole-and-line vessels and
trollers) shall be provided to the Commission, in accordance with the
standards adopted by Commission at its Second Regular Session. These are
listed in Annex 1.
It is recognized that certain members and cooperating non-members of the
Commission may be subject to domestic legal constraints, such that they
may not be able to provide operational data to the Commission until such
constraints are overcome. Until such constraints are overcome, aggregated
catch and effort data and size composition data, ... shall be provided. 19
Operational catch and effort data include information such as a unique identifier of
individual fishing vessels, time of day of the set, configuration of the longline (e.g.
hooks per basket which is a proxy for the depth fished by the longline), and target
species. All these variables have been shown, when they are available, to strongly
affect the catches of the key tuna species. In the absence of operational-level data,
we must rely on data that has been aggregated by 5x5 degree area and month and
none of the important variables are available. 20 Our ability to accurately estimate
trends in abundance is hampered by not having access to these comprehensive
operational-level data. Frustratingly it is not that the data do not exist or can never
be released, as when these same vessels fish within the waters of Pacific Island
countries, the coastal States obtain the detailed logsheet data and provide them to
the SPC-OFP. Also, several WCPFC members are in fact providing operational
level data to the Commission, indicating that problems relating to domestic data
confidentiality restrictions can be solved.
19

WCPFC, above n 16.
It is possible to get a summary of some of the variables, e.g. average hooks per basket, but clearly this is
less useful than having the data and a set level.
20
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These data issues are a global problem for all the world’s tuna stock assessments.
The policy/legal issue to be resolved is to what extent members of the WCPFC are
required to modify their domestic legislation to meet the requirements of the
WCPFC? And under what time frames? The phrase “until such constraints are
overcome” implies that there is an expectation that members will take steps to
overcome these constraints, but frustratingly little progress has been evident on
this issue to date and the science continues to suffer.
Research Funding to Support Stock Assessments
Whilst it is recognised that members of the WCPFC do fund their own research
into tuna stocks, the actual level of funding by the WCPFC is very low relative to
the value of the fishery, e.g. the 2008 budget for scientific activities was USD
665k for a fishery with a value of more than USD 3.9 billion, or 0.02%. In
contrast, for the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certified fishery for New
Zealand hoki where landings currently are worth NZD 141 million, 21 the industry
spends NZD 4.2 million on various surveys to monitor trends in the populations.
This spending represents around 3% of the value of the catch. This low proportion
of research expenditure within the WCPFC was noted at the Fourth Session of the
WCPFC SC, unfortunately in the face of requests to reduce the budget. 22
As mentioned previously, trawl surveys and other more traditional monitoring
tools are not feasible for tuna, but large-scale tagging programmes have the ability
to provide important information on many important aspects of population
dynamics including: movement rates, interactions between fisheries, and levels of
fishing mortality.
Previous large-scale tagging programmes were implemented by SPC-OFP in
1978-82 (funded by a number of Pacific regional donor agencies) and 1989-92
(funded by the European Community). A third programme is currently underway,
funded by a number of donors including development or fisheries agencies in New
Zealand, Korea and the European Community. Given the relatively short life span
of these tuna species, ideally the large-scale programmes would be undertaken
more frequently or, preferably, would undertake lower levels of tagging every
year. The total cost of the current programme is USD 10 million so if funding for
such work was considered an annual cost of the fishery, it would be around USD 1
million per year. This figure represents 43 cents per mt of fish taken in 2007.
Relying on intermittent, large donations from international aid agencies is clearly
not the appropriate model for funding the critical monitoring tool of the world’s
21
22

http://www.seafood.co.nz/hoki
Paragraph 309 of the WCPFC 4 Summary Record available at www.wcpfc.int
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largest and most valuable tuna fishery. New Zealand, one of the largest donors of
the current programme, noted at the Fourth session of the WCPFC SC:
while it was pleased to be able to provide significant funding for Phase II of
the PTTP, it would like to see WCPFC incorporate the ability to resource
such critical research into its core programme and budget, as well as
explore ways that costs could be internalized within the fishing industry
exploiting the resources. 23
Scientific Advice to the WCPFC
Two of the key functions of the WCPFC SC are described in Article 12 (2)(b) and
(g) of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention (WCPF Convention)
and relate to reviewing stock assessments and providing advice to the WCPFC on
these and other matters concerning conservation and management of target and
non-target stocks. The challenge for the WCPFC SC is to provide advice to the
WCPFC in terms that they understand and ensure that the advice relates to
concepts that are meaningful. The only way for this to happen is through the
WCPFC providing advice to the WCPFC SC on these matters. So far there has
been insufficient dialogue between the two groups on at least two key issues that
we discuss below; namely, the use of reference points, and the development of a
working definition for provisions contained within the Conservation and
Management Measures (CMMs) adopted by the WCPFC.
Lack of Agreed Management Objectives, Target and Limit Reference Points
A stock assessment in itself only provides estimates of the current levels of
biomass and rates of fishing mortality and these quantities alone are unlikely to be
useful to the WCPFC. One way to report the results from stock assessments to
managers is by comparing the estimates of model output against reference points
(i.e. pre-defined levels of, for example, biomass and fishing mortality). While
there is some guidance on this issue provided by the WCPF Convention, there are
currently no agreed reference points and currently the WCPFC SC is providing
advice against the three interim reference points discussed above.
Annex II of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) 24 provides some
guidelines for reference points for tuna-like stocks and notes that two types of
reference points are required: 1) conservation or limit reference points which are
23

Paragraph 102 of the WCPFC 4 Summary Record available at www.wcpfc.int
United Nations, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Signed 4 December 1995, entered into force 11 December
2001, reprinted in International Legal Materials, Vol. 34, 1995.
24
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intended to constrain harvesting within safe biological limits within which the
stocks can produce maximum sustainable yield; and 2) target reference points
which are intended to meet management objectives. Annex II goes on to indicate
that fishery management strategies shall ensure that the risk of exceeding limit
reference points is very low and that target reference points are not to be exceeded
on average.
Article 5(b) of the WCPF Convention is aimed at ensuring that measures (which
can be interpreted as the fishery management strategies described in Annex II) are
designed to restore or maintain stocks at levels capable of producing MSY. This
could be read to suggest that BMSY is a target reference point, however 5(b) then
proceeds to list many qualifying factors that can be used to vary the level
including the special requirements of developing States, fishing patterns, and the
interdependence of stocks. So clearly the situation is far more complicated and
there is a need for the WCPFC to determine if these factors do, in fact, modify the
target level, and if yes, in what direction and by how much.
There is no specific advice on potential levels of limit reference points, but clearly
if the guidelines in Annex II are considered, the WCPFC SC has the key role to
play in recommending limit reference points to the WCPFC. For WCPO stocks,
there is currently no history of depletion to low levels that would help inform the
development of limit reference points and its work is likely to be based on data
from other stocks of the same species in other oceans or other fish species. 25,26
Rather than relying on the equilibrium approaches to fish population dynamics,
this work should recognise and build on current thinking, regarding the variability
in abundance in exploited fish populations. 27,28
So there are two streams of work relating to reference points within the WCPFC,
one for the WCPFC in terms of developing target reference points based on Article
5(b), and a second for the WCPFC SC relating to the developing stock-specific
limit reference points for the consideration of the WCPFC. Both pieces of work
should allow the WCPFC SC to provide advice that is more meaningful to the
WCPFC.

25
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Evaluating Elements of Conservation and Management Measures
A key task of the WCPFC SC is to evaluate the conservation benefit of any CMMs
adopted by the WCPFC. To date it has adopted two measures intended to reduce
the risk of further increases in fishing mortality on bigeye and yellowfin tuna
(CMM2005-01 and CMM2006-01 29 ). To evaluate the conservation benefit of
these measures it is necessary to quantify the various provisions of the CMM.
Considering CMM2005-01, there are some provisions that are very straight
forward and can be converted into levels of purse seine fishing effort and longline
catches that can be evaluated in a modelling framework:
8. CCMs shall take necessary measures to ensure that purse seine effort
levels do not exceed either 2004 levels, or the average of 2001 to 2004
levels, in waters under their national jurisdiction, beginning in 2006.
17. The catch of bigeye for each CCM for the next 3 years shall not exceed
the average annual bigeye catch for the years 2001-2004 or the year 2004
(with a footnote for the USA and China). 30
Conversely there are other provisions that are not as easily interpreted:
[Footnote 1] Current level of fishing effort shall include fishing rights
authorized under existing regional or bilateral fisheries partnership
arrangements or agreements, provided these are registered with the
Commission, and provided that the number of licences authorized under
such arrangements does not increase. CCMs will register their bilateral
agreements or arrangements with the Commission in advance of the Third
Session of the Commission in 2006.
6. Nothing in this decision shall prejudice the legitimate rights and
obligations of those small island state Members and participating territories
in the Convention Area seeking to develop their own domestic fisheries.” 31
In terms of footnote 1 from CMM2005-01, the definition of ‘current’ effort levels
includes latent fishing effort that is not actually being exercised. Insufficient
details are provided to determine the levels of latent effort allowed for. 32
Similarly, that same report (Table 10) shows that fishing effort in the waters under
29
WCPFC, available from www.wcpfc.int under Conservation and Management Measures and
Resolutions.
30
WCPFC, above n 31.
31
WCPFC, above n 31.
32
WCPFC, Review of CCM’s Implementation of, and Compliance With, Conservation and Management
Measures. Fourth regular session of the WCPFC Technical and Compliance Committee, 2–7 October 2008,
Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC-TCC4-2008/10 (Table 6).
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the jurisdiction of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) members increased
about 11% from that ‘allowed for’ under CMM2005-01 33 . However, it is
recognised that the paragraph 6 of CMM2005-01 and footnote 1 (provided above)
have not been taken into consideration. Paragraph 6 is clearly an important area
where policy and/or legal interpretations are required.
It is difficult for the WCPFC SC to undertake meaningful evaluations of the
potential conservation benefits of any CMM, if they contain provisions that allow
for unspecified increases in fishing effort. Consequently, for the WCPFC to get
meaningful advice from the WCPFC SC there is a need to identify the objectives
of any CMM and ensure that definitions/supporting information is available to
allow quantification of the important provisions. Also, this type of work is critical
for the development of CMMs to give the WCPFC more certainty regarding what
limits are being imposed through the various provisions.
Summary and Recommendations
The waters of the WCPO are home to the largest tuna fisheries in the world.
Whilst the stocks are generally in good health, with biomass levels at or above
those capable of producing the MSY, current levels of fishing mortality for bigeye
tuna are well above commonly used limit reference points and approaching these
levels for yellowfin tuna. Furthermore catches have been increasing rapidly in
recent years and are at the highest levels observed for most species. With the
exception of skipjack tuna, biomass levels are at or close to historical lows.
In this chapter we have touched on several areas related to the provision of
scientific advice to the WCPFC that could benefit from policy and/or legal
developments. We note that while we raise these issues specifically in the context
of WCPFC, it is likely that they are relevant to other tuna RFMOs and to the
interpretation and further development of international fishery instruments. We
make the following recommendations to the WCPFC in relation to data provision,
funding of critical monitoring activities, and improving the relevance of the advice
from the WCPFC SC to the WCPFC:
1. develop processes to ensure that data are provided to the WCPFC, both the
types of data and the timeliness of its provision, in line with the existing
requirements;
2. develop timelines for members to make the necessary amendments to their
domestic legislation to implement the existing requirements to provide
operational level catch and effort data;

33

WCPFC, 2008, above n 32.
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3. develop a framework for funding the large-scale conventional tagging
programmes that need to be undertaken at regular intervals to monitor
trends in abundance and fishing pressure on the stocks;
4. begin discussions on management objectives within the WCPFC and its
subsidiary bodies to assist in the development of limit reference points,
target reference points and associated decision rules, to give effect to
Article 5(b) of the WCPF Convention; and
5. develop working definitions for the provisions within CMMs to allow the
conservation benefits of the measures to be evaluated.
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9. The Convention for the Conservation and Management of
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean: Implementation Challenges from a Historical Perspective
Sandra Tarte

Introduction
The negotiation of the Convention for the Conservation and Management of
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (the
WCPF Convention) 1 from 1997 to 2000 signaled a major turning point for Pacific
Islands coastal States and distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) in the Western
and Central Pacific. It was the first time these two groups of States sat together at
the table to work out a mechanism for broad-based management of the highly
mobile and highly valuable tuna stocks of the region. The negotiations also
marked the beginning of a process of building an international regime that would
promote the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the region’s tuna
fisheries. In many respects this process is still unfolding, despite the adoption of
the WCPF Convention and its subsequent entry into force in June 2004.
The WCPF Convention establishes a broad-based regime for the collective
management of tuna and other highly migratory stocks in the region. It has been
described as a ‘third generation’ treaty, building on the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)2 and the 1995 Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement or
UNFSA). 3 One of the common characteristics linking these three treaties is that
they all encompass high seas and areas under national jurisdiction. Drawing on
Article 64 of the LOSC and various sections of the UNFSA, the WCPF
Convention seeks to promote cooperation between coastal States and fishing
nations “with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of
optimum utilisation of highly migratory fish stocks through their range.” 4
It is the contention of this chapter that the implementation challenges now facing
the members of the WCPFC regime – and in particular the Pacific Islands States –
1

WCPF Convention
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
3
1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks; Swan, 2000.
4
WCPF Convention, Preamble.
2
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may be in part understood by reviewing the origins of the WCPF Convention and
its evolution. The analysis thus takes an historical perspective by highlighting
what have – over time – been the main challenges impeding and undermining
cooperation between States in the management and conservation of tuna stocks in
the Western and Central Pacific region.
The chapter begins with a short overview of the background to the WCPF
Convention. It then examines what was an early challenge to the region’s
implementation of the LOSC: overcoming reluctance on the part of Pacific Island
States to cooperate with DWFNs in broad based management and conservation of
the tuna fisheries. This reluctance to cooperate gave way to a second major
challenge: a lack of shared understanding especially between Pacific Island coastal
States and DWFNs about the scope and method of cooperation. This characterised
the period leading up to the negotiation of the WCPF Convention, as well as
influencing the negotiation process itself. The third key challenge that will be
covered here relates to a more contemporary challenge: overcoming capacity
constraints – particularly on the part of Pacific Island States – in implementing
conservation and management measures. This section looks at how this problem
was dealt with in the WCPFC negotiations and the Convention, focusing in
particular on the development of Article 30. The chapter concludes by suggesting
that all three challenges are to some extent intertwined and continue to influence
the level and effectiveness of cooperation between Pacific Island States and
DWFNs in the region.
A Brief Background to the WCPF Convention
In many respects, the negotiation of the WCPF Convention marked the final phase
of a process that began with the formation of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries
Agency (FFA) in 1979. Article III of the FFA Convention recognised that
“effective cooperation for the conservation and optimal utilization of the highly
migratory species of the region will require the establishment of additional
machinery to provide for cooperation between all coastal States in the region and
all States involved in the harvesting of such resources.” This was with a view to
fulfilling responsibilities under what would become Article 64 of the LOSC. 5
For reasons that will be explained more fully below, this “additional machinery”
did not begin to be developed until the mid 1990s; that is over 15 years after the
establishment of the FFA. This is despite pressure and prompting from several
major DWFNs in the region to develop a broad based “Article 64 type”
5

Nandan, 1997; Article 64 requires that coastal states and other states whose nationals fish in a region for
highly migratory species ‘shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international organizations with a
view to ensuring conservation and promoting optimum utilization of such species throughout the region,
both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone’.
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international tuna management organization for the region, comprising DWFNs
and coastal States.
In the mid 1990s, responding to a concern about the status of some fish stocks in
the region, as well as moves at the international level to elaborate on relevant
provisions of the LOSC relating to the management and conservation of highly
migratory and straddling fish stocks on the high seas (the UNFSA), increased
dialogue began to take place between FFA member countries and DWFNs. This
dialogue was primarily of a technical nature, tailored to promote cooperation on
specific issues: the December 1994 Multilateral High Level Conference on South
Pacific Tuna Fisheries, followed by the September 1995 Vessel Monitoring
System (VMS) technical consultations and the July 1996 technical consultation on
the collection and exchange of fisheries data.
What eventually grew out of this ad hoc dialogue, as well as out of a FFA-based
process to examine future management arrangements in the region between 1995
and 1996, was a decision by the FFA leaders to invite DWFNs to a second
multilateral high level conference, to be held in Majuro in June 1997, to begin a
process of developing comprehensive management and conservation arrangements
for the region’s tuna stocks, throughout their migratory range. It was this 1997
conference that formally launched what is now known as the MHLC (Multilateral
High Level Conference) process at which the WCPF Convention was negotiated.
The Majuro Declaration, adopted in June 1997, set a timeframe of three years for
the negotiation of a legally binding arrangement to facilitate cooperation in the
management and conservation of tuna stocks throughout their migratory range in
order to ensure long-term sustainability. Although the Majuro Declaration
provided a foundation upon which to begin negotiations, as will be pointed out
below this belied some fundamental differences between participants about the
nature and scope of the proposed arrangement. In part, this reflected the lack of
consensus on key provisions of the UNFSA – which provided the major
framework for the MHLC negotiations.
Negotiations on a first draft text of a regional arrangement, prepared by
Conference Chairman Ambassador Satya Nandan, who had also chaired the
UNFSA negotiations, began at the next session of the MHLC in June 1998 in
Tokyo. These negotiations continued over the next two years at four more sessions
of the conference, all of which were held in Honolulu, Hawaii. At the final session
(MHLC7) in September 2000, the text was finalized and the WCPF Convention
was formally adopted by a vote. 6
6

There were 19 votes in favor, two against and three abstentions. By 2000, the MHLC process included all
16 FFA states, plus the following states and entities: France, Japan, South Korea, China, the US, Canada,
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It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed discussion of the
provisions of the WCPF Convention. In terms of institutional arrangements,
however, the WCPF Convention establishes a Commission for the Conservation
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean (WCPFC). There is also to be a Scientific Committee and a
Technical and Compliance Committee, to provide advice and make
recommendations in their respective areas of competence. In addition, a permanent
Secretariat to service the WCPFC is established, to operate according to the
principle of cost-effectiveness. The WCPF Convention also provides for a separate
committee to be established by the WCPFC to make recommendations on
management and conservation measures pertaining to fish stocks occurring mostly
in the northern part of Convention Area. 7
As part of its final act, MHLC7 also adopted a resolution establishing a
Preparatory Conference to undertake some of the preliminary work of the WCPFC
pending the entry into force of the WCPF Convention and formal establishment of
the WCPFC and its subsidiary bodies. The Preparatory Conference (or PrepCon as
it came to be called) had the challenging task of providing a “smooth transition” to
the new management and conservation regime, elaborating on or clarifying those
parts of the WCPF Convention that remained to be resolved: including the funds
of the WCPFC and scheme of contributions, participation of territories, the role of
the so-called Northern Committee, the scientific arrangements and the location of
the WCPFC headquarters. 8
The first session of the PrepCon was convened by New Zealand, as depositary of
the WCPFC, and chaired by retired New Zealand diplomat Ambassador Michael
Powles. Altogether seven sessions were held, including the final session which
merged into the inaugural meeting of the WCPFC in December 2004 in Pohnpei. 9
The WCPF Convention entered into force in June 2004 with thirteen ratifications,
all of whom were members of the FFA. At the first session of the WCPFC, the
recommendations of the PrepCon covering the areas noted above were formally
adopted.

Indonesia, the Philippines and Chinese Taipei. Mexico and the European Union had observer status. See
Tarte, 2002a for a history of the MHLC process.
7
That is north of 20 degree North latitude. See WCPF Convention, Article 11, par.7.
8
See Final Act of the MHLC, in Report of the Seventh and Final Session of the Multilateral High Level
Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii, 30 August - 5 September 2000, Annex 7.
9
The PrepCon sessions were as follows: Christchurch April 2001, Madang February 2002, Manila
November 2002, Suva May 2003, Rarotonga October 2003, Bali April 2004 and Pohnpei December 2004.
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Challenge One: Overcoming a Reluctance to Cooperate
As noted earlier, there was a delay of some 15 years between the formation of the
FFA in 1979 and the first tentative steps towards broad-based cooperation with the
DWFNs. It would be a further six years before the adoption of the WCPF
Convention. To a certain extent, this lag could be viewed as both necessary and
natural, allowing time for the countries of the region to consolidate their newfound tenure rights under the LOSC. Moreover, as Ambassador Satya Nandan
observed in his opening address to the Majuro MHLC in 1997:
While it is true that there has been a long delay in establishing a
cooperative mechanism with a participation that would include coastal
states and distant water fishing nations, the delay may have worked to the
advantage of both sides. As a result of long experience, governments and
fisheries managers in the region are now in a better position to understand
the issues. 10
But the prospect of cooperating with DWFNs in the management and conservation
of the tuna fisheries of the Pacific was also one that many countries viewed with
reluctance – if not trepidation. This was for a number of reasons.
The “long experience” alluded to by Ambassador Nandan above included a history
of conflict and distrust between Pacific Island States and key DWFNs. The United
States (US) had initially refused to recognise the sovereign rights of coastal States
over highly migratory species (namely tuna) in their exclusive economic zones
(EEZs). This reflected their reading of Article 64 of the LOSC as well as the
political influence of the powerful American Tunaboat Association – an industry
lobby group. Relations with the US only improved in the late 1980s, following a
shift in US policy and the conclusion of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty in
1987. 11
Relations with Japan, which is traditionally the dominant DWFN in the Pacific,
had also been fraught. Although Japan entered into bilateral access agreements
with Pacific Island States (thereby recognising the sovereign rights of coastal
States), it exploited its dominance in the region as a fishing power and aid donor to
negotiate agreements on terms highly favourable to its industry. Despite the
cooperative efforts of the FFA States, and in particular the sub-regional Parties to
the Nauru Agreement (PNA), Japan refused to pay more than a nominal access

10

Nandan, 1997.
The full title is Treaty on Fisheries between Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the
Government of the United States of America.
11
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fee. It also insisted on making aid conditional on access, and incorporating aid as
part of the access fee. 12
Conflicts between the Pacific Island States and DWFNs were made more
intractable by the obvious power disparities between the DWFNs and Pacific
Islands (ameliorated only in part by regional cooperation). The failure to translate
new-found tenure rights into real or substantial economic benefits was seen in part
to be a function of the acute political and economic inequalities between the US,
Japan and other DWFNs on the one hand, and the Pacific Island States on the
other. 13 There was a palpable sense of vulnerability among Pacific Island States –
alluded to by Satya Nandan in his closing address to MHLC7 14 – and a belief that
their interests would not be served by such cooperation.
This leads to another reason why there was a reluctance to cooperate towards
management and conservation: the overriding priority and preoccupation of
Pacific Island States – at least in the early years – was to strengthen the exercise of
their sovereign rights over their EEZs in order to maximize economic benefits
from their marine resources.
Thus, the South Pacific Forum meeting in 1977 decided that the role of the
proposed FFA should be limited to assisting member governments in the exercise
of their sovereign rights to manage fisheries in their EEZs. The key strategy of the
Pacific Islands States from the late 1970s was to maximize economic returns
through the selling of licenses largely to foreign fishing vessels in exchange for
access to their EEZs. Access agreements were thus the main instrument through
which the tuna resource was managed, and have remained so according to some
observers. 15
The role of the FFA (and PNA) was to assist members to “collectively establish
their new marine tenure rights, increase the local economic benefits derived from
their fisheries resources, and improve their negotiating position with the distant
water fishing nations fishing in the 200 mile zones.” 16 Pacific Island States thus
viewed the tuna resource primarily as an economic resource. Conservation
considerations were secondary to economic objectives. Moreover, “the perception
that tuna represents an economic opportunity from which to build an economic
12

Tarte, 1998.
Schurman, 1998.
14
‘In dealing with this region account has to be taken of the feelings and vulnerability of some of the
world’s smallest states when they enter into a cooperative arrangement … with some of the largest and
most powerful countries. It would be insensitive to disregard or ignore this reality; equally it would be
insensitive to impose on this group of countries a regime which would add further to their sense of
vulnerability.’(Nandan, 2000)
15
Aqorau 2003.
16
Schurman, 1998.
13

209

base for survival” influenced the attitudes of the Pacific Islands States for most of
the post-independence era. 17
It is important to highlight these political and economic issues because they
remain pertinent today. The protection of sovereign rights and the pursuit of
economic benefit remain cornerstones of many countries’ ocean policies in the
region. This is how national interest continues to the defined and viewed.
Overcoming a reluctance to cooperate 18 has thus required a delicate and difficult
balancing act between protecting sovereign rights on the one hand and promoting
international cooperation on the other; and between maximizing short-term gain
on the one hand and long-term benefits on the other.
Challenge Two: Agreeing on a Mechanism for Cooperation
The lag in establishing a broad-based fisheries management and conservation
regime in the region was not only due to a reluctance by Pacific Island States to
cooperate with DWFNs, but also due to the different (if not conflicting) views and
expectations about what the scope and framework of cooperation should be.
The shift to cooperative management and conservation efforts in the Pacific region
occurred in a two-stage process. The first stage was acceptance of the need to
focus on fisheries management and conservation issues. The second was
acceptance by Pacific Island countries of the need to cooperate with DWFNs in the
development of management and conservation measures. On the latter issue,
however, a key point of contention was who would dictate the pace and direction
of cooperation: DWFNs or Pacific Island coastal States. This in turn rested on
different interpretations of relevant LOSC provisions
Initial attempts to address fisheries management in the early 1990s were mainly
undertaken unilaterally by the FFA member States. Driven in large part by FFA,
these efforts found expression through newly revised Minimum Terms and
Conditions (MTCs) of access adopted as part of the PNA’s Second Implementing
Arrangement in 1991. These included measures that pertained to the high seas, as
well as the EEZs: provision of high seas catch data, whenever fishing takes place
within an EEZ as well as on the high seas; and a ban on transshipment at sea.
Another attempt at management by the PNA that occurred in the early 1990s was
the adoption of the Palau Arrangement in 1992. This came into force in December
1995. It provided a framework for the management of the purse seine fishery in
the Western and Central Pacific.
17

Aqorau, 2003.
This applies to cooperation among Pacific Island States as well as to cooperation between Pacific Island
States and DWFNs.
18

210

In justifying these measures to skeptical (if not hostile) DWFNs, the FFA claimed
that member States had a “legitimate interest in the conservation and management
of highly migratory species on the high seas in order to exercise more effectively
their sovereign rights within EEZs.” 19 The Palau Arrangement was particularly
important to the FFA States because it was seen as a way of rebutting claims by
DWFNs, especially by Japan, that there needed to be an international tuna
management organisation for the region, comprising DWFNs and coastal States.
Japan wanted a broad-based fisheries organisation in the region that would give
Japan and other DWFNs some say over resource allocation and utilization. The
FFA responded that the Palau Arrangement precluded the need for such an
organization since it limited purse seine licenses and hence fishing effort in the
EEZs of the Western Pacific. 20
It is important to note the changing international context which influenced the
dynamics of regional fisheries policy and diplomacy at this time. To a certain
extent these regional initiatives taken by FFA/PNA were an attempt to influence
the outcome of evolving law of the sea negotiations and to position themselves
favorably in the negotiations that were unfolding at the UN. According to the FFA,
Pacific Island States needed to “ensure that no inroads are made to the principle of
sovereignty over highly migratory species while within areas of national
jurisdiction.” 21
The FFA States played an active role in the UN Fish Stocks Conference: fifteen
out of sixteen members attended the final session in 1995 which adopted the
UNFSA by consensus. This reflected the importance which they attached to the
proceedings, and in particular the significance the UNFSA would have for future
management arrangements in the region. But the way in which the UNFSA was
understood in this regard is important to note. It was seen by FFA as providing a
framework that promotes “good order on the high seas and the effective
conservation and management of high seas resources.” 22 (Italics added). It was not
considered to be the basis for managing EEZs except indirectly.
In 1995 and 1996, the Forum Fisheries Committee’s (FFC) Sub-committee on
Future Management Arrangements developed a proposed framework for regional
tuna management. This approach called for cooperation among Pacific Island
States to develop harmonised and competent in-zone arrangements. Coastal States
19

FFA, 1993.
See Tarte, 1998 p. 105,120. These claims by Japan were made in the context of consultations on a
multilateral access agreement between FFA states and Japan that took place in 1989and 1990, as well as
during subsequent consultations in 1993 on the revised MTCs.
21
FFA, 1993.
22
FFA, 1996.
20
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could thus set a high standard of conservation and management for their in-zone
fisheries that, according to the principle of compatibility, would also have to apply
to the high seas. Pacific Island coastal States would thus be in a stronger position
to negotiate with DWFNs on the establishment of an “Article 8” arrangement
essentially to deal with high seas issues. 23
Despite having the backing, in principle, of the FFC, as well as of one of the
architects of the UNFSA, Ambassador Satya Nandan, 24 this “complementary
management” approach was in the end shelved in favour of one that provided for
direct and immediate negotiation with the DWFNs on a regional management and
conservation regime. This was an approach favored by the DWFNs, but one that
Pacific Island States were not necessarily comfortable with. On the eve of the
Majuro MHLC it was apparent that countries were going into the talks with quite
different expectations and degrees of commitment. Among FFA members, there
were some who wanted to keep to the same general format as MHLC1 (in 1994),
that is an exchange of views on broad issues, and not proceed too quickly into
negotiations. There was also a view within the FFC that the UNFSA, which
provided the legal requirement for cooperation with DFWNs, was essentially
about high seas fisheries. It did not prescribe broad-based cooperation in the
management and conservation of in-zone fisheries. Any regional arrangement
should be viewed as a “multilateral arrangement for consultation purposes and not
for the DWFNs to become decision makers in the management of the tuna
resources from within our EEZs.” 25
In contrast, the position of DWFNs was not to differentiate between EEZs and
high seas for the purpose of management and conservation. Rather they generally
advocated a single regime to manage stocks through their migratory range. It was
argued that this was the only way to achieve effective conservation and
management, and it could be done without detracting from the sovereign rights of
23

One of the areas LOSC elaborated on in the UNFSA (Article 7) was the requirement that conservation
and management regimes inside the EEZs and those established for the adjacent high seas are compatible;
so that the same or similar standard will apply to the stock in its entirety. Article 8 of the UNFSA calls for
the establishment of regional fisheries management organisations or arrangements.
24
In 1996, Satya Nandan suggested that members of the FFA should:
‘enhance their level of cooperation through the FFA by establishing common fisheries
management policies which each State will then apply in its area of national jurisdiction. They
should assist each other in training, manpower development and research, in data collection and
exchange, and in the coordination of the levels of allowable catches in their respective zones and
in the region as a whole, in order to ensure that a precautionary approach to the management of
resources is taken … They should develop a coordinated and integrated management approach in
order to strengthen the leadership role of the coastal States in the management of the resources of
the region as a whole’. (Nandan, 1996).
25
Nauru Country Statement , FFC Special Thirty-Third Ministerial Meeting, 9 - 10 June 1997. The Pacific
Island States sought an explicit recognition of coastal state sovereign rights within EEZs in the Majuro
Declaration. However Australia and New Zealand expressed some concern that too much emphasis on
coastal State rights may be counter-productive and overly confrontational.
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coastal States. Both the US and Japan vigorously advocated this approach,
although the US supported strong enforcement measures for the high seas, while
Japan preferred a weaker enforcement regime (reflecting its opposition to
provisions in the UNFSA). 26
Nowhere was the divide more marked between Pacific Island coastal States and
DWFNs than on the issue of the role and powers of the proposed WCPFC,
specifically in relation to allocation. Negotiations on this issue appeared to reach
their most critical point at MHLC4 in February 1999. The FFA member States
proposed text which would ensure that the functions of the WCPFC in respect to
conservation and management measures would be limited to areas beyond national
jurisdiction. This specifically included the allocation of total allowable catches
(TACs). DWFNs were dismissive (if not scathing) in their response to the
proposed text, with the US delegate describing it as a “non-starter” and “at crosspurposes with the Majuro agreement to manage stocks throughout their range.”
This view was shared by Japan, Korea and Chinese Taipei. 27
As a result of these contrasting views, negotiations were not only difficult and at
times fractious, but key issues were left unresolved, to become the subject of later
negotiations within the WCPFC once it was established. On the issue of
allocations for example, the Conference Chairman proposed to leave undefined the
WCPFC’s role, referring instead to criteria and principles to guide allocation
decisions. The WCPF Convention text that was subsequently adopted by the
Conference, includes this somewhat ambiguous provision 28 what has been referred
to elsewhere as a ”jurisdictional grey area” and subject to different interpretations
by DWFNs and coastal States. 29
Such “grey areas” – the result of compromises reached as a way of meeting the
deadline set by members of the MHLC process to conclude an agreement – pose
major challenges to the implementation of the WCPF Convention. This is
particularly in light of the continuing disagreements between participating States
on key issues, such as on the method of allocation. The method of allocation will
have important economic consequences for member States, thus it is expected to
26
At the time of the MHLC process, the UNFSA was regarded by some observers to be a tenuous basis for
negotiation given the opposition of some DWFNs (notably Japan) to key provisions of the Agreement. At
MHLC5, Japan sought to remove all references to the UNFSA, arguing that it was not yet in place but also
that it did not provide clear guidelines on how to implement its provisions at the regional level. It also
described the precautionary approach as a ‘dangerous concept’. This position was restated at MHLC7.
(Tarte, 2002a, p.288, 294).
27
The US comments were not well received by FFA member States. PNG, for example, expressed ‘shock’
at the comments ‘which do not appear to recognize our rights’ (author’s notes of the meeting).
28
See Article 10, 1 [g] and 10, 3,
29
Swan, 2000. According to Swan: ‘the Commission is empowered, not required, to take allocation
decisions … There is no express provision as to whether the allocations are for high seas fishing only’.
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be the focus of intense negotiation and bargaining. But given that this issue is to be
subject to consensus decision-making (yet another compromise reached in the
MHLC), it is possible that no agreement will be reached and impasses will
develop, leading to the need to consider alternatives. 30
The allocation issue reveals how conflicts over perceived rights and economic
interests may impede cooperation and undermine the effective implementation of
the WCPF Convention. It also indicates that consensus over the powers and
jurisdictional competence of the WCPFC remains elusive. It is significant that at
the time the WCPF Convention was adopted in 2000, it was greeted with mixed
feelings and some pessimism. Most FFA members were unhappy with the last
minute concession they agreed to make on the decision making provisions of the
WCPF Convention. The two-chambered mechanism which had been proposed by
the US was seen to represent a “significant dilution of coastal State voting
power.” 31
Another major concern – one that had brewed during the MHLC process but
which was largely left unresolved – was how Pacific Island States would meet and
discharge their obligations, as members of the WCPFC and as coastal States.
Pacific Island coastal States needed to assume greater management and
conservation responsibilities under the WCPF Convention. But in almost all
countries, there was a severe short-fall in terms of technical, financial and legal
resources to undertake these responsibilities. 32 There was thus a real danger that
countries were signing up to a convention that they had no means to implement, let
alone the political will to enforce. This leads to the third major implementation
challenge: overcoming capacity constraints – particularly on the part of Pacific
Island States – in implementing the provisions of the WCPF Convention. The
following section focuses on one aspect of this challenge: providing assistance and
support for Pacific Island States to meet their obligations under the WCPF
Convention and participate effectively in its work.
Challenge Three: Addressing Capacity Constraints
The Majuro Declaration recognized the “need for special assistance for Pacific
Island developing States and territories to enable them to participate effectively in
the conservation, management and sustainable use of the highly migratory fish
30

Clarke, 2000. If Pacific Island States set their in-zone TAC, this could lead to them having control over
the fishery. If the Commission allocates quotas throughout the convention area – a method used elsewhere
– DWFNs could end up controlling the fishery. According to Clarke, the allocation issue may also be
determined by the manner in which catch and effort data is provided. Clarke, 2000.
31
Tarte, 2001. The legacy of this pessimism continues to be felt among the FFA states, weakening their
sense of ‘ownership’ over the Convention.
32
Aqorau, 2003, pp. 3-7.
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stocks of the region.” 33 This reflected Articles 24 and 25 of the UNFSA which
recognized the special requirements of developing States in relation to
conservation and management, and the need to provide assistance to developing
countries, particularly least developed and small island developing States, to
enable them to discharge their responsibilities and participate in regional
management regimes.
The need to provide assistance to developing countries has been described as a
“consensus issue” in the MHLC process. 34 However, consensus on this issue was
more apparent than real. FFA States, in fact, faced strong resistance during the
MHLC negotiations from some DWFNs to their efforts to give practical effect to
this principle. Japan not only rejected the inclusion of references to the UNFSA in
the draft text, 35 it was also opposed to the creation of a special fund to assist
developing member States, particularly to support their attendance at meetings of
the WCPFC. There was also strong disagreement about how specific services of
the WCPFC would be funded. These included VMS, observer program, vessel
register, and scientific services. While FFA States favoured the principle of cost
recovery, with costs levied against vessels operating in the area, DWFNs argued
that these services should be covered by the WCPFC budget.
Many of these conflicts were eventually deferred to the PrepCon and the future
Commission to resolve. The budget of the WCPFC, 36 for example, simply referred
to “due consideration” being given inter alia to the ability to pay and state of
development of members in assessing their respective contributions. The actual
scheme of contributions, including the relative weight of each of the components
of the budget was left undefined. 37
References to the special needs of small island developing States appear in a
number of places in the WCPF Convention: the preamble, Article 7, Article 10,
Article 18, and of course, Article 30. Article 30 elaborates at length on the
“recognition of the special requirements of developing States,” in line with the
UNFSA provisions. It includes a commitment to assist such States with limited
capacity in MCS, stock assessment and collection and exchange of fisheries data.
33
The Second Multilateral High-level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific, Majuro 10-13 June, 1997, Report of the
Conference, p.6.
34
Sydnes, 2001, p. 796.
35
See footnote n 26 above.
36
Article 18 par.2, Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Preparatory Conference Secretariat, September 2002, p. 15.
37
The three main components of the Commission budget are an equal basic fee, a fee based on national
wealth and a variable fee based – inter alia – on the total catch taken within the member’s EEZ. The
Convention provides for a discount factor to be applied in the latter case to catch taken by developing state
parties in their own EEZs. It was expected that contributions based on fish catch would comprise the major
portion of the Commission budget.
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In addition, Article 30 requires that a fund be established by the WCPFC to
facilitate the effective participation of developing State parties, particularly small
island developing States in the work of the WCPFC and its subsidiary bodies. Due
to lack of consensus within the MHLC about the proposed fund, it was left to the
WCPFC to develop guidelines and criteria for its use and administration, as part of
its financial regulations. The task of developing these financial regulations was
taken on by the PrepCon and this is where much of the negotiation over Article 30
occurred.
For FFA member States, a priority during the PrepCon process was to give effect
to those parts of the Convention dealing with the special requirements of
developing States. In fact, in a FFC statement to PrepCon 3 in Manila in
November 2002, Article 30 was described as “the foundation on which the
Commission will be built.” 38 To meet the provisions of Article 30, the FFA group
called for the so-called special requirements fund to be part of the core budget of
the WCPFC, funded by assessed, not voluntary contributions. Allocations to this
fund should be sufficient to meet the costs of participation for developing States
and territories in all Commission sessions and meetings of its subsidiary body. The
fund should also be sufficient to enhance the technical capacity of participants
from developing States. This proposal appeared to be an anathema to a number of
DWFN participants, with Korea voicing its concern that such a fund would
“change the nature of the Commission to a development assistance
organization.” 39
Article 30 remained the focus of intense negotiations at subsequent sessions of the
PrepCon. As a way of moving the process forward, FFA members agreed at
PrepCon 5 in Rarotonga to distinguish between the effective participation and the
capacity building components of the Article 30 provisions. For the FFA group,
while it was necessary that a “minimum level” of technical assistance for capacity
building be funded from assessed contributions, there was also some scope for
funding these activities from voluntary contributions. The “effective participation
fund”, however, should be drawn from the Commission’s budget. 40
What was eventually agreed was that participation costs for developing member
States would be a line item in the WCPFC’s budget, funded from assessed
contributions. The financial regulations provide for the budget to include an item
for the travel/accommodation of one representative from each developing State
38
Tarte, 2002b, p. 5. See also FFC statement to the Working Group on Organization Structure, Budget and
Financial Contributions (Working Group 1).
39
Tarte, 2002b, p. 6. The reason for arguing in favor of the fund being sourced from assessed, not
voluntary, contributions was because of the experience of other regional fisheries management
organisations where the practice of voluntary funds had failed to facilitate effective participation of
developing states. Canada supported the FFC stance but most DWFNs opposed this position.
40
Tarte, 2003, p. 9.
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party to the Convention and where appropriate, for territories and possessions, to
each meeting of the WCPFC and of its subsidiary bodies. The financial regulations
also spell out in more detail the operations and guidelines of the so-called special
requirements fund, to be funded from voluntary contributions. They stipulate that
the purposes of this fund are to assist in human resource development, technical
assistance and technology transfer, relating to the development of fisheries and
conservation and management; as well as building capacity in MCS, data
collection, scientific research and in the effective exercise of flag State
responsibility. Those eligible to apply for and receive assistance are developing
State parties, particularly small island developing States. The WCPFC will
consider and decide on these applications. 41
How meaningful and useful the special assistance fund is for Pacific Island States
remains to be seen. According to the report tabled at the third regular session of
the WCPFC in December 2007, the special requirements fund appears to be
largely inactive. It received no contributions in the past year, and only one project
(to Marshall Islands – costing USD 4,042) was approved. 42 But there is no doubt
that the WCPF Convention’s provisions relating to the needs and interests of small
island developing States are important ‘power-points’ for the region.
Conclusion
Regional efforts to manage and conserve tuna stocks in the Pacific Islands region
have been defined historically by three main challenges. As earlier suggested,
these three challenges – overcoming a reluctance to cooperate, agreeing on the
mechanisms for cooperation, and addressing capacity constraints affecting Pacific
Island coastal States – continue to resonate. They provide a basis for
understanding the implementation challenges now facing the WCPF Convention.
It is also suggested that these challenges are, to a certain extent, interconnected.
Overcoming a reluctance to cooperate will mean addressing the perceived and
inherent vulnerabilities of Pacific Island States. This in turn can only be achieved
by securing their rights and interests in the WCPFC, and ensuring they are not
side-lined in its deliberations. As noted above, there are a number of ambiguities
or ‘grey areas’ in the WCPF Convention, reflecting the lack of consensus on key
issues during the MHLC and PrepCon negotiations. How these are interpreted will
have important ramifications for members’ rights and interests (and hence
commitment to cooperate). These ambiguities or ‘grey areas’ in the WCPF
Convention may work against or in favour of member countries. 43 But which
41
See Regulation 7 of the Financial Regulations, Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission,
available at www.wcpfc.int
42
The balance in the fund was USD53,560. (WCPFC4-2007-FAC1/05).
43
Swan, 2000.
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members’ interests are favoured may in turn depend on how effective their
participation is within the regime. Hence the importance of the budget provision
for participation in the work of the WCPFC and the special requirement fund to
build capacity and assist countries in the conservation and management of their
tuna resource.
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10. Control, Cooperation and ‘Participatory Rights’ in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean Tuna Fisheries
Quentin Hanich

Introduction
Pacific Island governments and other members of the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) 1 are concerned at the level of capacity
migration into the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna fisheries. 2
Overcapacity is recognised as one of the primary causes of overfishing.3 This is
an important concern for the WCPO tuna fisheries where the WCPFC
Scientific Committee has repeatedly recommended reductions in fishing
mortality on bigeye and yellowfin. 4 Furthermore, economists have suggested
that fishing capacity in some WCPO tuna fisheries is significantly above
optimal levels, thereby reducing the profitability of these fisheries. 5 Unmanaged capacity migration into the WCPO tuna fisheries exacerbates
overfishing pressures and increases the difficulty of negotiating an effective
management response within the WCPFC.
These tuna fisheries are the world’s largest 6 with an estimated value of
approximately AUD$3.9 Billion. 7 They are the only significant resource for
some Pacific Island States and have long been viewed as the primary
1

The full title is the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (hereafter the WCPFC). The Commission is the
decision making body for the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (hereafter the WCPF Convention) which entered
into force in July 2004.
2
WCPFC, Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Fourth Regular Session. Summary Report, 2 - 7 December 2007,
Guam, 2007, cited 25 March 2008. http://www.wcpfc.int/
3
FAO, Fishing Capacity, Fisheries and Aquaculture Department of the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO), 2008, cited 26 March 2008. http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/2898#container
4
In 2007, some WCPFC members expressed concern that the WCPFC has yet to implement
conservation measures that will achieve the reductions in fishing mortality recommended by the
Scientific Committee recommendations. WCPFC, Summary Report, 2007.
5
Bertignac, M., Campbell, H., Hampton, J. and Hand, A. ‘Maximising Resource Rent from the
Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries’ in Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 15, 2001, pp. 151177. Kompass, T. and Che, T. ‘Economic Profit and Optimal Effort in the Western and Central Pacific
Tuna Fisheries’, in Pacific Economic Bulletin, Vol. 21, No. 3, Australian National University,
Canberra, 2006.
6
For the purposes of this chapter, the WCPO is defined as those waters within the Area defined by the
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean. This stretches from Indonesia and the Philippines in the west to Hawaii, Kiribati
and French Polynesia in the East.
7
Williams, P. and Terawasi, P. Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
including Economic Conditions – 2007. Paper presented to the Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. 11 - 22 August 2008. Port
Moresby, Papua New Guinea. WCPFC-SC4-2008/GN WP-1 For further information, see: Reid, C.
Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries, Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 2007.
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development opportunity for some of the region’s developing island states.
Foreign fishing access fees deliver much-needed financial contributions to
governments, while domestically-based fishing fleets and support industries
pump hard currency into national economies. In some cases tuna revenue
contributes up to 42% of gross domestic product. 8
It is no surprise then that sustainability and profitability concerns have
heightened antagonism by many Pacific Island States against the fishing
activities of non-members or ‘new entrants’ in the WCPO tuna fisheries. Given
their high dependence upon these resources, Pacific Island States are motivated
to protect and maximise their share of these fisheries. There is a concern that
new entrants may ultimately be allocated a share of the tuna fishery if they
engage with the WCPFC and build a fishing history. As these fisheries are
already suffering from overcapacity and overfishing, any future allocation to a
new entrant will necessarily reduce the allocation available to other WCPFC
members.
However, not all Pacific Island States are antagonistic to new entrants as some
States view new entrants as an opportunity to further their own national interest
through increased competition and higher returns on access fees and related
support industries. The Pacific Islands have long resisted any capacity
management measure that preferences historical or current fishing operations as
this would discriminate against Pacific Island aspirations to increase their
participation in the fishery. Similarly, Pacific Island States have opposed
capacity limits that constrain the choice of Pacific Island States on what vessels
they license to fish within their waters which could consequently reduce the
potential for competition and undermine economic efficiency. Instead, Pacific
Island States have adopted strategies that assert the rights of Pacific Island
States to choose who fishes in their waters, within established sustainability
limits, and have supported management measures that provide equitable limits
on catch and effort.
Additionally, as is demonstrated in this chapter’s vessel data analysis, some of
these so-called new entrants have some history of participation in the WCPO
tuna fisheries and could conceivably argue that they have an existing interest in
these fisheries.
This chapter examines the global and regional frameworks that establish the
participatory rights and responsibilities of flag States and regional fisheries
management organisations (RFMOs). The chapter then analyses regional
databases to identify flag States that have previously participated in the WCPO
tuna fisheries in any form, however minimal. Some of these States and entities
are likely to be no longer participating in the fishery, while other States have
only recently become active. The chapter then discusses their obligations, if
8

Gillett, R. and Lightfoot, C. The Contribution of Fisheries to the Economies of Pacific Island
Countries, Asian Development Bank, Forum Fisheries Agency, and the World Bank, Manila, 2002.
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any, to implement WCPFC measures. 9 Twenty nine of these identified flag
States are not members, or cooperating non-members of the WCPFC. Given the
space limitations of this chapter, the analysis does not go into sufficient detail
to individually support or counter arguments for participatory rights, but simply
indicates which States and entities could potentially express an historical
interest in the WCPO tuna fisheries.
Background
The issue of participatory rights in international fisheries raises complex, and
often conflicting, concerns relating to conservation, development and
international law. This issue becomes particularly difficult in fisheries that
migrate across or straddle the high seas and multiple exclusive economic zones
(EEZ) due to the inherent necessity for cooperative management responses
involving multiple stakeholders. Regional cooperation is necessary to agree on
participatory rights in a form that limits fishing capacity to sustainable levels
and prevents unsustainable levels of capacity migration.
The Multilateral High Level Conference (MHLC) that negotiated the WCPFC,
and subsequent WCPFC Preparatory Conferences and Commissions, noted
concerns regarding increasing levels of capacity migration into the WCPO
fisheries and adopted multiple resolutions calling on States to reduce or restrain
increases in fishing capacity. 10
This capacity migration is in part a symptom of the significant global overcapacity in fishing fleets, the dire status of many fisheries and the increasing
global demand for seafood products. Despite global and regional efforts 11 to
reduce overcapacity in fishing fleets, the Food and Agriculture Organisation
(FAO) noted in 2007 that the number of fishing vessels worldwide has
remained fairly consistent. 12 While some States have made efforts to reduce
overcapacity within their fleets, increases in the fleets of other States combined

9
See Table in Annex A for references. Of further interest, approximately 80 States from around the
world are involved in global tuna fisheries, some within their coastal waters and others wherever tuna
are found. Joseph, J. ‘Managing Fishing Capacity of the World Tuna Fleet’ in FAO Fisheries Circular,
No. 982, FAO, Rome, 2003.
10
WCPFC Resolution on Reduction of Overcapacity, Resolution-2005-02, adopted in December 2005
by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), 2005.
11
In 1999, the FAO Committee of Fisheries (COFI) adopted the International Plan of Action for the
Management of Fishing Capacity. Joseph, J. ‘Managing Fishing Capacity of the World Tuna Fleet’ in
FAO Fisheries Circular, No. 982, FAO, Rome, 2003. In 2005, Ministers from the Asia Pacific region
expressed serious concerns regarding the continuing threats to fisheries sustainability posed by: fishing
overcapacity; illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; discards; and by-catch. APEC Joint
Ministerial Statement. 2nd APEC Ocean Related Ministerial Meeting, Bali, September 2005, cited 26
March 2008. http://www.apec.org/content/apec/ministerial_statements/sectoral_ministerial/oceanrelated/2005_ocean-related.html
12
FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2006, FAO Fisheries and Agriculture
Department, Rome, 2007.
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with increases in fishing efficiency and vessel power have largely negated the
effectiveness of these efforts. 13
In 1995, the 21st Session of the Committee of Fisheries (COFI) of the FAO
noted that overfishing (due primarily to excess capacity of fishing fleets) was
threatening the sustainability of the ocean’s marine living resources. 14 This
problem has not eased. In 2007, the FAO reported that 77% of global fish
stocks are either fully fished, overfished, depleted or recovering from depletion
with no possibilities in the short or medium term for further increases in fishing
effort. 15 Finally, global demand for seafood products has increased by 200% in
the past 30 years and is forecast to continue growth at a rate of 1.5% per year
through 2020 as global populations and per capita fish consumption continue to
grow. 16
Management limits and quotas can serve to slow overfishing, but if
management responses do not reduce the overcapacity then excess capacity
continues to drive overfishing within the fishery or it migrates into less
regulated fisheries. Until recently, most WCPO tuna fisheries have effectively
been open access due to the lack of management limits for the high seas and the
minimal limits imposed in the EEZs.
As the WCPFC and the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) 17 necessarily reduce
catches, the region will be increasingly challenged to remove the excess
capacity created by these limits and control fishing vessels from States that are
not members of the WCPFC and which migrate into the region. The next
section describes the global framework that defines flag and coastal State rights
and responsibilities.
Global Framework – Exclusive Economic Zones
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)18 provides
the over-arching framework for marine fisheries and defines the limits of
13

Ibid.
FAO, Report of the Twenty First Session of the Committee on Fisheries, Twenty First Session of the
Committee on Fisheries, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Rome, 2007.
15
FAO, above n 12, 2007.
16
Delgado, C., Wada, N., Rosegrant, M., Meijer, S. and Ahmed, M. Outlook for Fish to 2020: Meeting
Global Demand, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC, 2003.
17
The VDS was implemented by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) in December 2007 and
limits purse seine fishing effort within the EEZs of PNA members. PNA members are a subset of the
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA): Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Micronesia, Marshall Islands,
Palau, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Nauru.
18
United Nations, ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (hereafter the LOSC), signed at
Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982, in International Legal Materials, No. 21, 1982, pp.
1261-1354. 50 six of the 65 States and entities identified in Annex A are parties to the LOSC. Three
States have signed but not ratified the LOSC (Cambodia, El Salvador and Thailand) and six States have
neither signed nor ratified the LOSC (Ecuador, Netherlands Antilles, Peru, St Vincent, United States of
America and Venezuela). United Nations, Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and
successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as at 01 February 2008, Division of Ocean
14
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participatory rights, both on the high seas and within waters under national
jurisdiction. Consequently, it is important to briefly consider this framework in
regard to the issue of participatory rights.
The LOSC established the EEZ concept in international law. 19 The EEZ
brought under national jurisdiction large tracts of ocean that had previously
belonged to the regime of the high seas and granted coastal States the sovereign
rights to all living marine resources within 200 nautical miles. 20 This
effectively transferred property rights for 85% to 90% of the world’s then
active fisheries from the international commons to coastal states. 21
Obligations come with these property rights. The LOSC describes three
obligations placed on coastal States in regard to their EEZ: conservation;
optimum utilization; and a duty to cooperate. Firstly, Article 61 requires coastal
States to manage and conserve fisheries within their EEZs. They shall
determine the allowable catch of the living resources in their EEZ and ensure,
through ‘proper’ conservation and management measures, that living resources
within the EEZ are not over-exploited. Secondly, Article 62 obliges coastal
States to share their surplus fish and promote the objective of optimum
utilisation within their EEZ (without prejudice to conservation requirements).
However, coastal States are granted a wide discretion in determining this
surplus and the conditions for foreign access. 22 Thirdly, Articles 63 and 64
oblige States to cooperate in regard to straddling and migratory fish stocks that
occur within their EEZ, or whose vessels fish for the same stocks on the high
seas. 23 Such States shall cooperate, either directly, or through fora such as
RFMOs, and ensure the conservation and optimum utilisation of such stocks
throughout their range. 24
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, 2008, cited 27 March 2008.
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_agreements.htm
19
LOSC – Part V.
20
Erik Molenaar notes that the sovereign rights granted to coastal States give them ‘practically
exclusive powers over regulating access’ to the fisheries within their EEZ, including straddling and
highly migratory fish stocks. Molenaar, E. J. ’Participation, Allocation and Unregulated Fishing: The
Practice of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations’ in The International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2003.
21
Shyam, M. ‘The Emerging Fisheries Regime: Implications for India’ in Ocean Development and
International Law, No. 8, Taylor and Francis, 1980.
22
Article 62 of LOSC states that coastal States are obliged to calculate their capacity to harvest the
entire allowable catch of their EEZ and give other States access to any surplus beyond which their
fleets could harvest. When giving access to other States to its EEZ, coastal States shall take into
account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the significance of the fisheries to the coastal State
economy and its other national interests, Articles 69 (rights of landlocked States) and 70 (rights of
geographically disadvantaged States), the requirements of developing States in the subregion/region in
harvesting part of the surplus, and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States who have
habitually fished in the zone or have made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks.
23
Straddling and highly migratory stocks may simultaneously straddle waters both within and beyond
the EEZ, or may migrate back and forth across EEZ boundaries. Consequently, catches of these stocks
on either side of an EEZ will affect the same stock with direct impacts on both coastal fishing fleets
and high seas fishing fleets.
24
Article 64 of LOSC also requires States to cooperate, in regions were there is no appropriate
organisation, to establish such an organisation (i.e. RFMO) and participate in its operation.
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Coastal States and fishing States established the WCPFC as the agreed
mechanism to cooperatively manage tuna stocks within the WCPO. The WCPF
Convention 25 states that it shall be interpreted and applied in the context of, and
in a manner consistent with, the LOSC and the United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement (UNFSA) 26 and that nothing in it shall prejudice the rights,
jurisdiction and duties of States under the LOSC or UNFSA. 27 Additionally,
Article 10 of the WCPF Convention states the functions of the WCPFC are
without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing highly migratory fish
stocks within their EEZs.
In brief, the rights and responsibilities held by coastal State States effectively
limit the question of participatory rights in the WCPO tuna fisheries to the high
seas. Coastal States exclusively control the sovereign rights for all fishing
within their EEZ, regardless of how many flag States are fishing in the region,
or the extent of their fishing history. 28 Similarly, the WCPFC has no authority
to allocate rights to fish within EEZs in any manner that undermines the
sovereign rights of coastal States.
So long as Pacific Island States implement and enforce comprehensive
licensing and reporting requirements to ensure that all catches from within their
waters are attributed to the coastal State, they can effectively license whoever
they want to fish within their waters (subject to treaty obligations such as the
WCPFC), without concern that this may create an historical argument for
future allocation to the flag State. If on the other hand, the catches from the
coastal waters are attributed to the flag State, then the flag State could
conceivably argue that it is has an historical catch history that warrants some
consideration if the WCPFC were to initiate negotiations to allocate shares in
the WCPO tuna fisheries, and consider catch history to be a significant criteria.
Finally, given that allocation decisions in the WCPFC require consensus, 29 and
Pacific Island States are the largest voting bloc, the WCPFC is unlikely to
adopt any allocation model that delivers less socio-economic benefits to these

25
Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean (hereafter the WCPF Convention), cited 25 March 2008.
http://www.wcpfc.int/
26
United Nations, ‘Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’ in International Legal Materials, No. 34,
1995.
27
WCPF Convention – Article 4.
28
Some distant water fishing States have historically rejected interpretations of the LOSC that grant
coastal States sovereign rights over migratory species within their EEZs. However, the reality at sea
has essentially moved on. For over 20 years, the status quo has reflected the coastal State interpretation
and there is no indication that fishing States are likely to fish for tuna within EEZs without the
permission of coastal States.
29
WCPFC – Article 10.4.
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coastal States than what they would otherwise gain from their existing
sovereign rights.
Global Framework – High Seas 30
The issue of participatory rights on the high seas needs to be considered within
the framework of five principles that derive from the LOSC and the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969 Vienna Convention). 31 These
principles are fundamental to the rights and responsibilities of States and
include: Pacta tertiis; freedom of the seas; global commons; flag State control;
and a duty to cooperate.
Pacta tertiis describes the basic rule of customary international law which dates
back to Roman law. The rule was codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention and
states that treaties do not: ‘create either obligations or rights for a third State
without its consent’. 32 In practice, this means that the WCPFC cannot impose
an obligation on a flag State to regulate, restrict or prohibit its vessels fishing
on the high seas unless the flag State has consented to the obligation. Similarly,
the WCPFC cannot impose obligations on market or port States to take actions
without the consent of the market or port State.
Next, the LOSC continued the global commons status for the high seas 33 and
provided that no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas
to its sovereignty.34 Similarly, the LOSC continued to apply the traditional
freedom of the seas to the high seas, thereby granting all States the equal right
to fish the high seas. 35 Every State has an equal right to access and share in the
sea’s resources. An early consequence of these equal rights was the creation of
an obligation not to interfere with the vessels of other States on the high seas,
nor impose on their equal rights which led inevitably to the exclusivity of flag
State jurisdiction. The LOSC subsequently endorsed in law the primacy of flag
State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas. 36

30
LOSC – Article 86. In effect, the high seas are those parts of the sea that lie beyond the jurisdiction
of coastal States (ie beyond 200 nautical miles from any coastal State).
31
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into
force on 27 January 1980, in United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, cited 27 March 2008.

http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf
32

1969 Vienna Convention – Article 34.
Grotius, H. The Freedom of the Seas, Oxford University Press, New York, 1604. This publication is
a translation of the latin text and was produced in 1916. Grotius argued that the oceans were the
common property of all, particularly in regard to freedom of navigation and trade. This countered
sovereign claims by Spain over the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico, and by Portugal over the
Indian Ocean.
34
LOSC – Article 89.
35
LOSC – Article 87.
36
LOSC – Articles 91, 92 and 94 are particularly relevant.
33
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Lastly, States have a ‘duty to cooperate’ with other States as may be necessary
for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas. 37 States are
required to consider a number of factors when establishing conservation
measures and catch limits for high seas fisheries, including the special
requirements of developing States, and to ensure that measures do not
discriminate in form or in fact against the fishermen of any State. 38
The duty to cooperate is further elaborated for anadromous 39 and
catadromous 40 stocks, trans-boundary and straddling stocks 41 and highly
migratory stocks (i.e. tuna). 42 For highly migratory species, the LOSC requires
coastal and fishing States to cooperate directly or through appropriate
international organisations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting
the objective of optimum utilisation, both within and beyond the EEZ. 43
However, the interpretation and practical application of the duty to cooperate
provisions of the LOSC have been problematic ever since its entry into force.
The vagueness of the obligation and the lack of practical guidelines allowed
some States to interpret the duty in a manner that minimised any regulation of
their own fishing activities. Furthermore, the duty to cooperate does not
necessarily involve the duty to reach an agreement, provided that cooperative
action has been undertaken in good faith. 44
In summary, these five principles generally allow vessels to navigate and fish
anywhere on the high seas, answerable only to the laws and regulations of the
flag State to which they are registered. The flag State, in turn, is subject only to
the treaty obligations to which it has consented and a generalised and
unspecific duty to cooperate.
For example, vessels flagged to Guatemala and Honduras have previously
fished within the WCPO and both States are parties to the LOSC, but neither
are party to UNFSA or WCPFC. 45 In accordance with the principles described
above, vessels flagged to these States (and others like them) enjoy a freedom to
fish in the WCPO high seas subject only to a vague duty to cooperate.

37
LOSC – Articles 63, 64, 66, 67, 116, 117 and 118. Article 118 of the LOSC elaborates on this
cooperation and requires States to enter into negotiations ‘… with a view to taking the measures
necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate, cooperate
to establish subregional or regional fisheries organisations to this end.’
38
LOSC – Article 119.
39
LOSC – Article 66.
40
LOSC – Article 67.
41
LOSC – Article 63.
42
LOSC – Article 64.
43
LOSC – Article 64.
44
Munro, G., Van Houtte, A. and Willmann, R. ‘The Conservation and Management of Shared Fish
Stocks: Legal and Economic Aspects’, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 465, FAO, Rome, 2004.
45
See table in Annex A for a full list of WCPO participants and WCPFC and UNFSA parties.
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Regional Framework – United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA)
and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)
Partly in response to these weaknesses and gaps, further international law built
upon the LOSC through the negotiation of additional binding and non-binding
instruments. 46 Of these, UNFSA and WCPFC are the most directly relevant as
they provide the regional framework for the determination of participatory
rights within the WCPO tuna fisheries.
UNFSA parties are obliged to cooperate in order to conserve and manage
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, either directly or
through appropriate sub-regional fisheries organisations or RFMOs. 47
Furthermore, all UNFSA parties are to apply the conservation and management
measures established by relevant existing RFMOs. This obligation significantly
extends the authority of relevant RFMOs (such as the WCPFC) as it indirectly
binds all UNFSA parties to apply all relevant RFMO conservation measures,
regardless of their status in relation to individual RFMOs. 48
However, the UNFSA duty to cooperate does not automatically translate into a
duty to participate in an existing RFMO, or establish a new one. Rather,
UNFSA parties can choose in what manner they apply their duty to cooperate.
They can become a member of the relevant organisation, or simply agree to
apply the conservation and management measures established by the relevant
organisation or arrangement. 49
Additionally, all UNFSA parties are obliged to support RFMO monitoring,
control and surveillance (MCS) systems and ensure their measures are
compatible with the RFMO MCS. 50 This specifically includes obligations for
UNFSA parties to require their vessels to abide by the boarding and inspection
procedures of RFMOs in the high seas, regardless of whether they are a
member of the organisation or participant in an arrangement. 51
Perhaps most powerfully, UNFSA explicitly states that only those States which
agree to implement conservation and management measures of an existing
RFMO (in regard to highly migratory and straddling stocks) shall have access
to the fishery resources to which those measures apply. 52 UNFSA binds its
parties to prohibit vessels from fishing within the Convention Area of an
46
Other relevant instruments include the: FAO Compliance Agreement; FAO Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fishing; International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU); International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing
Capacity (IPOA-Capacity); International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in
Longline Fisheries (IPOA-Seabirds); and International Plan of Action for the Conservation and
Management of Sharks (IPOA-Sharks).
47
UNFSA – Article 5.
48
UNFSA – Article 8.
49
UNFSA – Article 8.3.
50
UNFSA – Article 18.
51
UNFSA – Article 21.1.
52
UNFSA – Article 8.4.
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existing relevant RFMO if it does not implement that RFMO’s conservation
and management measures. 53
In the context of the WCPO tuna fisheries, UNFSA expands the number of flag
States required to abide by conservation and management measures adopted by
the WCPFC (the relevant RFMO in this fishery). Of the 65 States and entities
identified in Annex A with a history of participation in the WCPO tuna
fisheries, only thirty six are members or cooperating non-members of the
WCPFC. UNFSA expands this coverage through the addition of eleven States
from the list that are party to UNFSA, and therefore indirectly bound to
implement WCPFC conservation measures. 54
However, UNFSA has suffered from a slow take-up by Latin American States
and States who operate open-registry flags of convenience. Of the 65 States and
entities identified in Annex A, seventeen States and one entity are not party to
either UNFSA or WCPFC and are not bound to implement WCPFC
conservation measures. 55 In regard to these non-parties, UNFSA requires
RFMO members to exchange information on vessels fishing for migratory and
straddling stocks that are flagged to States which are neither members of the
relevant RFMO or party to UNFSA. 56 RFMO members shall also:
… take measures consistent with this agreement and international law to
deter activities of such vessels which undermine the effectiveness of
subregional or regional conservation and management measures. 57
UNFSA also describes similar provisions for ‘fishing entities’ that encourage
UNFSA and RFMO parties to request fishing entities to cooperate with RFMO
measures, and link the benefits available to fishing entities to their compliance
with such measures. 58
The WCPF Convention builds on these provisions and requires (amongst other
things) that each WCPFC member request the cooperation of non-members to
fully implement WCPFC conservation measures and take measures (consistent
with the LOSC, UNFSA and international law) to deter the activities of nonmembers which undermine the effectiveness of its conservation and
management measures. 59

53

UNFSA – Article 17.
UNFSA binds an additional 13 UNFSA parties with no record of WCPO tuna fishing to implement
WCPFC conservation and management measures.
55
Bolivia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Peru, Sierra Leone, Singapore, St Vincent, Thailand and
Venezuela.
56
UNFSA – Article 17.4.
57
Ibid.
58
UNFSA – Article 17.3.
59
WCPFC – Article 32.
54
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On the flip side, it is important to note that UNFSA also obliges RFMOs to
operate in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner and open their
membership to States with a ‘real interest’ in the RFMO’s fisheries. 60 While,
the definition of ‘real interest’ is unclear, the general view is that the concept of
real interest should not be interpreted in an exclusive manner. 61 Adjacent
coastal States and states fishing for stocks on the high seas inside the area in
question are generally regarded as having a real interest and therefore have a
right to participate in the relevant RFMOs, and a duty to cooperate. 62 In some
cases, a State may be able to demonstrate a real interest without any previous
fishing history, 63 while some regional organisations do not even require a
fishing interest. 64
The WCPF Convention offers little guidance on the definition of real interest.
Instead, the WCPFC relies on Conservation and Management Measure (CMM)
2004-02 65 (supported by the general text of the WPCF Convention and its
Rules of Procedure) which provides criteria for the consideration of
applications by non-members to become cooperating non-members. This
requires that applicants submit a written request to the Executive Director and
address certain criteria. 66 Paragraph 5 of CMM 2004-02 specifies the following
factors to be taken into account in considering such requests:
•
•
•

the views of the applicant on ratification of, or accession to, the
Convention;
the status of the stocks and the existing level of fishing effort in the fishery;
and
its record of compliance with WCPFC and other RFMO conservation and
management measures, and the provisions of the WCPF Convention.

60

UNFSA – Article 8.
Molenaar, E. J. ’The Concept of ‘Real Interest’ and Other Aspects of Cooperation through Regional
Fisheries Management Mechanisms’ in The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 15,
No. 4, 2000.
62
Ibid.
63
For example, New Zealand and the Cook Islands are cooperating non-contracting parties to the North
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) despite neither holding an Atlantic coastline or extensive
fishing history.
64
For example, the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR) is open to any State engaged in harvesting or research activities for the marine resources of
relevance to CCAMLR.
65
WCPFC Conservation Measure CMM 2004-02 Cooperating Non-Members, WCPFC, 2004, cited 28
March 2008. http://www.wcpfc.int/
66
WCPFC CMM 2004-02 requires that CNM applications be submitted at least 90 days prior to a
WCPFC annual meeting and, amongst other things: indicate views on accession to the Convention;
commit to cooperate fully in the implementation of WCPFC conservation measures; commit to ensure
that their fishing vessels and to the greatest extent possible, their nationals, comply with WCPFC
provisions and measures; submit full data and details on its historical and current fisheries in the
Convention Area; and submit results from relevant research programmes.
61
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If successful, cooperating non-members are entitled to participate in meetings
of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies as observers. 67 Paragraph 7 of
CMM 2004-02 imposes some financial obligations on cooperating nonmembers which are invited to make a contribution commensurate with the
benefits they enjoy from participation in the fishery. The status must be reapplied for on an annual basis and continuation of the status is subject to their
compliance with the Convention’s objectives and requirements. 68
Although originally intended as a transitory phase on the way to full
membership, cooperating non-member status is a clever mechanism that can
address the issue of non-members in an ongoing manner, and resolve an
inconsistency between the WCPF Convention text (and its associated Rules of
Procedure and CMMs) and the views expressed throughout the MHLC and
held today by many within the WCPFC.
On the one hand, the WCPF Convention and its documents describe an open
organisation that invites non-members to cooperate and join in its management
of the migratory fish stocks. For example, CMM 2004 -02 builds on inclusive
principles described in UNFSA 69 and WCPFC 70 to engage non-parties and
fishing entities:
The Executive Director shall contact each year all non-members whose
vessels fish in the Convention Area for species under the Commission’s
competence to urge them to become a member of the Commission or to
apply for the status of Cooperating non-member… 71
On the other hand, many within the WCPFC membership view the WCPFC as
an exclusive organisation and refer back to the 1999 MHLC resolution that
sought to restrict membership in the WCPFC. They note that the WCPF
Convention differentiates between MHLC participants (such as Indonesia) who
can accede to the WCPF Convention at any time and non-MHLC participants
(such as Belize) who must be invited to become a member by consensus of
WCPFC members. 72
The cooperating non-member status offers a mechanism to bridge this gap and
engage non-members at arms length, binding these States to the WCPFC
conservation measures without muddying the waters of decision making by
granting full voting rights. While cooperating non-members are still non-parties
in the traditional sense of international law, their commitment (expressed
through their application) to be bound by the WCPFC and its conservation
67
WCPFC CMM 2004-02 Paragraph 6- CNMs come under Rule 36(d) of the Commission’s Rules of
Procedure.
68
WCPFC CMM 2004-02 Paragraph 4.
69
UNFSA Article 17.3.
70
WCPFC Article 32.4.
71
WCPFC CMM 2004-02 Paragraph 12.
72
WCPFC – Article 35.
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measures means in practice that they carry the same obligations as members
without all of the rights, such as full participation in decision making.
While there is little guidance on what defines real interest, both UNFSA and
the WCPFC are more helpful when it comes to the question of the participatory
rights for cooperating non-members. UNFSA describes the following criteria 73
to be taken into account when determining the nature and extent of
participatory rights for new participants and requires that their application be
non-discriminatory: 74
•
•
•
•
•
•

the status of the fish stocks and existing levels of effort in the fishery;
the respective interests, fishing patterns and practices of new and existing
members;
the respective contributions of new and existing members to the
conservation and management of the stocks and to the collection and
provision of data and the conduct of scientific research on the stocks;
the needs of coastal fishing communities dependent mainly on fishing for
the stocks;
the needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly
dependent on the exploitation of living marine resources; and
the interests of developing States from the sub-region or region in whose
areas of national jurisdiction the stocks also occur.

The WCPFC does not describe criteria relating to the participatory rights of
cooperating non-members but does require that the WCPFC shall be interpreted
and applied in the context of and in a manner consistent with UNFSA and the
LOSC. 75 Furthermore, the WCPFC states that the Commission shall agree on
the means by which the fishing interests of any new member may be
accommodated 76 and that:
…co-operating non-parties to this Convention shall enjoy benefits from
participation in the fishery commensurate with their commitment to
comply with, and their record of compliance with, conservation and
management measures in respect of the relevant stocks. 77
In summary, UNFSA and WCPFC provide a comprehensive management
framework that is now binding on 50 out of the 65 States listed in Annex A (i.e.
those who have participated in WCPO fisheries). This framework provides a
process for the WCPFC to engage non-members with a real interest (to be
interpreted in a non-exclusive manner) in the implementation of WCPFC
conservation measures through their participation as cooperating non-members.
73

UNFSA – Article 11.
UNFSA – Article 8.3.
75
WCPFC – Article 4.
76
WCPFC – Article 10.
77
WCPFC – Article 32.4.
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In return, the WCPFC is obliged to treat all States with a real interest in a nondiscriminatory and open manner.
States and Entities with a History of Participation in the WCPO Tuna
Fisheries
An analysis of fishing vessel activity within the WCPO tuna fisheries identifies
65 States and entities that might conceivably hold a real interest and wish to
cooperate with the WCPFC. 78 This analysis is presented in Annex A. The
analysis presented in Table 1 used the WCPFC definition of ‘fishing vessels’
and included all support vessels (i.e. carriers and bunkers) on the basis that the
effectiveness of the WCPFC will, in part, depend upon its ability to control and
monitor such vessels. The analysis reviewed the following databases:
•
•
•
•
•

the FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing; 79
the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels (includes fishing vessels as defined
under the WCPF Convention (i.e. purse seine, carriers, bunkers, etc); 80
the WCPFC Temporary Register of Fish Carriers and Bunkers (only
includes carrier and bunker vessels flagged to non-members); 81
the WCPFC 2006 Tuna Fishery Yearbook; 82 and
the WCPFC IUU Vessel List 2007. 83

78
The analysis assumes that vessels on these lists have actually been involved in fishing activities (as
defined by the WCPFC/ or in WCPF Convention). This is a reasonable assumption for the FFA
Register where a significant fee is charged for each vessel on the list, and similarly for the historical
data for the WCPFC yearbook given that these countries have submitted some form of catch data in
support of the vessel numbers. This is also a reasonable assumption for the WCPFC Temporary
Register of Fish Carriers and Bunkers where States have specifically requested that these vessels be
exempt from the WCPFC prohibition on non-WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels and similarly for
vessels on the IUU list given the process required by the WCPFC before a vessel can be recorded on
this list. But it is possible that the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels may significantly overstate the
number of vessels actually fishing. Some vessels may be listed on the chance that they might fish in the
WCPO. It is likely therefore that some States identified on the WCPFC registers have less active
fishing capacity than indicated. However, while the vessel numbers may be questionable, this should
not falsely indicate States and entities participating in the region as the WCPFC Record of Fishing
Vessels only includes WCPFC members and CNMs that have a history of participation and/or are
coastal States. This vagueness was discussed by the WCPFC in 2007 which agreed to amend the record
in future to clarify which vessels were actively fishing. For the purposes of this study however, it relies
on the existing WCPFC record which does not specifically identify active vessels.
79
FFA, Forum Fisheries Agency Vessel Registry of Good Standing, cited 1 December 2007, FFA,
Honiara, 2007.
80
WCPFC, Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Record of Fishing Vessels, 2008, cited
25 March 2008. http://www.wcpfc.int/vrecord/search.php
81
WCPFC, WCPFC Temporary Register of Fish Carriers and Bunkers (only includes carrier and
bunker
vessels
flagged
to
non-members.),
2008,
cited
25
March
2008.
http://www.wcpfc.int/pdf/WCPFC%20Temporary%20Register%20of%20Fish%20Carriers%20and%2
0Bunkers_20%20Mar08.pdf
82
Lawson, T. (ed) Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Tuna Fishery Yearbook 2006,
WCPFC, Pohnpei, 2007, cited 25 March 2008. http://www.wcpfc.int
83
WCPFC,
WCPFC
IUU
Vessel
List
2007,
cited
28
March
2008.
http://www.wcpfc.int/mcs/pdf/WCPFC%20IUU%20Vessel%20List_7%20Dec%202007.pdf
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It is important to note that this analysis only includes flag States that have
reported either to the WCPFC, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community
(SPC) 84 or the FFA. It is possible that there are additional flag States with
vessels fishing in the WCPO which have not reported to these databases. For
example, within the limitations of this study, the only evidence that Venezuela
has participated in the WCPO tuna fisheries is the listing of two of it’s vessels
on the WCPFC Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Vessel List. 85 For
the purposes of this analysis, participation includes adjacent coastal States and
flag States and entities that have reported vessels as catching fish or supporting
fishing activities within the WCPO tuna fisheries. This interpretation was taken
due to the vagueness of the term ‘real interest’, its generally non-exclusive
interpretation, and to ensure a non-discriminatory and consistent approach. 86

84

The SPC compiles the Tuna Fishery yearbook.
WCPFC, WCPFC IUU Vessel List 2007, cited 28 March 2008.
http://www.wcpfc.int/mcs/pdf/WCPFC%20IUU%20Vessel%20List_7%20Dec%202007.pdf Analysis
of port and market data and national licensing lists from coastal States could identify additional flag
States that may not have reported. It is worth noting that Vanuatu and Kiribati informed the 4th Session
of the WCPFC in 2007 that vessels from Senegal, El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador had held licences
to fish within their EEZs in 2006 and/or 2007. These vessels had not previously been reported to the
SPC, WCPFC or FFA. WCPFC, Summary Report, 2007.
86
It is noted that this analysis includes flags of convenience with little genuine link with the vessel.
85
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Table 1: States that have reported participation in WCPO tuna fisheries.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Directly Regulated

Unregulated

WCPFC Members or
Cooperating non-member 87

Neither Party to WCPFC or UNFSA

Australia
Belize
Canada
China
Chinese Taipei
Cook Islands
Ecuador
El Salvador
Estonia
European Community
Fed. States Micronesia
Fiji
France
Indonesia
Isle of Man
Japan
Kiribati
Korea
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mexico
Nauru
Netherlands
New Zealand & Tokelau
Niue
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Poland
Samoa
Senegal
Solomon Islands
Spain
Tonga
Tuvalu
United Kingdom
United St. America
Vanuatu

Member 2003
CNM 2007
Member 2005
Member 2004
Member 2004
Member 2003
CNM 2008
CNM 2008
EC Member
Member 2004
Member 2002
Member 2001
Member 2005
CNM 2004
EC Member
Member 2005
Member 2003
Member 2004
EC Member
EC Member
EC Member
Member 2001
CNM 2008
Member 2003
EC Member
Member 2003
Member 2003
Member 2005
Member 2001
Member 2005
EC Member
Member 2001
CNM 2008
Member 2003
EC Member
Member 2003
Member 2004
EC Member
Member 2007
Member 2005

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Bolivia
Cambodia
Hong Kong
Cuba
Georgia
Guatemala
Honduras
Netherlands Antilles
Panama
Peru
Sierra Leone
Singapore
St Vincent
Thailand
Venezuela

Indirectly Regulated
Non-party or
Cooperating non-member to WCPFC … but,
Party to UNFSA 88
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Bahamas
Cyprus
Guinea
India
Liberia
Maldives
Russia
Seychelles
Sri Lanka
Ukraine

Party 1997
Party 2002
Party 2005
Party 2003
Party 2005
Party 1998
Party 1997
Party 1998
Party 1996
Party 2003

87

WCPFC, Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 5th Regular Session, Summary Report, Korea, 8-12/12 2008.
United Nations, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement
Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, United Nations, 1 February 2008, cited 2
April 2008. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_agreements.htm
88
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50 of the 65 States and entities identified in Table 1 are either WCPFC and/or
UNFSA parties or cooperating non-members and therefore obliged to
implement WCPFC measures. Fourteen States and one entity are not party to
either and are effectively unregulated and free to fish the high seas unless they
choose to join the WCPFC as a cooperating non-member.
Stalemate - New Entrants and the WCPFC in December 2007
The issue of participatory rights for non-members was a key point of
discussions at the 3rd and 4th meetings of the WCPFC in 2006 and 2007. The
matter came to a head in December 2007 when New Zealand and some Pacific
Island States opposed some applications (Ecuador, El Salvador and Senegal)
for cooperating non-member status in a complex and chaotic discussion. 89
They suggested that, if successful, these applications could increase capacity at
a time when the WCPFC was focusing on the need to cut effort and catches.
They expressed concern regarding the level of participatory rights that new
entrants could hold and suggested that participatory rights should be defined
individually at the time of application. 90 Some States also raised concerns
regarding the past compliance record of the applicants and suggested that
citizens from existing WCPFC members were exploiting non-member flags of
convenience to avoid fishing limits on existing members and expand their
fishing effort. 91
The WCPFC legal counsel advised that there was no basis under WCPFC
procedures for differential treatment of newly admitted cooperating nonmembers in regard to their participatory rights, unless the applicant agreed to
such treatment. 92 The legal counsel advised that the applications complied with
the information requirements established by CMM 2004-02, but they could not
advise on the quality of the data presented. 93
The WCPFC accepted Belize as a cooperating non-member after Belize agreed
to voluntarily limit its participatory rights in the WCPO tuna fisheries.
However, some members continued to oppose other applications on various
grounds, including concerns regarding further capacity migration into the
WCPO tuna fisheries. The applications from Ecuador, El Salvador and Senegal
were subsequently rejected. Kiribati immediately requested an exemption to
allow it to continue authorising vessels from the non-members El Salvador,
Ecuador and (non applicant) Panama to fish within it’s EEZ in a manner
otherwise consistent with the relevant WCPFC measures. The WCPFC
approved the request and granted a one year exemption that allowed Kiribati to
license six Ecuadorian, one Panamanian and two El Salvadoran purse seiners to
89

WCPFC, Summary Report ,2007.
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.
90
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fish within the Kiribati EEZ. The Chair requested Kiribati ensure these vessels
do not fish on the high seas. 94
Because of this refusal, the WCPFC relied on a tenuous thread of control
through Kiribati for vessels from El Salvador, Ecuador and Panama. Kiribati, a
small island developing State, was expected to enforce and monitor a high seas
prohibition on vessels flagged to a foreign State with no implementing
infrastructure or institutions (such as a binding international agreement).
The 2007 outcome was particularly problematic in regard to Senegal. Senegal
is party to UNFSA but not a member of the WCPFC. As an UNFSA party,
Senegal was obliged to implement WCPFC conservation measures and its
MCS provisions for its flagged vessels fishing for tuna in the WCPO,
regardless of its status within the WCPFC. On the other hand, the WCPFC is
obliged by its own convention and UNFSA to engage non-members with a real
interest in an open and non-discriminatory manner. Senegal has a history of
participating in the WCPO fisheries as a fishing flag State and attempted to join
the WCPFC as a cooperating non-member. Given current practice in other
RFMOs, Senegal could have argued that it has a real interest in the WCPO tuna
fisheries and has attempted to cooperate. Senegal potentially had legal grounds
to argue that the WCPFC has acted in breach of its obligations regarding nonmembers and consequently Senegal could potentially have ignored, at least
partially, WCPFC conservation measures. 95 At the very least, it would have
been within Senegal’s rights under the LOSC, UNFSA and WCPFC to
continue fishing on the high seas within the limits set by the WCPFC
conservation measures so long as it reported data to the WCPFC secretariat.
For example, given the minimal controls and limits that the WCPFC has
implemented, this would effectively have allowed Senegalese longliners to
catch up to 2000 tonnes of bigeye.
Furthermore, deterrence measures against non-members (such as Senegal
following its 2007 rebuffal) can only be triggered against those who have
refused to cooperate with the RFMO through membership, participation in the
work of the RFMO or agreement to comply with the conservation measures
established by the RFMO. 96 It appears that vessels flagged to Senegal and other
non-members have not breached any WCPFC conservation measures (other
than WCPFC CMM 2004-01) 97 nor has there been adequate investigation of
potential breaches of conservation measures.
94

Ibid.
Molenaar, E. J. 2000. Molenaar argues that a rebuffed State would have legal grounds to ignore
RFMO management measures if the rebuff was inconsistent with Article 8.3 of UNFSA.
96
UNFSA – Article 17.4.
97
CMM 2004-01 (Record of Fishing Vessels and Authorization to Fish) requires that only fishing
vessels on the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels can be authorised to fish in the Convention Area, and
that members shall prohibit landings at their ports or transhipments to their vessels by vessels not
entered on the Record. However; only vessels flagged to members or CNMs may be listed on the
Record. This effectively means that all non-member vessels cannot be listed on the Record, and
therefore by implication are engaged in IUU fishing and cannot unload in WCPFC ports or tranship
95
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Following the 2007 meeting, it was difficult to see how the WCPFC could
effectively control fishing vessels from non-members if the WCPFC refused to
cooperate with them. This was particularly problematic as the WCPFC
appeared to be years away from any catch and market scheme that might
indirectly address unregulated fishing in a similar manner to other RFMO’s
approaches to addressing unregulated fishing by non-members.
Maximising Control and Cooperation of Non-Members
A more effective strategy is required that recognises the political realities at sea
and the international legal framework, and offers incentives to non-members to
cooperate with the WCPFC. In this regard, the WCPFC would likely achieve a
higher level of compliance with its conservation measures if it encouraged
cooperation by non-members through their participation in the WCPFC as
cooperating non-members (as it is required to do anyway). This strategy would
bind non-members to WCPFC conservation measures and enable the WCPFC
to control fishing capacity and effort. This middle ground best balances the
practical need to engage these flag States in the WCPFC with the desire of
existing WCPFC members to limit future participatory rights and ensure that
the membership of the WCPFC does not increase significantly beyond current
numbers (with the consequent increase in decision making complexities and
difficulties).
Such an approach could broadly outline the participatory rights available in the
fishery in accordance with the UNFSA criteria, particularly relating to
sustainability and the special interests of coastal and developing States. In this
context, the responses of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation
(NAFO) and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) to new
entrants, such as New Zealand and the Cook Islands, offer a useful precedent.
The WCPFC could consider treating non-members from a distant corner of the
globe in the same way that the distant corner of the globe has treated Pacific
States.
The NAFO adopted a resolution in 1999 that advised aspiring new members
that ‘stocks managed by NAFO are fully allocated, and fishing opportunities
for new members are likely to be limited, for instance, to new fisheries (stocks

with WCPFC members. IUU listing of non-member vessels on the grounds that such vessels are not on
the Record could be inconsistent with international law. Non-members do not automatically lose their
legal right to fish in the WCPO tuna fisheries by virtue of their non-membership. Provided such nonmembers discharge their duty to cooperate with the Commission, their fishing activities on the high
seas in the Convention Area could be considered to be within their rights (see legal counsel comments
in WCPFC Summary Report, 2007). The listing of non-member vessels on the IUU list solely because
they are not on the Record could be considered to be discriminatory and a denial of the right to fish on
the high seas (as only member or CNM vessels can be listed on the Record, but such States cannot
easily become CNMs or members).
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not currently allocated by TAC/quota or effort control.)’ 98 Similarly, the
NEAFC adopted Guidelines for the Expectation of States Considering applying
for Membership of NEAFC and Possible Fishing Opportunities in the NEAFC
Regulatory Area and similarly noted that fishing opportunities for new
members are likely to be limited to new fisheries. 99
In 2006, a performance review of NEAFC noted the difficulties it experienced
in determining participatory rights for new entrants in fisheries that are fully or
over-exploited. The review panel 100 considered the guidelines and rules
governing applications for co-operating non-contracting party status were
appropriate and properly implemented.
In 2007, NEAFC adopted Recommendation VIII:2008 on fishing for orange
roughy within the NEAFC Regulatory Area. This recommendation prohibited
targeted fishing for orange roughy in certain sub-areas and only allowed
directed fishing for orange roughy in other sub-areas under specified
conditions. These conditions included a restriction on fishing activities only to
vessels from NEAFC contracting parties that have already participated in the
orange roughy fishery in these other sub-areas prior to 2005. 101 This limited the
participatory rights of non-members and new entrants. The Cook Islands noted
this in a statement to NEAFC opposing the decision and expressing its
disappointment. 102
The NAFO and NEAFC strategies recognise that RFMOs have a responsibility
to open their doors to all States with a real interest in the fisheries in question,
and need to effectively control all vessels fishing within their regulatory area to
ensure full implementation of conservation measures. Consequently, NAFO
and NEAFC do not deliberately exclude non-members from cooperating or
participating in their organisations. However, their resolutions make it very
clear that participatory rights within the fishery will be, and are limited.

98
NAFO, Resolution of the General Council of NAFO, Adopted on 17 September 1999, To Guide the
Expectations of New Members with Regard to Fishing Opportunities in the NAFO Regulatory Area,
(1/99), Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada, 2006.
99
NEAFC, Guidelines for the Expectation of States Considering applying for Membership of NEAFC
and
Possible
Fishing
Opportunities
in
the
NEAFC
Regulatory
Area,
2003.
http://www.neafc.org/reports/annual-meeting/am_2003/docs/2003_45.doc
100
The Review Panel was nominated by Canada, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and
the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS). It comprised Michael
Arbuckle, Bruce Atkinson and Valentina Germani.
101
NEAFC, Report of the 26th Annual Meeting of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, 12-16
November 2007, Volume II – Annexes 1, NEAFC Headquarters, London, 2007, cited 1 April 2008.
http://www.neafc.org/reports/annual-meeting/docs/26neafc_annual_2007_vol2_annexes.pdf
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NEAFC, Report of the 26th Annual Meeting of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, 12-16
November 2007, Volume I, NEAFC Headquarters, London, 2007, cited 1 April 2008.
http://www.neafc.org/reports/annual-meeting/docs/26neafc_annual_2007_vol1_main-report.pdf
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Resolution - New Entrants and the WCPFC in December 2008
In 2008, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico and Senegal again applied for
cooperating non-member status to the WCPFC, while Belize and MHLC
participant, Indonesia, applied for their status to be continued. Following the
unsatisfactory outcome in 2007, the Chair proposed that resolving these issues
would be one of four priorities for the 2008 Commission.
During the confused discussions in 2007, it became clear that some members
appeared to misunderstand or misrepresent the rights and responsibilities of
non-members and the WCPFC itself. In 2008, the Chair of the Commission
requested the legal counsel to present a summary of the legal rights and
responsibilities relating to non-members, cooperating non-members and the
WCPFC. The legal counsel noted that the participatory rights of cooperating
non-members were limited by the CMMs implemented by the WCPFC. The
legal counsel suggested that the cooperating non-member status offered a
useful tool for members of the Commission to control the activities of nonparties and their vessels fishing in the Convention Area and that this status did
not necessarily grant participatory rights on the high seas and might only allow
rights to purchase access from coastal State members to fish within their EEZs.
In this light, the legal counsel noted that non-cooperating non-members have
more flexibility to fish on the high seas in the Convention Area than
cooperating non-members. 103
The legal counsel’s presentation greatly clarified the issues relating to
participatory rights and reassured many members, particularly those from the
FFA bloc, that granting cooperating non-member status to new entrants would
not immediately grant them historical fishing rights or an unlimited freedom to
fish. Rather, it quickly became clear that it was in the interests of existing
WCPFC members to include these new entrants within the WCPFC to ensure
their cooperation and limit the growth of their fishing fleets. 104
Throughout the following week, the Commission quickly approved the
applications from Indonesia and Belize and then worked through the
outstanding applications from the other applicants. Discussions with the
applicants clarified their fishing activities in relation to existing conservation
measures and confirmed their agreement that they would abide by the limits
established by these measures, as specified in the meeting record. These
discussions progressed remarkably smoothly given the experiences in 2007,
except for the application from Ecuador. Examination of the data provided by
Ecuador raised concerns from the USA that Ecuadoran vessels had been fishing
103

Tsamenyi, M. Co-operating Non-Members, Powerpoint presentation to informal side-meeting of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 6 December 2008, Busan, Korea.
104
Author’s notes – 2008. Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Fifth Regular Session. 8 - 12 December 2008,
Korea.
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illegally within their waters in 2007 and 2008. The USA opposed the
Ecuadoran application unless the matter could be resolved to their satisfaction.
Subsequent discussions approved a conditional granting of cooperating nonmember status to Ecuador, subject to their provision of adequate data to the
satisfaction of the USA by the 15 February 2009. Failing this, Ecuador’s
cooperating non-member status would be null and void, but Kiribati, Nauru and
Tuvalu would be granted an exemption allowing them to license seven
Ecuadoran vessels to fish within their EEZs. As in 2007, this exemption
required that these vessels not be allowed to fish on the high seas within the
Convention Area. Furthermore, the exemption required that no other Ecuadoran
vessels be allowed to fish on the high seas, following an admission from
Ecuador that non-licensed fishing vessels had continued to fish in the high seas
of the WCPO after its 2007 application had been refused.
Simultaneously, the Commission addressed the process issues to ensure future
applications are considered consistently and transparently. As noted earlier,
CMM 2004-02 offers little guidance in regard to the issue of participatory
rights and was originally negotiated to enable MHLC participants who had not
yet ratified the WCPF Convention to remain engaged in the WCPFC while
their national governments processed their ratifications. Since then,
requirements have changed as ‘new entrants’ increasingly express interest in
participating in the WCPO tuna fisheries.
In response to these changing circumstances and the requirements for a more
transparent and consistent approach, the WCPFC adopted a revised
conservation measure governing the process of considering cooperating nonmember applications from 2009 onwards. 105 This revised measure provided
explicit and transparent criteria for evaluating applications and provisions from
UNFSA relating to the granting of participatory rights.
Conclusion
The outcomes of the WCPFC meetings in 2006 and 2007 were effectively a
refusal to cooperate with non-members and an ineffectual request that they do
not fish within the WCPO tuna fisheries. This undermined the ability of the
WCPFC to implement its conservation measures and allowed these nonmembers to continue fishing within the WCPO high seas as permitted by the
LOSC and the 1969 Vienna Convention.
In 2008, the WCPFC addressed many of its members’ concerns and responded
to new entrants in a far more transparent and inclusive manner. This response
recognised the interests and rights of non-members, and maximised their
cooperation in such a manner as to enable control of their relevant fishing
vessels within the WCPF Convention Area. This improved the ability of the
105

WCPFC Conservation Measure CMM 2008-02, Cooperating non-members, WCPFC, 2008.
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WCPFC to limit capacity and effort to sustainable levels. The amendments to
CMM 2004-02 provide a way forward for the WCPFC to continue to address
the
the threat
threat posed
the issue
issue of
of new
new entrants
entrants and
and the
posed by
by capacity
capacity migration
migration while
while
protecting
the
special
interests
of
coastal
and
developing
States.
protecting the special interests of coastal and developing States.
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France includes vessels from French Polynesia and New Caledonia.
Japan reports 836 Coastal LL vessels, 432 Distant Water LL vessels and 179 Offshore LL vessels.
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Japan reports 252 Coastal pole and line vessels + 179 Distant Water/Offshore pole and line vessels.
117
WCPFC4 – 2007 – OP 17. Observer Statement by Mexico to the WCPFC, cited 27 March 2008.
http://www.wcpfc.int/
114
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State

Participation in WCPFC fisheries
1996-07
FFA Register
History

39

Netherlands
Antilles

Fishing Flag State
Carrier Flag State
Coastal State
Fishing Flag State

1999-07

2008 WCPFC

Fishing &
Carrier
Register

Temp
Carrier
Register

Long
line

Purse
seine

Pole &
Line

MHLC & Prep
Con history

--

3 Carriers

--

--

--

Non-Member

11 vessels

--

1990
56 vessels

1983
11 vessels

1990
2 vessels

Member 2003

2005
13 vessels
1992
---

--

--

Member 2003

--

Member 2005

--

1964
1 vessel
--

1993
26 vessels
--

1994
40 vessels
--

1970
---

Member 2001

New
Zealand &
Tokelau

41

Niue

Coastal State

--

--

--

42

Palau

Coastal State
Fishing Flag State
Fishing Flag State
Carrier Flag State
Coastal State
Fishing Flag State
No reports.

1999-00 & 2002-03

--

--

1 vessel
33 vessels

73 Carriers
7 Bunkers
--

--

--

44
45

Panama
Papua New
Guinea
Peru

WCPFC 2006 Yearbook

Fishing & Carrier Vessels

40

43

WCPFC
Status

2008 WCPFC

1996-07
Fishing Vessels

Fishing Vessels
1996-07
Fishing & Carrier Vessels

1996-07
Fishing Vessels
--

Non-Member

Non-Member
Failed request to be
PrepCon participant.

46

Philippines

47

Poland

48

Russia

Coastal State
Fishing Flag State
Carrier Flag State
Carrier Flag State
Coastal State (?)
Carrier Flag State

1996-07 577 vessels

--

Member 2005

--

1980 118
164 vessels
11 vessels
--

--

EC Member

10 Carriers
2 Bunkers

--

1985

--

--

1982
14 vessels

--

--

--

Fishing & Carrier Vessels

1997-98
Carrier Vessels
1996-06
Carrier Vessels

Non-Member
PrepCon & WCPFC
Observer. Failed request
to be PrepCon participant

49

Samoa

Coastal State

--

--

--

--

Member 2001

Senegal

Fishing Flag State

--

--

--

--

Non-Member.

51

Seychelles

Fishing Flag State

--

--

--

--

--

Non-Member

52

Sierra
Leone
Singapore

Carrier Flag State

2006-07
Fishing Vessels
2001-04
Fishing Vessels
--

1993
54 vessels
--

--

50

--

1 Carrier

--

--

--

Non-Member

Carrier Flag State

--

--

--

--

Non-Member

Coastal State
Fishing Flag State
Fishing Flag State

---

--

Sri Lanka

Fishing Flag State

--

--

1980
4 vessels
1999
3 vessels
--

1973
11 vessels
--

56

1973
9 vessels
2004
10 vessels
--

Member 2003

55

Solomon
Islands
Spain

1 Carrier
11 Bunkers
--

--

Non-Member

57

St Vincent

Fishing Flag State
Carrier Flag State
Carrier Flag State
Coastal State

--

1 Carrier

--

--

--

Non-Member

---

-6 vessels

2 Carrier
--

---

---

Non-Member
Member 2003

Coastal State

--

--

--

-1982
14 vessels
--

--

Member 2004

61 Ukraine

Carrier Flag State

--

--

--

--

62 United
Kingdom
63 United St.
of America
64 Vanuatu

Coastal State
(Pitcairn Island)
Coastal State
Fishing Flag State
Coastal State
Fishing Flag State
Fishing Flag State

1998-99
Carrier Vessels
--

1982
---

--

--

--

--

--

EC Member

53
54

58
59

Thailand
Tonga

60 Tuvalu

65 Venezuela

1996-07
Carrier Vessels
1996-07
Fishing Vessels
1999-07
Fishing Vessels
1996-99
Fishing Vessels
1996-07

Failed CNM in 2006/07.

EC Member

Fishing & Carrier Vessels

1996-07 453 vessels
Fishing Vessels
1996-07 89 vessels
Fishing Vessels
-- 2 Vessels on

----

1960 119
1976
1995 120
154 vessels 13 vessels 5 vessels
1995
1994
-55 vessels 8 vessels
----

Non-Member

Member 2007
Member 2005
Non-Member

IUU list 121

118

119
120

Philippines reports 160 Domestic PS and ringnet vessels and 11 Distant water PS vessels.
United States combines reports from Amer. Samoa (1st report 1996) and Hawaii (1st report 1960).
United States reports 5 pole and line vessels from Hawaii.
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11. Allocation Models in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission and Implications for Pacific Island States
Hannah Parris and Alex Lee 1

Introduction
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) is empowered
under its Convention 2 to determine the allocation of fisheries resources for stocks
under its management and potential allocation mechanisms have been discussed
by WCPFC members on both a formal and informal basis. 3 Nevertheless, progress
on allocation issues in the WCPFC remains stalled and is likely to remain so for
some time as members have recently rejected opportunities to openly discuss
allocation in WCPFC sponsored forums. 4 One reason for this reluctance is
political: consideration of allocation explicitly raises difficult issues regarding
equity between members and requires active debate on the contentious topic of
who should bear the burdens of any reduction in fishing effort or harvests. Another
reason is lack of structured concepts about what an allocation regime may look
like and what may be the implications for WCPFC members. 5 This is particularly
the case for members of the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), some of whom have
already received a significant effort-based allocation for the purse seine fleet
1

The authors would like to thank Steve Shanks, Mike Batty, Quentin Hanich and participants in the FFA
Conference on Legal and Policy Trends in the Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments in the
Western and Central Pacific Region, 7-9th April 2008, for comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
Any mistakes remain those of the authors. All views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors’ and
do not represent the position of the FFA. Support for this research is gratefully acknowledged from the
Australian Research Council, The Bureau of Rural Sciences and the CSIRO “Wealth from the Oceans”
Flagship Program.
2
Full title is the Convention On The Conservation And Management Of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks In
The Western And Central Pacific Ocean (WCPFC) (PITSE 4) Done At Honolulu, Hawaii, 5 September
2000, available at: http://www.paclii.org/cgibin/sinodisp/pits/en/treaty_database/2000/4.html?query=Western%20and%20Central%20Pacific%20Fisher
ies hereafter referred to as the WCPF Convention.
3
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), Commission for the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Third Regular
Session, Final Report, 11 - 15 December 2006, Apia, Samoa, 2006; Marine Resource Assessment Group
(MRAG) 2006 Allocation Issues for WCPFC Tuna Resources: A Report for the WCPFC Secretariat, 2006,
available at www.wcpfc.int
4
Government of Japan, Letter from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to Executive Secretary
of WCPFC, dated 31 August 2007; Australian Government, Email from Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry to Executive Secretary of the WCPFC, dated 7 September 2007, available at
http://www.wcpfc.int/wcpfc4/pdf/WCPFC4-2007-14%20[Allocation].pdf
5
For example MRAG, 2006 prepared an allocation paper for the third WCPFC annual meeting, but this
was considered by FFA countries to insufficiently cover the range of issues associated with allocation,
WCPFC, 2006.
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through the adoption of the Vessel Day Scheme 6 (VDS) and, naturally, are
reluctant to open discussions on allocations lest they lose political ground.
Although recognizing this reluctance, this chapter argues that the explicit and
transparent allocation of tuna resources under the rules of the WCPF Convention
remains a potentially valuable and effective way for the WCPFC to meet its
management responsibilities, in particular the sustainable management of stocks,
whilst also addressing the aspirations of stakeholders. This chapter aims to address
the second issue facing WCPFC stakeholders - lack of appropriate structured
models - through the presentation of several alternative allocation models that
could form the basis of an allocation debate within the WCPFC. Adopting an
explicit “FFA” point of view, these models aim to explore the practical
implications of key principles that underpin the FFA positions on allocation by
estimating potential shares for FFA States (and other WCPFC members) that could
be generated if these principles were used as part of an allocation calculation.
Although the WCPFC has allocation powers for all highly migratory species in its
Convention Area 7 the focus here is on the principle tuna species of interest to the
FFA (skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and southern albacore tuna) and on the three
main gear types of purse seine, (frozen and fresh) long line and pole and line
fleets. The relative performance of each model is then discussed including some
potential implications for the existing FFA purse seine treaties.
This chapter is organised in the following way. Section two defines allocation and
briefly discusses the role of the WCPF Convention as a framework for the
allocation debate within the WCPFC. Using an interpretation of the FFA position
on allocation, section three sets out the allocation principles used in this chapter
and outlines the alternative allocation models. Section four presents the results of
these models, while section five discusses issues relating to their interpretation.
Section six concludes this chapter.
Basis for Allocation in the WCPFC
What is Allocation?
Allocation is defined here as the process of determining shares, for each resource
user, of an explicitly defined level of fishing (eg a total allowable catch (TAC) or
total allowable effort (TAE)). This level of fishing, or fishing target, is chosen, in
turn, for the purposes of achieving an explicit management goal for the fishery (eg
6

FFA, Information Sheet 07/01: Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) Implementation (Parties to the Nauru
Agreement), 2007, available at http://www.ffa.int/system/files/VDS+information+Sheet+07_01.pdf;
WCPFC, Conservation And Management Measures for Bigeye And Yellowfin Tuna in the Western And
Central Pacific Ocean, adopted at Second Regular Session, 12 - 16 December 2005, Pohnpei, Federated
States of Micronesia, 2005, hereafter WCPFC CMM 2005 -01.
7
The exception here is sauries, WCPFC Convention – Article 3 (3).
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achieving biological sustainability or achieving maximum economic yield). In
essence, allocation is a negotiation about “who” is allowed to catch “what” fish
and to “what amount”.
Although a lot of emphasis in policy discussions is placed on the allocation
process, determining “who” is allocated “what fish” and “how much”, by itself,
will not deliver a sustainable outcome for the WCPFC. Rather, sustainability
outcomes (and economic profitability) can only come from setting appropriate
global levels of effort or harvest across the fishery and enforcing them
appropriately. 8 Allocation plays the secondary role of translating this global
harvest or effort level into a day-to-day management regime for the fishery and, if
done well, can do so in a way that promotes fair access to resources and provides
significant economic incentives, and resources, for members to comply with the
conservation objectives of these targets. 9 For example, if allocation units are
defined as permanent property rights, members who hold a unit of allocation have
an interest in ensuring that the fishery is sustainable in the long run so they can
continue to enjoy the economic benefits of their rights to fish.
Another relevant issue in the allocation is determining what can be done with an
allocated share of TAC or TAE. Choices about how to use an allocated unit is the
decision of individual members of the WCPFC, but the means in which some
members may exercise this sovereign right may negatively affect the fishing and
development opportunities available to other members. Where this occurs,
members may consider developing some ‘ground rules’ to minimize these
negative effects. Conversely, ground rules about how allocated units can be used
can improve the ability of members to fully exploit the opportunities of an
allocated unit. 10
8

Kompas, T. ‘Fisheries Management - Economic Efficiency and the Concept of 'Maximum Economic
Yield' in Australian Commodities, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005, pp. 152-160. Grafton, R. Q. ‘Individual
Transferable Quotas: Theory and Practice’ in Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, Vol. 6, 1996, pp. 520. Gordon, H. S. ‘The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery’ in The Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 62, No. 2, 1954, pp. 124-142. Davis, D. and Gartside, D. F. ‘Challenges for
Economic Policy in Sustainable Management of Marine Natural Resources in Ecological Economics, Vol.
36, No. 2, 2001, pp. 223-236. Bjorndal, T. and Munro, G. The Economics of Fisheries Management: A
Survey, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1999.
9
See for an over view Grafton, R. Q., Kirkley, J., Kompass, T. and Squires, D. Economics of Fisheries
Management, Ashgate, 2006; Moloney, D.G. and Pearse, P.H. ‘Quantitative Rights as an Instrument for
Regulating Commercial Fisheries’ in Journal of Fisheries Resources Board, Canada, Vol. 36, 1979, pp.
859-866; Davis and Gartside, 2001; Grafton, R.Q., Bjørndal, T., Campbell, D., Campbell, H.F., Clark,
C.W., Connor, R., Dupont, D., Hannesson, R., Hilborn, R., Kirkley, J., Kompas, T., Lane, D., Munro, G.R.,
Pascoe, S., Squires, D., Steinshamn, S.I., Turris, B.R. and Weninger, Q. ‘Incentive Based Approaches to
Sustainable Fisheries, in Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2006, pp.
699-710.
10
For example, rules under the Vessel Day Scheme that allow for the Parties to the Nauru Agreement
(PNA) countries to ‘trade’ days can allow individual PNA members to earn revenue from their allocations
even if there is no purse seine fishing in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).
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In effect, then, for allocation to improve sustainability outcomes in the WCPFC,
members need to consider three interrelated questions:
• how much fish should be harvested or how much fishing effort should be
allowed in the fishery? (i.e. what is the target?);
• if the amount of fish harvested or effort allowed in the fishery is limited (due
to the target) who should be allowed to fish and how much should each be
allowed to harvest? (i.e. what is the allocation process?); and
• once members receive their allocated unit, what other rules may the WCPFC
need to implement to allow CCMs to pursue their own tuna development
strategies? (i.e. what are the ‘ground rules’?).
Members have a wide range of choices when determining policies for each
component of this framework – for example there are a wide range of options
regarding the actual allocation process (i.e. “who” gets “how much”) and this will
be considered in some detail in section 3. But there are equally a large number of
policy choices for determining targets or the ‘ground rules’. For example, should
allocations be made on a permanent basis or re-calculated periodically? Should
there be a target for biomass as well as for the level of fishing? Should members
be permitted to trade their allocated units? A full discussion of these options would
extend beyond the scope of this chapter but a range of relevant issues that are
worthy of consideration are set out in Table 1. 11

11

For a fuller discussion of these issues see Parris (forthcoming) Governing the Western and Central
Pacific Tuna Fisheries in a Complex World, Chapter Ten in unpublished PhD Thesis, The Crawford School
of Economics and Government, The Australian National University, 2009.
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Table 1: Policy Options in an Allocation Based Management Framework
POLICY ISSUE TO
CONSIDER
Targets
What target should be
adopted by the WCPFC?
What should it look like?

POTENTIAL POLICY OPTIONS
•
•
•
•
•

use of a Maximum Sustainable Yield target (focuses on
biological sustainability issues only)
use of Maximum Economic Yield target (addresses
biological sustainability and economic profitability
issues)?
targets to be made for biomass levels? (e.g. Bmsy or Bmey)
targets to be made for harvest/effort levels only? (e.g.
TAC = Fmsy or Fmey)
adjust harvest/effort levels to maintain target biomass?
(e.g. TAC = Fmsy or Fmey subject to meeting Bmey)
B

Nature of allocated unit

•
•

permanent share of any future level of fishing/harvest?
allocated units tradeable between parties?

Addressing (biological,
economic and political)
change in fishery over time

•
•
•

should targets change over time? What time period?
should units be tradeable between gear types?
allowing the use of an allocated unit in any area of the
WCPFC-CA? (i.e not just in the EEZ of the coastal state
who holds the allocated unit)

Dealing with vessel capacity
issues

•

should WCPFC members be required to pass on (sell or
gift) their allocated units to individual vessels? (i.e. in
order to avoid establishing an ‘Olympic Fishery’?
vessels receiving allocation subject to being on WCPFC
register and completing all reporting requirements?

•

“Ground Rules”

•

Rules to address ecological impacts of fishing? (e.g.
restricting access to spawning ground areas?)

Source: Grafton; 12 Kompas; 13 authors’ own analysis.
WCPFC Powers and Allocation Precedents in Management Measures
Any allocation debate within the WCPFC will not be an ‘open discussion’
between members but will be guided both by the legal framework of the governing
WCPF Convention as well as the set of precedents embodied in the current
management measures of the WCPFC.
The WCPFC holds specific powers for allocation and these are set out in Article
10 of the WCPF Convention which allow for the establishment of TAC and TAE
12

Grafton et al, 2006.
Kompas, T. ‘Fisheries Management - Economic Efficiency and Concept of 'Maximum Economic Yield'
in Australian Commodities, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005, pp. 152-160.
13
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goals and processes for allocating these fisheries limits between WCPFC
members. Unusually for a regional fisheries management organization, the WCPF
Convention significantly acts to guide the scope within which the WCPFC may
exercise these powers and these could work potentially in favour of the FFA
states. Three Articles are particularly important. The first of these is Article 10 (3)
which contains a list of factors that must be ‘taken into account’ when determining
any allocation formula under the WCPFC – many of which reflect the specific
interests of FFA members. However; the benefit to the FFA members of Article 10
(3) is unclear because the text is ambiguous and does not provide clear guidance in
terms of ‘quantifying’ shares. For example, it is unclear how to quantify the clause
10 (3) (i) which states “the geographical situation of a small island developing
State which is made up of non-contiguous groups of islands having a distinct
economic and cultural identity of their own but which are separated by areas of
high seas.” 14
The second is Article 8, which deals with ‘compatibility’ issues between the high
seas and areas under national jurisdiction and states and requires that conservation
measures established within exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and high seas must
be compatible, that WCPFC members must cooperate to ensure this occurs but
that, in doing so, the WCPFC must ‘take into account’ any management regimes
for the tuna stocks put in place prior to the WCPFC. That is, WCPFC must
recognise the prior work of the FFA when determining management measures,
including that of allocation.
The third is Article 30 which gives explicit recognition to the special needs of
developing state members of the WCPFC. Here, the Convention states that in
carrying out its duties, the WCPFC needs “…to ensure that such measures do not
result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of
conservation action onto developing States parties. 15 ” That is the WCPFC needs to
ensure that any allocation regime takes into account the economic circumstance
and aspirations of FFA members.
While these three aspects of the WCPF Convention (Article 10 (3), Article 8 and
Article 30) can be used to promote FFA interests, there is a risk associated with
them because ensuring that they are used in this way relies on interpretation of the
WCPF Convention. This in turn, depends on ensuring that all non-FFA members
of the WCPFC share the same interpretation of the WCPF Convention. At the time
of writing, text interpretation is actively being negotiated between WCPFC

14
15

WCPFC Convention - Article 10 (3)
WCPFC Convention - Article 30
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members 16 . More specifically, two factors that may ‘dilute’ the benefits of these
clauses for the FFA members are:
•
•

Article 10 (3) also includes elements that could be used by distant water
fishing nations (DWFN) to support their perspectives on allocation (including,
for example ‘past and present fishing patterns’). 17
Article 30 recognises the special needs of small island developing State
members of the WCPFC – but there are many countries beyond the FFA group
that could be considered in this way. In particular it is likely that the
Philippines and Indonesia – both of who have large domestic fisheries – could
also argue for ‘special consideration’ under this clause in any allocation
debate.

Implicit Allocation in the WCPFC Conservation and Management Measures
Although explicit allocation has not been pursued in the WCPFC, the
implementation of several conservation and management measures (CMMs),
focusing primarily on yellowfin, big eye and albacore tuna, and on fleet capacity,
carry with them some implicit, and precedent setting, patterns of allocation. These
precedents have potentially both positive and negative implications for the FFA
States in the allocation debate.
The CMMs are, in the main, structured as imposing limits on fishing effort,
capacity or harvest equal to an historical baseline, which is predominately 2004 or
2005 depending on the measure. From an allocation perspective, these CMMs
imply that whatever percentage share of effort or harvest that each WCPFC
member had operating in the fishery during the base period then that is the share of
allocation accruing to that WCPFC member. Table 2 sets out the relevant
management measures pertaining to tuna stocks and fishing capacity in active
fleets and notes the relative implicit allocation contained in them. One
interpretation of these CCMs, that works against the FFA states, is that each of
these management measures makes an implicit allocation that tends to favour
fleets – predominately the DWFN fishing on the high seas and larger countries
with long line fleets – that are already active within the WCPF Convention Area. 18
This, in turn, potentially undermines the political and economic aspirations of the
16
Parris, H., Wright, A., Cartwright, I. (2009, forthcoming) The Challenge of Fisheries Governance post
UNFSA: the case of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries in Grafton, R.Q., Hilborn, R., Squires, D.,
Williams, M. and Tait, M. (eds) 'Handbook of Marine Fisheries Conservation and Management’ for
publication late 2009
17
E.g. WCPF Convention, Article 10 (3) (e) the ‘contribution to scientific study’ clauses.
18
This is particularly the case for long line fleets but less so for purse seine fleets for whom a significant
percentage (~50%) of effort is expended in the PNA waters and are therefore covered under the allocation
mechanisms of the VDS.
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small island developing (SID) States (which includes the FFA group) who may
wish to expand their domestic fishing industries.
This interpretation is not shared by the FFA group who have argued consistently
that these measures do not limit their fishing related activities to the baseline years
but, rather provides them, as a SID member of the WCPFC, with exemptions to
expand fishing activity under domestic development strategies in accordance with
‘responsible levels of exploitation’ (see for example 19 , statement of RMI in
WCPFC, 2007). For example, with respect to big eye tuna and yellow fin tuna, the
WCPFC’s management measures state:
Nothing in this decision shall prejudice the legitimate rights and obligations
of those small island State members and participating territories in the
Convention Area seeking to develop their own domestic fisheries. 20
While this position carries legal and political weight, it is raises the difficult issue
that these exemptions could actually expand current levels of fishing and
harvesting and thus critically undermine the sustainability objectives of the CMMs
to protect vulnerable stocks. For example analysis of CMM 2008-01 for long line
catch of big eye tuna suggests that exemptions given to SIDs members to catch up
to 2000 tons of this stock could possibly maintain the level of harvests to ~54%
above recommended maximum sustainable yield (MSY) levels. 21

19
See for example Statement of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to WCPFC Plenary on issue of
Tuvalu in WCPFC, 2006
20
WCPFC CMM 2005 -01, paragraph 6.
21
This does not include required reductions in big eye tuna harvests from purse seine fleets – Parris, H.
(forthcoming) Is the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission meeting its conservation and
management objectives? Chapter in PhD Thesis, unpublished manuscript, The Crawford School of
Economics and Government, The Australian National University 2009
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Table 2: Summary of CMMS Relating to Regulation of Effort and Harvest of
Species under Management
Target Stock
(Resolution)
Reduction
of
Overcapacity
Resolution 2005-02

Main Features of Measure

Implied Allocation
Share of fishing
To reduce capacity of purse seine vessels that
vessels/effort/capacity allocation
entered the fishery between the years 1999equal to the share experienced in
2005
1999
Total level of fishing effort not increased Share of fishing effort in zones
and on high seas for purse seine
beyond current (2004) levels:
• Tropical purse seine vessels to implement fleets (and other commercial
measure through the Vessel Day Scheme. fisheries) equal to share
• Vessels fishing on the high seas not to experienced in 2004 or average of
exceed 2004 or average of 2001-2004 2001-2004 levels adjusted for
reduction historical bigeye catch
levels
• 30% reduction in bigeye mortality (purse seine) by 30% and possible
reduction of historical fishing
(Applicable 2010-11)
• In 2009: as alternative to FAD closures on activity on high seas by 10%.
Bigeye
and
high seas a 10% reduction in purse seine
yellowfin
tuna
effort (fishing days). Fishing permitted on Reduction in share of effort of
high seas purse seine fleets
CMM 2008-01
‘free-schools’
• Closure of high seas ‘pockets’ in Western equivalent to that undertaken in
the ‘high seas’ pockets in the
equatorial region to purse seine fishing.
• “Other Commercial Fisheries” do not Western equatorial region (for
exceed average capacity level for the DWFN fleets only).
period 2001-2004 or 2004.
Reduction in share of bigeye
• Phased reduction (over 3years) of long
catch by long line of 30% or
line vessels catch of big eye tuna of 30%
allocation of 2000 tons (which
from average annual catch for the years
ever is larger).
2001-04 or 2004 (with ‘floor’ reduction of
2000 tons).
Share of long line vessel
allocation equal to share
southern albacore Limit number of fishing vessels to equal 2005
experienced in fishery in 2005 or
tuna CMM 2005-02 levels or 2000-2004 levels
average levels throughout the
years 2000-2004
Share of long line vessel
northern albacore Limit fishing effort above equator to ‘current
allocation equal to share
tuna CMM 2005-03 levels’
experienced in fishery in 2005.
Note: ‘Other Commercial Fisheries” refers to those fisheries such as hand-line, pole and line,
purse seine fisheries north of 20oN and south of 20oS, ring-net, troll and unclassified fisheries.
Source: WCPFC Website. 22

Obviously, in the longer run, the continuation of ‘exemptions’ for SIDS members
is not viable if the sustainability objectives of the WCPFC are to be met. An
alternative interpretation is that these exemptions provide a ‘bargaining chip’ that

22
WCPFC website: Conservation and Management Measures and Resolutions, updated on 05/03/2008,
cited 30 May 2008. http://www.wcpfc.int
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can be used by FFA states in future negotiations to leverage more favorable
allocations within the context of tighter fishing restrictions. 23
The obvious exception to this implicit allocation approach in the current
conservation and management measures is the VDS which has been the most
significant measure adopted by the WCPFC. 24 The VDS allocation mechanism is
unusual in that the organizing principle underlying the formula places sole focus
on the issue of where the harvest occurs, or where in space the distribution of
resources are, rather than on who is harvesting the fish. In this way it gives
practical expression to the principle of coastal State sovereignty and ‘ownership’
of resources, found in Article 61 and 62 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (LOSC) 25 . The WCPFC’s adoption of the VDS as a formal
conservation management measure in 2005 was important both in the formal
recognition of the importance of the FFA grouping within the WCPFC, and the
previous work by the FFA on regional management, as well as explicit recognition
of the validity of the ‘coastal State’ principle that underpinned the Scheme’s
allocation mechanism.
Allocation Models in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
Allocation Principles
Article 10 gives the WCPFC the power to determine criteria for allocation
between members and this inevitably will be a political and subjective process.
The central question is how to combine the various competing arguments over
allocation into a set of allocation principles and subsequently into a set of concrete
concepts capable of being quantified in a formula. The critical issue for the FFA
states is to determine what principles best represent their interests within this
process.
The previous section has highlighted that various factors may be considered
relevant in determining allocation principles capable of being quantified. Article
10 (3) of the WCPF Convention provides some guidance to negotiators, but the
clauses in this text are difficult to use in deriving an allocation formula primarily
because of their ambiguous meaning and the difficultly in quantifying them. As
noted above, for Articles 10 (3), 8 and 30 to work in favour of the FFA States, it
will require further negotiation with other members. The current set of
conservation and management measures do contain potentially negative
23
This view was expressed privately to the author by various Pacific based commentators during the
research conducted for this chapter.
24
See WCPFC CMM 2005-01 paragraph 10 (i).
25
United Nations, ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (hereafter the LOSC), signed at
Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982, in International Legal Materials, No. 21, 1982, pp. 12611354.
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implications for allocation outcomes the FFA States but contain a very big positive
in the form of the VDS which sets a clear precedence for ‘coastal State’ sovereign
rights within a broader allocation scheme in the WCPFC.
In to this mix, the FFA states have expressed clearly their views on how allocation
is to proceed. For example, responding to the Marine Resource Assessment Group
(MRAG) paper, 26 on behalf of the FFA group, the WCPFC representative from
the Federated States of Micronesia noted:
The FFA members see the role of the Commission as being to determine
stock-wide total allowable catch or total allowable effort and developing
criteria for allocations of the TAC or TAE exactly as provided for in Article
10 of the Convention. We also see the Commission making allocations for
the high seas ... we do not see the Commission as having a major role in
allocations relating to fishing in waters under national jurisdiction ... [which
is] subject under Article 10 to the sovereign right of coastal states … 27
Driven by political imperative to assert their power within the WCPFC, this
position by the FFA is understandable. However, set within the context of
managing highly migratory shared tuna stocks it is difficult to see how the
artificial separation of decision making processes between ‘coastal States’ and
‘high seas’ areas could be achieved in practice in the context of achieving an
overall TAC or TAE target for the fishery – at some level both coastal States and
States operating on the high seas will need to reach agreement on the level of
fishing each member is permitted to have if an over all sustainability objective for
the tuna stocks is to be met. This view carries with it the risk that unless coastal
States provide reasonable levels of fishing opportunities on the high seas then
those that operate in that part of the WCPFC area face strong incentives to
undertake illegal fishing – which could have negative consequences for the
conservation efforts of FFA States. In evaluating this view it is also worth noting
that almost all of the WCPFC members are, in themselves, coastal States (in fact
only 5 could be considered purely as DWFNs) and that there are many other
‘developing States’ beyond the FFA group. To talk about allocation solely as the
responsibility of ‘coastal’ States means in practice to consider most members of
the WCPFC.
In finding a pragmatic way forward, a reasonable interpretation of the FFA
position, supported by the text of Article 10 (3), may be that the WCPF
Convention gives coastal State powers (FFA countries as well as others) a priority
in determining allocation shares in their favour and, that developing country
26
27

MRAG, 2006.
WCPFC, 2006.
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coastal States are particularly generously accounted for in any allocation formula.
This does not necessarily mean that SID country members are excluded from the
disciplines of catch limits that are put in place for sustainability reasons, but that
the allocation regime directly addresses their political and economic aspirations,
through generous allocations.
Drawing these various drivers together, the following set of principles were
developed to guide the construction of allocation models discussed in the
following section:
• allocation shares for coastal States should be based on the amount of
harvesting and/or biomass that occurs within its EEZs, regardless of the flag of
the vessels carrying out the fishing activity. This is referred to as the “coastal
State principle” in the rest of the chapter. This concept essentially reflects the
allocation precedence set in WCPFC CMM 2005-01 which endorsed the VDS
and extends it to cover all fleets, all species and all countries within the
WCPFC;
• allocation on the high seas should preferably be shared equally between all
WCPFC members or, if a compromise is needed, in accordance with Article 10
(3) (c) and be based on historical catch of fishing fleets operating based on
harvest taken from the high seas only;
• some recognition should be given to precedents set in the current CMMs of the
WCPFC; and
• the physical concentration of the tuna resources within the tropical zones of the
WCPF Convention Area, and therefore the concentration around the Pacific
Island States, should be recognized and incorporated into the allocation
formula.
Thus WCPFC members may derive their allocation share in one of three ways. For
coastal States, with no high seas fleet, their allocation is based on the amount of
fishing/catch in their zones as expended by all fleets of all nationalities operating
in that zone, and/or based on the relative size of their EEZs in the Convention
Area and/or (possibly) equal shares of any allocation made on the high seas. For
coastal States with high seas fleets, their allocation similarly depends on
catch/effort in zone, and/or the relative size of their EEZs, and either equal shares
high seas allocation or the proportion of effort/catch expended or taken by their
flagged vessels on the high seas. For members who are not coastal states, their
allocation depends on either receiving equal share on the high seas or the ratio of
effort/catch their flagged vessels take on the high seas only.
Allocation Models
Using the allocation principles set out in the section above, the following four
allocation models were developed.
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Allocation Using Effort Data and Current WCPFC Measures (the “Effort” Model)
This model calculates allocated shares using historical effort data for the principle
industrial sized fishing gears: purse seine, frozen long line, fresh long line and pole
and line gears. The years 2001-2004 were chosen as the base years for calculation
to reflect the base years currently used by the majority of the WCPFC measures.
The two key principles are used in this model are the ‘coastal State’ principle and,
the compromise principle for the high seas: allocation of a high seas ‘pool of
shares’ based on the historical effort of fishing fleets operating in this part of the
Convention Area.
To calculate these shares it was necessary to adopt an interpretation of several key
issues currently under consideration by the WCPFC. These are as follows:
• it was assumed that the management measures CMM 2008-0128 applied to all
major commercial purse seine, long line and pole and line fleets and all areas
of the WCPFC Conservation Area, including those flagged to, or based in (ie
domestically based) Pacific Island countries;
• Indonesia is yet to ratify the WCPF Convention, and consequently is not
eligible for allocated units. Its share of the fishery is calculated and represented
separately; 29 and
• all references to ‘capacity’, ‘effort’ and ‘vessels’ is interpreted as meaning
‘fishing days’ for the purse seine and pole and line fleets and ‘number of
hooks’ for the long line fleet.
Principle data sets used in this analysis, can be found in Reid (2007), Hampton et
al (2006a), Hampton et al (2006b), Langley et al (2005a), Langley et al (2005b),
WCPFC (2008) and supplementary national reports submitted by members to the
WCPFC Scientific Committee. 30
28
WCPFC, Conservation and Management for bigeye and yellowfin in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean, CMM 2008-01, adopted at the Fifth Regular Session, Busan, Korea, 2008.
29
Ideally, effort related to Indonesian fishing fleets would be explicitly incorporated into the allocation
model either through Indonesia joining the WCPFC or by ‘holding in trust’ and therefore explicitly
accounting for its effects on the fishery.
30
Reid, C. Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries, 2007, database available at www.ffa.int; Hampton, J., Langley,
A., Kleiber, P. Stock Assessment of Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Including an
Analysis of Management Options, Scientific Committee Second Regular Session, 7-18 August 2006,
Manila, Philippines, WCPFC-SC2-2006/SA WP-1, 2006a; Hampton, J., Langley, A., Kleiber, P. Stock
Assessment of Bigeye Tuna In The Western And Central Pacific Ocean, Including An Analysis Of
Management Options, Scientific Committee Second Regular Session, 7-18 August 2006, Manila,
Philippines, WCPFC-SC2-2006/SA WP-2, 2006b; Langley, A. and Hampton, J. Stock Assessment of
Albacore Tuna in the South Pacific Ocean, 1st Meeting of the Scientific Committee of the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, Noumea, New Caledonia, 2005; Langley, A., Hampton, J. and
Ogura, M. Stock Assessment of Skipjack Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 1st Meeting of the
Scientific Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 8–19 August 2005,
Noumea, New Caledonia, WCPFC–SC1, 2005; WCPFC, Conservation and Management for Bigeye and
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As this model reflects the current set of WCPFC management measures, an
additional form of allocation to cover bigeye tuna harvest is also incorporated into
this model. CMM 2008-01 provides an implicit harvest based allocation for long
line fleets catching bigeye tuna to an amount equal to 70% of the average catch
taken in the years 2001-2004 or 2004 from 2011(for China and US only) or 2000
tonnes, which ever is larger. 31 This was converted into shares of bigeye tuna catch
based on the proportion of catch taken by each party, as allowed for in CMM
2008-01, on the assumption that the total amount of allowable bigeye tuna was
harvested. 32
Allocation Using Harvest Data and Variable Based (the “Harvest” Model)
This allocation model uses historical harvest data to calculate relative allocations
using the ‘coastal State’ principle and high seas historical “flag” catch record as in
the ‘Effort model’. Two base years were chosen for the analysis. First, the years
1997-2005 were used for determining the relative shares of allocation as this
reflected both a period of several El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycles in
the Pacific, which alter the geographical spread of skipjack tuna harvests, 33 and
Yellowfin in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean CMM 2008-01, Agreed at the Fifth Regular Session,
Busan, Korea, 2008; PNA States: FFA Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) Implementation Information Sheet 07/01,
2007, available www.ffa.int accessed 1 September, 2007; WCPFC, Purse Seine Effort In The Zones Of
Non-PNA CCMs And On The High Seas WCPFC-TCC4-2008/13, Date: 29 August 2008, Paper presented at
the Technical and Compliance Committee Fourth Regular Session, 2-7 October 2008, Pohnpei, Federated
States of Micronesia, 2008; WCPFC, Purse Seine Effort in the Zones of Non-PNA CCMs and on the high
seas WCPFC-TCC4-2008/13 Supplementary, dated 24 September 2008, Technical and Compliance
Committee Fourth Regular Session, 2-7 October 2008, Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, 2008;
New Zealand Data: pers. com. Matthew Hooper, 4 February 2008; Japan Data: Matsunaga, H., O, H.,
Uosaki, K., Sato, K., Semba Y. and Miyabe, N. National Tuna Fishery Report: Japan WCPFC-SC2-2006.
Paper presented at the Scientific Committee Second Regular Session, 7-18 August 2006, Manila,
Philippines, 2006; Fisheries Agency of Japan. Annual Report - Part 1, Information on Fisheries, Research
and Statistics WCPFC-SC3-AR Part1/WP-13. Paper presented at the Scientific Committee Third Regular
Session, 13-24 August 2007, Honolulu, USA, 2007. During the analysis it was not possible to obtain
spatially disaggregated data for effort levels for all fleets and all gear types – such data was only available
for the purse seine fleet. Instead the analysis uses spatially disaggregated catch data from Reid, 2007,
above, as a proxy for effort data for the frozen and fresh long line fleets and the pole and line fleets.
31
CMM 2008-01 states: “paragraph 31. The total catch of bigeye tuna by longline fishing gear will be
subject to a phased reduction such that by 1 January 2012 the longline catch of bigeye tuna is 70% of the
average annual catch in 2001-2004 or 2004. The catch of yellowfin tuna is not to be increased in the
longline fishery from the 2001-2004 levels. And Paragraph 32 Paragraph 31 does not apply to members and
participating territories that caught less than 2,000 tones in 2004. Each member that caught less than 2,000
tonnes of bigeye in 2004 shall ensure that their catch does not exceed 2,000 tonnes in each of the next 3
years (2009, 2010 and 2011). Consistent with paragraph 3 opportunities for non members will be decided
by the Commission on a case by case basis.”
32
That is, assuming that all parties caught, in the future, the equivalent of their average 2001-2004 catch or
2000 tonnes. Since not all parties actually catch this amount, this allocation mechanism is essentially
allowing for an expansion in the bigeye tuna harvests.
33
Lehodey, P. ‘The Pelagic Ecosystem of the Tropical Pacific Ocean: Dynamic Spatial Modelling and
Biological Consequences of ENSO’ in Progress In Oceanography, Vol. 49, No. 1-4, 2001, pp. 439-468.
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the scope of the time series used in the analysis. A shorter based period of 20002005 was also calculated to explore the effects of using different baselines in
calculations of allocation and to reflect an historical period whereby FFA domestic
fleets were growing in relative size in the fishery. This model was calculated using
the same basic procedures of the ‘Effort model’ with the principle data sources
being derived from Reid.34
In addition to allocations made to individual parties of the WCPFC, this model
explicitly incorporates an allocation to two global ‘pools’ of harvest rights that are
held by the WCPFC as a whole. The first allocation ‘pool’ is made to cover
harvests taken by fishers (such as subsistence fishers) whose target stocks are
biologically part of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna stocks
but for some reason are not institutionally incorporated within the WCPFC
allocation based management regime (for example, artisanal catches or catches
taken in Indonesian waters). This ensures that catches taken from non-covered
sources do not become a source of ‘leakage’ for the system, and thus undermine
broader efforts to achieve stock sustainability. This allocation also directly
addresses the criteria in Article 10 (3) (d) and (g) which requires the needs of
coastal communities, and their reliance on fishing activities, be incorporated into
the allocation regime.
Following on Chand 35 , the second pool is to allocate directly to the WCPFC
Secretariat, who can then auction the TAC for fund raising to finance its own
activities and/or to finance a ‘development/capacity fund’ for developing country
members of the WCPFC. If necessary, a portion of the funds raised through the
open action could be used to fund a ‘buy back’ scheme to enable vessels to leave
the fishery, and reduce capacity down to more appropriate levels.
Allocation Using Estimated Biomass Shares in EEZs (the “Biomass” Model)
The allocation pattern in this model follows the basic pattern of coastal state/high
seas allocation as discussed above but, in contrast to the previous two models, the
baseline data uses patterns of estimated biomass distribution throughout the WCPF
Convention Area to determine relative shares for each member. Thus, the expected
share of biomass to be found in the EEZs of coastal State members and shares of
high seas biomass allocated on a flag State basis, forms the basis of calculating
shares. This method extends the biomass component of the allocation mechanism
used in the VDS to cover all coastal States and all tuna species harvested in the

34

Reid, 2007
Chand, S., Grafton., R.Q. and Petersen, E. ‘Multilateral Governance of Fisheries: Management and
Cooperation in the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries’ in Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 18,
2003, pp. 329-344.

35

264

WCPF Convention Area. 36 The years 1995-2005 were chosen as the base years for
determining relative shares as this reflects the impacts of several ENSO cycles in
the Pacific, as well as recent levels of biomass available in the fishery.
Following the precedent of the VDS allocation mechanism, this model is
calculated using the relative size of EEZs of each coastal state within the WCPFC
and the estimated relative ‘biomass’ density of each coastal State area, a summary
of which is set out in Diagram 1. Basic data is drawn from tuna stock assessment
reports of Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and from a Graphic
Information System (GIS) spatial model of the WCPF Convention Area
constructed for the purposes of this analysis. Further details of methods used in
this model are set out in Parris. 37
Diagram 1: Key Principles in Biomass and ‘Spatial’ Based Allocation Model

EEZ
Size
(km2)

Coastal State Allocation (each species)
=
Biomass estimate in EEZ
Total biomass

Multifan-CL
Region X
Size Km2

CMM Allocation, high seas component (each species) =
Biomass estimate on High Seas X % share of catch
Total biomass
by flag
history

High
Seas
Size
(km2)

36

As discussed above, the northern albacore tuna stocks are excluded from this analysis.
Parris H (2009, forthcoming)Allocation Based Governance in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission: who gets what, where and why? Chapter in unpublished PhD thesis, Crawford School of
Economics and Government, The Australian National University. For the calculations of biomass
estimates, the GIS model required the use of defined boundaries of both the EEZs of coastal states and the
WCPF Convention Area itself. The later was problematic due to the lack of a formal western boundary of
the Convention Area. This was resolved by adopting the spatial boundaries used by MFCL model when
conducting stock assessments for the WCPFC – although it is recognised that there may be some underrepresentation of the actual distribution of biomass as a result. For example, it is likely that skipjack tuna
biomass may be found in the Australian and New Zealand EEZs but estimates pertaining to these areas are
not incorporated into the skipjack tuna biomass model because the MFCL model for skipjack tuna does not
incorporate the EEZs of these two countries. In addition, it is recognised that some minor portions of the
WCPFC-CA are subject to joint maritime claims or joint management regimes. These areas are grouped
together in the results to highlight the uncertainty surrounding these areas and to avoid making pre-emptive
decisions regarding maritime or other international boundaries.
37
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Allocation Using Relative Size of EEZs (the “Spatial” Model)
This model is a simplified version of the Biomass model and uses spatial
parameters only to determine relative shares between coastal States and high seas
areas. Preliminary calculations of this model produced results for the FFA
countries that were less than the shares calculated in the Harvest model, because
the relative size of coastal State EEZs was diluted by the broad expanse of high
seas areas in the northern and southern regions of the WCPF Convention Area.
Although the high seas areas are legitimately a part of the WCPF Convention
Area, it is recognized that the majority of the tuna biomass spend the majority of
their lives in and around the tropical and sub-tropical zones (see stock assessment
reports prepared by SPC, listed in footnote 28) where most coastal States’ EEZs
are found. To incorporate this into the analysis, estimates of EEZ biomass was
weighted against the SPC biomass estimates in each sub-region of the SPC stock
assessment model (i.e. the Multifan-CL or MFCL Model) to provide an overall
estimate of the size of the EEZ and its relative ‘importance’ in terms of tuna
resources. In order to test the influence of the ‘equal high seas shares’ approach,
this model allocates shares associated with high seas spatial areas equally between
all WCPFC members, of which there are currently 33. 38
Although much focus is placed on the ‘tropical’ part of the WCPF Convention
Area, the EEZs of other coastal States – such as Japan, New Zealand or the US –
are also fished and also legitimate parts of the fishing grounds and are included in
SPC stock assessments. Where the appropriate data was available, these areas
were therefore included in the allocation calculations.
Allocation Shares: Results and Comparison to Current Fishing Activities
Results
The results for the four basic allocation models are set out in diagrams 2, 3, 4, 5
and 6. For conciseness, the results for individual countries are grouped together
with other WCPFC parties of similar interests although it is acknowledged that
this does mask some differences within groups as actual shares for individual
countries may differ significantly from what is suggested by group totals. These
groups are:
• PNA countries: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati,
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Nauru;
• Other FFA countries: Vanuatu, Fiji, Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Nuie,
Australia, New Zealand, Tokelau;
• distant water fishing nations (DWFN): USA, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China,
European Union;
38

WCPFC, Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission website homepage, cited December 2007,
http://www.wcpfc.int and were correct at the time of calculations.
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•
•

other WCPFC members: Philippines, French Polynesia, American Samoa,
New Caledonia, Guam and CNMI, Wallis and Futuna and Canada; and
Indonesia.

Clearly, each model results in different outcomes for FFA countries and evaluation
of whether this is a ‘good’ or a ‘poor’ outcome depends on individual countries
actual and relative allocations and on the current and aspirational resource industry
development plans for each country. 39 Here, discussions are limited to comments
on the relative proportions allocated towards a particular group – with high
proportions of allocated units being considered more favorable, although it is
noted that this does not necessarily translate into relative shares of any wealth
associated with the tuna resources. 40
Diagram 2 Harvest Based Allocation Model
(Baseline 2000-2005)
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39
For a discussion of these in the context of the WCPFC management measures see Gillett, R. A Study of
Tuna Industry Development Aspirations of FFA Member Countries, A report prepared for the Forum
Fisheries Agency, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 2008.
40
This is because the ability for a country to generate income from its shares may be disproportionately
more valuable and the percentage share of its physical allocation. This issue is considered in more depth in
the discussion section.
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Diagram 3: Effort Based Allocation Model
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Diagram 4: Space Based Allocation Model
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Diagram 5: Biomass Based Allocation Model
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Diagram 6 Share of Big Eye Allocation Using CMM 2005-01
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Comparing across models for the PNA countries, the Effort model for the purse
seine and frozen long line fleets provides the best relative share of the fishery,
although this model performs relatively poorly for this group for shares of fresh
long line and pole and line gears 41 . The relatively good results of the frozen long
line, rather than the fresh long line, are driven primarily by Kiribati’s significant
share of frozen long line activity (by DWFNs) in its EEZ. This is potentially good
news for the PNA countries because, in using their negotiation position of ‘coastal
State allocation’ it could provide good outcomes for the primary gear of interest
for the PNA States (ie the purse seine fleets) while providing some scope for the
PNA countries to provide for some domestic long line fleet development.
The Space model provides the second best option for the PNA, in terms of
accessing relative shares of skipjack tuna, yellowfin tuna and bigeye tuna, albacore
tuna and actually provides shares for each species in excess of the gear shares set
out in the Effort model. However, the Effort model was considered a more
favourable outcome for the PNA because it provided a stronger share in purse
seine gears (assumed to be the highest priority) and was considered an ‘easier’
form of allocation to implement because it is based on the existing approach under
the VDS. Somewhat surprisingly, the Biomass Based Allocation model provides
the least favorable overall outcome for the PNA countries. Although these
countries have the highest level of biomass in their EEZ for skipjack tuna,
yellowfin tuna and big eye tuna – and thus are allocated accordingly – this relative
advantage (particularly compared to the DWFN) is more than offset by the
allocation shares derived from biomass found in the high seas – the majority of
which is allocated to the DWFNs on the basis of their dominant historical catch in
this area.
The results for the “Other FFA group” are significantly different from the “PNA
countries” group both in terms of having an absolutely smaller allocation in all
models, with the exception of albacore tuna in some models, and the pattern of
favourable allocations being, in general, different from the PNA. For this group,
the Space Based model provides the possibility for these countries to obtain the
largest share in the fishery in terms of species – although estimated fresh long line
shares in the Effort model or the albacore shares in the Biomass or Harvest model
may also provide a reasonably acceptable share. It is likely that, for many
countries in the “Other FFA group”, the relatively good results from the Spatial
model come from the equal sharing of allocations on the high seas, and on the
weighting procedure adopted – rather than the actual relative size shares of the
EEZ of this group.
41
For the Harvest model, the difference between using the 1997-2005 baseline versus the 2000-2005
baseline were considered and shown to provide some positive benefits for PNA States for skipjack tuna
stocks but only marginal benefits being accrued to other FFA States and for other species.
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The underlying coastal State/high seas allocation principle in each of these models
assumes that this approach will produce an outcome that directs the largest share
of tuna resources towards the FFA States, with the PNA States being particularly
advantaged. These results are, therefore, somewhat surprising in the sizeable
allocations that each scenario provide to both the DWFNs, to other WCPFC
countries and to Indonesia, in some cases on more favorable terms than the FFA
countries. The results for the Biomass model are particularly challenging because
they indicate that the use of the physical characteristics of the fishery, an idea that
has broad support throughout the FFA, may not necessarily work in the FFA’s
favour if it is extended across the WCPF Convention Area. 42
One explanation for observed allocation patterns in the Harvest and Effort Based
models arises from the choice of using recent historical catch and effort data as the
basis for allocation. As this data reflects actual recent activity, then the allocation
patterns using the data will also mirror this history – it is therefore unsurprising
that the DWFN, and the Philippines, which dominate recent fishery activity, are
also dominant in the allocation formula. More generally, however, three factors
contribute to the observed allocation patterns:
• Japan, Taiwan, the US are coastal States as well as being DWFNs – they
therefore receive allocations from both the EEZ pool and the high seas pool;
• Indonesia and the Philippines are significant coastal States; and
• Japan and Taiwan, and to some extent Korea, dominate high seas catches and
effort for most gear types and for albacore tuna.
The final effect may be somewhat ameliorated if the use of the principle of ‘equal
share’ of high seas is adopted – and the results in the spatial model indicate the
potential benefits this approach. An alternative way of addressing the dominance
of the DWFN on the high seas may be achieved if the results incorporated the into
the high seas quota, the fishing history taken by vessels fishing under their own
(DWFN) flag, but are operated as part of a chartering arrangement with a FFA
State. Counting fishing activity of this type towards the allocation of a chartering
State is a position adopted by the FFA States as part of its draft Charter
Arrangement Scheme developed for, but never adopted by, the WCPFC. 43 FFA
States argue, in turn, that this position is supported by the text of the Conservation
42

Care needs to be taken when interpreting these results because some of the technical assumptions used in
this analysis skews the results in favour of the high seas. The primary problem with the biomass
calculations is the assumption that the high seas part of the Convention Area is as ‘biologically’ dense as
the EEZ areas – something unlikely to actually be the case, although it was used in order to simplify the
calculations. The effect is to over state the level of biomass found in the high seas and therefore inflate the
allocation accruing to the (DWFNs) fleets that operate there.
43
FFA, Draft WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure to Establish a WCPFC Vessel Chartering
Scheme WCPFC3-2006-DP06 Rev. 1, submitted to the WCPFC Third Regular Session, 11-15 December
2006, Apia, Samoa.
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and Management Measure 2005-01 of the WCPFC, which relates to the
conservation and management of big eye tuna and yellowfin tuna. This text states:
For the purposes of these measures, vessels operated under charter, lease or
other similar mechanisms by developing islands States and participating
territories, as an integral part of their domestic fleet, shall be considered to
be vessels of the host island state or territory44.
For the FFA interpretation of this clause to have substantial impact on allocation to
the FFA countries (PNA and “Other FFA”) then it must be read by the WCPFC
membership as a whole as applying beyond monitoring, compliance and
surveillance to incorporate allocation and to allocation of all species (rather than
just big eye tuna and yellowfin tuna which is the subject of this measure). At this
point in time, it is unclear whether this interpretation will be adopted by the
WCPFC but, if so, this could alter the balance of tuna in the FFA’s favour with
particular benefits accruing in the albacore tuna allocation as the majority of this
species is taken on the high seas.
Finally, the Effort model (based on the current management measures of the
WCPFC) also includes a harvest component for big eye tuna based on the
allocation implied by CCM 2005-01. The results set out in diagram 8 clearly show
a dominance in allocation of this species to DWFN, primarily driven by the
dominance of DWFN long line fleets targeting this species on the high seas –
although, as noted above, this could potentially be offset through an FFA charter
arrangement. The pattern of allocation in this measure for big eye tuna draws
attention to one of the potential risks to the FFA of using the current CMMs as the
basis for an allocation negotiation strategy. While the use of a TAE can benefit the
PNA countries, extension of a TAE and TAC for big-eye could mean that some
other FFA states miss out on receiving an allocation that could accommodate their
aspirations for future development.
Combinations of Models
As part of the negotiating process, it is possible that some combination of
allocation approaches may be used – and indeed the experience of the VDS
negotiations highlights this as a real possibility. Numerous combinations are
possible, and ultimately depend on what is negotiated between parties. To explore
some possibilities, this chapter examines four combinations:
• combination 1: 33.3% equal sharing of the ‘spatial’, ‘biomass’ and ‘effort’
models;
• combination 2: 50% equal sharing of the ‘effort’ and ‘biomass’ models (as an
attempt to replicate the VDS);
44

WCFPC CMM 2005 -01.
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•
•

combination 3: 60% share of ‘spatial’ model and 40% ‘effort’ model; or
combination 4: 25% equal sharing of all four models.

Summary results are set out in Diagrams 7, 8, 9 and 10. Combination 1 was
chosen to incorporate the results of the two best options for the FFA States (the
spatial and effort models) with the best option for the DWFN countries (the
biomass model) – as may be necessary in a negotiated outcome. Combination two
was chosen to reflect the allocation mechanism used in the VDS. Combination 3
was chosen to reflect a combination of the two best models for the FFA and
combination 4 reflects the effects of all four models.
A key disadvantage of using the ‘single’ models discussed above is that the model
that best suits the PNA States is not the one that best suits the “Other FFA group”
– and the choice of one over the other will involve a significant trade off for one of
those groups. This effect is muted with the use of the ‘combined models’, where
both FFA groups experience the best outcomes in a ‘combined approach’
(unsurprisingly) in combination three – which uses the two best individual models
for both groups (space and effort), with some additional emphasis placed a key
resource (space has 60% weighting) that is available to all FFA members. This
suggests that an allocation approach does exist which promotes the interests of all
FFA States, relative to other WCPFC members.
However, combining the models in this way does require a tradeoff in shares
compared to the situation if individual “Effort” or “Spatial” models were used and
it is not apparently clear that using this approach of combining models is in the
absolute advantage of either group. For example, while Combination 3 model
(space and effort) is the best blend of the individual models, it may be better for
the PNA or the Other FFA group to adopt their ‘second best’ option, in the base
case models, rather than used a combination of approaches. That is:
• for the PNA group, the effort model (its best result) provides a 47.91% share
of the purse seine gear, while the second best option (space model) provides a
44.67% share of the skipjack tuna species. In contrast, combination three
provides a 43.41% share of skipjack tuna allocation;
• for the Other FFA group, the space model (its best result) gives them a 35.06%
share of albacore tuna allocation while the effort model (its second best option)
gives this group a 24.63% share of the fresh long line gear allocation.
Combination 3, in contrast, provides this group with a 25.03% share of the
albacore tuna allocation.
Although comparisons between TAC (species shares) and TAE (gear shares)
based allocation regimes is difficult, these results suggest that there is no one clear
best option for developing a unified FFA allocation position and some
compromise between the different FFA interests will be required. However,
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evaluation between these options will also need to take into account factors such
as the relative difficulty in implementing and enforcing a TAE versus a TAC
based allocation and the relative merits of each approach in achieving target
fishing mortality or biomass levels. While an effort based approach may be easier
to implement, a species based approach, if implemented well, will provide a more
reliable tool for achieving overall sustainability outcomes.
Comparisons to 2005
In considering issues regarding allocation, debate often centers around the relative
performance of the new management regime compared to the existing situation.
To this end, the following comparisons were made:
• Biomass, Spatial and Harvest Based models compared to proportional share of
harvest in 2005 harvests – allocated to each country using same allocation
rules used in the allocation models discussed above; and
• Effort based models, compared to the level of effort in the purse seine fleet in
the fishery in 2005.
For skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna, the Space Based model produces the
allocation outcome that is most similar to the distribution of skipjack tuna patterns
experience in 2005 by the PNA group (although it is a reduction). By contrast, the
Biomass Based model represents a substantial shift away from 2005 patterns –
with the significant reallocation away from PNA countries towards the other
groups. For the Other FFA group, the Harvest model represents a slight decrease
(skipjack tuna) or increase (yellowfin tuna) compared to 2005, while the
remaining models represent significant increases in catch shares.
Diagram 7
Combination One: 30% equal share to "Space", "Biomass" and "Effort"
Models
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Diagram 8
Combination Two: 50% Shares "Biomass" and "Effort Model"
(VDS Simulation)
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Diagram 9
Combination Three: 60% "Space" Model, 40% "Effort" Models
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Diagram 10
Combination Four: Equal Share "Harvest", "Space", "Biomass" and
"Effort" Models
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For big eye tuna (incorporating the TAC component of the Effort model) the Harvest
Based model represents a slight increase for the PNA Group, while the Biomass
Based model and the Effort Based model represents a moderate and significant
decrease respectively. The Space model and the Combined model 3 represent
substantial increases for the PNA. For the “Other FFA countries” all models represent
a slight to significant increase in harvest shares compared to 2005. These models
represent a shift away from the PNA countries, “other WCPFC countries” and
“Indonesia” towards the DWFNs.
For albacore tuna none of the models produce an allocation pattern that is close to the
harvest share experienced in 2005. For all FFA countries, the Harvest model
represents a decrease compared to the 2005 fishery, while all other models provide an
increase in harvest shares compared to 2005 with the Space Based model providing
the largest increase.
For purse seine effort, comparisons with 2005 levels of effort suggest that the Effort
model represents a decrease in shares accruing to the PNA - with a shift towards the
DWFN group and other WCPFC country group (mainly the Philippines) - and a slight
increase to the Other FFA group.
Discussion
Is an Allocation Regime Worthwhile for the FFA States?
The models discussed above provide an analysis of a limited number of alternative
allocation scenarios that could be considered in the context of the WCPFC. A key
question is whether these models are consistent with Article 10 (3) of the WCPF
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Convention. This is a difficult question to answer because the language used in
Article 10 (3) is ambiguous and depends on developing a consistent interpretation
agreed to by all WCPFC members. A preliminary analysis of whether these models
meet the range of issues that ‘need to be taken into account’ is set out in Table 2 and
suggests that it may be consistent, but it depends on the interpretation of the WCPF
Convention.
While each model attempts to draw upon the FFA approach to allocation it is
acknowledged that many other alternatives are also possible – including a purely
negotiated allocation formula without reference to harvest, effort or biomass data.
However, if the FFA countries wish to use a data driven formula as the basis for an
allocation debate, the results in this chapter raise some challenging issues including:
• general application of the allocation principles often promoted by the FFA States
will not result in an unambiguously positive outcome. Furthermore, there is no
one single allocation regime that will provide the ‘largest share’ of the fishery to
all FFA States. In particular, emulating the VDS allocation formula across the
entire WCPFC may not work in the favour of the broader FFA membership;
• the coastal State principle legitimately allocates a substantial portion of shares to
non-FFA coastal States – predominately Japan, Indonesia, Philippines;
• use of Harvest or Effort based models rewards those countries that have actively
encouraged an expansion in the fishing effort; and
• although the Effort model represents a potentially good outcome for the PNA
states – and, as it draws upon the VDS, and therefore may be the easiest to
implement – it does represent a decrease in purse seine shares from 2005. WCPFC
data currently indicates that purse seine effort in PNA waters has increased since
2005 – which suggests that the use of the Effort model may require an even
further the reduction from ‘status quo’ as set out in this analysis.
It is recognised, however, that there will remain a strong political driver to find a
unified negotiating position amongst the FFA group in order to push forward an
allocation debate that does not undermine the potential benefits of the approach or
undermine the gains already made by FFA states. In finding a path forward, it may be
observed that different models produce different kinds of outcomes for individual
species or gears and that there are significant variations in interests in the fishery
amongst FFA members. A potential option to accommodate these different interests
may be to explore the implications of using different allocation formulas for each
species or gears. For example, using the Spatial model for allocation of albacore tuna
stocks, the Effort model for the skipjack tuna stocks and a combination of both for
allocating the big eye tuna and yellowfin tuna stocks.
In weighing up the potential costs or benefits of an allocation approach several other
factors should be considered. First it is important to remember that the shares
calculated in this chapter represent physical shares in the fishery and do not
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necessarily represent the share in the value of the fishery – which may be quite
different. It is likely that the economic value of a share of an allocated unit of ‘TAC’
or ‘TAE’ in the WCPFC will be calculated differently from the current way of
determining access fees in a bilateral access arrangement. This is because a unit of
allocated ‘TAC/TAE’ represents a different, and possibly more secure, form of access
to the fishery and, the greater the security, the more likely vessels are to offer higher
payments for it. This benefit is more likely to occur if the ‘ground rules’ used by the
WCPFC mean that allocations are made as permanent rights (increase in security) and
that those rights are able to be exercised anywhere within the WCPF Convention Area
(increases the area in which these rights are exercised).
A second, the benefit of an allocation approach is that it does provide some allocation
to the non-PNA members of the FFA group – and therefore allows them to generate
an income stream (by selling the allocation) somewhat equivalent to the access fees
enjoyed by the PNA States. Under the current situation, the “other FFA” group does
not receive any DWFN access fee revenue beyond the US Multilateral Treaty
(USMLT) and faces the possible risk under the WCPFC CMMs of having limited
access to the fishery should CCMs be enforced on SIDS.
Implications for the FFA Treaties
For the PNA countries and for the FFA more broadly, an important consideration is
the impact of allocation based management models on the current purse seine treaties:
the VDS, the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement and the US Multilateral
Treaty. 45 The potential benefits to the purse seine treaties lie predominately in the
choices that the WCPFC make regarding the nature of the allocated unit – ie issues
relating to targets and sustainability, property rights and the way in which these rights
are exercised throughout the region (see table 1). These allocation based management
regimes have the capacity to strengthen the FFA Purse Seine Treaties through the
provision of more secure access to resources through the provision of in-perpetuity
TAC or TAE, and by placing fisheries management goals on a sustainable basis by
selecting a TAC that achieves a sustainable harvest over time. To achieve these
benefits, however, the allocation results here suggest that PNA States may have to
accept a slightly lower share of the allocation pool than the share of total fishing
activity they experienced in 2005 for skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna.
The overall impact of this trade-off on the FFA Treaties from these models depends
on the particular model selected and the PNA’s own response to allocation based

45
The full names of these Treaties are: Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island
States and the Government of the United States of America which entered into force in 1987 and Federated
States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access which entered into force in 1995.
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management under the WCPFC. A number of different scenario’s are possible, with
three such outcomes being:
• under an Effort Based allocation regime: continue as is under the current
framework – albeit with different amounts of purse seine days available for
distribution to DWFN, US vessels and domestic vessels under the Federated
States of Micronesia Arrangement (FSMA);
• under a Harvest or Biomass based regime: implement a dual licensing system
where by PNA states sell or use their available allocation under a TAC, which can
be fished anywhere in the WCPF Convention Area. In addition, the PNA states
continue to charge access fees for the purposes of granting permission to
physically access the fishing grounds within their EEZs (and pool this access
much in the same way as under the current FSMA); or
• under any allocation regime: Abandon the VDS and continue with the USMLT
and the FSMA as mechanisms to leverage development assistance and domestic
industry development. In this scenario, PNA States could make sale of allocated
units conditional on domestication in much the same way as the current FSMA.
Conclusion
Although an infinite number of allocation options could be considered for the
WCPFC, this chapter sets out several potential models that investigate the
implications of a coastal state/high seas approach. Placed in the context of the broader
benefits of an allocation based regime these approaches could improve the access and
resource security of FFA States, but it is likely to require some compromises on the
sharing of resources across all members.
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12. Implementation of the Precautionary Approach and Reference
Points
Les Clark

Introduction
This chapter addresses an issue that has arisen in the implementation of the
provisions of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF
Convention) relating to the precautionary approach, reference points and the
adoption of conservation and management measures. The issue is the apparent
need to reconcile the provisions relating to the application of the precautionary
approach with the provision for the maximum sustainable yield (MSY)-related
target of conservation and management measures to be qualified by factors
including the special requirements of small island developing states. There have
been differences in views among Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)
members and regional organisations on the appropriate approach to
implementation of these provisions which need to be resolved for progress to be
made in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC),
especially with respect to the adoption of longer-term management strategies for
the multi-species tropical tuna fisheries.
Background
Article 5 of the WCPF Convention (Principles and Measures for Conservation and
Management) includes as requirements for WCPFC members to:
(a)
adopt measures to ensure long-term sustainability of highly migratory
fish stocks in the Convention Area and promote the objective of their
optimum utilization;
(b)
ensure that such measures are based on the best scientific evidence
available and are designed to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable
of producing maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant
environmental and economic factors, including the special requirements
of developing States in the Convention Area, particularly small island
developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the
interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international
minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or global;
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(c)

apply the precautionary approach in accordance with this Convention
and all relevant internationally agreed standards and recommended
practices and procedures. 1

The WCPF Convention in Article 7 requires these principles to also be applied by
coastal States within their exclusive economic zones (EEZs). The application of
the precautionary approach is elaborated in Article 6 of the Convention (set out in
Attachment I to this chapter) which incorporates by reference the Guidelines for
the Application of Precautionary Reference Points in Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks from
Annex II of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) (set out in
Attachment II to this chapter). Key elements of the precautionary approach for the
purposes of this analysis are:
• the use of stock-specific precautionary reference points, including
conservation, or limit, reference points and management, or target, reference
points. Limit reference points set boundaries which are intended to constrain
harvesting within safe biological limits within which the stocks can produce
maximum sustainable yield. Target reference points are intended to meet
management objectives;
• reference points to be used to trigger pre-agreed conservation and management
action; and
• management strategies to ensure that the risk of exceeding limit reference
points is very low. If a stock falls below a limit reference point or is at risk of
falling below such a reference point, conservation and management action
should be initiated to facilitate stock recovery. Fishery management strategies
to ensure that target reference points are not exceeded on average.
And most importantly for this discussion,
• Fmsy should be regarded as a minimum standard for limit reference points. For
stocks which are not overfished, fishery management strategies shall ensure
that fishing mortality does not exceed Fmsy and that the biomass does not fall
below a predefined threshold.
The issue arising from these texts that has emerged in WCPFC-related discussions
is that:
• on the one hand, the guidelines for the application of precautionary reference
points in Annex II of the UNFSA appear to require the adoption of Fmsy as a
limit reference point, which would not allow the adoption of Fmsy as a target
reference point or the adoption of strategies and measures that involved
overfishing of a stock;

1

WCPF Convention, Article 5.
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•

on the other hand, Article 5 (b) appears to provide some flexibility in the
adoption of measures providing for fishing at levels at or beyond those
consistent with MSY for economic and environmental reasons.

Analysis
The Management Issue
Normally, and for most of the stocks covered by the WCPF Convention, there
would be no question of considering levels of fishing mortality beyond those
associated with MSY, since that reduces yields and increases costs. In fact, it will
usually make biological, ecological and economic sense to keep fishing mortality
significantly below Fmsy and the biomass significantly above Bmsy, for reasons
including the increased risks to stock sustainability and the greater effort at higher
costs required as effort approaches MSY-related levels.
The question turns then on whether there are “relevant environmental and
economic factors” associated with any significant management issues in the
WCPFC that would lead to consideration of levels of effort at or beyond those
associated with Fmsy (i.e. overfishing) and raise the potential conflict between
Article 5 (b) of the WCPF Convention and paragraph 7 of the UNFSA.
The most important among the “relevant economic and environmental factors”
referred to in Article 5 (b), are multi-species considerations. These can take a
range of forms but for this chapter, the major consideration is that of the
occurrence of species in the catch that have different susceptibilities to fishing, so
that it is not possible to fish all stocks at optimal levels. In such a fishery, fishing
the most resilient stocks at MSY risks damaging the reproductive potential
capacity of less resilient stocks while restricting fishing effort to that associated
with MSY for the least resilient stocks leaves other, possibly major stocks,
substantially under-utilised.
This is precisely the case with tropical tuna fisheries. Bigeye tuna is typically the
most susceptible of the major stocks to fishing. However, in the Atlantic, Indian
and Western and Eastern Pacific Oceans, feasible/acceptable measures to conserve
bigeye typically mean reducing effort on stocks such as skipjack, and in some
cases yellowfin, below optimal levels. The apparent failures to conserve bigeye
stocks at levels above Bmsy in those regions can largely be traced to an
unwillingness by at least some members of the relevant commissions to make the
trade-off of losses in skipjack and yellowfin for the gains in bigeye.
That trade-off is particularly sharp in the Western and Central Pacific. It is
illustrated in the following multi-species yield curve which indicates broadly that
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if the 25% reduction in effort recommended by the WCPFC Scientific Committee
in 2007 to maintain bigeye biomass at Bmsy was applied as across the board effort
cuts, the result in terms of yields would be a gain of around 3,000 tonnes annually
in bigeye yield, and a loss of around 200,000 tonnes annually in skipjack yield.
Figure 1: Multi-Species Yield Analysis
MULTI-SPECIES YIELD ANALYSIS
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If a more precautionary approach to maintaining bigeye biomass is adopted at an
appropriate level above the estimated Bmsy; for example at 25% above, is estimated
to require reductions in fishing effort on bigeye of around 40%; while adopting
Fmsy as a limit reference point is likely to require a reduction in fishing effort of
around 50%. 2 While it should be possible to reduce fishing effort on bigeye by
25% with relatively small potential losses in overall fisheries net benefits through
measures targeted at reduced fishing mortality from fish aggregating devices
(FADs) and moderate reductions in fishing effort on longlining targeting bigeye,
reductions in fishing effort of 40% to 50% on bigeye are likely to come at a much
higher price in terms of overall net benefits.
In addition, most of the benefits from the bigeye yield gain and associated gains in
catch rates would accrue to fishing outside FFA members’ waters, while most of
the costs associated with reduced skipjack yields would be borne by fishing inside
FFA members’ waters. There might also be some costs to FFA members from
foregone albacore yields if measures to conserve bigeye required FFA members to
limit fishing effort in their albacore longline fisheries below optimal levels.

2

Hampton et al., 2006.
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This is not the whole story. There are opportunities to frame measures which
reduce fishing mortality on bigeye with lesser impacts on bigeye and possibly
albacore than simple across-the-board effort cuts by targeting reductions in effort
on fishing operations that have the greatest impact on bigeye stocks such as purse
seining on floating objects and longlining targeting bigeye. There also appear to be
opportunities to make fishing methods and forms of operation more selective so
that catches of bigeye can be reduced in some fisheries with much lesser impacts
on catches of other species. There may also be benefits in terms of skipjack yields
and catch values from measures such as reducing sets on floating objects to reduce
catches of juvenile bigeye, and reduced bycatch. In addition, there may be
opportunities for compensatory arrangements so that Pacific Island States that
incur losses from measures to conserve bigeye could be compensated by those
who gain.
However, and notwithstanding these considerations, there remains the prospect
that limiting fishing effort on bigeye below that associated with Fmsy and
maintaining the bigeye stock above Bmsy may require effort on albacore and
skipjack to be limited below optimal levels in ways that would be particularly
burdensome on Pacific Island States.
FFA Position
This issue has not been formally discussed within the FFA process for a long time.
FFA members adopted in 1995 3 as one of principles for the negotiation of the
WCPF Convention within the Multilateral High Level Conference on South
Pacific Tuna Fisheries (MHLC) process to “prevent any decrease in the size of
harvested populations below those necessary to ensure their stable recruitment.” 4
More recently, there has been a difference in view among FFA members and
technical experts on the issue at different times within the Forum Fisheries
Committee caucus at WCPFC sessions, in FFA workshops, and in the WCPFC
Scientific Committee, in which:
• some have argued that the WCPF Convention by incorporation of Annex II of
the UNFSA requires Fmsy and Bmsy to be used as limit reference points, which
means that the WCPFC may not adopt strategies and measures that would
result in overfishing of bigeye in order to promote the optimum utilization of
skipjack and albacore;
• others, notably Pacific Island participants, have argued that the WCPF
Convention explicitly provides for economic factors, including their special
requirements and multi-species considerations, to be taken into account and
that the WCPFC may, if necessary, adopt measures that would involve
3
4

Forum Fisheries Committee (FFC), 1995.
Similar wording, with qualification, occurs in the CCAMLR Convention.
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overfishing of bigeye in order to promote optimum utilization of skipjack and
albacore, as along as the bigeye biomass remains above some limit level
necessary to ensure appropriate levels of reproduction/recruitment, i.e., that the
overfishing level is sustainable. Some Pacific Island participants in the
Multilateral High Level Conference recall their understanding that Article 5
(b) was specifically modified for this purpose, and that this was an important
element in the preparation of the WCPF Convention.
The Texts
The language of Article 5 (b) is not new. It comes from Article 61 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), relating to conservation of the
living marine resources of the EEZ, and can be found in the fisheries legislation of
most FFA members. In the context of management of EEZ resources, it has long
been interpreted as providing substantial flexibility to the coastal State:
It seems abundantly clear that (if) a coastal State is not obligated to
maintain abundance at an MSY level ... This establishes that a coastal State
is not required to manage fisheries to produce the maximum sustainable
yield if it does not wish to do so. Instead the coastal State is expressly
authorized to manage for yields that are suggested by its environmental and
economic interests. 5
and as “implicitly referring to multi-species considerations.” 6
In some recent discussions, it has been suggested that there is some ambiguity in
Article 5 (b) with the qualifier being linked to the “measures”, the “levels” or
“maximum sustainable yield” in some discussions related to the WCPFC’s work.
However, when the text in Article 5 (b) is written in this way:
ensure that such measures are based on the best scientific evidence
available and are designed to maintain or restore stocks at or above Bmsy, as
qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, …
it seems clear that the qualifier applies to the biomass level. This means that
measures must be designed to maintain stocks at or above Bmsy unless there are
environmental or economic reasons otherwise. It should also be clear that the
qualifier can only apply to allow a lesser standard. Any stock level above Bmsy can
produce MSY, so the qualifier is not needed to support a higher standard of
biomass maintenance – it can only have the effect of supporting a lower standard.
In addition, it should be clear that the effect of the qualifier is to specifically
enable the Commission to adopt measures that will not maintain stocks at or above
5
6

Burke, 1983.
Caddy and Mahon, 1995.
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Bmsy. Without the qualifier, the Commission is required to maintain stocks at or
above Bmsy and is free to adopt measures that maintain stocks well above Bmsy if it
chooses – and it may do so for reasons including those related to the qualifying
factors.
The main issue that has arisen with respect to Article 5 (b), especially the
qualifying language, is its standing alongside the principle of the application of the
precautionary approach, and what happens when there is an apparent conflict
between Article 5 (b) and the standards in paragraph 7 of Annex II of the UNFSA,
that are incorporated as part of the precautionary approach that WCPFC members
are required to apply under Article 5 (c), as discussed below.
The language of Annex II of the UNFSA leaves room for discussion about the
status of Annex II as “guidelines”, its standing vis-à-vis the Article 5 (b) qualifier,
and the use of “should” rather than “shall” with reference to the use of Fmsy in
paragraph 7. However, it is clear that:
• Annex II is an integral part of the WCPF Convention;
• it prescribes Fmsy as a minimum standard without being precise about the
stocks to which this prescription applies;
• as part of the framework for the application of the precautionary approach,
which is the subject of a separate article as well as the reference in Article 5
(c), there is relatively great force attached to Annex II and therefore to the
standards in paragraph 7;
• however, this can not completely override the effect of the Article 5 (b)
qualifier.
The divergence in views emerges at this point. Those supporting the potential
scope for the WCPFC to apply the Article 5 (b) qualifier recall the history of that
text and its importance to Pacific Island States along with the “without prejudice”
chapeau to Article 10 as part of the package to which they signed up in the WCPF
Convention, and the general understanding at that time that the WCPF Convention
did not preclude the adoption of lower minimum standards than Fmsy. Those
supporting the interpretation of Fmsy as a mandatory minimum standard point to the
force of the relevant provisions within the WCPF Convention, and might also
argue that international law on this issue has moved on to give greater force to the
precautionary approach and the minimum standards in Annex II.
One point of convergence in the discussions is the idea of the Annex II minimum
standards as, at least, a starting point, or default levels. However, there is a
divergence of views on what this means. To some, the “default” standard is one
that is used unless there is agreement otherwise. To others, the “default” standard
is one that applies unless there are good reasons otherwise, noting that multispecies considerations may provide those reasons.
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A further aspect is – if not Fmsy, as a minimum standard for limit reference points,
then what? Article 61 of the LOSC requires coastal States to apply these minimum
standards in their EEZs:
a) ensure that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive
economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation; and
b) maintain or restore populations of associated and dependent species
affected by fishing above levels at which their reproduction may become
seriously threatened. 7
These concepts are further developed in the UNFSA, and then taken up with some
modification in the WCPF Convention, which includes as functions of the
Commission in Article 10, to adopt measures to
a) ensure the long-term sustainability of highly migratory fish stocks; and
b) maintain or restore populations of non-target, and associated and dependent
species, above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously
threatened. 8
No real work has been done on trying to define and measure biomass and fishing
mortality levels for Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna stocks
corresponding to points at which reproduction of stocks may be seriously
threatened, recruitment becomes unstable or long-term viability is threatened, but
the estimated recruitment-spawning biomass relationship for bigeye below
illustrates the idea, noting that:
• the initial bigeye spawning stock biomass is estimated as around 560,000
tonnes;
• the spawning biomass corresponding to MSY is estimated as around 100,000
tonnes;
• the current biomass is estimated as around 120,000 tonnes; and
• spawning biomass levels at which reproduction of stocks may be seriously
threatened, recruitment becomes unstable or long-term viability is threatened
probably lie somewhere below 100,000 tonnes, but these are points that must
be associated with very low levels of risk in any management strategy –
generally proposed as less than 2%. 9

7
8
9

LOSC, Article 61.
Reference quotation please
From Hampton et al., 2006.

291

Figure 2: Estimated relationship between equilibrium recruitment and
equilibrium spawning biomass in the 2006 WCPFC Bigeye Assessment.

Note: The grey area indicates the 95% confidence region. Estimated recruitmentspawning biomass points are plotted as open circles.
National Practice
Many countries have included elements from the relevant texts in some form in
national legislation, but very few have operationalised them. New Zealand, the
United States and Australia are examples of countries with laws and formal
policies that set standards for conservation and management measures. These
countries include specific provisions in their legislation relating to the trade-offs
that arise from multi-species fishery management considerations.
New Zealand law requires the Minister to set a total allowable catch (TAC) at a
level that maintains the stock at or above Bmsy, with a limited range of exceptions.
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One exception relates to the setting of a TAC that allows the catch of a key target
species to be maintained without being unduly constrained by the need to apply a
target based on MSY-related reference points to minor bycatch stocks. Under the
recent draft Harvest Strategy Standard for New Zealand Fisheries 10 a minimum
standard for such cases is that the stock must be maintained at or above the soft
limit of ½ BMSY or 20% B0, whichever is higher. However, the application of this
exception is subject to stringent conditions, which include the following and this
exception provision has never been invoked:
a) the stock is taken primarily as an incidental catch during the taking of one
or more other stocks and is only a small proportion of the combined catch
of the stock and other stocks or stocks;
b) the total benefits of managing the stock at a level other than that permitted
under section 13 outweigh the total costs; and
c) the stock is able to be maintained above a level that ensures its long-term
viability.
The tropical tuna fishery stocks, and the bigeye stock in particular, would not meet
these conditions.
In a similar way, the United States National Standard Guidelines for
implementation of the national standards for sustainable fisheries management set
out in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act allow
exceptions to the requirement to prevent overfishing in the case of a mixed-stock
complex. If one species in the complex is harvested at Optimum Yield, overfishing
of other components in the complex may occur if:
(1) long-term net benefits to the nation will be obtained and;
(2) similar long-term net benefits cannot be obtained by modification of fleet
behavior or gear characteristics or other operational characteristics to
prevent overfishing; and
(3) the resulting fishing mortality rate will not cause any stock or ecologically
significant unit to require protection under the Endangered Species Act. 11
The recently adopted harvest standards for Australian Commonwealth Fisheries
include these elements for the management of multi-species fisheries:
a) within the Policy
• judgment needs to be exercised;
• alternate reference points may be determined;
• where a harvest strategy applies to a multi-species fishery, it may be
appropriate for some species to be maintained below Bmsy, but always
above Blim to ensure that the fishery maximizes net economic returns;
10
11

Ministry of Fisheries, 2007.
US NMFS, 1998.
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b) within the Guidelines
• Maximim Economic Yield (MEY) applies to the fishery as a whole, and
is optimized across all species. This may result in some species being fished at
levels that will result in their biomass being maintained at levels below their target
reference point (i.e. Bmey). In such cases, the biomass must be maintained above
Blim (where the proxy for Blim is 50% of Bmsy). 12
The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) is in the process of
applying these standards to two major multi-species Australian tuna and billfish
fisheries.
Some features of these three national cases in respect of reference points for multispecies fisheries are:
• all include provisions to allow for overfishing of stocks in multi-species
fisheries if necessary to optimize yields from the fishery, subject to conditions
of varying stringency;
• all apparently apply the same standards to highly migratory and straddling
stocks as to other stocks, but where appropriate, apply the applicable standards
of any international management organisation or arrangement for jointlymanaged stocks.
Practice of Other RFMOs
A good review of the practice of other RFMOs with respect to reference points
was included in a report presented to the WCPFC Scientific Committee in 2007. 13
The following table summarises that information, and shows that none of these
organisations responsible for highly migratory fish stocks and straddling stocks
have adopted the UNFSA Annex II standards for limit reference points, even for
target species.

12
13

DAFF, 2007.
Davies and Polacheck, 2007.
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Table 1: RFMO Reference Point Practice
LIMIT
REFERENCE
POINTS
20% of initial
Commission for the
Spawning Stock
Conservation of Antarctic
Biomass; with a
Marine Living Resources
probability of less
(CCAMLR)
than 10%
Commission for the
Spawning Stock
Conservation of Southern
Biomass in 2004
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)
Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC)
International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT)
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
(IOTC)

TARGET
REFERENCE
POINTS
20% of initial
Spawning Stock
Biomass; with a
probability of between
50 and 75%
Spawning Stock
Biomass in 1980
FAMSY, BAMSY
FMSY, BMSY
MSY, FMSY

A recent Chatham House report proposes as best practice with respect to limit
reference points that:
The limit reference point for fishing mortality is no greater than the
mortality giving maximum long-term sustainable yield, as specified in
UNFSA. The limit reference point for stock size is the size below which it
is known or expected that there is a much greater probability of
significantly reduced recruitment but at which the probability of
significantly reduced low recruitment is still small. 14
but does not deal with the multi-species aspects discussed above.
Conclusions
•
•
•

14

there is great force attached within the WCPF Convention to the application of
the precautionary approach, and the use of MSY-based reference points;
this places Fmsy and Bmsy and proxies for them at the centre of any consideration
of conservation and management measures under the WCPF Convention as
minimum standards;
the UNFSA Annex II establishes Fmsy and Bmsy at least as starting points or
default standards for limit reference points;
Lodge et al., 2007.
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•

•
•
•

•

•

•

this does not preclude WCPFC members from applying the qualifying factors
in Article 5 (b) to adopt measures that result in a stock being fished at levels
above Fmsy. The most obvious application of these factors is to optimize yields
in multi-species fisheries;
the issue of whether the WCPFC and its members should use Fmsy and Bmsy as
limit reference points in these cases is a matter of policy, not law;
the WCPFC and its members are obliged to adopt management strategies,
reference points and measures that are designed to maintain stocks above some
measure of Blim related to maintaining recruitment;
unless there are good reasons otherwise, the WCPFC and its members should
adopt management strategies, reference points and measures that are designed
to keep fishing mortality significantly below Fmsy and maintain stocks
significantly above Bmsy, and it is highly likely to be in all FFA members’
interests for South Pacific albacore and skipjack to be managed in this way;
the “good reasons otherwise” for which the WCPFC and its members might
adopt management strategies, reference points and measures that do not
maintain particular stocks significantly above Bmsy include reasons related to
relevant environmental and economic factors, including the special
requirements of developing States in the Convention Area, particularly small
island developing States;
consideration of these economic trade-offs involved in conserving bigeye tuna
at the possible cost of optimizing yields from other stocks will be important in
the Commission’s work on the conservation and management of bigeye tuna,
and will likely be particularly important to Pacific Island States;
progress on analyzing these trade-offs is likely to be important before progress
can be made in adopting WCPFC reference points for bigeye tuna.
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Attachment I
Article 6
Application of the precautionary approach
1.

In applying the precautionary approach, the members of the Commission
shall:
(a) apply the guidelines set out in Annex II of the Agreement, which shall
form an integral part of this Convention, and determine, on the basis of
the best scientific information available, stock-specific reference points
and the action to be taken if they are exceeded;
(b) take into account, inter alia, uncertainties relating to the size and
productivity of the stocks, reference points, stock condition in relation
to such reference points, levels and distributions of fishing mortality and
the impact of fishing activities on non-target and associated or
dependent species, as well as existing and predicted oceanic,
environmental and socio-economic conditions; and
(c) develop data collection and research programmes to assess the impact of
fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species and their
environment, and adopt plans where necessary to ensure the
conservation of such species and to protect habitats of special concern.

2.

Members of the Commission shall be more cautious when information is
uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific
information shall not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take
conservation and management measures.

3.

Members of the Commission shall take measures to ensure that, when
reference points are approached, they will not be exceeded. In the event they
are exceeded, members of the Commission shall, without delay, take the
action determined under paragraph 1(a) to restore the stocks.

4.

Where the status of target stocks or non-target or associated or dependent
species is of concern, members of the Commission shall subject such stocks
and species to enhanced monitoring in order to review their status and the
efficacy of conservation and management measures. They shall revise those
measures regularly in the light of new information.

5.

For new or exploratory fisheries, members of the Commission shall adopt as
soon as possible cautious conservation and management measures, including,
inter alia, catch limits and effort limits. Such measures shall remain in force
until there are sufficient data to allow assessment of the impact of the
fisheries on the long-term sustainability of the stocks, whereupon
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conservation and management measures based on that assessment shall be
implemented. The latter measures shall, if appropriate, allow for the gradual
development of the fisheries.
6.

If a natural phenomenon has a significant adverse impact on the status of
highly migratory fish stocks, members of the Commission shall adopt
conservation and management measures on an emergency basis to ensure that
fishing activity does not exacerbate such adverse impacts. Members of the
Commission shall also adopt such measures on an emergency basis where
fishing activity presents a serious threat to the sustainability of such stocks.
Measures taken on an emergency basis shall be temporary and shall be based
on the best scientific information available.
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Attachment II
Un Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), Annex II
Guidelines for the Application of Precautionary Reference
Points In Conservation And Management Of Straddling Fish
Stocks And Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
1. A precautionary reference point is an estimated value derived through an
agreed scientific procedure, which corresponds to the state of the resource
and of the fishery, and which can be used as a guide for fisheries
management.
2. Two types of precautionary reference points should be used: conservation, or
limit, reference points and management, or target, reference points. Limit
reference points set boundaries which are intended to constrain harvesting
within safe biological limits within which the stocks can produce maximum
sustainable yield. Target reference points are intended to meet management
objectives.
3. Precautionary reference points should be stock-specific to account, inter alia,
for the reproductive capacity, the resilience of each stock and the
characteristics of fisheries exploiting the stock, as well as other sources of
mortality and major sources of uncertainty.
4. Management strategies shall seek to maintain or restore populations of
harvested stocks, and where necessary associated or dependent species, at
levels consistent with previously agreed precautionary reference points. Such
reference points shall be used to trigger pre-agreed conservation and
management action. Management strategies shall include measures which
can be implemented when precautionary reference points are approached.
5. Fishery management strategies shall ensure that the risk of exceeding limit
reference points is very low. If a stock falls below a limit reference point or is
at risk of falling below such a reference point, conservation and management
action should be initiated to facilitate stock recovery. Fishery management
strategies shall ensure that target reference points are not exceeded on
average.
6. When information for determining reference points for a fishery is poor or
absent, provisional reference points shall be set. Provisional reference points
may be established by analogy to similar and better-known stocks. In such
situations, the fishery shall be subject to enhanced monitoring so as to enable
revision of provisional reference points as improved information becomes
available.
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7. The fishing mortality rate which generates maximum sustainable yield should
be regarded as a minimum standard for limit reference points. For stocks
which are not overfished, fishery management strategies shall ensure that
fishing mortality does not exceed that which corresponds to maximum
sustainable yield, and that the biomass does not fall below a predefined
threshold. For overfished stocks, the biomass which would produce
maximum sustainable yield can serve as a rebuilding target.
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13. Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management:
Implementation Issues and Challenges for the Pacific Island States
Samasoni Sauni

Introduction
The ecosystem approach - a rhetoric concept or disguise of guilt. The art of
managing fisheries has taken many turns. Recently, global attention has focused
on the adoption of the ecosystem approach. Although there is much critique and
debate on its central functions, the concept presents modern fisheries management
regimes with fresh holistic insights towards correcting failed fisheries. The
‘ecosystem-based management’ is now a recurring priority item in global fisheries
agendas and has gained much attention. It now influences management and policy
decisions amongst regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs),
fisheries managers and scientists as well funding institutions and external actors.
The members of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) have now
agreed to apply the concept to managing tuna fisheries within their national
jurisdictions. However, there are significant implementation issues and challenges
that are yet to be fully addressed. A real test in general terms of such commonly
introduced concepts and initiatives is the practical ramifications, acceptance and
effective implementation at the local stakeholders’ level. There are significant
challenges relating to the disparate levels of fisheries developments implemented,
and policy instruments available amongst FFA 17 member countries and
territories. Unlike the high island countries, for instance, the poor level of
domestic tuna fisheries developments in low-lying atoll countries is partly
explained by the lack of resources and capacity, limited opportunities and
alternative developmental means As such, there needs a harmonized and strategic
approach towards the implementation of the ecosystem approach.
Fisheries continue to rank relatively high in national and regional agendas. It is not
only because of cultural significance of the seas to Pacific peoples. However, in
the face of globalization, Small Island States of the Pacific continue to fall back on
their ocean resources for protein sustenance, alternative earnings, trade and
transportation means. These oceanic resources are worth billions of dollars, but,
these values degrade with unsustainable management and poor policy decisions
towards use and functions of attributes in the mosaic of the marine ecological
system. This realization of anthropogenic impacts and consequences on the
resources remain a key challenge amongst resource managers, scientists and policy
makers towards sustainable management. During the turn of the 21st century, this
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has been an area of great interest to all interested stakeholders and Pacific Islands,
as the challenge of elevated fishing pressure and over-fishing mounts against
increasing demand for economic benefits and development aspirations.
The ecosystem approach to fisheries management is one management tool
resource managers and scientists believe may work in addressing indiscriminate
exploitation of resources and other influences on other species and the
environment. The tool is by no means a perfect solution to fisheries and fishing
problems. But it provides relevant links to explaining in some levels of details,
with the availability of data and information, the interchanges and inter-linkages of
various attributes. This means that in a given ‘fishery’ there are indeed attributes
that forms the entire mosaic and any imbalance can have repercussions across
many attributes, particularly during excessive impact (exploitation) on one
attribute.
In a nutshell, the ecosystem concept puts into perspectives the issues and interrelationships amongst each other. 1 One advantage is the ability to holistically
address issues affecting resource, resource user and associated environment. The
difficulty however is that not all the data and information is often available to
usefully assess the mosaic of issues in any given ‘fishery’. While research is
encouraged to collect sufficient data needed for analytical work, the end results do
not often become available during urgent policy and management decisions.
Sometimes, it takes many years of research and data collection to make any sense
out of management challenges and, to properly understand the attributes and the
linkages. This challenge is paramount at the country level through implementation
of policy decisions that deal with the mobility nature of regional tuna stocks. The
challenge becomes particularly critical when decisions are forced into finalizations
without the availability of sound data and scientific information. Some scholars
refer to this as ‘data less management’ – a concept disputed in the scientific
community, however often used by managers in the absence of scientific data.
This leads to the core of the problem in addressing key implementation challenges
amongst the FFA member countries and territory. In tuna fisheries, the
fundamental challenge is balancing development aspirations and sustainability
issues with ecosystem and by-catch concerns. The challenge therefore rests on the
balance between management option agreed and influenced by external actors, and
realistic concerns of the implication at the national level. Nonetheless, the debate
surrounding this continues and becoming an underlying priority agenda item in the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and other regional
fisheries forums. This chapter investigates the ecosystem approach to tuna
fisheries in its practical application and implementation among vulnerable
1

MRAG, 2002.
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economies of Pacific Island countries and territories (PICTs). It also presents a
suite of strategic directions in overcoming those implementation challenges.
Implementation Challenges and Lessons
The implementation challenges and lessons are discussed predominantly in the
process of FFA Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM) work
amongst its members. These challenges include development processes on
logistical arrangement constraints, workshop approach and materials, lack of wider
stakeholder participation, conflicting opinions amongst stakeholder groups and
with government, and post EAFM follow up and practical implementation. In the
FFA EAFM framework, there are limited experiences in regard to the post EAFM
work given at least only four countries have gone through the process to
completion. An additional two countries have just recently completed this process
and production of EAFM reports.
Development Process
The challenges vary from one country to the next, depending on the number of
‘fisheries’ under investigation. The consultations are carried out using a
participatory process with a focus to encourage free discussion amongst the
stakeholders on issues pertinent to the fishing industry. The process also
influences the discussion to reflect on a range of issues from different perspectives
of user groups. In essence, the challenges specifically rest on the conduct of
stakeholder consultations, quality and quantity of materials formerly presented and
disseminated, working group deliberations, and as well as facilitation support from
key resource persons.
In order to fully comprehend the extent of the above challenging areas, it is crucial
to highlight the details for further scrutiny. The details are well documented 2 and
also found in the EAFM Guide; 3 the latter of which is now in its fifth revision.
Below is a revised summary of the lessons and observations gathered from series
of stakeholder workshops and consultations as outlined in Sauni and Amos 4 .
Conduct/ Planning of Stakeholder Consultations
All in-country EAFM work is coordinated and managed by the FFA Secretariat, in
consultation with resource persons from the Secretariat of the Pacific Community
(SPC) and expert consultants. There are at least three separate in-country
workshops conducted independent of each other; initially with a scoping
2
3
4

Fletcher et al., 2005.
Fletcher, 2008.
Sauni and Amos , 2007a, 2007b.
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workshop, followed by stakeholder consultations and finally the presentation and
expert discussion panel of the EAFM report. The exact timing of the workshops is
determined by mutual agreement between host country and resource persons, at a
time that best suits the schedules of fisheries personnel and stakeholder
participants.
In most cases, it was difficult to establish a suitable time for workshops that is
conveniently acceptable by everyone. In response, the FFA Secretariat in
collaboration with the host country undertakes advance informal arrangements
with tentative dates of such activities; and progressively finalizes the exact dates
toward the deadlines. This would give advance notice to attract key relevant
stakeholders and make necessary preparations for the meetings. The process is
through collaborative efforts between FFA (including resource persons from SPC
and consulting firms) and the host country (local fisheries administration). When
this fails due to the unavailability of resource persons and stakeholders, a specific
date is set with priority given to availability of stakeholders’ in-country.
The increasing number of meetings that fisheries stakeholders and regional
officials attend in a year is an influencing factor. Having EAFM meetings included
in annual work plans at the beginning of each calendar year, is a good possibility.
For most administrations and FFA, provisional meeting lists and work plans are
normally available for quick reference towards the end of each year.
Workshop Materials
As described in the FFA EAFM Guide, 5 resource persons prepare relevant but
concise materials for each subject area. Additional background materials are also
provided during the workshops. These relate to tuna fisheries in country, either in
their original report form or compiled from information summaries. The
presentations are often organized to introduce all the elements of the FFA EAFM
Framework, highlighting the main stages and processes and with reference to
examples. Also, brief presentations are prepared on the state of tuna resources,
legal aspects and domestic fisheries perspectives.
The FFA Secretariat normally assesses the relevance and quality of materials used
in the workshops. It is often a problem that the quality and amount of materials
prepared may be too technical and voluminous. This, in turn, affects the ability of
local participants to fully understand in order to prepare them well for group
discussions. The workshop materials are sent electronically to host fisheries
departments for further dissemination to participants, well in advance of the
meetings.
5

Fletcher, 2008.
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Working Group Exercises
A participatory process is adopted through working group exercises. Against each
element of the EAFM, the groups are tasked to produce outputs, component trees
of issues, risk assessment matrices (including prioritization of issues), and
presentation of results. The group exercises are planned for each scoping and
stakeholder consultation sessions, with the aim of systematically working through
the issues and producing reporting matrices required for the EAFM report.
The main challenge rests on coordinating group discussions, ensuring there are no
mis-understandings of EAFM and that issues are fairly debated, particularly where
limited quantitative information is available to guide deliberations. In most cases,
experiences were shared against each of the issues raised which often identified
possible solutions (or mix of solutions) that were considered most appropriate
from the participants’ perspectives and experiences. However, it becomes a
problem if there are significant differences of opinions on issues, especially
between government and industry participants.
Sometimes the disparity of views also occurs within government and private sector
agencies representatives. In moderating the discussion, facilitators often make
inferences or references of similar situations that occur in other countries. Also,
real case studies and reliable information are explained to group participants over
certain issues. The aim is to add value and have a focused discussion that could
generate further insights into understanding the underlying causes and impacts of
the issue(s). One major shortfall of working group exercises, depending on the
amount and extent of issues being debated, is the limited time for each working
group session. As well, the lack of participation from key stakeholders is a
constraint in this participatory process.
Facilitation Role
The role of facilitators may not be challenging. But the cause of concern relates
more to instances where there is confusion and contradictions arise over
interpretation and/or understanding the EAFM processes. Similarly, a situation
may surface where facilitators debate the issues profusely, and discussions enter
into questioning of each other’s level of understanding over certain issues or
aspects of the FFA EAFM process.
This can been caused by the lack of briefing and exchange of understanding over
the process and other matters prior to the meetings. It is also possible that the
problem is due to the lack of effective coordination by the FFA Secretariat to
ensuring all facilitators understand their specific roles during the meetings.
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Another way to curb this is to ensure everyone understands the EAFM processes,
despite its limitations in some aspects. The aim is to encourage effective
discussion amongst stakeholders and to achieve key outputs relevant for the
EAFM report. The primary aim of the workshops is to encourage effective
stakeholder participation, and to gather as much as possible feedback and inputs
from stakeholders themselves.
Post EAFM Challenges
The formal process of developing EAFM reports ends during the final submission
report to member countries. The stages of working towards an operational plan
and legal framework under the EAFM process are the prerogative of member
countries. These plans are brief and cover the implementation schedule that focus
predominantly on the management reports section of the EAFM report. They
describe in detail the management actions for each specific medium and high
priority risk issues identified in the EAFM report. This covers the main headers of
manpower resources, funding resources, timelines and reviews; and spreading
across main areas of ecology, environment and socio-economic.
Progressing these stages further requires political will and support to ensure this
work is adequately implemented, and that external technical assistance can be
sought. Sauni and Amos 6 outline a number of challenges which are further
updated below:
Stakeholders’ Understanding
Stakeholders lack an awareness of current information on the stocks and efforts
currently in place, and the various inter-agency relationships and mandates. This is
partly explained by the relevant information not necessarily filtering down to
stakeholders. This is further exacerbated by sensitivities on some fisheries issues
particularly in the areas of socio-economics and administration and governance.
There is also confusion over priority issues, driven either by the lack of data to
support the issues or the lack of clarity of national policies and priorities on
fisheries. There are, in some countries, conflicts between agency responsibilities
over tuna fisheries, particularly where more than one agency deals with tuna
related matters. The ability to identify and address such governance related issues
is one of the key benefits of the EAFM approach.
Institutional Structural Changes
Institutional structural changes can also create obstacles. For example, the
departure of skilled staff, re-shuffling and reforming of fisheries agencies (e.g.
6

Sauni and Amos, 2007a, 2007b.
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changes from department of ministry type model to fisheries authorities, or vice
versa) further complicate matters in effective management of tuna fisheries. In the
consultations, the stakeholders often raise concerns that numerous Tuna
Management Plans in the past were not fully implemented. There were few
consultations and key stakeholders did not participate fully in the development
process of the plans, and that these plans were not circulated widely and that
people lack awareness of it. Also, there is a sense of participants protecting their
interests by way of their contributions to the discussion. Some countries point to
the lack of political will and government interventions, corruption as well as the
lack of financial and technical support to implement tuna management plans.
Stakeholder Exchanges
The above experiences add to the difficulty to coordinate in-country EAFM
consultations. However, the process encourages participants to raise those issues
in EAFM national workshops. These issues are then assessed succinctly through
the prioritization and risk assessment steps in order to arrive at possible
management responses. In most cases, new ideas and proposals flagged during the
consultations present new opportunities for government officials in decision
making positions to follow such actions through to full implementation. Similarly,
the discussion also benefits stakeholders in the private sector to take on the new
challenges in the fishing industry. These stakeholder exchanges require thorough
understanding to address ongoing issues with fisheries authorities as well as
implementing management responses within their own fishing businesses.
Political Will and Support
In almost all EAFM stakeholder consultations, there exists relevant informal
debate and conflict of ideas and opinions, between the formal and informal sectors
in the tuna industry. The industry stakeholders often argue on the lack of financial,
technical and logistical support or provision of essential services from the
government to foster sustainable and profitable onshore developments. The issues
of government subsidy and relevant technical information and materials filtering
down to industry stakeholders are often limited. For example, the industry
stakeholders often request governments implement duty free or imposition of tax
exemptions on fuel, oil, spare parts and other accessories commonly used by
domestic tuna fleets. Also, there exists a lack of proper and adequate onshore
facilities like fuel depot, wharf facility and berthing area, and skilled skippers and
crews (which often results in the employment of foreign crews).
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Infrastructure Support Services
However, during national EAFM consultations, the national governments counterargue that there are current national and regional initiatives and projects in place
that look into alternative and better means of developing tuna fisheries in the
private sector. But first, government officials argue the need to have feasibility
studies and related accounts of the major challenges and constraints, explore and
identify development opportunities, develop or review strategic management and
development plans and policy documentations and the implementation the plans.
In more general terms, the government adopts and implements policies that are
holistic and broadly addressing sustainability, economics and social issues and
development aspirations of the country.
In knowing the state of the tuna resources and its environment, and development
opportunities against the challenges and constraints, strategic responses to key
issues experienced in the industry would be effectively addressed. This includes
the construction or improvement of onshore-based facilities and services,
allocation of licenses and related control limits, application of technical
specifications on boats, use of monitoring, control and surveillance mechanisms,
analyses on the use of subsidies and exemptions, as well as other incentives to
encourage effective, sustainable and profitable management of domestic tuna
fisheries. All these elements provide the basis for developing national EAFM
reports that incorporates all the components of ecological, ecosystem, social and
economic aspects of the tuna industry.
Evolving EAFM Process
In addition, national EAFM workshops and consultations further provide
opportunities for improvements in the conduct and preparation of EAFM reports,
Operational Plan, Legal framework and Policy platform and other related
documentation. For instance, some lessons learnt in the process includes: keeping
the EAFM report concise and short; improving the delivery of risk assessments for
clarity among the participants; and encourage the use of non-technical languages
during the consultations – possibly by engaging national fisheries officials. There
is also a need for clear demarcation of jurisdictions between inshore and offshore
fisheries, flexibility in approach, and linking the debate of issues to WCFC
decisions, provision of workshop materials in advance, ensure local stakeholders
drive the EAFM process and encourage local ownership of the EAFM reports.
Effective EAFM Challenges Amongst PICTs
The real test to the EAFM approach in the FFA framework is how best it can be
adopted and implemented successfully. While the holistic management approach
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is clear, the practical consequences of implementation remain a challenge. With
the small sizes of fisheries administrations, lack of resources and capacity to deal
with current issues, any additional management requirements would certainly
require additional flow of resources and commitment. The diverse national
policies and development aspirations relative to tuna fisheries amongst PICTs,
which may often change with any change of governments, would further
complicate progress in implementing EAFM. These key challenges are interrelated
and are further discussed below. 7
Ecosystem Approach - A Rhetoric Concept or Disguise of Guilt
A track record exists on failed fisheries developments in PICTs and the intensity
of such failures potentially varies between countries. Amongst others, the key
attributes are discussed earlier in the chapter; however ranging from institutional
structures, governance, political support, stable investment environment and
policies, lack of resources and capacity, stakeholders’ participation and others. The
ecosystem approach through the EAFM process is a holistic management tool,
which strategically identifies and suggests management actions to address priority
risk issues.
On the one hand, it can be described a ‘rhetoric concept’ given the high command
of attention and global acceptance as one effective fisheries management tool to
address failed fisheries. On the other hand, it is a disguise of guilt on fisheries
experts for failing in their application of conventional fisheries management.
Generally conventional fisheries management has failed in the past, and the
EAFM process may correct such failures by accounting for the
interrelationship/inter-linkages of systems through roles and attributes in a true
setting of mosaic of ecological systems.
Lack/Shortage of Human and Financial Resources
The lack of skilled manpower and financial resources to implement policies and
pursue legitimate fisheries developments are key elements which PICTs are still
struggling to overcome. Failing this may lead to EAFM reports not effectively
implemented, thus not achieving its intended use. Funding support is a common
problem in fisheries developments throughout Pacific Island countries despite the
millions of dollars worth of tuna resources in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean (WCPO). The bulk of funds from licensing and catches are channeled to
government consolidated funds, and a small portion of which is used for fisheries
management and development purposes in fisheries authorities. The general
feeling in attitudes on the allocation of such funds has not been commensurate to
the contribution of tuna fisheries in national GDPs and economies.
7

Also see Ferraris, 2007.
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There are nonetheless, strenuous efforts to address this and there have been
successes in some PICTs. There are pressures in government where the allocation
of fisheries funds is disputed, regardless of its share in national gross domestic
product (GDP), and elements of corruption from fishing companies to gain access.
This can result in uncontrolled fishing beyond maximum sustainable yield levels.
The availability of skilled and ample staff in fisheries administrations vary greatly
between PICTs. Over the years, this issue has been greatly addressed by the
number of qualified and skilled graduates joining fisheries administrations.
However, it would generally require time to build up experiences and, some of
which are already holding influential and senior positions in countries. Also, the
high turn over in skilled staff, career attractiveness and financial packages on offer
influence retention of skilled staff.
Lack of access to finance to promote domestic fisheries development is lacking in
most PICTs. In part, the lack of certainty over catch rates, and thus, future
economic viability of domestic fishing fleets, seriously inhibits investment in
domestic fisheries development. National development banks and financial
institutions are very cautious about loaning investors the necessary capital to
promote domestic industry development. In many cases, the same concerns exist
at the Ministerial level, which creates difficulties in getting government support
for domestic tuna fisheries development initiatives.
Competent Industry Groups and Effective Participation
No doubt the need for skilled and qualified personnel also extends to the fishing
industry. Across PICTs there generally exists the lack of fisheries managerial and
business skills, and broad understanding of stock assessments. This has led, in
some instances, to failure and bankruptcy in some domestic fishing companies.
Until such time, the growing capability and capacity amongst fishing industry
groups is needed to improve the support towards effective decision making. This
may lead on to the government regimes providing explicit allocation decisions
between stakeholder groups. This relationship is crucial to advance the collection
of fishery dependent data (spatio-temporal scale of catch and effort data) in the
capture sector.
The devolution of decision making within the EAFM process to industry groups is
paramount towards greater focus on fishing capture and processing sectors.
Similarly the long term impact on the EAFM process would be a bonus giving
competent stakeholders to implementing and managing sustainable fisheries. The
importance of engaging industry is to reduce management cost and at the same
time maximise benefits. For instance, in some countries, the fishing industry link
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directly to commercial and recreational sectors and subsequently exerts impact on
the environment.
Governance
Unless transparency, accountability and good governance are upheld it would be
extremely difficult to have a successful ecosystem approach to fisheries
management. The resource rents generated from the resources are commonly
prone to corrupt activities. In the private sector it lacks stewards and investors
have in some cases lost confidence in investing in PICTs. The short term outlook
is that many players want access and invest in the resources. The response to these
challenges is to reform and strengthen fisheries institutions.
Fisheries institutional reforms and strengthening often link to good fisheries
legislation and are based on ecosystem principles (including precautionary) and
clear objectives – a paramount requirement for good governance. In addition there
may be merits in exercising flexibility in the delegation to fisheries management
and arrangements, and provide power base to enter into institutional fisheries
management plans. Also, it is important to revise management and statutory plans
to reflect emerging fisheries issues and challenges.
Stable Investment Policy Environment
Getting the policy environment right is fundamental and should be based on a
vision that focuses on good policy, law and management. In fisheries, it requires a
legislative policy that is supported by whole-of-government fisheries policy. The
sequence level of policy, law and management can be built concurrently and be
flexible to changes in the political climate. It is also important to design the right
policy that avoids the emergence of continuous problems in fisheries development
projects. A common recurring issue is that initial designs of policies or projects are
carried out by one or group of people (or consultants) but implemented by others.
A greater relationship between design and implementation of fisheries programs is
needed.
In PICTs investment needs to be tailored towards genuine fisheries opportunities,
as well as exploring other investment opportunities that underpin fishing
operations. It may not be just developing domestic fishing fleets in the capture
sector but also on processing and provision of services (e.g. fuel, repair and
transshipment). Sometimes it takes legitimate need for a good vision, policy and
good staffing to be able to convince foreign investment in country. This includes
the undertaking of fisheries reforms and strengthening exercises and that, any
transitions or implementation of new changes would need to handle swiftly. PICTs
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may wish to undertake reforms that should aim towards creating a stable and
attractive investment location and policies, for example:
• reforming tax systems;
• lowering barriers to trade (tariff and non-tariff barriers); and
• invest on human capital through education and training.
In 2007, FFA members raised the need to create a stable and attractive investment
environment for businesses to invest in domestic fisheries development. This can
be addressed at both the national and sub-regional levels. It initially requires a
stable policy environment at the national level and that PICTs may wish to limit
the number of vessels allowed to enter the domestic fishery and fish in national
waters. This means that large numbers of vessels will not enter the fishery in the
future to compete with existing businesses for a share of the catch. Also, in order
to stabilize fishing operations and investments, countries may opt for longer term
licensing for domestic fleets. For example, the preference of longer licensing
period such as three years instead of annual licenses.
Institutional Gaps
Given the broad element in the EAFM process there is a need for inter-agency
relationship and collaboration. The agencies need to agree and keep well informed
on the process to ensure smooth execution of activities that may require inputs
from various agencies. Failing this may lead to failure in any undertakings in the
EAFM process. The agencies involved need convincing and understanding on the
work and the relevant details as to why they are pursuing such EAFM work.
Furthermore, the ‘one stop approach’ brings together relevant government
agencies dealing with fishing and fisheries. This approach will successfully bridge
the gaps across finance, customs, transport and social services agencies. The
finance agency often imposes tax on fuel, customs dealing with papers on export
and workers, flights increase to cover more travelers and goods for export and
imports. Also there are social issues in the fishing industry that link to prostitution.
Because there is money involved, inter-agency officials sometimes turn a blind
eye to the issue, perhaps influenced by the lack of interest and motivation. The
inter-agency working groups that were set up to address common issues lack
competence and willingness to perform their roles efficiently.
In order to have significant changes, as an outcome of the EAFM process, it
requires pursuing success in inter-agency collaboration and nominated working
groups. This should work towards addressing minor problems and other priority
issues, and also motivating officials dealing with fisheries matters.
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Any form of institutional reforms would cost a lot. However, this reflects the key
changes that are necessary to establish appropriate institutional models that deliver
the necessary output levels anticipated from the fishing industry. Factors in the
success or failure of any institutional strengthening and reform work include the
critical level of career structure, the effectiveness of reformed fisheries activities,
issues of corruption, efficiency in the workforce and ensuring the generation of
maximum benefits in the overall fishing industry.
Political Will
The EAFM requires commitment and political will to carry it forward. Given the
broad range of issues and management actions that are flagged in the EAFM
report, it is important to have political backing for implementation. In this region,
the collapse of fisheries development projects when funding and technical
assistance terminates or projects close down remain a challenge amongst fisheries
managers. While, there may be short term benefits realized in the duration of the
projects, the long terms benefits at the termination do not necessary continue. The
lessons are the lack of continuity backed by support from key stakeholders and
agencies, downgrading of individual work performances of project counterparts.
There is a need for ‘champions’ in influential positions, recognizing the risk in
putting all hopes in one individual. The lesson was that ensuring sustainability in
development projects requires people of high profile and respect on the ground to
ensure effective implementation.
Many PICTs have serious constraints on their capacity to promote development in
their domestic fisheries. This is simply because of their small administrations and
small number of staff that are allocated to handle fisheries related issues. Also,
there are limited government incentives provided in some jurisdictions to promote
domestic tuna fishery development. In part this may relate to perceived failures in
the past; as well as perceived achievements of domestic fisheries development.
Also, fisheries and fishing may have ranked low in some government priorities.
Changing Priorities
PICTs have come a long way in the evolution of fisheries. The most important
change is the transitional and gradual re-focus on objectives from maximizing
economic benefits to adopting conservation and management approach – the
EAFM process. The cross dramatic changes were strategic and systematic, such as
the core change in administration and management to better improve fisheries
structure and relevant skills. Some of the changing priorities are:
• the element of security access is important in the overall fisheries
management, particularly the need for incorporation in relevant fisheries
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management, particularly the need for incorporation in relevant fisheries
management plans and regulations;
the primary output of the EAFM process may be difficult to achieve if there
are frequent changing priorities in country. Policy decisions and capacity
building are critically important areas and needed to ensure better outcomes;
the trade offs between stakeholders is to maximize economic benefits and not
economic efficiency, and to enforce policy decisions and not preferred
economic indicators. The rationale is to avoid benefits being enjoyed by a
small group of operators but to spread the benefits across the entire
community. There is a need to build capacity within fisheries authorities and
industry/ private sector, raise level of confidence by equal participating in
training programs and aware raising programs. These efforts need backing up
by the appropriate legislation framework to gain political support;
the central focus on effective and powerful fisheries institutions is the ability
of managing fisheries as important assets for national economies, while at the
same time performing necessary risk assessments of fisheries operations to
address priority pitfalls and emerging challenges; and
the changing priorities also affect movements in skilled staff and employing
new fisheries graduates. The lack of job opportunities, financial and political
support to create positions in fisheries institutions also exacerbates the
problem. Sometimes fisheries staffs with the right mix of skills and
experiences, while initially motivated, are forced to leave given the changes in
the working environment. The central issue in fisheries institutions is not
necessary about the lack of capacity and resistance to changes, however the
lack of awareness of the changes across spectrum of fisheries stakeholders.

Effective implementation of fisheries development projects are hampered by
challenges of change in government and priority policies, numerous changes in
leadership within fisheries administrations and late start of project activities. In
most cases, this leads to the re-evaluation of project activities as opposed to
allowing the project to continue into the next phase. On the one hand, PICTs
fisheries institutions require the necessary suite of skills that are urgently needed
to re-direct priorities and operations of fisheries structures. The general pattern is
clear in some countries with the drive to cut back outside influence. On the other
hand, countries exercise a more cautious and gradual process through an informal
process. The main drivers influencing such decisions vary potentially between
countries, but in consideration of other priority areas and sectors that drive
national economy of scale.
Markets & Marketing
To ensure sustainability and growth in the domestic fisheries operations, market
opportunities and incentives play a significant role. This means that access to key
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markets (including Japan, US, EU) and the need to meet strict certification
standards to enter these markets is fundamentally important. Access to air freight
and the issues associated with geographic isolation from shipping routes, airline
routes and more generally the main markets. Issues associated with the monopoly
control that most airlines have in each jurisdiction complicates matters further.
Others
Other factors such as infrastructure, geographical isolations and transportation also
provide further challenges in the successful implementation of the EAFM process.
The necessary on-shore infrastructure facilities are important in the development
of domestic fisheries operations. Similarly, the isolation of some PICTs and the
lack of reliable transportation further hamper domestic fisheries developments in
linking to potential markets abroad.
Future Challenges
The biggest test for the success of an EAFM is whether the strategies and
measures adopted will enable the living component of the ecosystem to continue
sustainably as it did prior to fishing interventions. Furthermore, how will the
physical impacts of the activities of resource exploitation on the environment, and
the effects of those environmental impacts on resource productivity, be dealt with
together under an integrated management regime.
Due to the obvious paucity in data and scientific information and knowledge
required to formulate and implement strategies under an EAFM approach, an
immediate challenge is to adopt a precautionary principle approach as an integral
component of the ecosystem-based fishery management regime.
Specific challenges to the EAFM approach include and directly relate to:
i)
the integration of ecosystem aspects of management into a Fisheries
Management Framework;
ii) the non-availability of fisheries data for non-target species;
iii) scientific surveys are expensive and time consuming;
iv) ongoing monitoring may be logistically impossible;
v) application of ecosystem-based models;
vi) capacity development needs of PICTs;
vii) traditional work on fishery assessment tends to limit its focus on the
effects of fishing on target species and does not take explicit account of
ecological and ecosystem considerations;
viii) implementation of the Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management Regime;
and
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ix)

ecosystem-based biodynamic models have not, as yet, proved themselves
as management tools, but are paving the way to future implementation of
ecosystem-based management of fisheries. 8

Way Forward
The way forward is to effectively sell the EAFM report and its subsequent
operational plan potentially to decision makers, formal and informal sectors and
foreign investors as well as funding institutions. In considering the diverse issues
covered and participation of stakeholders involved putting together these
documents, in line with ecosystem principles, and national policies and priorities,
there is good expectation of its success. Further, the documents are balanced
having covered the issues linked to resources, users and the environment. As such,
the ecosystem approach is neither a rhetoric concept nor disguise of guilt but it
surely provides PICTs with an alternative to conventional and traditional fisheries
management practices.
Fisheries reform is generally influenced by numerous factors such as culture
barriers, political support or interferences, lack of skilled staff and funding support
and attitudes of those directly and indirectly involved in the fishing industry. The
fisheries administrations play direct role providing policy, management and
development advice, as well, ensuring the sustainability of tuna stocks. It is
therefore important that fisheries reforms strengthen these roles in order to provide
the most cost-effective and efficient delivery of support services to the fishing
industry that meets both conservation and economic goals.
There has been a regime shift in fisheries developments, physical infrastructure,
fisheries organizations, management approaches, market access and opportunities
in oceanic fisheries. This calls for the effective implementation of EAFM
processes that account for these changes. The drive now amongst fisheries
institutions and administrations is towards securing larger and more efficient
fishing boats to harvest more fish. Great effort at all levels is now directed towards
making informed decisions to regulate and manage tuna resources. The change in
mindset of fisheries managers rests more in the management (and development) of
fisheries resources. The current issues are far more complex than in the long past,
which undoubtedly makes the work of fisheries managers a little more difficult
and challenging. For instance, the need for stock assessments and methods used,
and the need to include stakeholders in the decision making process (e.g.
facilitators and mediators). The existence of challenges affecting Pacific Islands’
tuna fisheries may prolong into the future if ecosystem processes are not
considered and that succinct management actions applied.
8

Fletcher, 2006.
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14. Legislative Guidelines for Sustainable Fisheries: Some Future
Directions for the Development of Fisheries Legislation in the
Pacific Islands
William Edeson

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the work underway in the
preparation of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) Legislative
Guidelines for Sustainable Fisheries. It proposes to focus on those aspects which
involve the implementation into national legislation of recent developments in
international fisheries instruments. It contains extracts of a much longer study on
the subject.
In particular, the following aspects are considered here: objectives and principles
clauses, ecosystem considerations, precautionary approaches to fisheries
management, records of fishing vessels, implementation of conservation and
management measures of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs),
authorisations to fish, scientific research, collection of data, port State measures,
jurisdiction over nationals, evidentiary provisions, offences, penalties,
cancellation, suspension and seizure, compliance and enforcement provisions,
alternative mechanisms, “Long Arm” (Lacey Act) 1 Jurisdiction, and bail and bond
issues.
It must be stressed at the outset that the objective is not to provide a
comprehensive overview of all aspects to be covered in a fisheries law. Certain
provisions that are often found in a fisheries law, such as those concerning driftnet
fishing, and bilateral fisheries agreements, are not included in this document.
Important though they are in their own right, they do not raise any novel aspects
which a fisheries law needs to address, nor do they stem from recent developments
in the international regime of fisheries. However, in a comprehensive fisheries
law, such matters would obviously be included. Likewise, it is assumed that all
countries have already provided for the declaration of their maritime areas (in
particular, archipelagic waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ)),
which may of course be covered in a more generally applicable marine spaces law.
Certain aspects such as fish processing and importation of fish are sometimes
included in a basic fisheries law, other times not. These aspects are not considered
here. Although important, these topics are not included in this chapter for the same
1

United States, Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378; Pub. L. 97-79, as amended (2002).
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reason that they do not raise novel questions concerning the modern law of the sea.
Their importance should not be underestimated, of course, for such topics will
have a bearing on how a country is dealing with obligations under the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) regime.
Objectives and Principles
The starting point is the statement of objectives and principles in Article 5 of the
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), 2 accompanied by the objective
of long term sustainable use stated in Article 2 and the precautionary approach set
out in Article 6. These objectives, along with those found in Agenda 21,3 the Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 4 the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) 5 the Johannesburg Plan of Action,6 and the various
international plans of action and ministerial declarations adopted by Food and
Agricultural Organisation (FAO), are widely accepted as indispensable to modern
fisheries conservation and management. Further, they have been incorporated into
the provisions of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF
Convention). 7
Thus, Article 5 of the WCPF Convention states:
In order to conserve and manage highly migratory fish stocks in the
Convention Area in their entirety, the members of the Commission shall, in
giving effect to their duty to cooperate in accordance with the 1982
Convention, the Agreement and this Convention:
(a) adopt measures to ensure long-term sustainability of highly migratory
fish stocks in the Convention Area and promote the objective of their
optimum utilization;
(b) ensure that such measures are based on the best scientific evidence
available and are designed to maintain or restore stocks at levels
capable of producing maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by
relevant environmental and economic factors, including the special
2

Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, concluded on 4 August 1995, in force 11 December 2001, 34
ILM 1542 (1995); 2167 UNTS 88.
3
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Agenda 21, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, 03-14 June 1992.
4
FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted at the 28th Session of the FAO Conference,
Rome, Italy, 31 October 1995.
5
World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, August 26 - September 4, 2002.
6
Johannesburg Plan of Action, adopted at the conclusion of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) in September 2002.
7
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean, Honolulu, USA, 5 September 2000.
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(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)
(g)

(h)
(i)

(j)

requirements of developing States in the Convention Area, particularly
small island developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns,
the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended
international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or
global;
apply the precautionary approach in accordance with this Convention
and all relevant internationally agreed standards and recommended
practices and procedures;
assess the impacts of fishing, other human activities and environmental
factors on target stocks, non-target species, and species belonging to the
same ecosystem or dependent upon or associated with the target stocks;
adopt measures to minimize waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned
gear, pollution originating from fishing vessels, catch of non-target
species, both fish and non-fish species, (hereinafter referred to as nontarget species) and impacts on associated or dependent species, in
particular endangered species and promote the development and use of
selective, environmentally safe and cost-effective fishing gear and
techniques;
protect biodiversity in the marine environment;
take measures to prevent or eliminate over-fishing and excess fishing
capacity and to ensure that levels of fishing effort do not exceed those
commensurate with the sustainable use of fishery resources;
take into account the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers;
(i) collect and share, in a timely manner, complete and accurate data
concerning fishing activities on, inter alia, vessel position, catch of
target and non-target species and fishing effort, as well as information
from national and international research programmes; and
(j) implement and enforce conservation and management measures
through effective monitoring, control and surveillance. 8

This is backed up by the adoption of the precautionary approach in Article 6.
The trend today is, therefore, towards having objectives clauses in fisheries
legislation, which should refer to these objectives one way or another. There are
several different approaches that can be adopted. For example, the objectives
could be spelled out. Another approach, of course, could be to refer to these
objectives and principles by a process of incorporation, for example, by simply
referring in the legislation to the statements as found in Article 5 of UNFSA or
Article 5 of the WCPF Convention. An important underlying issue, however, is the
extent to which such objectives can be used in judicial and administrative

8

Article 5, WCPF Convention.
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proceedings to measure whether appropriate decisions have been made. In other
words, are they justiciable?
An important issue to consider is the extent to which such provisions should be
justiciable. In many instances in the South Pacific such objectives clauses involve
clauses using “shall”; thus, in most instances, administrative action could be
challenged in the courts on the basis of an alleged non-compliance with such
objectives. Each country should be judged separately to determine whether that is
appropriate, for example, that it could impose too great a strain on limited judicial
resources. If that is the case, it may be necessary to insert weaker language, and
add a clause to the effect that compliance with such provisions is not subject to
judicial review. If it is considered necessary to do this, it would be important to
ensure that the law in other ways provides for transparency and accountability.
Ecosystem Considerations
A modern fisheries law will need to provide the basis for the inclusion of
ecosystem considerations in decision making, and this has been done already by
referring to it in the objectives discussed above. It is no longer considered
appropriate, for example, to make decisions solely on the basis of information
concerning one stock or species of fish. Instead, it is necessary to consider effects
of associated and dependent species, as well as considering the impact of the
activity in question on the marine environment as a whole.
The ecosystem approach is reflected in the WSSD Plan of Implementation. 9 Thus,
in paragraph 30(d), it is stated: “Encourage the application by 2010 of the
ecosystem approach, noting the Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in
the Marine Ecosystem and decision V/6 of the conference of the Parties to the
Convention on Biological Diversity.” However, while the basic point is clear, it
can often be difficult (and expensive) to obtain the information necessary to make
an effective evaluation of the ecosystem considerations. In an important article by
J Caddy and K Cochrane, the difficult task ahead for fisheries managers in
embracing the ecosystem approach is put into context in their wide ranging review
of fisheries management, when they state:
Even while fisheries management struggles to get to grips with single
species issues, it is increasingly being called on to take a multispecies and
ecosystem perspective. However, there are still few case studies with more
than few years duration which illustrate how these concepts are to be
applied, and the difficulties are already apparent to all. 10
9
See Paragraph 30 (d), Chapter IV. Protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and
social development, WSSD Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.
10
J.F. Caddy and K. L. Cochrane, ‘A Review of Fisheries Management Past and Present and Some Future
Perspectives for the Third Millennium’ in Ocean and Coastal Management, No. 44, 2001, at 653-666.
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The following extracts from an FAO study 11 on the ecosystem approach are also
helpful:
EAF [ecosystem approach to fisheries] is not well covered in binding
international law at present, either explicitly as EAF sensu stricto, or
implicitly as sustainable development principles, but is reflected mainly in
voluntary instruments such as the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the Code of
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the Reykjavik Declaration. As a
result, few regional fisheries organizations and arrangements make explicit
recognition of EAF in their instruments. Furthermore, EAF is not
frequently an integral part of national fisheries policy and legislation. This
leads to many deficiencies in current fishery management regimes, such as
(i) weak cross-sectoral consultation and cooperation and (ii) the failure to
consider, or a legal inability to act on external influences such as pollution
and habitat deterioration. Such problems need to be addressed and corrected
where required. Especially in the case of national policies and laws, EAF
may require that existing legal instruments and the practices of other sectors
that interact with or impact on fisheries need to be considered, and that
adjustments to those instruments and practices pertaining to other sectors be
made.
EAF is, therefore, likely to require more complex sets of rules or
regulations that recognize the impacts of fisheries on other sectors and the
impact of those sectors on fisheries. It may be desirable to regulate the
major and more or less constant inter-sectoral interactions through the
primary legislation. This could apply, for example, to laws controlling
coastline development and coastal habitat protection, the establishment of
permanent MPAs [Marine Protected Areas], and the creation of crosssectoral institutions. However, many interactions between fisheries and
other sectors will be dynamic, and in these cases, it may be desirable to
strive for a more responsive and flexible mode of interaction than is usually
possible through the primary legislation. In these cases, it would be
preferable to rely instead on agreed rules. This is consistent with the advice
in the FM [Fisheries Management] Guidelines, namely that routine
management control measures needing frequent revision should be included
in subordinate legislation, rather than in the primary legislation (4.3.1. vi).
The FM Guidelines states that the primary legislation should specify the
“functions, powers and responsibilities of government or other institutions
involved in fisheries management” (4.3.1 iv). It also states that the
11
FAO, The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries: Issues Terminology, Institutional Foundations,
Implementation and Outlook, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 443, Rome, 2003).
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jurisdiction should include the geographical area, the interested parties and
the institutions involved in fisheries management (4.3.1 v). In addition,
EAF requires that (i) the geographical jurisdiction should, as far as
practical, coincide with natural ecological boundaries and (ii) that the
legislation should specify the appropriate level of consultation and
cooperation between the specific fishery agency and those institutions
dealing with other fisheries or with other interacting sectors.”
It will be apparent that giving full effect to EAF is an enormous task, and one that
is beyond the reach of most governments. However, steps towards achieving it can
be made, for example, by ensuring that EAF is included in the objectives and
principles clauses discussed above. Also by providing the opportunity for cross
sectoral assessments and interactions in the governance regime, the EAF approach
can be given at least some prospects for application.
In the context of the FFA, important and novel work is underway in the form of
stakeholder consultations and workshops to provide the initial basis for the
adoption of ecosystem approaches to fisheries management.
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)
While the ecosystem approach should permeate thinking about all aspects of
decision making, one very practical step is to ensure that the fisheries legislation,
or otherwise the legislation governing the marine environment, at least provides
for setting up marine protected areas (MPAs). The legislation should also provide
for the establishment of different types of MPAs according to the objective to be
achieved. Thus, there should be scope for establishing the following: marine parks,
marine reserves, and prohibited fishing areas.
By itself, the power to establish such areas will not, of course, ensure the
application of an ecosystem approach. It will however, constitute an important tool
in achieving that objective. In any event, the inclusion of the power in legislation
to establish MPAs will form an important part of a range of controls available.
Precautionary Approaches to Fisheries Management
Closely linked to the need for an ecosystem approach is the need to adopt
precautionary approaches to fisheries conservation, management and exploitation.
This has already been referred to under the objectives above. However, it may be
necessary to include in the law provisions requiring the decision maker to apply
precautionary reference points in formulating fisheries management decisions.
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Record of Fishing Vessels
Under both UNFSA and the FAO Compliance Agreement, 12 it is necessary to
maintain a record of fishing vessels for vessels flying their flag and fishing on the
high seas. This is in addition to any national registry or record that the country
might have, and additional to the regional register maintained by FFA.
Similarly, the WCPFC imposes in Article 24 the following obligation with respect
to the maintenance of a record:
4. Each member of the Commission shall, for the purposes of effective
implementation of this Convention, maintain a record of fishing vessels
entitled to fly its flag and authorized to be used for fishing in the
Convention Area beyond its area of national jurisdiction, and shall
ensure that all such fishing vessels are entered in that record.
5. Each member of the Commission shall provide annually to the
Commission, in accordance with such procedures as may be agreed by
the Commission, the information set out in Annex IV to this Convention
with respect to each fishing vessel entered in the record required to be
maintained under paragraph 4 and shall promptly notify the
Commission of any modifications to such information.
6. Each member of the Commission shall also promptly inform the
Commission of:
(a) any additions to the record;
(b) any deletions from the record by reason of:
(i) the voluntary relinquishment or non-renewal of the fishing
authorization by the fishing vessel owner or operator;
(ii) the withdrawal of the fishing authorization issued in respect of
the fishing vessel under paragraph 2;
(iii) the fact that the fishing vessel concerned is no longer entitled to
fly its flag;
(iv) the scrapping, decommissioning or loss of the fishing vessel
concerned; and
(v) any other reason, specifying which of the reasons listed above is
applicable.13
The following provision is intended to give effect to the UNFSA and the FAO
Compliance Agreement, as well as the WCPFC:
(1) The Managing Director/Minister shall maintain a record of fishing
vessels of [country] in respect of which high seas fishing permits have
12
FAO, Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, hereinafter referred to as FAO Compliance Agreement, adopted at the
27th Session of the FAO Conference, 24 November 1993.
13
Article 24, WCPF Convention.
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been issued, including all information required to be submitted under
Annex IV of the WCPFC.
(2) The Managing Director/Minister shall:
(a) make available to FAO and to WCPFC information contained
in the record maintained under sub-section (1);
(b) promptly notify FAO and WCPFC of changes in such
information in respect of high seas fishing vessels;
(c) promptly notify FAO and WCPFC of any additions to or
deletions from the record, and the reasons for any deletion;
(d) convey to FAO and WCPFC information relating to any high
seas fishing permit granted under section 6(4) of this Act,
including the identity of the vessel and its owner, charterer or
operator, and factors relevant to the Minister’s decision to issue
the permit;
(e) report promptly to FAO and WCPFC all relevant information in
his possession regarding any activities of fishing vessels of
[country] on the high seas that undermine the effectiveness of
international conservation and management measures,
including the identity of vessels and any sanctions imposed;
(f) provide FAO and WCPFC with a summary of evidence in his
possession regarding the activities of foreign vessels that
undermine the effectiveness of international conservation and
management measures; and
(g) maintain a record of international conservation and
management measures and subregional or regional fisheries
management organisations which are recognised by [country].
(3) The Managing Director/Minister may make available on request the
information maintained under sub-section (1) to any directly interested
foreign State which is a party to the Compliance Agreement, the Fish
Stocks Agreement, the WCPFC and to any other subregional or regional
fisheries management organisation.
(4) The Managing Director/Minister may lay an information before the
Court in respect of alleged offences committed under this Act.
However, clause (3) above may be unnecessary depending on the specific solution
adopted for giving effect to conservation and management measures of RFMOs.
There are two other aspects concerning a record, or register. First, a country might
wish in any event to have a much more widely based record or register than merely
for high seas fishing. It might, for example, wish to register all fishing vessels above

326

a certain size. Second, the role of the FFA regional register needs to be covered in
national legislation.
Implementation of Conservation and Management Measures of Regional
Fisheries Bodies
Under the UNFSA in general, and specifically under the WCPF Convention, it
will be necessary for parties to RFMOs to give effect in their national laws to
international conservation and management measures. Article 23.1 of the WCPF
Convention states:
Each member of the Commission shall promptly implement the provisions
of this Convention and any conservation, management and other measures
or matters which may be agreed pursuant to this Convention from time to
time and shall cooperate in furthering the objective of this Convention. 14
The means by which a treaty is given effect in national law can vary from one
country to another (and may even be subject to constitutional requirements), hence
what follows might not work for all countries. Further, several environmental
treaties either overlap with, or will have the potential to do so, with fisheries, and
this needs to be monitored.
One approach would be to have such measures laid before the Parliament for a
number of days, and if not objected to, they would then acquire legal effect. Such
an approach requires action by the country in question to give effect to such
measures. A more radical approach would be to make conservation and
management measures of an RFMO such as the WCPFC immediately applicable
in national law, unless specifically disallowed. Provisions dealing with this need to
be drafted with special care if the violation of one of these measures constitute an
offence. A possible draft provision, which does not go quite so far as to give
immediate application, is set out here:

Giving effect to fisheries and international agreements
(1) The Minister shall publish in the Gazette the texts of all conservation
and management measures adopted under the [WCPF Convention] and
any other such measures adopted by a regional fisheries management
organization to which ….. is a party.
(2) The Minister may, for the purpose of giving effect to [WCPF
Convention] as amended from time to time make such regulations or

14

Article 23.1, WCPF Convention.
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give notice in the Gazette or attach such conditions to a licence as the
Minister may consider necessary or expedient for this purpose.
(3) The Minister may, for the purpose of giving effect to any fisheries
agreement entered into under section ... or any international agreement
or arrangement to which ……. is a party, make such regulations or give
notice in the Gazette or attach such conditions to a licence as the
Minister may consider necessary or expedient for this purpose.
(4) For the purposes of this section, “conservation and management
measures” means measures to conserve and manage one or more species
of living marine resources that are adopted and applied by global,
regional or subregional fisheries organisations, including in particular
those adopted by WCPFC, consistent with the relevant rules of
international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, and [the 1995 UN Fish Stocks
Agreement]. 15
The penalty to be imposed needs also to be considered. The provision quoted
above in respect of the fisheries management plans could be adapted as follows:
The Minister may by regulation prescribe offences in respect of non
compliance with conservation and management measures and penalties for
such offences, not exceeding a fine of [$250,000] and, where the offence is
a continuing one, a further fine not exceeding [$5000] for every day that the
offence has continued.
Consistency in penalty levels across WCPFC members would be desirable.
Authorisations to Fish
The type of authorisation adopted by a particular country will almost certainly
raise important policy issues that go well beyond legal drafting considerations. No
attempt here is made to promote one system over another.
1. Licensing (not including foreign fishing)
It will be necessary to distinguish broadly between those countries which need or
want a licensing regime, and those which want additionally a rights based regime.
In a straightforward licensing regime, the duration of a license has become a
contentious issue for certain sectors. Thus, one year for recreational fishing by
individuals might be suitable; however, where there are significant investments
involved, usually longer periods are required. It will be necessary to look at the
laws in order to assess how effective they are in terms of granting security to the
participants.
15

This definition may be unnecessary if the term has already been defined in the Act as a whole.
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It will also be necessary to consider which categories are needed for each country:
for example, local, locally based, foreign. For some, the middle category might be
dispensed with. For others, the category may have become too deeply entrenched
to be easily dispensed with.
The arrangements for subsistence fishers and the role of customary fishing rights
will also need to be considered in many countries. It will be recalled that there
may be a need to refer specifically to such fishing in the objectives clauses
considered above.
2. Rights Based Fisheries
If a system of rights based transferable quota is introduced, then a more elaborate
authorization regime is required. The legal provisions governing the setting up of a
rights based regime can be very complex. Indeed, the laws of some countries (eg
New Zealand (NZ)) are highly involved. They need to be, as in effect, property
rights are being established, and issues such as security of title to the right need to
carefully spelled out. Another consideration is that such systems have tended to
involve significant burdens for the administration.
Ideally the law dealing with rights based fishing should provide for at least the
following:
• the method of applying for a right of access or quota share;
• the identification of any criteria governing those eligible to apply
(including, for example, the important question whether foreigners are
eligible to apply and compete on equal terms with local applicants);
• the duration of any right;
• the method of dealing with fluctuations in the quota from one year or
fishing season to another;
• the character of the right granted (is it to be inheritable, leasable, saleable,
divisible or inheritable);
• the amount of quota any person or company may hold at any one time;
• the calculation of the quota (usually as part of the total allowable catch
(TAC) or the TAC for a particular species); and
• the circumstances in which a right may lapse, be reduced, be suspended, or
cancelled.
More elaborate versions can be found in the NZ and Australian provisions.
However, these both assume a considerable administrative backup, as well as the
need for an appeal process. It may not therefore be appropriate in all instances for
FFA members. Much will depend also on how many participants will be eligible
for a rights based system.
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3. Authorisation of Fishing Vessels on the High Seas
Both the UNFSA and the Compliance Agreement have imposed certain
obligations on States which have vessels registered with them, in particular to
control their activities on the high seas. This requires the establishment of a
licensing or authorization system for such vessels to cover their activities while
fishing on the high seas. It also applies to placing controls on their activities while
fishing in the EEZs of other States. See Article 18.3 (b) (iv) UNFSA. This is
linked to the need for the State to provide for a boarding and inspection scheme on
the high seas both in respect of its vessels as well as its power to board and inspect
vessels pursuant to measures adopted by RFMOs.
The licensing regime will need to provide both for obtaining information on the
fishing vessel and the proposed fishing activity at the application stage, and for the
setting of conditions on high seas fishing.
There are additional specific obligations arising under the WCPFC. In particular
Article 24 of WCPF Convention states:
Flag State Duties
1. Each member of the Commission shall take such measures as may be
necessary to ensure that:
(a) fishing vessels flying its flag comply with the provisions of this
Convention and the conservation and management measures
adopted pursuant hereto and that such vessels do not engage in
any activity which undermine the effectiveness of such measures;
and
(b) fishing vessels flying its flag do not conduct unauthorized fishing
within areas under the national jurisdiction of any Contracting
Party.
2. No member of the Commission shall allow any fishing vessel entitled to
fly its flag to be used for fishing for highly migratory fish stocks in the
Convention Area beyond areas of national jurisdiction unless it has been
authorized to do so by the appropriate authority or authorities of that
member. A member of the Commission shall authorize the use of vessels
flying its flag for fishing in the Convention Area beyond areas of national
jurisdiction only where it is able to exercise effectively its responsibilities
in respect of such vessels under the 1982 Convention, the Agreement and
this Convention.
3. It shall be a condition of every authorization issued by a member of the
Commission that the fishing vessel in respect of which the authorization
is issued:
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(a) conducts fishing within areas under the national jurisdiction of
other States only where the fishing vessel holds any licence, permit
or authorization that may be required by such other State; and
(b) is operated on the high seas in the Convention Area in accordance
with the requirements of Annex III, the requirements of which
shall also be established as a general obligation of all vessels
operating pursuant to this Convention. 16
Thus, in addition to the extensive controls already provided for, it is necessary to
ensure that the requirements of Annex III of WCPF Convention (Terms and
Conditions for Fishing) are complied with by members of the Commission.
Therefore, it is important to add to the fisheries laws a provision along the
following lines:
In addition to any conditions governing the authorisation to fish in the area
covered by the WCPFC, as defined in that Convention, it shall be a
condition of every such authorization that the requirements of Annex III of
the WCPFC are complied with.
A penalty for failure to do so should be added.
Scientific Research
National legislation should provide for the regulation of marine scientific research
in the EEZ, the territorial sea, the archipelagic waters, and internal waters.
However, it is only in the EEZ that a coastal State has an obligation to permit
marine scientific research in certain circumstances. A related question however, is
whether it is better to have a general provision dealing with all marine scientific
research or whether it is better to have a provision in the fisheries legislation that
deals with fisheries research activities.
Bio prospecting is one aspect of scientific research which is becoming a topic of
increasing concern, and it would be important to ensure that it is specifically
covered in the law itself and referred to in the regulation making power. As an
alternative, it could be covered in the environment law, or in the laws governing
biodiversity.
The law should, therefore, set out clear procedures to be followed for those who
wish to undertake marine scientific research, including bio prospecting and to
allow the government to impose certain controls on such research. These controls
might be imposed directly as conditions governing the permission to undertake
such research, or they could be imposed more generally through regulations.
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Collection of Data
The law should provide for the collection of fisheries data, which is now
recognised as being of “fundamental” importance in Annex I of UNFSA. This
broad obligation also finds reflection in WCPFC: thus, one of the principles and
measures for conservation and management is stated (in Article 5) to be:
(i) collect and share, in a timely manner, complete and accurate data
concerning fishing activities on, inter alia, vessel position, catch of
target and non-target species and fishing effort, as well as information
from national and international research programmes; 17
This mirrors the provisions of UNFSA Article 5 (j).
Likewise, under the precautionary approach (Article 6 WCPF Convention) it is
stated:
(a) develop data collection and research programmes to assess the impact of
fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species and their
environment, and adopt plans where necessary to ensure the
conservation of such species and to protect habitats of special concern. 18
The functions of the Commission also refer (in Article 10) to:
(d) adopt standards for collection, verification and for the timely exchange
and reporting of data on fisheries for highly migratory fish stocks in the
Convention Area in accordance with Annex I of the Agreement, which
shall form an integral part of this Convention;
(e) compile and disseminate accurate and complete statistical data to ensure
that the best scientific information is available, while maintaining
confidentiality, where appropriate;
(j) obtain and evaluate economic and other fisheries-related data and
information relevant to the work of the Commission; 19
Data will also be crucial to the work of the Scientific Committee established under
Article 12.
Further, members of the Commission have, inter alia, the following obligations
under Article 23:
2. Each member of the Commission shall:
(a) provide annually to the Commission statistical, biological and
other data and information in accordance with Annex I of the
Agreement and, in addition, such data and information as the
Commission may require;
17
18
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(b) provide to the Commission in the manner and at such intervals as
may be required by the Commission, information concerning its
fishing activities in the Convention Area, including fishing areas
and fishing vessels in order to facilitate the compilation of
reliable catch and effort statistics; 20
It will be apparent that data will need to be collected for a number of reasons, and
not only to meet obligations under international instruments. The following extract
will indicate how varied these reasons could be.
Both the 1982 UN Convention and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement make it
clear that the purpose of collecting fisheries data is to underpin decisions
with respect to conservation and management of the resources, in the case
of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, with respect to straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. That said, it is unlikely that these
statistics, having been collected, will be used only for that purpose. Thus,
the data might be used, for example, directly or indirectly, to assist in
identifying the origin of a catch for the purposes of trade rules concerning
the origin of a particular item in trade (subject to any applicable
confidentiality restrictions). However, it is important to keep in mind the
basic purpose of the data collected, and that same information might only
partly serve another purpose in another context. For example, in the area of
fish processing, sales, and trade in the product, the data will have to be
adapted to meet that purpose.
Fisheries data will also play an important role in determining the financial
contributions to certain management organizations, as for example is the
case with the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. Thus, Article XIII of the
Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission,
which deals with finances, states, that a scheme for contributions shall be
adopted by the Commission, which shall involve an equal basic fee and a
variable fee, which shall be based "inter alia on the total catch and landing
of species covered by the Agreement in the area," and the per capita income
of each Member. However, it will be apparent that simply answering this
question by reference to the flag of the vessel making the catch will not be
sufficient information.
Fisheries data will also of course be useful in negotiations concerning
access to exclusive economic zones where one of the issues is catch history.
Indeed, Article 62(3) of the 1982 UN Convention requires the coastal State
to take into account a number of factors, including the need to "minimise
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economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the
[EEZ]".
Another area where the data might also play a role is in determining the
parties to a negotiation on the management of a particular straddling fish
stock or highly migratory fish stock. Here, the information would need to
be looked at more closely in order to determine if, in fact, the stock in
question was actually found in the EEZ of a particular coastal State. It
would not be enough merely to work from data made by the flag State
(unless of course, it was provided in enough detail to permit such a more
detailed analysis). Related to this is the question of using fisheries data to
determine the "catch history" of a particular country in a particular region
(both within and beyond the EEZ), which will often be a major issue in
negotiations.
Another instance where the catch data can be used is to cross check the
accuracy of the statistics provided in respect of landings.
There are no doubt numerous other instances where such data can (or does)
serve another purpose. 21
With the introduction of trade measures as one of the weapons used in combating
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, fisheries data will have a part to
play there too.
From a legal perspective, the collection of such data can be secured most often in
one of two ways: firstly, by the power of the fisheries administration to impose
conditions on fishing activity to collect certain data, including for example, the
form and content of fishing log books, or secondly, by enacting regulations
applicable in general to the collection of data. An important consideration is that in
some countries, especially for small scale fishing activities or subsistence fishing,
it may be impractical to make the collection of data unduly onerous in relation to
the activity itself, and, depending on particular circumstances, it is useful to ensure
that there is also a power to exempt or vary this requirement.
It will also be useful to state specifically that there is authority to transmit data to
WCPFC and other RFMOs in accordance with the obligations incurred under such
agreements. Thus, a clause could be added to the provisions above (or similar
provisions in other laws) as follows:
21
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The [Minister/Managing Director] may transmit any data which is
necessary to be transmitted to WCPFC and to any other regional or
subregional fisheries management organization in order to fulfil any
obligations of [State] under the treaties establishing such bodies.
There should also be a penalty imposed for failure to collect data as required. It
should be noted that failure to provide data constitutes a “serious violation” under
Article 21.8 of UNFSA (as well as under WCPFC, which in effect adopts the
UNFSA definition). It would be useful to check if the level of penalty imposed is
adequately high.
Port State Measures
Both the FAO Compliance Agreement and UNFSA authorize the taking of certain
measures in ports in order to promote the effectiveness of applicable conservation
and management measures, including the prohibition of landing and transhipment.
See in particular, Article 23 UNFSA. 22 In the case of the 1995 UNFSA, it speaks
of the right and the “duty” to take measures. These will need to be put into effect
in national legislation to give inspectors the necessary powers to take action. The
WCPFC also mirrors the provisions of UNFSA. In particular, Article 27 of WCPF
Convention states:
3. Members of the Commission may adopt regulations empowering the
relevant national authorities to prohibit landings and transhipments where
it has been established that the catch has been taken in a manner which
undermines the effectiveness of conservation and management measures
adopted by the Commission. 23
The FAO model scheme on Port Measures to combat IUU Fishing 24 adopted by an
FAO Technical Consultation in 2004 sets out elements that could be adopted by a
regional fisheries body. It therefore gives a good indication of the kinds of issues
likely to be adopted by a regional body such as WCPFC, even if it is not followed
to the letter. Many of its elements need to be reflected in national legislation in
order to give the port State an effective basis for taking port State measures.
Because this is a new development in the international regime of fisheries, it is
unlikely that many countries will have comprehensive legislation to deal with this.
There is another reason for addressing port measures with some care. There is
evolving a perception that the older approach, which focuses on the power of a
State to exclude foreign fishing vessels from its ports, needs to be reconsidered in
22
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the light of the WTO framework, and in particular, how it interacts with other
global regimes such as the law of the sea, and international environmental law,
especially multilateral environmental agreements. How much the situation has
changed is still not clear, and discussions are taking place at the global level to
work out a solution to these issues. Very simply, this is not a static area of
international law.
The model scheme referred to has detailed provisions on port measures which
include:
• the designation of ports into which foreign fishing vessels may enter, and
have the capacity to conduct inspections;
• requiring those vessels to provide information, with due regard to
confidentiality requirements, of information about the vessel,
authorisations, its VMS, and quantities of catch;
• prohibition on landing, transhipment or processing by vessels whose flag
states are not parties to, or not cooperating non-contracting parties with,
regional fisheries management organisations, unless the vessel can establish
that the catch was taken consistent with applicable conservation and
management measures;
• refusing to allow the vessel to use its ports for refuelling etc where there are
clear grounds for believing that the vessel has engaged in or supported IUU
fishing; and
• obtain certain specified information set out in annex to the model scheme. 25
The model also has detailed information on inspections, the actions which may be
taken, and requirements for reporting the results of inspections to the flag State,
other relevant States, and relevant RFMOs. Further, there are some important
savings clauses, for example, that vessels shall nonetheless be able to enter ports
for reasons of force majeure, that nothing in the model scheme will affect
sovereignty over ports in accordance with international law, that all measures are
to be taken in accordance with international law, and that all measures are to be
implemented in a fair, transparent and non discriminatory manner.
The model scheme has now been taken a few stages further as FAO is developing
a global treaty on port State measures to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing.
This has been considered at an expert consultation held in Washington in
September 2007. However, it is useful to note that the text as it stands contains the
following provisions.

25
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In the first place the preamble draws on the International Plan of Action for Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU), 26 the Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries, and is intended to be consistent with the 1982 UN
Convention, the FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 UNFSA.
The objective of the agreement is stated to be:
to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of living marine
resources through strengthened and harmonized port State measures to
prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.27
Likewise, the application of the agreement is stated to be:
1. Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, each Party shall, in its
capacity as a port State, apply this Agreement in respect of vessels that
are not flying its flag that are seeking access to its port(s) or are in one of
its ports.
2. Each Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure effective
jurisdiction and control over the fishing and fishing related activities of
vessels flying its flag. To the greatest extent possible, such measures shall
include mutatis mutandis the port State measures set forth in this
Agreement in respect of such vessels.
3. This Agreement shall be applied and implemented in a fair, transparent
and non-discriminatory manner, consistent with international law. 28
In addition to definitions of specific terms, it has general provisions (set out in Part
1) concerning the relationship with international law and other international
instruments, integration and coordination, cooperation and exchange of
information. Part 2 concerns the requirements prior to entry into port, and it has
specific provisions concerning designation of ports, and advance notification. Part
3 concerns the use of ports. It has provisions concerning denial of the use of a port,
in certain circumstances, and withdrawal of the denial of the use of a port. Part 4
concerns inspections and follow up actions. It has provisions on levels and
priorities for inspection, conduct of inspections, results of inspections, transmittal
of results by a party, electronic exchange of information, training of inspectors,
port State actions following inspection, appeals concerning actions by the port
State compensation, and force majeure or distress. Part 5 deals with the role of
flag States. Part 6 deals with the requirements of developing States. Part 7 deals
26
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with dispute settlement, Part 8 with non-Parties to the Agreement, Part 9 with
monitoring and review, and Part 10 with final provisions. The agreement has some
detailed annexes. Annex A concerns information to be provided in advance by
vessels, Annex B with port State inspection Procedures by vessels, Annex C
concerns the results of port State inspections, Annex D the information system on
port State inspections, Annex E with the training of inspectors. This draft
agreement is still subject to further negotiation.
A draft port measures scheme for possible inclusion in national legislation is set
out here for preliminary consideration. However, this must still be considered as
tentative in view of negotiations at the global level.
Draft Port Measures Regime
(1) For the purpose of promoting the effectiveness of conservation and
management measures adopted by sub regional, regional or global
fisheries management organisations or arrangements, including those
adopted pursuant to the WCPF Convention, the [Minister/Secretary]
may make regulations concerning the following matters:
(a) the designation and publicisation of ports to which foreign fishing
vessels may be permitted access;
(b) the designation of port inspectors;
(c) requiring, prior to allowing port access to a foreign fishing vessel,
that such vessel provides such notice as may be prescribed prior to
entering its port or its EEZ for the purpose of port access, including
vessel identification, any authorization to fish, information on its
fishing trip and vessel monitoring systems, quantities of fish on
board and such other documentation as may be prescribed;
(d) regulating or prohibiting the landing, transhipment or processing of
fish, or refuelling or resupplying the vessel, including the prohibition
of port access of a vessel which has been identified as having been
engaged in or supporting fishing activities in contravention with sub
regional or regional conservation measures, or in contravention of
the laws of a particular country, or where there are reasonable
grounds for presuming that a vessel has been engaged in such
activity;
(e) establishing the procedures, the contents of and the results to be
obtained from an inspection regime, including the adoption of port
measures adopted by a global, regional or sub regional fisheries
organisation;
(f) prescribing the powers of inspectors, including the power to inspect
any area of the fishing vessel, the catch (whether processed or not),
any fishing gear, equipment or other gear and document which the
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inspector deems necessary to verify compliance with relevant
conservation and management measures;
(g) requiring the provision of such assistance and information as may be
needed in order to undertake inspections; and
(h) authorising the cooperation and exchange of information with other
States and regional or sub regional fisheries organisations.
2. The [Minister/Secretary] may prohibit from entering a port of country X
a vessel which has been sighted as being engaged in or supporting
fishing in contravention of the conservation and management measures
of a regional or sub regional fisheries organization and whose flag State
is not a member of nor is it a cooperating non contracting Party to that
sub regional or regional fisheries organisation, unless it can be
established that the catch on board has been taken in a manner
consistent with the relevant conservation and management measures.
Such a prohibition may apply to an individual vessel or to a category of
vessels. 29
3. Such measures shall not discriminate in form or in fact against the
fishing vessel of any State.
4. References to ports in this part include offshore terminals and other
installations for landing, transhipping, refuelling or resupplying vessels.
Penalties for breach of port State measures should be set reasonably high.
One aspect of port State provisions is that they need to mesh in with a wide range
of other laws. For example, in many countries, ports are the subject of quite
precise definitions as there are different powers to be exercised in ports. This is
particularly the case with customs and excise laws, and the issue of “in bond”
shipments. There is also a potential problem should any FFA member decide to
introduce a freeport, as Mauritius has done. This will be important if, for example,
fish are transhipped though freeports. Thus, the introduction of a port States
29
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regime along the lines proposed above will require a review of several related
laws, such as customs laws and laws governing the operation of ports.
Jurisdiction over Nationals
Some States are now including in their basic fisheries laws provisions which
enable them to exercise control over their nationals. As the point is put in the
IPOA-IUU:
18. In the light of relevant provisions of the 1982 UN Convention, and
without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the flag State on the
high seas, each State should, to the greatest extent possible, take
measures or cooperate to ensure that nationals subject to their
jurisdiction do not support or engage in IUU fishing. All States should
cooperate to identify those nationals who are the operators or beneficial
owners of vessels involved in IUU fishing. 30
A strong instance of the exercise of this kind of jurisdiction is found in section
133E of the 1996 New Zealand Fisheries Act giving effect to the 1995 Agreement:
No New Zealand national may use a vessel that is not registered under the
Ship Registration Act 1992, or a tender of that vessel, to take (by any
method) on the high seas any fish, aquatic life, or seaweed for sale, or to
transport any fish, aquatic life, or seaweed taken on the high seas, except in
accordance with an authorization issued by a state specified in subsection
(2). 31
The 1990 Cook Islands Marine Resources Act has the following provision:
22. Use of Vessels of other Flags by Cook Islanders on the High Seas – (1)
No person, being a Cook Islander, or a body corporate established under
the laws of Cook Islands may use a vessel registered in another country
for fishing or related activities on the high seas except in accordance
with a qualifying authorisation issued by the flag State.
(2) A qualifying authorisation may be issued (a) by a State that is a party to the Fish Stocks Agreement; or
(b) by a State that is a party to the FAO Compliance Agreement; or
(c) by a State that is a party to, or has accepted the obligations of, a
global, regional, or sub-regional fisheries organisation or
arrangement to which the authorisation relates; or
(d) by a State that (i) is a signatory to the Fish Stocks Agreement; and
30
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(ii) has legislative and administrative mechanisms to control its
vessels on the high seas in accordance with that agreement.
(3) For the purpose of subsection (1) any notice given by the Minister in the
Gazette, specifying any State or category of States as States that may
issue a qualifying authorization shall be conclusive of its contents.
(4) Any person who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence, and
shall be liable on conviction to a fine not less than $50,000 and not
exceeding $100,000. 32
The authorisations referred to may be issued by a party to either the 1995 UN Fish
Stocks Agreement or the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, or by a State that is
party to or has accepted the obligations of a global regional or subregional
organization or arrangement to which the authorisation relates. However, it would
be useful to include a specific reference to WCPFC in such a provision.
Role of the Attorney General
One important safeguard is written into this Act, namely that the consent of the
Attorney General is required before proceedings can be instituted under these
provisions. This is a device that is intended to ensure that the primacy of the
jurisdiction of the flag State is protected, as well as providing a means of avoiding
the risk of double jeopardy, jurisdictional conflicts, and other legal and policy
difficulties that might arise. Although especially important in the context of
proceedings against nationals, this safeguard is of more general value in fisheries
laws where actions against foreign fishing interests are concerned.
Evidentiary Provisions
In countries which have inherited the Anglo Saxon or common law system, there
are important issues of proof which need to be addressed. Further, in many
countries of the region there are fundamental human rights provisions which place
restrictions on the reversal of the burden of proof.
In order to facilitate the task of proving a case before the court, many laws have
special provisions which make the proving of certain facts easier. One method is
to allow the government to put before the court certain certificates which are
prima facie evidence of the matters before the court. These usually relate to
whether a fishing vessel was a local or a foreign fishing vessel, whether a person
or vessel had been issued with an authorisation, whether certain areas had been
32
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closed off or restricted for fishing purposes, whether a chart showed certain marine
boundaries, and whether a report had been issued in respect of a person or vessel.
Certain limited presumptions can also be used, for example, that the presence on
board a vessel of explosives or poisons shall be presumed to be there unlawfully
unless the contrary is proved. These solutions are usually not seen as reversing the
burden of proof in a manner likely to contravene the basic proscription against
reversal of proof.
There is also the need to ensure that evidence by foreign enforcement officials can
be relied on in the local courts. The following example is taken from the Marshall
Islands, and it could adapted to cover the WCPFC context:
(3) Standing in the High Court of the Republic of the Marshall Islands shall
be afforded to any authorized officer or authorized observer designated
under a fisheries management agreement entered into pursuant to
subsection (1)(b) or (c) of this section to bring action against any person
or fishing vessel for any act or offense that is actionable under the law
of the Republic of the Marshall Islands is a violation of an access
agreement or fisheries management agreement pursuant to which the
officer or observer was authorized which has occurred in the Fishery
Waters or the high seas, notwithstanding the nationality of the
authorized officer or authorized observer. 33
Photographic, electronic and digital evidence is also an important issue. In some
countries, the basic laws of evidence do not permit the use of so called hearsay
evidence, of which such evidence is a part. With increased reliance on vessel
monitoring systems in the fisheries sector, it is important to ensure that such
evidence can be relied on in court. It should be noted here that the IPOA-IUU
states in paragraph 17 “National legislation should address, inter alia, evidentiary
standards and admissibility including, as appropriate, the use of electronic
evidence and new technologies.” 34
Offences
Virtually all of the recently drafted fisheries laws will already have comprehensive
provisions setting out offences, and imposing heavy penalties, and it is therefore
unnecessary to address that subject fully here. It will however; be necessary to
check whether the laws provide for offences on the high seas, and that adequate
penalties are set in order to be an effective deterrent.
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Definition of Serious Violations
One aspect of the subject of offences does need attention, however. Article 21.8
UNFSA (Subregional and regional cooperation in enforcement) which provides:
8. Where, following boarding and inspection, there are clear grounds for
believing that a vessel has committed a serious violation, and the flag
State has either failed to respond or failed to take action as required
under paragraphs 6 or 7, the inspectors may remain on board and secure
evidence and may require the master to assist in further investigation
including, where appropriate, by bringing the vessel without delay to the
nearest appropriate port, or to such other port as may be specified in
procedures established in accordance with paragraph 2. The inspecting
State shall immediately inform the flag State of the name of the port to
which the vessel is to proceed. The inspecting State and the flag State
and, as appropriate, the port State shall take all necessary steps to ensure
the well-being of the crew regardless of their nationality.
11. For the purposes of this article, a serious violation means:
(a) fishing without a valid licence, authorization or permit issued by the
flag State in accordance with article 18, paragraph 3 (a);
(b) failing to maintain accurate records of catch and catch-related data,
as required by the relevant subregional or regional fisheries
management organization or arrangement, or serious misreporting of
catch, contrary to the catch reporting requirements of such
organization or arrangement;
(c) fishing in a closed area, fishing during a closed season or fishing
without, or after attainment of, a quota established by the relevant
subregional or regional fisheries management organization or
arrangement;
(d) directed fishing for a stock which is subject to a moratorium or for
which fishing is prohibited;
(e) using prohibited fishing gear;
(f) falsifying or concealing the markings, identity or registration of a
fishing vessel;
(g) concealing, tampering with or disposing of evidence relating to an
investigation;
(h) multiple violations which together constitute a serious disregard of
conservation and management measures; or
(i) such other violations as may be specified in procedures established
by the relevant subregional or regional fisheries management
organization or arrangement. 35
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Article 25.4 of WCPF Convention has also essentially adopted the definition of
serious violation found in Article 21.8 UNFSA.
The New Zealand and Australian laws also provide contrasting approaches to
defining the term “serious violation” as that term is used in Article 21 of the 1995
UNFSA. The New Zealand Amendment of 1999 states simply that “‘Serious
violation’ has the meaning given to it by Article 21.11 of the Fish Stocks
Agreement.” 36 The Australian law, on the other hand, transforms the definition of
serious violation into its own version of what the term means.
On the other hand, the Cook Islands Marine Resources Act 2005 defines “serious
violation”:
“Serious violation” means (a) fishing without a valid licence, authorisation, fishing right or
permit as required under this Act;
(b) failing to maintain accurate records of catch and catch-related
data, as required by this Act or a licence issued pursuant to this
Act, or serious misreporting of catch contrary to this Act or a
licence issued pursuant to this Act;
(c) fishing in a closed area, fishing during a closed season or fishing
without, or after attainment of, a quota established in the fishery
waters or by an applicable subregional or regional fisheries
management organization or arrangement;
(d) directed fishing for a stock which is subject to a moratorium or
for which fishing is prohibited;
(e) using prohibited fishing gear;
(f) falsifying or concealing the markings, identity or registration of a
fishing vessel;
(g) concealing, tampering with or disposing of evidence relating to
an investigation or anticipated investigation;
(h) multiple violations which together constitute a serious disregard
of conservation and management measures; or
(i) such other violations as may be specified in this Act; 37
The Cook Islands approach is preferred inasmuch as it spells out what amounts to
a serious violation while the NZ law merely refers to UNFSA.
Where a serious violation is established, certain consequences follow: first, under
Article 19.1(e) of UNFSA, if it is established that a vessel has been involved in the
commission of a serious violation, the vessel does not engage in fishing on the
36
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high seas until such time as all outstanding sanctions imposed by the flag State in
respect of the violation have been complied with. Second, under Article 21.6,
where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel has committed a serious
violation, and the flag State has failed to take action or to respond, the inspectors
can remain on board and secure evidence, and bring the vessel without delay to the
nearest appropriate port.
Penalties
There is also a need to review the level of penalties imposed to ensure that they
continue to be effective. One solution is to use a system of points, usually as part
of scheme that applies to all financial penalties. This enables penalties to be
increased very easily without the need to amend the Act from time to time.
Cancellation, Suspension and Seizure
There already exist several good models in the region for provisions relating to
cancellation, suspension and seizure which, with only minor adaptation, can be
used as effective templates for such provisions. This subject, though important, is
not considered here, except to note that the seizure, or confiscation, of foreign
fishing vessels has been considered in some recent decisions of the International
Tribunal for Law of the Sea (ITLOS). These cases are discussed at the end of this
chapter under “Bail, Bond and Confiscation”. These cases might necessitate a
more detailed review of policies to be adopted with respect to confiscation of
foreign fishing vessels.
Compliance and Enforcement Provisions
The provisions of both UNFSA and WCPF Convention will present a significant
challenge, as they require the legislator to envisage situations in which its flag
vessels are the offenders subject to inspection and others in which it is the
inspecting State. These provisions need to be drafted with care as courts have
traditionally interpreted and applied these provisions narrowly in order to provide
basic protections to individuals.
Fortunately, there is already considerable experience in the drafting of legislation
on such matters in the South Pacific. The most recent laws include provisions
which address the following:
For the high seas:
• powers of inspectors on foreign and local vessels;
• boarding and inspection procedures for foreign vessels;
• investigation of “serious violations” (as defined in Article 21 of UNFSA);
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• cooperation of persons on local fishing vessels with high seas inspectors;
and
• powers of high seas inspectors.
General provisions:
• appointment and designation of authorised officers;
• powers of authorised officers;
• identification of authorised officers;
• obligation to comply with instructions of authorised officers;
• powers of authorised officers beyond the EEZ;
• offences committed against an authorised officer;
• destruction of evidence and avoidance of seizure;
• release, sale and forfeiture of detained property;
• inspection and enforcement measures regarding national vessels and
foreign vessels;
• inspection and enforcement measures for vessels voluntarily in port; and
• immunity of authorised officers in good faith execution of their duties.
Therefore, the most important needs are, firstly, to check that all of the above
aspects are covered, and secondly, to ensure that there are references to the power
of authorised officers to enforce measures of the WCPFC, and other regional
fisheries bodies. This latter point could be achieved by the inclusion of a general
clause along the following lines:
The powers of an authorised officer under this Act shall extend to actions
taken by an authorised officer with respect to measures adopted by WCPFC
or other regional or subregional fisheries bodies, and to actions taken by
such officers in support of compliance with or enforcement of such
measures.
Alternative Mechanisms
The judicial process has often been criticised as being unduly lengthy, and that its
strict insistence of high standards of proof can lead to too few successful
prosecutions for illegal fishing. In many instances, the situation has been
ameliorated to a limited extent by providing that fisheries offences are triable
summarily, that is, usually before a magistrate and without a jury.
One solution has been the introduction of a system of administrative penalties for
dealing with fisheries offences. This was specifically referred to in the IPOA-IUU
as one possible approach that could be adopted. The main advantage of this
approach is that it enables the tribunal to apply a lower standard of proof than is
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possible in a full criminal trial (usually accepting proof on the civil standard of
balance of possibilities rather than on the criminal standard of beyond reasonable
doubt), it makes possible expedited hearings, and it can also include the possibility
of a negotiated settlement of the case.
This method has been adopted in the United States and in a number of the island
States of the South Pacific. Despite the fact that it involves a possible diminution
of their legal rights, it is often popular with fishers as it enables a speedy
resolution of their case.
This approach may not work in all countries as there may be constitutional or legal
reasons why such a system cannot be introduced. In some countries, a system of
“compounding” of offences is used. This is also an alternative to the use of
administrative or civil penalties, but compounding usually lacks the safeguards
built into the more formally structured administrative or civil penalty system.
“Long Arm” (Lacey Act) Jurisdiction
One method to promote compliance that has been adopted in a number of laws is
the so called “long arm” or Lacey Act laws. Such laws typically make it unlawful
to import fish that has been taken contrary to the laws of another country.
In a study of national legislative options to combat IUU fishing, Kuemlangan gave
as a model of such a provision the following:
(1a) on his own account, or as partner, agent or employee of another
person, lands, imports, exports, transports, sells, receives, acquires or
purchases; or
(1b) causes or permits a person acting on his behalf, or uses a fishing
vessel, to land, import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire or
purchase, any fish taken, possessed, transported or sold contrary to the
law of another State shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to
a fine not exceeding (insert monetary value).
(2) This section does not apply to fish taken on the high seas contrary to the
laws of another State where (insert name of country) does not recognise
the right of that State to make laws in respect of those fish.
(3) Where there is an agreement with another State relating to an offence
referred to in subsection (1) (b), the penalty provided by subsection (1),
or any portion of it according to the terms of the agreement, shall, after
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all the costs and expenses have been deducted, be remitted to that State
according to the terms of the agreement. 38
Bail, Bond and Confiscation Issues
One matter which is worth reconsidering in possibly all of the laws of the
members States is the provision of bond and bail issues. Article 73 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) states: “Arrested vessels and
their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of a reasonable bond or
other security.” 39 The meaning of this provision has been subject to interpretation
in cases before ITLOS. The most important to date is the Volga case. 40 In this
case, Australia sought, inter alia, to impose as a condition for the release of the
vessel an obligation to carry certain vessel monitoring scheme (VMS) equipment.
The Tribunal commented generally about Article 73.2 in the following terms:
73. In interpreting the expression “bond or other security” set out in article
73, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the Tribunal considers that this
expression must be seen in its context and in light of its object and
purpose. The relevant context includes the provisions of the Convention
concerning the prompt release of vessels and crews upon the posting of
a bond or security. These provisions are: article 292; article 220,
paragraph 7; and article 226, paragraph 1(b). They use the expressions
“bond or other financial security” and “bonding or other appropriate
financial security”. Seen in this context, the expression “bond or other
security” in article 73, paragraph 2, should, in the view of the Tribunal,
be interpreted as referring to a bond or security of a financial nature.
The Tribunal also observes, in this context, that where the Convention
envisages the imposition of conditions additional to a bond or other
financial security, it expressly states so. Thus article 226, paragraph
1(c), of the Convention provides that “the release of a vessel may,
whenever it would present an unreasonable threat of damage to the
marine environment, be refused or made conditional upon proceeding to
the nearest appropriate repair yard”. It follows from the above that the
non-financial conditions cannot be considered components of a bond or
other financial security for the purpose of applying article 292 of the
Convention in respect of an alleged violation of article 73, paragraph 2,
of the Convention. The object and purpose of article 73, paragraph 2,
38

See generally Kuemlangan, B. National Legislative Options to Combat IUU Fishing, AUS:IUU/2000/9
http://www.affa.gov.au/ecoiuuf/papers.html This scheme is discussed in detail at p. 13.
39
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Jamaica, concluded on 10 December
1982, in force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 (1982).
40
ITLOS, The “Volga” Case (Russian Federation v. Australia) (Prompt Release), Case No. 11, Judgment
on 23 December 2002.
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read in conjunction with article 292 of the Convention, is to provide the
flag State with a mechanism for obtaining the prompt release of a vessel
and crew arrested for alleged fisheries violations by posting a security of
a financial nature whose reasonableness can be assessed in financial
terms. The inclusion of additional non-financial conditions in such a
security would defeat this object and purpose.
73. The Respondent has required, as part of the security for obtaining the
release of the Volga and its crew, payment by the owner of one million
Australian dollars. According to the Respondent, the purpose of this
amount is to guarantee the carriage of a fully operational monitoring
system and observance of Commission for the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources conservation measures until the
conclusion of legal proceedings. The Respondent explained that this
component of the bond was to ensure "that the Volga complies with
Australian law and relevant treaties to which Australia is a party until
the completion of the domestic legal proceedings"; that the ship does not
"enter Australian territorial waters other than with permission or for the
purpose of innocent passage prior to the conclusion of the forfeiture
proceedings"; and further to ensure that the vessel “will not be used to
commit further criminal offences”.
74. The Tribunal cannot, in the framework of proceedings under article 292
of the Convention, take a position as to whether the imposition of a
condition such as what the Respondent referred to as a "good behaviour
bond" is a legitimate exercise of the coastal State's sovereign rights in its
exclusive economic zone. The point to be determined is whether a
“good behaviour bond” is a bond or security within the meaning of these
terms in articles 73, paragraph 2, and 292 of the Convention.
75. The Tribunal notes that article 73, paragraph 2, of the Convention
concerns a bond or a security for the release of an "arrested" vessel
which is alleged to have violated the laws of the detaining State. A
perusal of article 73 as a whole indicates that it envisages enforcement
measures in respect of violations of the coastal State's laws and
regulations alleged to have been committed. In the view of the Tribunal,
a “good behaviour bond” to prevent future violations of the laws of a
coastal State cannot be considered as a bond or security within the
meaning of article 73, paragraph 2, of the Convention read in
conjunction with article 292 of the Convention.41
41
ITLOS, The “Volga” Case (Russian Federation v. Australia) (Prompt Release), Case No. 11, Judgment
on 23 December 2002. Paragraphs 73 – 75.
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Australia had argued in support of a very wide interpretation of the provisions of
Article 73.2, which, it can be seen above, was not accepted by the Tribunal. It
should also be noted that Australia, in its submissions, had also explained
Australian law in the following terms (which is probably also broadly relevant to
the legal systems of many FFA members):
16. ... Article 73(2) provides: “Arrested vessels and their crews shall be
promptly released upon the positing of a reasonable bond or other
security.” That is, the right to prompt release exists in relation to both
vessels and their crews. However, in relation to an action alleging
non-compliance with Article 73(2), Article 292(1) provides:
Where the Authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel flying
the flag of another State Party and it is alleged that the detaining
State has not complied with the provisions of this Convention for the
prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the positing of a
reasonable bond ...
17. When used in this context, the word “or” is: a “particle co-ordinating
two or more words … between which there is an alternative.” 42
18. This indicates that the prompt release of each of the vessel and the crew
are separate issues. An assessment of what is “reasonable” will depend
upon the circumstances of the case. However, the facts that are relevant
to an assessment of what is reasonable in relation to the release of the
vessel will be different from the facts that are relevant to an assessment
of what is reasonable in relation to the release of the crew. This
difference is reflected in domestic law. Under Australian law, the setting
of a bond for the vessel is an administrative matter and the setting of
bail or sureties for the crew is a matter of criminal law. Australian law is
not unusual in this respect. 43
It would be useful to review the bail and bond processes in each country to
ascertain if the problems encountered in the Volga case could arise. It may be
necessary to put into fisheries laws a specific provision addressing bail and bond
issues (alongside forfeiture of vessel, gear and catch) in order to achieve
compliance with the provisions of Article 73.
An alternative approach, though a more risky one, is to leave the matter as it is,
namely with the courts having very wide powers on bail in criminal cases
42

The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, Volume X, p. 882.
ITLOS, The “Volga” Case (Russian Federation v. Australia) (Prompt Release), Case No. 11, Judgment
on 23 December 2002. Paragraphs 16 – 18.
43
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concerning the master and crew and bond issues with respect to the vessel gear,
and catch, but arguing in each case for the exercise of judicial or administrative
discretion in favour of conforming with the provisions of Article 73 as interpreted
by ITLOS.
In its more recent judgments it is possible to detect also a tendency toward
adopting a human rights perspective towards the provisions of Article 73, as the
following comments in the 2004 Juno Trader case reveal:
The Tribunal considers that article 73, paragraph 2, must be read in the
context of article 73 as a whole. The obligation of prompt release of vessels
and crews includes elementary considerations of humanity and due process
of law. 44
This was also expressed very firmly by Judges Mensah and Wolfrum in their
separate opinion in the Juno Trader case, where as well as endorsing the above
paragraph, 45 they added:
[T]he tribunal must operate on the basis that the obligation of States …
under the convention and general international law, includes the obligation
not to deny justice or due process of law, especially in respect of legal and
judicial procedures that involve interference with the property rights of
aliens. 46
This position has been reiterated in the latest case with particular reference to
confiscation of a foreign fishing vessel. 47 The Tribunal in the Tomimaru case
stated:
A decision to confiscate eliminates the provisional character of the
detention of the vessel rendering the procedure for its prompt release
without object. Such a decision should not be taken in such a way as to
prevent the shipowner from having recourse to available domestic judicial
remedies, or as to prevent the flag State from resorting to the prompt
release procedure set forth in the Convention; nor should it be taken
through proceedings inconsistent with international standards of due
process of law. In particular, a confiscation decided in unjustified haste
would jeopardize the operation of article 292 of the Convention.48

44
ITLOS, Juno Trader (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea Bissau), Case No. 13, 18 December
2004, para. 77.
45
Juno Trader Case, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Mensah and Wolfrum, para. 5. Online at:
www.itlos.org/case_documents/2004/document_en_253.pdf. Accessed on 28 February 2008.
46
Ibid., para. 6.
47
ITLOS, The Tomimaru Case (Russian Federation v. Japan), Case No. 15, 6 August 2007.
48
Ibid., para. 76.
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It should be noted that some of the judges in the Tomimaru case appended
separate opinions disagreeing with the above proposition. 49
Because this raises issues wider than the fisheries law, it would be useful in the
first instance to study this matter separately, for example, by reviewing the laws of
individual countries on the subject of bond, bail, forfeiture (of vessel, gear and
catch). Against that background, it might be possible to formulate a common
regional approach to these matters.

49

See Declaration of Judge Nelson, Separate Opinions of Judge Jesus and Judge Lucky, available at
<www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=15&lang=en>, 28 February 2008. Judge Yanai noted that,
“National prompt release procedure should be based on the principle of due process of law in order to
ensure fairness in its implementation” (para. 3, Declaration of Judge Yanai), available at
<www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=15&lang=en>, 28 February 2008.
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